

Completion of the Conceptual Analysis²¹

The goal of Negative Philosophy, Schelling reminds us, is to conceive "God in his pure ipseity" or, to use his other mode of speech, "to isolate the Principle (A)." We have already seen, in our last chapter, how Schelling discovered in pure thought (not in experience and not in psychological facts) that essence and existence are separable, for he was able to discriminate in an immediate way the Existent in its three moments and the Principle which *is* the Existent. But now he enters a new stage of Rational Philosophy. He wishes to make this separate existence of Principle and Existent, as found in pure thought, a matter for "scientific" reflection. That is, the goal of negative philosophy will be reached when God is conceived "scientifically" (mediately, discursively) in His as-such-ness and recognized as the First Principle of all being and becoming (V:545f).

A. The Absolutely-Absolute: the "Pantheistic" Presupposition


To know the truth about the Principle, says Schelling, is *Nous*, and to know what follows from the Principle is *Science*. Wisdom, then, is *Science and Nous*. It is only in pure thought (*Nous*) that original necessity resides. All knowledge (*Science*), mathematical as well as

empirical, has a contingent character. *Nous*, therefore, should precede Science. But it is also that which drives us toward Science, for the Principle strives to be free, to be known *as such*.

The Principle itself strives to escape from pure thought in which it is, so to speak, imprisoned, unable to reveal itself as a principle. It is, of course, *in thought*, but only materially or essentially, not as such. As such, it is only *in potentia*, for we possess it, but only through the Existent as its logical *Prius* to which it is bound. Here then it is rather the Existent which has power over the Principle, and instead of saying that the Principle has (or is) the Existent, the more correct thing to say would be the reverse, viz., that the Existent contains the Principle (which is what Aristotle also said, *Metaphysics* VII, 16).

To possess the Principle as such, not merely through the Existent (as intermediary) but free of the Existent, is thus no longer a matter of pure thought, but of that which goes beyond immediate thought; in other words, it is a matter of *scientific* thought. What was found previously in pure thought now becomes itself the object of thought, and in this sense one can say that the thought which transcends simple and immediate thought is thought about thought (V:546).

Now when this (scientific) thought about what was found in (pure) thought "conceives the separate existence of the Principle and the Existent", it discerns that "the Existent posited outside the Principle" (posited, that is, as extra-divine being) and "the Principle posited outside the Existent" (posited, that is, in its pure God-hood) are equally possible. Hence thought is driven to posit a Principle which represents the union of these two as equi-possibilities (Indifference). This Principle becomes, for Schelling, "the Absolute Idea in which God and the World are in like manner comprehended as possibilities", and "to distinguish this Absolute from the Absolute in the merely material sense, i.e., from the Existent", he calls it "the Absolutely-Absolute" (V:548). Thus the starting point of Schelling's "newly-arisen rational philosophy" is the Indifference, and its matter (*Stoff*) is the Absolute Idea (God and the World in one). The situation, it seems, can be summarized as follows:



This notion of the Absolutely-Absolute, into which the divine and extra-divine Existence seem to disappear as into a common abyss, is aptly described, agrees Schelling, as a *pantheistic* idea. But he rejects the suggestion that his total view is pantheistic in the sense of Spinozism. In Spinoza "we see the *Pan* alright, because God is the Existent, but we can see no *Theism* since, for Spinoza, God is *only* the Existent and not that which *is* the Existent." For Schelling, Pantheism is simply in principle the presupposition of a scientific Theism. "It is precisely the Science which springs from that Principle which leads us to this goal of a pure Theism, i.e., it leads us to the (conception of) God separated from *all* other things," God in his isolation, God in his *existentia separata*; for "it strives to isolate or eliminate everything material and potential which is posited in immediate thought with the first concept of God as universal Being, in order that he might be recognized in his pure ipseity (V:554f).

This "new phase" of Schelling's exposition prompts him to offer a further and more specific historical orientation (V:550-557). Kant, he points out, had shown that an examination of the possibilities and conditions of knowledge is necessary prolegomena to any future metaphysics. But Kant did not abandon the view that Philosophy

should be the science of the other sciences, and even seems to reserve a place for a metaphysic. For Kant's disciples, however, philosophy was contained in *the Critique itself*. Fichte raised the Kantian Critique of the limits of knowledge to the rank of a Science, and found the principle of Critical Idealism (according to which the world as we represent it does not exist outside ourselves and is a mere appearance in us) in the Ego. Hence Fichte is to be praised, "for he was the first to emancipate himself completely from purely natural knowledge (which Kant had still kept as the foundation), and conceived the idea that Science is to be *the free product of pure thought*" (V:551). But Fichte's enterprise became "lost in total subjectivity and revealed itself as sterile from the scientific point of view" for Fichte overlooked the inwardly-moving principle he had introduced when defining the Ego as subject-object, and also failed to see that the world of the empirical Ego itself implies the thought of God. His atheism, therefore, was simply asserted, not scientifically established. Years before the writing of this present work, Schelling had advanced beyond Fichte. As he *now* puts it:

If the Ego as absolute principle was the common center of the external world as well as of the internal world which leads to God, there was no longer any reason for still referring to that absolute principle as Ego, a term which had been introduced at the beginning in its purely human significance. It had to be replaced by the abstract but (in the light of what we said above) understandable expression: indifference of the subjective and the objective, which implies that the object (the external world of material existence) *and* the subject as such (the inner word which leads to the permanent subject, i.e., God) are posited and conceived as being equally possible (in one and the same) (V:553).

This was the way Schelling's so-called *System of Absolute Identity* had expressed itself (V:553).²² He believes it represented a reorientation of the Kantian investigation. "The whole great apparatus of the Kantian Critique has in the end one purpose: to find an answer to the question as to whether the existence of God can be proved." To that end,

Kant summoned all the various faculties which as a whole make up the human reason and cross-examined them. But this meant that his investigation was entirely limited to the subject. The so-called *Identity System* oriented that investigation toward the objective. It is not a

question of how *we* are capable of knowing God, but of how, by setting out from pure thought, God as such can become an object of possible knowledge (V:555f).

His present rational philosophy, Schelling believes, finally shows how God can be an object of possible knowledge. Hence it represents "the last phase and objective completion of the Critique which investigates the *possibility* of metaphysics." In fact, Schelling fulfils his earlier prediction that "a new Dogmatism, more magnificent and more powerful than that old rational Dogmatism, would arise from the ruins of that which had been destroyed by Criticism" (V:556).²³

The last necessary consequence of the crisis introduced by Kant was the fact that the human spirit entered finally and for the first time into possession of *pure rational science*, in which there was nothing out of harmony with reason, as was the case in the old metaphysics which, up till the time of Wolff, included such chapters as *De Miraculis* and *De Revelatione*. The old metaphysics aimed at being a rational dogmatism, hence its rational aspect could be only of a subjective and contingent nature. It was replaced by the system of an *objective rationalism* (characterized by a thorough-going internal necessity) which was produced by *reason itself*, not by subjective reason. It is pure rational science both by virtue of that out of which it creates and by virtue of that which is creative in it. For movement is included in the Existent, but the Existent is only that in which reason has comprehended and materialized itself, the immediate Idea, the figure and form (so to speak) of reason.

Hence the movement inherent in the Existent is a movement of reason. It is not determined by a Will or by any arbitrary factor. God, or that which is the Existent, is the goal of the movement, but not that which acts or wills in it. Rational science will perform its task so much the more perfectly, the further away it places its goal (God) and the more it strives to comprehend everything as far as possible without God, i.e., according to pure logical necessity. For there is in the Existent, i.e., in Reason, not merely the matter (*Stoff*) but also the *law* of movement, predetermined in it (V:557f).

Schelling's Negative Philosophy is thus an *a prioristic* rationalism ("because thought unfolds directly in it"), like Mathematics in its concern with the Possible and Intelligible (V:558f)²⁴ but going beyond

Mathematics in that it includes not merely the Existent or the Hylic ("mathematics is entirely comprehended in this"), but also the Principle (that which is the Existent) (V:560).

B. The Empirical World and its Intelligible Structures - The Potencies as Causes of all Becoming

Still in the interests of "isolating the Principle", Schelling now conceives the merely possible principles (-A, +A, $\pm A$) as raised to the status of reality and as entering into action.

In -A, +A and $\pm A$, there is a passive possibility of becoming real. They receive reality through participation in A° . But this makes it possible for them to be real in their own right, although, of course, "their self-reality is therefore mediated." Rational Science, however, is concerned with mere possibility, and is therefore "satisfied with the mere possibility that that first potency will emerge out of relative non-being" (V:569). But *how* would such a thing be possible? Only by an act of *willing*, answers Schelling. Only a willing could transform the first principle (-A) into reality, and through it all the others. But "by passing over into reality" (Schelling is still speaking conceptually) "the principles become causes in the strict sense" (V:571).

Since the potency (-A) is related to its own being as a pure power, and since all pure power (*Können*) is nothing but a *calm willing* (*ruhendes Wollen*), it follows that it will be a *willing* in which the potency is transformed, and the transition is identical with that which each one can observe in himself when he passes from not-willing to willing. The old proposition is here once again in place: the original being is will and will is not merely the beginning but also the *content* of the first emergent being (V:570).²⁵

Now man, in unrestrained willing, loses the power to will (i.e., unable to direct his will he loses it). In the same way, this first emergent being appears as will-less will, without limit or determination,²⁶ and necessitates the positing of a second cause (and a third) if we are to conceive the possibility of real process. When Schelling considers the primal potencies as causes whose relations imply a process, he refers to them as A^1 , A^2 , A^3 . We here condense and summarize his several descriptions of the first three causes (V:573-577).

The first cause, A^1 , is the Aristotelian *causa materialis* (the $\epsilon\xi\ \sigma\upsilon$ or *causa ex quam*), or the Platonic Unbounded (the matter and substratum of sensible things and of the prototypes or ideas).²⁷ It is that which *can be*, *das unmittelbar Seinkönnende*, but as such it "appears only at the end." In the process "it appears as a being without a subject, hence it is designated by *B* and must be brought back again to *A*" (the power-to-be in general). Conceived as pure substance, A^1 is, strictly speaking, not a cause at all, since its nature is indeterminate and stands in need of determination.

The second cause, A^2 , is the Aristotelian *causa efficiens*, (the $\upsilon\phi\ \sigma\upsilon$ or *causa per quam*), or the Platonic *περας* (that which limits, always immanent in that which becomes, positing number and measure and ordering times and movements). It is the pure Existent, that which *must be* (*das sein Müssende*) inasmuch as it is introduced into being with necessity. It is posited only *in potentiam* and raised to the rank of subject by *B*. It confers determination on *B*. It is related to substance as its *ratio determinans*. It is *pure cause* since it wants and expects nothing for itself.

The third cause, A^3 , is the Aristotelian *causa finalis* (the $\epsilon\iota\varsigma\ \sigma\ \sigma\upsilon$ or $\epsilon\nu\epsilon\kappa\alpha$ or *causa in quam*). For Plato, this cause was a mixture of the first two, but for Schelling it is a real and simple (not composite) cause, "at once substance *and* cause, determined *and* determining." Hence it is "the substance which determines itself." "It is the true, i.e., the *free* power to be because to be and not to be are the same to it." Furthermore, since the other causes exist for its sake, it is not only that which *is*, but that which *should be* (*das sein Sollende*), the one which is destined to be, the one which cannot *not* be.

The first cause is "undefined being" and wills to affirm itself only in being. The second is "defined being" and seeks to lead the first back into non-being. The third is "the being which defines itself" and "oscillates freely between being and not-being", able to be both, and "acting with purpose and intent" (V:579).

With this third cause Schelling can comprehend a *Becoming*, for it is by this third principle that everything that becomes is determined. Aristotle, unlike Plato, defined this third factor as a *cause*, but he did so on the basis of experience and in an external way, not by virtue of a necessity of thought. (In fact, Aristotle found it difficult to distinguish the third and fourth causes, and also the second and fourth)(V:579).

From the combined action of these causes "conceived as being in a state of tension" emerge "composed substances (*ουσαι συνθεται*), things in the literal sense, a world of things" (V:581).

But now Schelling notes that "we have tacitly assumed a *unity* by which the three causes are held together and united in common action" - and this unity seems to represent a *fourth* cause. Such a fourth cause cannot be man, for man is no more the final term of our inquiry than he is the final term of Nature:

Man is not merely the end of nature, he is also the beginning, the starting point, of a different and completely new world, a world which rises above and goes beyond Nature, the world of *knowledge*, of *history* and of the *human race* (V:582).

Nor can the fourth cause be God, for "we experience a natural revulsion toward defining God as *one of the causes*; rather are we inclined to regard him as the *absolute cause*, i.e., the cause of causes." We could say: God is the *absolutely* final cause, for "it is no contradiction to conceive a plurality of final causes, since every sequent is so related to what comes before it." And yet, just as we say of God that He *is* the Existent, i.e., the cause of its being and unity, so we may say that God is what this fourth cause *is*; for God actualizes the potencies; He is their *That* (pure *Actus*). But Schelling makes this distinction: what God was for the undissociated Existent, the fourth cause is for the dissociated Existent. In other words, the fourth cause is "what the principles are in their separation", hence it is what God is, but it is not God as such (V:582).

The name of this fourth cause is *Soul* and, as we shall see, Schelling speaks of individual souls and of a World Soul. He says the word "Soul" designates "this concept of a being (*Wesen*) which is Actuality (*Actus*) not in order to be itself but in order to be something other" or to be the cause of this other's being (V:584). He identifies this cause with Aristotle's *formal* cause, the *τι εστιν* or *ειδος*, and notes that this cause (the Idea, thought-form, *Urform*, *Logos*) precedes the actuality of formed particular things. The idea of the statue, for example, precedes the actual statue elaborated in matter; the real house emerges from the idea of the house. The form of the statue is what the statue *was earlier*. Just so, the unity of the three potencies is *prior* to the separation of the potencies - as the Idea of the development of the world is prior to the succession of things. The Idea is *Prius*. [Prior to a world but not prior

to Will.] So Aristotle called the Essence or Ground of things - because of this priority - the being which was, *το τι ην ειναι*, and Schelling concludes that the *τι ην ειναι* signifies that which, at every given moment, is the Existent.

Aristotle says: the *τι ην ειναι* is each thing according to what it itself is, free of everything accidental, hylic and different ...

Aristotle referred to that which is the Existent - whether the absolute Existent or the Existent in a definite form -- by saying that its nature is *τι ην ειναι* and he used the same expression to distinguish the fourth cause ... the phrase indicates that which belongs not merely to the Existent as such but what the Existent is by its nature ... Being (*sein*) is the fundamental concept, the nature of the fourth cause ... It is not itself one part of the Existent, but it is identical with the whole Existent. Hence it can enter into things as Soul only to the extent that these things express in themselves the total Existent which, at the inferior stages of becoming still appear as divided and dispersed. In a way, then, one can say that everything is animated (*beseelt*), for nothing really exists as purely material. But, strictly speaking, it is only of organic beings that we can say the soul *manifests* itself among them. But in everything, inasmuch as it contains the *total* Existent (hence also the final cause), it is the immaterial not the material which determined what the thing is by itself (V:587, 589f).

In *Die Weltalter* (begun in 1811) Schelling had already designated the four potencies, as the world-ordering and world-forming principles, with the word "Soul". Here he repeats the expression, equating it with the Aristotelian *τι ην ειναι* or Logos. These principles govern all becoming, all movement and all change. They are identical with Aristotle's four causes.²⁸ The first three together are "the general matter, the stuff of all creation (*Entstehenden*)", although "of the three it is the first which has the most material nature", while the other two are relatively immaterial (V:592). But since the latter are destined to be integrated in the first, to actualize or materialize themselves there, the need for *that which is* the three principles, i.e., the necessity for the fourth principle, the Soul, arises. The Soul is related to the first three principles in the way that "a commander in chief is the soul of his army": "he is that which truly is the existent, since without him the army would be merely material, a crowd without name or cohesion,

and it is only because of him that it is something, namely, an army (V:593).

With this fourth principle, we obtain at once the two great subdivisions of the world: the organic and the inorganic (*unbeseelten*). And with the four principles in general [reunited] the whole world of ideas is given. By themselves, the principles are simple, *causae purae et ab omni concrezione liberae*, but from their unified action there arise *concreta* and, according to the different possible positions of the principles with respect to one another, *different concreta* arise. These *concreta* are called Ideas, for they are formed in a thought which is necessary, to be sure, but yet pure.

In this whole hierarchy (or succession) it is the nature of each idea to find its fulfilment in that which is immediately above it, and what is in the state of actuality in the latter is in the former as mere possibility ... The antecedent has the consequent in itself as mere possibility. Therefore, in the whole ascending series, each member demonstrates that it does not exist for its own sake precisely by virtue of the fact that it is absorbed by a member higher in the series. This fact can be established even by a fairly superficial glance at the phenomenal world, for here we see how the pure material, the stuff and the elements, gather themselves together and grow together into bodies; then how this corporeal level rises to the organic level in the plants, followed by the animals and then by man who occupies the highest place (V:594).

And what is the *goal* of all Becoming? It is God in his pure ipseity. Everything which is becoming, every member of the series, seems to have had impressed upon it a feeling of the vanity of its being-for-itself, and seems filled with a desire to attain that which exists by and for itself. "That to which all becoming aspires is not a general principle ... but an absolutely individual being, i.e., one which is as such pure actuality (*Wirklichkeit*), unmixed, excluding all potentiality, not entelechy but pure energy, not something immaterial like the soul, but the supra-material." In other words, the whole world of becoming, every thing and every soul, aspires after *God as such*, and they do so "without knowing or willing it but simply by nature" (i.e., in an eternal way) (V:594f).

This, however, creates a problem - perhaps *the* problem - for

Schelling. For he holds that God as he is in Himself is fully real, and therefore "has no need of that which comes to be in order to be real or acquire more reality." Why then is there a world at all? Why *anything*? Why not *nothing*? Schelling asks us to wait for the attempted answer, because we must know God for or by himself if we are to answer this question. Pure rational science, as we have seen, "knows nothing of God other than through the Existent which He is" (V:600). For the moment, we see God in his pure ipseity as "indifferent and impassive" toward the world of Becoming, and the consequent need for an intermediary or middle-member between God-as-such and the world. "If all things and even all souls have only an indirect contact with the eternal, there must exist among them one which realizes in itself the highest perfection, containing completely what is present in the others only in part", and yet one which is at the same time "in immediate contact with the Infinite" (V:595). This final element, this middle-member, is the World Soul. As the goal of the Existent, it is "related to the totality of the Existent as God is related to the original Existent, and exists for the former instead of God (*instar Dei*)."¹ Aristotle calls God the first $\tau\iota\eta\nu\epsilon\iota\nu\alpha\iota$ (A^o). Schelling calls the Soul the second $\tau\iota\eta\nu\epsilon\iota\nu\alpha\iota$ (a^o).

With this notion of the Soul - to be further worked out in the next chapter - Schelling completes his sketch of the world of Ideas, a world which is different from God but not cut off from Him, "a world which is extra-divine in the ideal not in the real sense of the word, an *existentia praeterdivina* not *extradivina*." Of course, "pure Rational Science could always reject the question of the actuality of an extra-divine world, but never the question of its possibility." And it is precisely the World-Soul, declares Schelling, which contains in potency the reality of the extra-divine world.

If that which is first in thought (-A) contains the possibility of the *ideal* extra-divine world, then that which presents itself *last* in thought [a^o] must contain the possibility of the *real* extra-divine world ... Between God and the Existent, there steps this immaterial aspect [a^o] of the Existent (which could not appear before the material aspect had emerged as material). Its appearance, however, marks the end, the conclusion of the Intelligible (the Idea) as such, and God is moved beyond the latter and also therefore beyond pure thought (V:596).

The possibility of a truly extra-divine being - one which excludes

God completely - is for Schelling inconceivable. But so is the notion of God as cause or author of the extra-divine or anti-divine elements in things. "This He could never be even if (indeed, especially if) one recognizes Him as creator." Kant had held that God creates (wills) only things-in-themselves, in their ETERNAL structure, not phenomena. Schelling agrees: it seems a contradiction to say God subordinated himself to time as a *necessary* form in order to create phenomena. The World-Soul avoids this assumption, since it is that which mediates to all the others the Being-in-God. "It is thanks to this Soul that all the rest can acquire an eternal being, unless they are of such a nature that they can elude or refuse this mediation (V:597).

We may close this chapter, and provide a transition to the next, by stressing Schelling's view of the Soul's dependent and ambiguous character. The Soul does not have a separate and independent existence: "its being consists purely in being the Existent." But Schelling has earlier said that God is the Existent. The point of difference, however, is that God, unlike the Soul, has a being of his own, "a being which is his independently of the Existent." Rational Science rests on the fact that the Existent is separable from God-as-such; but the Existent is *not* separable from the Soul. In addition, while the Soul is the unity of the Existent and has no being apart from the latter, it is *also related to God* since it is only "*what God is.*" It is not God in his ipseity, of course, but it is God *potentially*, and can therefore mediate to all other beings participation in God's being. This dual relationship of the soul - potentially God and yet possessed of a standpoint independent of God by virtue of its relation to the Existent - affords the Soul opportunity to affirm itself, to be an *Actus* over against God, to "rise above the material in order to become equal with God, separate and for itself", to push itself forward in an autonomous fashion and be as (*wie*) God.

Hence we recognize in a° a double will. According to the one will, a° relates to God as potency, the Soul becomes that which it should be, namely a Soul in touch with the divine, and mediates to all the rest entrance into the divine being. According to the other will, the Soul renounces God, refuses to serve as intermediary, and is a Soul which not only fails to achieve its own proper goal but also prevents all the rest from attaining the end it has assigned them: participation in the being of God (V:601).

Now when Rational Science discovers the possibility of a (real extradivine world) in the intelligible world, its task then becomes that of following it through its stages ... thus pursuing its business of extracting everything which is hidden in the Existent as mere possibility in order to come - after the exhaustion of all the possibilities - to that which is real in and by itself. Let us now see the consequences which follow if the soul, in contact with the divine, avoids the mediation: first what they are for the material and then what they are for the immaterial (V:604).

The Soul's mediation of the intelligible world to the world of matter is thus described in Lectures 18 and 19 by conceiving as starting point the complete absence of Soul. Since the Soul mediates being to the world, its withdrawal, "its elevation to autonomous existence", would mean that the world would fall back into relative non-being (physical materiality) (V:604f). But as we have seen, "everything aspires to exist and to exist for itself" (as God does). This means that a thing wants not merely materiality but extension (i.e., its own space and time) and corporeality (i.e., it wants to be a body, "extension circumscribed on all sides"). But only the Idea is the whole *par excellence*. Hence, "every object of the phenomenal world shall be a whole only insofar as it is the image of the Idea itself, of the four principles" (V:613).

Schelling shows us here the extent to which he conceives this world as ordered (pre-ordered). (The non-rational will be discussed later.) "In fact, if spatial simultaneity (outside-one-another-ness) and temporal succession were not, so to speak, pre-organized in the intelligible world, everything here below would be without sense", and we would have random juxtaposition, disorderly succession. Schelling cites "the geological strata superimposed on one another." These are "so regular that we may see in them a reminiscence of the world of Ideas" (V:610f).

As Soul increasingly preponderates, it "brings to a higher degree of energy that Will, that principle of ipseity, of being-for-itself, hence that independence of the general." "The closer to man, the more contingent and changing is the energy with which each thing affirms itself and which determines its individuality" (V:612ff). Here is the fundamental difference between the Animate and the Inanimate (or Inorganic). And yet everything, even the Inanimate, moves toward the Soul "through which each thing participates in the whole and is itself a whole."

Even though in its material aspect an inanimate thing does not attain (so to speak) the soul, the latter is none the less the end of its movement, which makes the thing, in spite of everything, a representation or image of the four principles. Only in this way does the thing become a *body* ... Through the material, the corporeal has a relation only to sensation; through the corporeal, the material has a relation to thought or spirit. The corporeal has its source, not in the material as such, but in the principles and in the Idea whose action continues effective³ in the material, and which itself is only a union of principles (V:614).

The Soul does not manifest itself in the same way in all organic beings or in all animate beings in general. It presents its different aspects as different phases. "These phases or differences of the soul imply (cause) the differences among living beings according as they are endowed with only one soul, the most inferior, or with all" (V:629). Schelling calls these soul-phases vegetative or nutritive, sentient, propulsive or moving, and intelligent. The highest phase of the soul is (still following Aristotle) the *noetic* or *intellective* (V:634f). It merits the name *entelechy* [i.e., the immanent substantial form, the formal principle which realizes itself in the activity of the body.]

The soul is Actus but not as Actus. It is intelligent but according to the very nature of the thing; material, but without knowing itself to be intelligent. The vegetative soul is sufficient for the plant, but without the intellective soul the animal could not exist any more than it could without the sentient, moving and vegetative souls (V:636).

In the foregoing manner, Schelling has been attempting to establish his conviction that there are intelligible structures - knowable by the mind - which find expression in the empirical world. His procedure has been to permit the merely possible principles to enter into action and to become causes of a being which is then divided and ranked in stages as the Ideas themselves are. Hence a series of objects arises, each of which is capable of becoming the object of a particular science - which makes Philosophy the Science of Sciences! With his discussion of the physical aspect of the Soul, this phase of Rational Philosophy is completed. To take up the hyper-physical aspect of the Soul is to enter new territory.