

Notes

Notes to General Introduction

Chapter 1

- 1 See Brown (1974, 1977:8-11). Major influences discussed were Creuzer, Hermann, Voss, Muller and David Hume.
- 2 Schelling's Master's Dissertation (1792): "*Antiquissimi de prima malorum origine philosophematis genes. III. explicandi tentamen criticum*" - an allegorical interpretation of the Biblical narrative of the Fall of Man on the basis of the ideas of Herder. Cf. also Schelling's (1795) "*De Marcione Paulinarum epistolarum emendatore*" - an opuscle belonging to the area of New Testament criticism and early church history.
- 3 Schelling's (1793) "*Über Mythen, historische Sagen und Philosopheme der ältesten Welt*", in Paulus. *Memorabilien*, No. V: 1-68 - an essay written in the same spirit as the above mentioned Dissertation.
- 4 Schelling's (1794) "*Über die Möglichkeit einer Form de Philosophie überhaupt*", published in Tübingen, Jan, 9, 1795. Here Schelling held that neither a purely material principle, like Reinhold's theorem of consciousness, nor a merely formal one, like the principle of identity, can serve as the principle of Philosophy. The latter must be contained in the Ego, in which positing and posited coincide. In the proposition Ego=Ego, form and content mutually condition each other.

- 5 The Schröter edition conveniently adds to its pages the Cotta pagination. Details on the four editions may be found in the Bibliography.

Chapter 2

- 6 The unauthorized publications of Schelling's lectures were by Frauenstadt (1842) *Schellings Vorlesungen in Berlin*, Berlin; and by Paulus, H. E. G. (1843) *Die endlich offenbar gewordene positive Philosophie der Offenbarung, der allgemein Prüfung dargelegt*, Darmstadt.
- 7 Michelet as quoted in Fackenheim (1952:1).
- 8 Baur, F. C. *Geschichte der christlichen Kirche*, V, III:405. Baur uses the word "Galimathias", i.e., jumble of words, grandiloquent nonsense.
- 9 Rosenkranz as quoted in Fackenheim (1952:1)
- 10 Zeller as quoted in Kuno Fischer (1923:715f).
- 11 Bolman (1942:7). As Bolman notes, however, Schelling did speak on politics, early and late. Cf. Jäger, Gertrud. (1939) *Schellings politische Anschauungen*. Berlin.
- 12 Zeltner (1954:4). Cf. also Marcel (1957:73). Marcel thinks Schelling was ignored because philosophers were preoccupied with restoring a harmony or continuity between philosophy and science.
- 13 Hayes (1972:63-73).
- 14 Russell, Bertrand (1945). *A History of Western Philosophy*. New York. 703, 718.
- 15 Cf Gutmann (1936:xviii).
- 16 Croce (1941:328) refers to Herr's article on Hegel in the *Grande Encyclopedie*. It may now be consulted in Herr (1932:117-119).
- 17 Schröder, C. M. (1936) *Das Verrhältnis von Heidentum und Christentum in Schellings Philosophie der Mythologie und Offenbarung*. München. 11-15.
- 18 Braun, O. (1907) "Die Entwicklung des Gottesbegriffes bei Schelling" in *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik* Bd. 131: 141, 113. Also, Braun, O. (1906) *Schellings geistige Wandlungen in den Jahren 1800-10*. Jena.
- 19 Choudhury, J. D. (1926) *Das Unendlichkeitsproblem in Schellings Philosophie*. Berlin. 16.
- 20 Tsanoff, R. A. (1953) *The Great Philosophers*. New York. 469.

- 21 Erdmann, J. E. (1874) *Geschichte der neueren Philosophie* III (2):541.
- 22 Beckers, H. (1875) *Schellings Geistesentwicklung in ihrem inneren Zusammenhang*. München. 28.
- 23 Hartmann, E. von (1897) *Schellings philosophische System*. Leipzig. 221.
- 24 Schertel, E. (1911) *Schellings Metaphysik der Persönlichkeit*. Jena. 14.
- 25 Gentsh, P. (1926) *Die Identitätsphilosophie Schellings in ihrem Verhältnis Zur Religion*. Würzburg. 11.
- 26 Stamm, E. (1930) *Der Begriff des Geistes bei Schelling*. Göttingen. 8.
- 27 See especially the discussion in W. Schulz (1955:304-6).
- 28 Cf. also Tillich's "Reply" in Kegley, C. W. and Bretall, R. W. (1956:343) *The Theology of Paul Tillich*. New York.
- 29 Kaufman, W. (1956) *Nietzsche*. New York:Meridian. 11.
- 30 Marcel (1957) cites E. Reisner's view: "What Schelling calls Positive Philosophy coincides essentially with the *pensee existante*" of Kierkegaard and with the philosophy of actual existence" and Knittermeyer's judgment (reported by Reisner) that Schelling in grappling with the great issues of his time was a century ahead of his age and the herald of a development which today has reached its height.
- 31 Barrett's view of Existentialism as part of an anti-rationalist revolt is seen by Alasdair MacIntyre as "a dangerous half-truth". See O'Connor, J. A (ed.) 1964. *Critical History of Western Philosophy* New York. 510. MacIntyre, of course, represents a tradition that cannot find much sympathy with Existentialism.
- 32 Cf. also E. Fackenheim (1954:566): "It is no accident that existentialists tend to see the decisive event for modern metaphysics in the collapse of Hegelianism in the middle of the nineteenth century; and it is a most suggestive fact that practically every existentialist seems to have to struggle with Hegel. This would appear to indicate an agreement that one can neither return to a pre idealist metaphysics, nor remain with idealism. This is precisely the conviction which gives rise to Schelling's positive philosophy."
- 33 To be sure, Schelling's criticism of Hegel - which is also his criticism of himself as the founder of Absolute Idealism - and his reorientation toward a philosophy of existence, is present in earlier works, e.g., in his Preface to a work by Victor Cousin (1834), in his Munich Lectures on the History of Modern Philosophy (1827), and in the much earlier Treatise On Human Freedom (1809). Indeed, this latter is really the turning point, for it is here that the concept of freedom breaks into the concept of absolute identity, and it is here that a new sense of the dark depths of the Unconscious, of driving self-will, of evil and sin and

- alienation (the Fall), emerges to shatter the system of Absolute Reason (see J. Gutmann, 1936:4, 26ff, 34ff, 42f, 49-51, 54, 59, 63, *et al.*). (Behind this are not only certain maturing life-experiences, but the reading of the mystical writings of Boehme and Oetinger.)
- 34 Barrett (1962:22, 28, 34, 26). On the meaning of the term "Existentialism" see Roger Shinn's *The Existentialist Posture*, and Maurice Friedmann's *The Worlds of Existentialism*.
- 35 Bolman (1942:19f). Also, Kurt Leese (1927) *Von Jacob Boehme zu Schelling: zur Metaphysik des Gottesproblems*. Erfurt.
- 36 Cf. J. Boehme [1624 and later editions] 1947:xxiiiiff.
- 37 See Tillich's "Reply" in Kegley, C. W. and Bretall, R. W. (1956). *The Theology of Paul Tillich*. New York. 343.

Chapter 3

- 38 Schelling explains on VI:712: "Only from the three great apostles (Peter, Paul and John) are there unquestionably extant Christian sources, didactic writings, which show that the destiny of these three at the same time went on into the future and was not limited to their period, so that its effect was to extend to the last development of Christianity."
- 39 Cf. Klaus Penzel (1964:324). For Schelling's reference to Neander's *General History of the Christian Church*, see VI:690n.
- 40 On the Tautegorical Interpretation of Mythology see VI:198 or The First Book, Chapter 4 below.
- 41 For example, Grotius' view that the last chapter of John is a later addition (VI:723), the Synoptic "problem" (VI:718), Mark as the first Gospel (VI:439), Ecclesiastes as pseudepigraphical (VI:405), and many others (see VI).
- 42 See *The Philosophy of Revelation*, Lecture 33.
- 43 Cf Socrates on the poets in the *Apology*.
- 44 For example, the interpretation of 1 Peter 3:18f (VI:600), of Elijah (VI:695), of the Caesarea Philippi episode (VI:703), of Jude 6 (VI:681) and of 2 Peter 2:4 (VI:680) to cite just a few interesting cases.
- 45 E. g., Acts 2:36 (VI:466) and Mark 1:11, the Baptism of Jesus where, says Schelling, "Christ becomes the Son" (VI:475).
- 46 It is Schelling's *Reply to Jacobi*, of 1812, which is the decisive document.
- 47 E. Benz (1966:168-170). See Benz for a discussion of Beth (173-176), Dacqué (177-182), Ziegler (182-187).

- 48 Cf. Tillich's *Dynamics of Faith*, 1957:52.
- 49 The reference may be to Rudolph Carnap's (1932) suggestion that Metaphysics, as the expression of one's general basic attitude toward life (*Lebenseinstellung, Lebensgefühl*) is most adequately expressed not by writing a metaphysical system but by producing a work of art. Metaphysicians, he thought, were "musicians without musical ability."

Notes to The First Book

Introduction

- 1 This procedure, of course, raises several questions:
 - (a) Can Schelling be sure his enumeration of possible explanations is exhaustive?
 - (b) Has he *definitively* rejected all alternative views?
 - (c) Does he consider the possibility of a plurality of explanations?

Chapter 1

- 2 Poetry is here taken by Schelling as "the natural opposite of truth" (VI:12).
- 3 See Herodotus II, 543: *ουτοι εισιν οι ποιησαντες θεογονιην Ελληνισιν*.
- 4 For further discussion, see Guthrie, W.K.C. (1955) *The Greeks and their Gods*. Beacon Paperback, especially "The Gods existed before Homer" (216).
- 5 See his *Divinities of Samothrace*.
- 6 "Philosophical" because these views attribute to mythology a philosophical (or scientific) *content*.
- 7 Schelling is referring to Heyne. *De origine et causis Fabularum Homericarum*. Commentt. Gott. T. VIII. 34, 58.
- 8 Schelling refers to Hermann (1817) *Dissert. de Mythol. Graecorum antiquissima*. Leipzig; and Hermann (1819) *Ueber das Wesen und die Behandlung der Mythologie*. Leipzig.
- 9 Schelling gives an account of Hermann's interpretation of the Theogony, especially the opening section, to remind the reader of its philosophic spirit. By positing the initial three elements - Chaos (empty space), Matter (the original formless stuff) and Eros (the Unifier) - the ancient philosopher has "that in which", "that out of which" and "that through or by which" everything can come to be (VI:39ff).
- 10 Citing Hermann (1819:38, 47, 101).
- 11 Nevertheless, Schelling does *not* yield to this temptation, though Cassirer (1955:21, 22) seems to suggest he does and is *himself* so tempted.
- 12 Schelling quotes what Leibnitz says of the German language, viz., "*Philosophiae nata videtur*" (VI:53f).
- 13 Wolf's studies in Homer provide Schelling with a striking analogy, for though the Iliad and the Odyssey read as if written by one man, "they

were apparently written by a whole generation (*Geschlecht*) of men." This view now appears to be rejected (see Reinhold, Meyer. 1946:7. *Classics, Greek and Roman*. New York.)

- 14 Hermann believed that the mythology of the Greeks, Egyptians, Hindus, indeed, the mythology of the whole world, had its origin in a cosmogony conceived by one or several individuals very much by accident, dressed up, misunderstood, yet firmly believed and transmitted from people to people. In Hesiod's poem, for example, the original oriental names have been skillfully imitated and replaced by Greek equivalents, says Hermann, who claims that this technique of "transmission" as well as the content of the original cosmogony have been revealed by his etymological-grammatical method of interpretation.
- 15 Schelling leans heavily upon Azara's *Voyages* for field support for this thesis, and quotes Azara's reports on South American tribes. Of the Pampas, Guanäs and Lenguas, Azara concludes: "They form one people as little as a collection of wolves or foxes do. They are even less sociable than many animals who do live and work together in community - e.g., the beavers, ants or bees" ... "Any attempt to make a people out of them, i.e., to create a social bond among them, would be fruitless. If such a bond is forcibly introduced, the tribe is simply destroyed; and this is proof that there is no power, divine or human, that can make a people out of what was not born as a people at the very beginning, and that where an original unity and community of consciousness is lacking, nothing can be done to create it" (VI:65n, 66n).

Chapter 2

- 16 See Lecture 4, VI:69-95.
- 17 Schelling is quoting from a French translation of Hume's *Natural History of Religion*.
- 18 On VI:75n Schelling quotes from Azara's description of "the savages who rove the broad plains of the La Plata river, and who experience unreasoning fear in the presence of anything in nature that is mysterious and invisible" (*Voyages* II:3f).
- 19 Schelling refers here to the theories of Volney: *Origine de tous les Cultes*, and Dupuis: *Les Ruines*.
- 20 But cf. the possibilities that the masses as well as the learned may lose interest, or may distort principles supported by popular proofs.
- 21 See Gerhard Voss: *De Origine et Progressu Idolatriae*, and Daniel Huet: *Demonstratio Evangelica*. Schelling (VI:88) writes "Huet tries to prove that Taut of the Phoenicians, Adonis of the Syrians, Osiris of the Egyptians, Zoroaster of the Persians, Cadmus and Danaus of the

Greeks - in short, all the divine and human personalities of the various mythologies are really the same individual: Moses!"

- 22 Schelling (VI:89) criticises Bailly's concept of an *Urvolk* (in the latter's *History of Astronomy* and his *Letters Concerning the Origin of the Sciences*): "It is a proposal which cancels itself out for one of two reasons: either one conceives of this original people as endowed with the distinctive characteristics of an *actual people*, in which case the existence of other peoples outside it is presupposed and the *Urvolk* can no longer be understood as containing the unity of all; or the *Urvolk* is represented as lacking all particularity and all individual consciousness in which case it is not a people at all but simply primitive mankind to which the notion of a 'people' does not apply."
- 23 "Moses' doctrine gave no complete idea of this system but was, so to speak, merely an extract from it. Established in order to oppose polytheism and keep it in check this Mosaic doctrine ... maintained the purely negative attitude of rejection of polytheism."
- 24 "As a result of Creuzer's work, there can never again be a return to explanations which put together the content of mythology atomistically." "Perhaps one could liken mythology to a great musical piece played mechanically, so to speak, by a number of men who have lost all sense of musical relation, rhythm and measure, so that it seems to be nothing but an inextricable mass of discord. The same composition, skillfully and artistically produced, would reveal again its harmony, coherence and original rational structure" (VI:91, 91n).
- 25 Creuzer's theory is seen as "hopelessly inadequate" (VI:125, 139ff).

Chapter 3

- 26 This issue is the concern of Lecture 5, VI:96-120.
- 27 Schelling writes: "We hold to the unity of origin not simply for the sake of tradition or in the interests of some moral sentiment, but solely for scientific reasons. The hypothesis finds support in the fact that even individuals of mixed racial origin are able to procreate, and we will maintain it unless and until it can be proved incapable of comprehending and explaining the natural and historical differences which characterise mankind" (VI:100).
- 28 This state Schelling later calls the "Natural State" (*Naturstand*) of man, the "Golden Age of the World" (VI:177f).
- 29 Although Schelling recognizes that theodicies and peoples do not all appear at the same time (VI:133), he does set the scene of the "crisis" at Babylon. He suggests that unbiased historical investigation will support the Bible in regarding the transition to polytheism and the birth of languages and peoples, as having taken place at the site of the future great city. Polytheism spread out irresistibly from this source

where "the golden cup was filled which made the whole earth drunk" (VI:107 cf. Jer 7:51). It seems difficult, despite this passage, to regard Schelling as a supporter of "Pan-Babylonianism." Cf. his criticism of Hermann (VI:59-63). And see Cassirer (1955:18).

Strictly speaking, says Schelling, "paganism" means "nationalism" (*Völkerthum*), and is so intimately connected with the word Babel that even the last book of the New Testament regards Babylon as a symbol of all that is pagan. Schelling does not derive Babel from Bab-bel (door or court of Bel) but from *balbel*, an oriental word which "imitates the stammering speech which jumbles up sounds." The onomatopoeia is preserved in the later Greek *barbaros* (barbarian), "one who speaks in an unintelligible fashion." Genesis is correct in saying: "Hence it was called Babel, because it was there that the Lord made a babble of (*verwirret*) the language of the whole earth" (VI:108).

- 30 Cf. also his *Philosophy of Revelation*.
- 31 There was, for example, (i) "the formation of special communities, often strictly isolated, in which the feeling of universality, the consciousness of unity would, it was hoped, survive." An example is the division into castes, "the basis of which is as old as history and common to all peoples." (ii) "The establishment of strict priestly institutions which gathered all knowledge and set it up as doctrine" (e.g., in Egypt). (iii) The erection in prehistoric time of massive monuments (e.g., cyclopean constructions) by those who sensed the approach of the crisis (VI:117f).
- 32 The builders of the Tower of Babel say to one another: "Let us build ourselves a stronghold and a tower whose top may reach to heaven, so as to make a name for ourselves, lest we be scattered abroad across the whole earth" (Gen 11:4). Up till then they were a nameless humanity. Now they want to make a name for themselves, i.e., become a people so as to avoid dispersion - for a name differentiates one people from another but it also holds a people together (VI:118).
- 33 Lecture 6, VI:122-128.
- 34 Or God-system in the sense of *Göttervielheit*. See VI:128f.
- 35 Cf. *The Philosophy of Mythology*.
- 36 Of course Schelling adds that Elohim is Jehovah and Jehovah Elohim. He sets aside the suggestion that this alteration of the divine names indicates a plurality of sources behind the Pentateuch.
- 37 Gen 7:1. Schelling uses Luther's felicitous translation: *ein Mann ohne Wandel*.
- 38 See Gen 17:8, 35:27, 37:1; Gen 47:9; and cf. VI:160 where Schelling discusses the Hebrews' request for "a king such as the nations have" (1 Sam 8:5). Consider one of Schelling's examples of this distinction between peoples and non-peoples. He cites "the Alamans who

- invaded Gaul and Italy in the time of Caracalla (272-282 A.D.). They were the part of the Germanic hordes which had not crystallized as a people. They had a passion for the free individual life and hated cities regarding them as tombs in which men interred themselves alive. By contrast, the Deutschen (=Thiod'schen, where *Thiod* = *Volk*) are simply the Germans (*Germanen*) who have already particularized and segregated themselves as a people" (VI:16).
- 39 Here Schelling views the rise of Islam as a restoration of the old primitive religion.
- 40 Hence he is called "*the father of all the faithful*" by Jew and Oriental alike, VI:179).
- 41 [A.V. has "I am that I am." Moffat has "I will be what I will be." R.S.V. has "I am who I am."] Schelling notes that the true pronunciation of YHWH is unknown (since the vowels of Adonai were early substituted), but that grammatically it can be only the archaic future of *hawa* (later *hajah*) "to be".
- 42 Schelling refuses to see these promises as mere fictions of later Jewish national pride.
- 43 "As mythology advances, as relative monotheism enters into a struggle with thorough-going polytheism, as Chronos' dominion over the peoples is extended, the relative God, who is the ground of the absolute God, must impose himself on the people of the true God with increasing strictness, defending his prerogatives with ever greater energy, and becoming ever more jealous of his Oneness. This characteristic exclusiveness, this most uncompromising negative unity, can be due only to the relative-One, for the *true*, the *absolute* God, is not One in this way and is threatened by nothing since he excludes nothing" (VI:175).

Chapter 4

- 44 Lectures 8-10, VI:177-254.
- 45 Schelling agrees with David Hume that "as far back as we go in history, we find polytheism," but regrets "the vagueness and imprecision of Hume's exposition, for the preconceived ideas of Hume as philosopher have been prejudicial to the precision and exactitude of Hume as historian (VI:184f).
- 46 It appears likely to Schelling, however, that mythology alone is capable of throwing light on that "extraordinary state of consciousness" which revelation presupposes (VI:182).
- 47 See Lecture 9, VI:200-218.
- 48 "In the mythological process there appears a line of development as complete and natural as that which is manifest in the physical realm when an organism, affected by some disorder, tends inevitably to take a regular and natural course toward the reestablishment of health" (VI:224).

- 49 Schelling adds: "Philosophy began to consider Mythology in depth only when it became aware of itself as a process enclosed within history and characterized by successive and multiple phases, or at least only from the moment when it understood and declared itself to be the history of consciousness," later incorporating Nature into Philosophy as a necessary moment in its development.
- 50 Schelling cites works by J. A. Kanne who seems to hold that Mythology rests upon a monotheism - or pantheism - more profound than a purely historical monotheism (VI:226f). But he claims it was due to Fr. Creuzer's efforts that mythology attracted attention and recognition: "His classically beautiful exposition, his remarkable and authentic learning supported and illuminated by a profound central idea, succeeded in spreading and establishing in ever wider circles the conviction that it is necessary to consider and study mythology from a higher point of view" (VI:228).
- 51 "Hence any comprehensive philosophy of art must assign an important place to the discussion of the nature and meaning as well as the origin of mythology - as I myself did in lectures on the Philosophy of Art delivered fifty years ago" (VI:243). (These lectures of 1803 were never published).

Notes to The Second Book

Introduction

- 1 "Positive Philosophy is historical philosophy," (V:753).
- 2 The assertion of this connection was certainly not new for Schelling. As Bolman (1942:52) points out, Schelling expressed the desire to treat of "the noble art of reason" as early as *The Ages of the World*. Later in his Munich lectures *On the History of Modern Philosophy*, Schelling declared: "Any philosophy which does not remain grounded in the negative but tries instead to reach what is positive, the divine, immediately and *without* that negative foundation, will inevitably end up by dying of spiritual impoverishment" (V:246).

Consider, too, these words from his *First Lecture in Berlin* (15 Nov. 1841): "I will not occasion the loss of anything won for true science since Kant. How should I give up that philosophy which I myself founded earlier, the discovery of my youth? (My) task and purpose is not to put another philosophy in the place (of negative philosophy), but to add to it a new science until now considered impossible. This will restore (negative philosophy) to its true foundation and give it once again the orientation it lost when it went beyond its natural limits - i.e., when it was regarded as the whole, instead of simply a fragment of a higher whole" (VI:758).

- 3 See Footnote by D. H., V:735.

Chapter 1

- 4 This chapter is a Summary-Translation of Lectures 13, 14 and 15 (V:477-541). Points made here are frequently repeated in these and in other, later lectures.
- 5 "What a work Aristotle would have produced had he devoted himself to the study of the various religions of the nations, as he did to the study of different political constitutions. Through his royal pupil, he could have received as much information about the religions as about the animals of far-away places" (V:438).
- 6 Schelling notes: "At this stage there was no possibility of a *religion* of reason" (V:443).
- 7 Schelling quotes the following from the Preface to Melanchthon's *Locis theologicis* which indicates the basis of this old metaphysical edifice: "*Causae certitudinis in philosophia sunt experientia universalis, principia et demonstrationes. - Demonstrativa methodus progreditur ab iis quae sensui subjecta sunt et a primis notitiis, quae vocantur principia. - Philosophia*

docet, dubitandum esse de his, quae non sunt sensu comperta, nec sunt principia, nec sunt demonstratione confirmata" (V:444).

- 8 [But Bonaventura accepted it.]
- 9 Schelling continues to warn that the science to be produced by pure reason is not to be thought of as the final science, for when this pure rational science is elaborated, it may become our most urgent task to transcend it.
- 10 "*il est en un mot l'Etre*" - Schelling refers to the beginning of the *Entretien d'un philosophe Chretien avec un philosophe Chinois* for this sentence from Malebranche. Schelling renders *l'Etre* by *das Seiende* ("that which is", or "the Existent").
- 11 Schelling concedes that this material atheism of Spinoza (as distinct from formal atheism, *Atheismus vulgaris*), at least saved the substance of religion, and as such was admired by men like Goethe, Herder and Lessing. Cf. V:461f.
- 12 Schelling takes note of a reaction, in terms of a personal God, which came from Jacobi: "Jacobi was so convinced of the impotence of syllogistic science that he believed he could ground belief in God - a God with whom one can speak and from whom one can receive answers, a God with whom one could be *auf Du und Du* (to use J G Hamann's expression), in brief, a God with whom a personal relation is possible - simply on his individual feeling ..." Schelling feels Jacobi's position is correctly stated *only if* there is no alternative to ancient metaphysics on the one hand and demonstrative science in Spinoza's sense on the other. Since, for Schelling, the word "personal" applies "only to a being who is free of all generality and who exists only for himself, independently of reason and obedient only to his own will" (V:463), it is obvious that rational knowledge will not discover such a God. "But what rational knowledge does not secure for us can be obtained by the science whose mission it is to extract the God who is enclosed in this rational knowledge out of the same, in order to reinstate him in his own proper being, i.e., to lead him toward freedom and personality" (V:463).
- 13 Schelling has based his account of Kant on the latter's *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, pp. 571-583 of the first edition. "The later edition shows no variation here" (V:466).

Chapter Two

- 14 This Chapter is a Summary-Translation of Lectures 13, 14 and 15 (V:477-541). Points made here are frequently repeated in these and in other, later lectures.
- 15 Cf. V:542f (Lecture 16).
- 16 See V:470ff (Lecture 12), V:484f (Lecture 13), V:495f (Lecture 13), V:499f (Lecture 13), V:508f (Lecture 14), V:568f (Lecture 17), V:591 (Lecture 18),

V:670f (Lecture 20). For minor restatements, see V: 474, 475f, 518, 557, 573, etc.

- 17 Schelling cites Latin usage: "Consider the distinction between *est indoctus*, *est non-doctus* and *non est doctus*. Neither the first nor the second would be used in the case of a new born child ... We would have to say of him *non est doctus*, for this denies the actuality while affirming the possibility" (V:490). Consider another example: "one can say 'Peter writes', 'Peter does not write'. Of the second proposition, two interpretations are possible. (i) Peter does not write because he *cannot*, he has never learned how and lacks the ability (power) to write. In this case the first proposition contradicts the second ... (ii) Peter does not write simply because he is not writing, though he knows how. Here there is no impossibility, hence no contradiction ... for one has in mind that the two statements are true *at different times*" (V:491).
- 18 The comparison with Plato here runs from V:503 to V:517.
- 19 "for truth and error are not in things but only in the understanding" (V:520).
- 20 School metaphysics, observes Schelling, went back to Aristotle, to Science, to Dianoia, rather than to Plato, i.e., to reason itself, in searching for a *Gemeinwissenschaft* (V:541).

Chapter 3

- 21 This chapter deals with the material in Lectures 16, 17 and 18 (V:542-614), and briefly with Lecture 19 (V:615-638).
- 22 Schelling comments: "This name, by the way, was used by the author only once in order to distinguish his system in general and in particular from the Fichtean system which allowed nature no independent existence but made it a mere accident of the human Ego. The name was meant to express the fact that in that totality, subject and object existed over against one another with equal independence, the one being only the subject which has become actualized in the object (for the potencies are indeed subjects), the other being only the subject posited as such. Apart from this purely historical reference, we cannot justify the name; it is too general to mean anything" (V:553).
- 23 Schelling refers back to his *Briefe über Dogmatismus und Kriticismus*, in Niethammer's *Philos. Journal*, 1796, and in the *Philos. Schriften*, Landshut, 1809.
- 24 "In geometry there is no proposition which means that what is stated really is so, but simply that it cannot be otherwise. The triangle, for example, is possible only in a certain way, whence it follows, of course, that if it exists it will be in that way. It by no means follows that it actually exists ... First Science is like mathematics because of that general character which Aristotle noticed when he said that what

is purely potential in a figure (e.g., the relation between the hypotenuse and the other two sides in a right-angled triangle) is found when the activity of thought actualizes that potentiality and recognizes in this way what is dependent on its competence" (V:558f).

- 25 This proposition is discussed in Schelling's *Philosophische Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit*, 1809 (IV).
- 26 "Hence it is completely identical with the Pythagorean and Platonic Infinite (*απειρον*), which we do not find in phenomenal reality, of course, for all being which is present in the latter is already a being enclosed within limits and cannot be comprehended otherwise. Phenomenal reality, however, contains signs that there is at the basis of all being a ground which is as such limitless and refractory to form and rule - without power over itself and therefore unable to be for itself - the ground and beginning of all becoming, Aristotle's first or material cause" (V:570).
- 27 "Perhaps, says Schelling, Plato's *απειρον* or *αορατον* signified "the still undifferentiated and chaotic sum of all possibilities we call the Existent" (V:574f).
- 28 Note the extent of Schelling's conscious borrowing from Aristotle.

Chapter 4

- 29 This chapter presents a Summary-Translation of the material in Lectures 20 - 24 (V:639-754).
- 30 We note that the *causa sui* is also, of course, the Principle, for both Spinoza and Fichte. But for Spinoza it excludes all self-consciousness, all willing and knowing, while for Fichte it consists essentially of nothing else.
- 31 [Note: Professor Richard Kroner's trilogy provides such a series!]
- 32 Fr. Copleston (1965:137) writes: "Kant does indeed affirm God on faith, but simply as a postulate, that is, as a possibility. Further, Kant affirms God as an instrument, as it were, for synthesizing virtue and happiness."

Notes to The Seventh Book

Introduction

- 1 Lectures 24-37. Once again, condensation and the elimination of repetition have reduced the bulk of the original by about 80 percent.

Chapter 1

- 2 This chapter comprises Lectures 24, 25 and 26 (VI:395-465).
- 3 As D.H. notes (VI:624n), Schelling, while still a university student, had written an essay which dealt mythically with the History of the Childhood of Jesus (*Die Kindheitsgeschichte Jesu*) - an essay "which is still among his handwritten manuscripts".
- 4 This expression is explained in S6:367, 371.
- 5 Schelling now finds support for his view in St Paul - "for God forbid that I should deduce as Christian doctrine what is not Christian doctrine at all" (VI:443); - but I have placed this section in Chapter Two of the Seventh Book.
- 6 Repeated at VI:466, 471f (Cf. Acts 2:36).

Chapter 2

- 7 This Chapter comprises Lectures 27, 28 and 29 (VI:466-543) and VI:431-442 of Lecture 25.
- 8 [The New English Bible has: "men who preserve the outward form of religion but are a standing denial of its reality."]
- 9 "From another MSS".
- 10 Lecture 29 (VI:511-543).
- 11 This explanation helps us to understand a story which is not without difficulties for modern readers, says Schelling. Can God directly encounter a human being? Is God in character in tempting so devout a man to perform so unnatural an act? Did not God enjoin the shedding of blood after Cain's fratricide?
- 12 This contradicts Hayner's account in Hayner (1967:163).
- 13 Cf. the "anger" of the Lord in Josh 7, and cf. Ex 33:3f, Lev 26:17, and Ex 23:22f.
- 14 Schelling cites: "the sacred bulls of the Persian Artemis, grazing freely without herdsmen, and marked with a torch, the sign of the goddess" (in Plutarch's *Life of Lucullus* K. 24); "the seven herds of sacred bulls

which grazed to Helios in Sicily" (in the *Odyssey* XII); and the mob of horses consecrated to Julius Caesar at the Rubicon, and released to rove freely (in Seuton's *Life of Caesar*); and the release of birds in modern times at the coronation of the French kings.

- 15 Schelling distinguishes Idolatry from the worship of Jehovah through images. When Jeroboam set up two golden calves in Bethel and Dan, the pagan basis is clear, but this image-worship is not idolatry proper (1 Kgs 3:2).

Chapter 3

- 16 This Chapter summarizes Lectures 30, 31, 32, and half of Lecture 33 (VI:544-633).
- 17 Schelling confesses doubt that he can "make everything clear down to the tiniest detail" (VI:562).
- 18 This is the moment designated by Urania in *The Philosophy of Mythology*.
- 19 Schelling adds in a marginal note that "the true explanation of miracles is in the New Testament itself, e.g., Mt 14:2, Mk 6:14. They are effected not materially but with the *dunamis*. Cf. 1 Cor 12:10" (VI:588).
- 20 Schelling expressed this "essentification" idea as early as 1811, in a letter of condolence to his friend, President Georgii in Stuttgart. See footnote by D. H. (VI:599).
- 21 Cf. "He was in death *Superstes anima* (a surviving soul) as a man, wanting nothing but to be raised and glorified in human form ..." (VI:617).
- 22 On the significance of the Flood, v. the First Book above (VI:696).
- 23 Cf. Lecture 18 of the Philosophical Introduction to the *Philosophy of Mythology*.
- 24 These and other supporting passages are discussed, e.g., Lk 24:26, Heb 2:10.
- 25 Heaven is defined as "the region of the free, universal potencies, liberated from the concrete" (VI:630) (Eph 3:10).

Chapter 4

- 26 The discussion comprises the last half of Lecture 33 plus Lectures 34 and 35 (V:633-685).
- 27 "The serpent in Paradise is actually that principle of non-being which, in tempting man, is *actually* Satan ... *Apate* (Deception) was there harmoniously among the first potencies which preceded mythology" (VI:657).

- 28 As St. Paul says, Everything was again brought under one head by the man Jesus. He became the κεφαλη πασης αρχης και εξουσιας as in Col 1:20 (VI:673).
- 29 Schelling notes that *Eichhorn* appears to have been the first to attempt "the application of the mythological explanation to the Old Testament." He was "an inventive genius" who pointed the way to make many Old Testament stories and representations intelligible, although he himself "did not know how to travel the road" (VI:684).

Chapter 5

- 30 So avers Klaus Penzel (Spring 1964:6). This article includes partial translations of Lectures 36 and 37, that is VI:686-726.
- 31 Klaus Penzel points out that in Schelling's time this position "had been forcefully set forth in Neander's church historiography." See K. Penzel (1964:324).
- 32 Schelling says he "received an unexpected confirmation" of this view and of most of the applications of it, when, while reading the last part of August Neander's *General History of the Christian Religion and Church* (Bd. V, Abth. 1:438ff), he found "the same view and the same applications in the writings of the famous (11th C) Abbott Joachim of Flores." He adds: "I made this discovery in none of the earlier church-historians of whom I have looked at many" (VI:690n).
- 33 See, e.g., Mk 10:2; Lk 8:45; Mt 16:16; Acts 1:15, 2:14, 15:7; Mk 1:36; Lk 22:31f. In such passages, Peter is named first, or exclusively, or acts as spokesman.
- 34 Klaus Penzel draws attention to a note in Philip Schaff's *History of the Christian Church, Vol. I* (3rd ed., New York, 1890), p. 517n. Here Schaff reports that when he asked the dying Schelling (1854) whether he was still convinced of the truth of his vision of Church history, Schelling "emphatically replied in the affirmative" and added that he now "made room for James as the representative of the Greek Church ..." See K. Penzel (1964:327).

Notes to Retrospect

- 1 Written in the 1960's, this Review draws heavily on five English language studies of Schelling's later work. The studies, all published before the mid-50's, were by Pflleiderer (1887), Gutmann (1936), Bolman (1942), Hayner (1950, 1967) and Fackenheim (1952, 1954).
- 2 On Bolman's point that Schelling broke with the Gnostics, see Retrospect, Section I. below.
- 3 But see such books as Morris, T. V. (ed.) 1988. *Philosophy and the Christian Faith*. Notre Dame Press; and Morris, T. V. (ed.). 1994. *God and the Philosophers*. Oxford University Press.
- 4 The Existentialists have developed a number of methods for communicating their insight into the nature of Being. Blackham, H. J. (ed.), 1965, in *Reality, Man and Existence (Eight Great Existentialist Thinkers)*, Bantam, cites Kierkegaard's dialectical method, Nietzsche's "perspective" thinking, Jasper's logic of philosophizing, Marcel's "secondary reflection", Husserl's phenomenological method (and Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty are all his students). Even Jaspers, who insists that there can be no ontology because Being cannot be the object of a science (with which Marcel agrees in principle) explores "the modes by which we encounter Being".
- 5 Cf. Macquarrie, John. 1967. *God and Secularity*. Philadelphia: Westminster Press. 96ff.
- 6 Schelling, of course, noticed in Aristotle the distinction between essential and non-essential accidents (see V:526f and The Second Book, end Ch. 2, above).
- 7 Cf. Bolman, 1942:47: "How do universal statements apply to such immemorial (*unvordenklich*) being which is actually prior to all thought, without potency, in itself necessary, and in the highest sense individuality?"
- 8 Blackham, H. J. (ed.) 1965. *Reality, Man and Existence (Eight Great Existentialist Thinkers)*. Bantam Books.
- 9 Cf. Adam Margoshes' (1967) article on Schelling in *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, edited by Paul Edwards, New York, VII:309.

