

Value incongruence between natives and forced migrants in Europe and Australia

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Abstract

Multiple conservative parties in Europe and Australia have enjoyed a considerable level of electoral success in recent times on the back of their restrictionist asylum agendas. These agendas are often justified by the symbolic threat argument, which asserts that forced migrants hold values that represent a threat to host societies. However, despite the immense consequences of this belief, its empirical validity has rarely been investigated in previous literature. We addressed this problem by comparing the responses of forced migrants (N = 163) and both Australian and European (French, British, Polish and Spanish) natives (N = 816) to the same 10-item value questionnaire using latent profile analysis. Our findings revealed that forced migrant values appear to be at odds with established liberties in France, Spain, the UK and Australia, and to a much lesser extent, Poland. We encourage future researchers to use these discoveries as a basis for developing further knowledge on intergroup value discrepancies to ultimately facilitate peaceful integration of forced migrants in their host countries.

Keywords: symbolic threat, values, forced migrants, natives, refugees, value incongruence

Introduction

Forced migrant¹ integration is one of the most contentious issues in contemporary Western politics. It has been a salient topic at every Australian federal election since 2001 and has divided Europe since the start of what is commonly referred to as the “European refugee crisis” in 2014. Restrictionist asylum agendas have consistently received bipartisan support from Australia’s major political parties over the past two decades (Reilly, 2017); while policies of this nature have become “mainstreamed and normalized” across multiple European states in recent years, due largely to the rising electoral success of far-right populist parties (FRPP) at both a national and European level (Mudde, 2019). Ultimately, these policies are a reflection of the large number of citizens who feel that forced migrants represent a threat to local society. In the following section, we explain how Stephan and Renfro’s (2002) Integrated Threat Theory (ITT) can be applied as a framework for understating this perceived threat.

Previous literature indicates that aversion to forced migrant integration and thus the recent success of FRPPs can be explained by the perception among natives that forced

¹ “Forced migrants” refers to both refugees and asylum seekers.

migrant values (FMV) are incompatible with those of the host society. A defining feature of an FRPP is the party's discursive emphasis on national belonging and the careful delineation of in-groups and out-groups (Wodak, 2020; Talay, 2020). It is difficult to determine whether such discourse is the driver of public perceptions of intercultural incompatibility or whether exclusionist FRPP agendas simply cater to pre-existing public sentiment. Regardless of the true evolution of FRPP electoral success, multiple studies have discovered a positive relationship between perceived intergroup value differences and intergroup prejudice (Riek, Mania & Gaertner, 2006; Guan et al, 2009). Similarly, results from a large-scale public opinion study by the Pew Research Group (2016a) revealed that natives consider forced migrants a threat to host country culture. In line with these findings, migrant acculturation research has consistently found that both native and migrant groups perceive native expectations of cultural assimilation to be significantly stronger than those of migrants (Phelps et al., 2013; van Osch & Breugelmans, 2011). There is sound evidence to suggest that these perceptions are accurate and that native perceptions of discordance between native and migrant acculturation preferences correlate positively with perceptions of symbolic threat (Arends-Tóth & Van de Vijver, 2003; Piontkowski, Rohmann & Florack, 2002). Thus, not only does it appear that native opposition to forced migrant integration stems from the perception that forced migrants hold values that threaten local culture, but this resistance may also be related to the belief among natives that forced migrants are unwilling to change such values after settling in their host societies to the extent that natives desire.

Due to the high representation of Muslims among recent waves of European asylum seekers (European Asylum Support Office, 2020) and the salience of Islam in media coverage of forced migrants, it is reasonably assumed that negative perceptions of forced migrants are associated with unfavorable views of Muslims among natives (Pew Research Center, 2016a). Although there is some evidence to suggest that the values of forced migrants could be incongruous with host country culture (Eskelinen & Verkuyten, 2020; Talay, 2017; Lewis & Kashyap, 2013), this conclusion cannot be drawn without specific data. Earlier research has demonstrated that perceptions of minority group values are rooted in unfounded stereotypes, many of which prove to be inaccurate (Tartakovsky et al., 2020; Hanel et al., 2018). It is feasible that native perceptions of FMV in Australia and Europe are derived from emotive, unrepresentative portrayals of asylum seekers from exclusionist parties.

To our knowledge, there is only one study that has attempted to compare native perceptions of FMV incongruence with actual values from native and forced migrant groups. Although that study generated some important findings on the subject, it used survey data from prominent asylum sender countries rather than actual forced migrants and compared this data with data from differently formulated surveys (Talay, 2017). In addition to this limitation, it only surveyed natives from two refugee host countries: Hungary and the Netherlands. In this article, we address those two limitations and examine the value incongruence between European-based forced migrants and French, Spanish, British, Polish and Australian natives. The selection of European countries was based on the interest of obtaining a broad spectrum of subjects across an asylum application acceptance scale. Between 2014 and 2019, France and Poland rejected a little over 82 percent of asylum applications at the first instance, while the UK and Spain delivered a negative decision to just over 62 percent and 44 percent of applicants respectively (Eurostat, 2020a). However, these figures do not tell the full story. France and Poland might have rejected a similar percentage of asylum

applicants, but the former received nearly 574,000 applications over the 5-year period, whereas only 15,785 cases were lodged in Poland (Spain had just under 100,000; and the UK had just over 180,000). A commonly cited reason behind the comparatively low number of applications in Poland is the country's substandard treatment of asylum seekers (Global Detention Project, 2018; Rusilowicz & Ostaszewska-Zuk, 2020). Additionally, over 95% of the 3795 final decisions (appeals) in Poland were also rejected, in comparison to only 43.4% of the UK's 18710 final decisions (Eurostat, 2020b). Only a tiny percentage of total decisions on protection visas were made following an appeal in Spain and France (both less than 1%). Consequently, on a scale with welcoming and averse at opposite ends, one could feasibly place the four countries at different points in the following order (from welcoming): Spain, the UK, France and Poland. As a caveat, it needs to be stressed that these figures are impacted by applicant country of origin, which varies across the four countries. Australia was included in the study because it was felt that an analysis of Australian perceptions of forced migrants might illuminate some unique features of the public response to the European refugee situation. Moreover, because media coverage of refugee settlement and the treatment of asylum seekers has declined considerably in Australia since 2001, we felt that an analysis of Australian perceptions of FMVs may give an indication of the durability of certain views. Australia received protection visa applications from over 100,000 (predominantly Malaysian, Indian and Chinese) asylum seekers between 2013-2018 (Refugee Council of Australia, 2020). Throughout this period, only 13.8% of applications were accepted; many of them are still being processed, which is a trend of Australia's asylum procedure that is often criticized (Reilly, 2017).

Native perceptions of incompatibility between host country and FMVs are of great significance for two reasons. Firstly, because they predict negative attitudes and behaviours towards forced migrants and other out-groups that share certain traits with the latter such as religion (Riek et al., 2006). And secondly, because these perceptions have been found to impact outgroup attitudes and asylum policy preferences (De Coninck, Rodriguez-de-Dios, & d'Haenens, 2020a; Talay, 2017). If this study finds that values of forced migrants are in fact reasonably compatible with those of host society members, then it may contribute to establishing a basis for a change in attitudes towards one of the most maligned groups in contemporary Western society, which would conceivably result in better policy outcomes for people escaping persecution. On the other hand, if we discover that certain FMVs are incongruous with host country culture, then we will have established a clear basis for effective acculturation initiatives such as education and integration programs. Accordingly, through primary survey research, we seek to discover the extent to which the asylum restrictionist argument has a basis in reality by comparing FMV with native values.

The symbolic perspective of intergroup threat

ITT (Stephan & Renfro, 2002) is arguably the most widely used framework in literature exploring the relationship between perceived threat and intergroup attitudes. The theory argues that perceptions of intergroup threat fall into one of two categories: realistic threats and symbolic threats. Realistic threats are described as those related to the perception of intergroup competition for scarce resources such as work, income, social services, healthcare and education. Symbolic threats, on the other hand, concern the perception of incompatibility in values, customs and identity. Given that perceptions equate to an individual's understanding of reality, both of these perceived threats "have real consequences, regardless of whether or not they are accurate"

(Stephan, Ybarra & Morrison (2009, p. 45). Although empirical studies have shown that host country citizens are concerned about both the realistic and symbolic consequences of out-group integration, perceptions of symbolic threat appear to be stronger (Riek et al., 2006; Sides & Citrin, 2007; Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). More importantly in the context of this study, it has also been demonstrated that perceptions of the symbolic threat of asylum seeker integration have a greater impact on asylum policy preferences than perceptions of realistic threat (Talay, 2017; Sides & Citrin, 2007). FRPPs play a major role in driving perceptions of the symbolic threat of forced migrants, as their portrayals of the latter often account for the main or only source of information natives receive on the outgroup (Schmuck & Matthes, 2017).

When groups such as FRPPs advance the symbolic argument, they typically formulate it in unspecific ways. Its proponents never list all of their society's values that they consider to be threatened by asylum seeker integration – in fact, they tend not to list any. The closest contemporary anti-asylum politicians get to identifying these values is usually through their demonisation of Muslim culture. As Pickel (2017, p. 21) maintains, “in the context of the current refugee crisis, the attitude of rejection has been increasingly directed toward members of one specific religious group – namely, Islam”. Because the majority of European- and Australian-based asylum seekers are Muslim, nationalist politicians often leverage negative portrayals of Muslim culture to justify their restrictionist asylum agendas (Talay, 2020). This is often done by constructing a link between illegitimate asylum seekers and terrorism. Assertions such as “How many Mohamed Merahs (*individual who admitted to committing several terrorist attacks in Montauban and Toulouse in 2012*) arrive every day in France on boats and planes full of immigrants,” and “Islamisation is a life-threatening danger... why do we import all that misery” abound in contemporary FRPP discourse (Le Pen, 2015; Wilders, 2015). Similarly, since the mass sexual assaults on New Year's Eve 2015-16 in Germany, many FRPPs have adopted a feminist stance and framed forced migrants as a threat to sexual liberties (Farris, 2017; Pickel, 2017). Consequently, it would appear that the symbolic restrictionist argument is predicated on the belief that forced migrants espouse a range of values that are a threat to host societies. Given that this argument, by nature, always concerns at least two sets of values (those belonging to the host society and outgroup/s), we believe it is essential to compare forced migrant and native responses to the same value-related questions.

Values

Values can be described as cognitive constructs which define certain desirable goals. When ordered by importance, they represent people's motivations and are an integral part of stereotypes because most stereotypes are formulated in terms of a group's motivational goals, which are inherently linked to values, e.g., “Muslims want to Islamize Europe”; “Jews are greedy and mercenary” (Tartakovsky et al, 2020). Stereotypes of forced migrants manifest in FRPP discourse because they represent one of the most effective means for legitimising their exclusionist asylum agendas (Van Leeuwen, 2007; Wodak, 2020; Talay, 2020). Although FRPP discourse does not tend to identify the specific values that underpin their forced migrant stereotypes and broader symbolic exclusionist argument (Talay, 2020), these values can be logically derived from two sources: prevalent FRPP tropes and global values survey data. The former was outlined in the previous section – FRPPs typically construct their exclusionist narrative around portrayals of forced migrants as terrorists and violent misogynists. Consequently, one can infer that they perceive forced migrants to hold

unacceptable views on violence, gender equality and consent. The World Values Survey (WVS) and the Pew Research Centre's "Global Views on Morality" project (2013) present two of the largest projects that collected cross-national data on value orientations. These studies contain questions that assess a wide array of values ranging from the perceived importance of children using their imagination to the justifiability of non-marital sex, and paint a picture of the values that would likely divide forced migrant sender populations and residents of (largely) non-Islamic forced migrant destinations².

After analyzing these two global values studies and the above-mentioned FRPP tropes, we identified ten values that would help us examine the difference in value orientations between forced migrants and natives. Four of these values came exclusively from the global values studies: those pertaining to abortion, homosexuality, religious freedom and preference for authoritarian over democratic governance. Both studies revealed significant incongruence between African-Islamic countries and European and English-speaking countries across all of these values. Findings from all 6 waves of the WVS (7th in publication) have also led its authors to the conclusion that attitudes to abortion, homosexuality and religious freedom underpin the two major dimensions of global cross-cultural variation: traditional vs secular values and survival vs self-expression values (Inglehart et al., 2014) The remaining six values were all derived from prevalent FRPP tropes (Krzyżanowski & Ledin, 2017; Talay, 2020; Wodak, 2020;), three of which also appear in Pew and WVS studies. These values include views on transgender equality, consent, religious attacks, honour killings, female leadership and female sartorial freedoms. The most recent WVS and Pew global values studies have demonstrated a clear chasm between Islamic countries and the host countries of this study in regard to attitudes towards religious attacks, honour killings and female leadership. These findings on religious attacks and honour killings are particularly significant for they have likely fuelled FRPP claims of the alleged link between migration and terrorism.

The three values we identified in FRPP tropes that do not appear to have been previously examined in Pew or WVS studies were those pertaining to transgender tolerance, sexual consent and female sartorial freedoms. In addition to playing an important role in FRPP discursive strategies, we felt these values needed to be included in our study for the following reasons. Transgender people represent one of the largest and fastest-growing sub-groups within the LGBTIQ+ community, accounting for up to 2.7% of national populations in certain countries with an increasing percentage of people "coming out" in recent times (Goodman et al., 2019). Despite their increasing presence, transgender people are often subject to a higher level of discrimination than other gender minority groups such as homosexual or bisexual individuals (FRA, 2015). Accordingly, we consider transgender tolerance a fundamental component of gender equality; if one assesses views on homosexuality and female leadership, then an assessment of attitudes towards transgender people should also be conducted. Ideally, we would also compare attitudes towards other gender minority groups, but in order to keep our questionnaire to a reasonable length we were not able to include questions related to such values in this study. Findings from human rights reports in Iraq and Afghanistan (Outright Action International, 2014; Grossman, 2017) suggest that

² See Inglehart et al. (2014) and Pew Research Center (2013) for more information.

forced migrant views on transgender people will be incongruous with European and Australian values (Ipsos, 2018).

As mentioned in the previous section, European FRPPs have regularly framed forced migrants as perpetrators of sexual violence since the mass sexual assaults on NYE 2015-16 in Germany. Framing strategies pertinent to this trope range from the exaggeration of migrant crime rates (Adamson, 2020) to the fabrication of stories that legitimise exclusionist agendas. A recent example of the latter occurred in mid-2020 when far-right groups throughout Europe falsified the events surrounding the murder of a Swedish male with ties to neo-Nazi groups, Tommie Lindh, in order to present the man as a 'hero' and champion of women's rights (Colborne, 2020). Lindh's suspected murderer, a 22-year-old Sudanese asylum seeker, had sexually assaulted a white Swedish teenage girl on the same night as Lindh's murder. However, despite the investigation's prosecutor stating the two crimes "have no direct connection to each other", the far right disseminated the tale that Lindh was killed by the girl's perpetrator in an attempt to defend her (Colborne, 2020). This mythologisation of feminist ideals is a classic example of what Farris (2017) refers to as 'femonationalism', which the author describes as the far right's attempt to present itself as a bastion of gender emancipation in order to justify its demonisation of migrants. The rise of femonationalism also forms the basis of our decision to compare views on female sartorial freedoms. Female swimwear has become a focal point of the alleged divide between Muslim and Christian culture since the early stages of the European refugee situation. On the one hand, FRPPs such as Germany's AfD have used bikinis as a "symbol of women's self-determination over their bodies" in visual femonationalist campaigns (Doerr, 2021, p.4), while on the other hand, the far right also likes to condemn Islamic burkinis for "locking away a woman's body" (Dearden, 2016). Thus, similar to the case of sexual consent, views on female dress freedoms are connected to the far right's alleged goal of protecting females from Islamic oppressors. However, it is important to distinguish the two values, as they could feasibly be inconsistent with one another given that one is associated with violence whereas the other is not. It is also essential that we assess views on female leadership – another femonationalist component – as this concerns another critical aspect of feminism: male deference.

As there is such a dearth of forced migrant public opinion data, the best available guide for predicting FMV appears to be Muslim values. Scholars have argued that there is a fundamental difference between Muslim and Western views on issues concerning gender equality and sexual liberalization (Norris & Inglehart, 2004; Fish, 2011). Public opinion studies have supported this theory and indicated that Western European Muslims are considerably less supportive of these values than Europeans of majority ethnic and religious groups (Eskelinen & Verkuyten, 2020; Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007; Lewis & Kashyap, 2013). It has also been demonstrated that structural integration has a limited effect on religiosity among Muslims living in Western countries; second-generation Muslim migrants are often just as religious as first-generation Muslim migrants who settle in communities of high co-ethnic concentration (Voas & Fleischmann, 2012). Accordingly, we hypothesize that forced migrants will be significantly less tolerant of multiple items on the questionnaire than natives.

Procedures and participants

We collected data on the values of natives in Australia, Spain, France, Poland, and the United Kingdom (N = 816) and Europe-based forced migrants (N = 163) via Qualtrics³, an online survey distribution tool, in June 2020. All participants provided informed consent prior to participating in the study. The questionnaire was distributed among two population groups: adults between the age of 18 and 86 in Australia, Spain, France, Poland and the UK, and Europe-based refugees and asylum seekers between the age of 18 and 75. It was fielded for one week, at which point a sample size of 816 responses was reached among the native residents, and 163 responses among asylum seekers and refugees.

The native sample was representative by age, gender, income and education in each of the countries under study. Respondents could complete the questionnaire in the official language of their respective countries. Muslim participants were screened out of these samples via an early question on religious beliefs because we believed that they may compromise the validity of the value scores. Although the opinions of Muslim natives in the five countries no doubt contribute to policy debates, given the relatively small size of each sample we wanted to limit the samples to their non-Muslim majorities as their perceptions are more likely to sway policy decisions. Asylum seeker and refugee respondents had the option of an English or an Arabic questionnaire, with the latter having been provided by a professional translator. A quota was applied to ensure that at least 90 percent of this sample was Muslim (Sunni, Shia or any other denomination). This was done to maximise the sample's representativeness of forced migrants in Europe. Respondents who did not complete the survey were automatically excluded from the dataset. For an overview of the participants, see Table A1 and A2.

Measures

Value orientations

Participants were requested to fill out a matrix with ten value questions. The ten statements (which become 'value questions' when read with the preceding text) contained in these matrices concern – amongst others – the moral acceptability of homosexuality and abortion, freedom of religion, gender relations... Answer options ranged from 1 = totally disagree, to 7 = totally agree. Some items were reverse coded so that a high score indicated 'progressive' values. Determinations of progressiveness were based on the broader values espoused by societies that scored high on both axes of Inglehart et al.'s (2014) secular/self-expression scale. We refer to lower scores on our matrix as "conservative" values.

All of the seven questions that were derived from Pew and/or WVS studies were formulated slightly differently in our questionnaire. There were three primary reasons for this. Firstly, in some cases we felt the question frame was too narrow, e.g., "Men make better political leaders than women do"; and "The only acceptable religion is my

³ Qualtrics works with partner agencies throughout the world and can recruit specific samples within a short period of time. Once a questionnaire is ready to be administered, they perform a soft launch to confirm whether the design and sample are desirable. If the researcher is not happy with the outcome, Qualtrics allows them to implement changes and proceed with further soft launches. When the researcher is satisfied with the results of the soft launch, Qualtrics performs the full launch and delivers the dataset at its completion. The researcher can then clean the data and request respondent replacements should the number of quality responses fall below the requested sample size.

religion” (both WVS). In such instances, we broadened the scope of the question while maintaining clarity, e.g., “Men make better leaders than women”; and “People should be free to choose their religion and practice it freely.” Secondly, we considered the articulation of some other questions to be a little too short and unspecific, e.g., “Justifiable: Abortion”; and “Justifiable: Homosexuality” (Both WVS). And finally, the independent ethics committee at the University of Sydney requested that we reformulate the Pew questions related to honour killings and religious attacks that we had originally submitted due to their potential to offend participants. The formulation of the remaining three questions of the value matrix was also based on feedback from this ethics committee.

Analytic strategy

We investigated differences in values orientations between natives and migrants in two ways. First, we conducted a MANCOVA to analyse whether there were significant differences between natives and migrants in mean scores per item, while controlling for age, gender, and education. Second, we used latent profile analysis (LPA) to investigate whether different classes of natives and migrants existed with regards to these values. LPA is a statistical technique that aims at identifying hidden groups within data based on continuous variables (Oberski, 2016). It is underpinned by a person-centred approach, allowing subpopulations in the data to be estimated according to a variety of parametrizations (Howard & Hoffman, 2018). Within the person-centred approach, a latent profile analysis has been preferred to the K-means clustering technique. The selected technique counters the current wide usage of variable-centred approaches (e.g. factor analysis) which draw conclusions about types of people by reducing them to one aspect of their context (Bámaca-Colbert & Gayles, 2010).

The choice to employ LPA rather than the traditional K-means cluster analysis is based on three methodological reasons. First, LPA uses probability-based classification instead of an *ad hoc* approach to determine the mean and size of the retained cluster (Magidson & Vermunt, 2002). Second, LPA offers more flexibility in terms of the variances and correlations within and among clusters (Vermunt, 2011), while K-means assumes equal variances and zero correlations among the variables within the model. This leads to a more accurate and precise representation of the real-world subgroups (Vermunt, 2011). Third, while the number of clusters in K-means is predefined and ultimately decided based on subjective interpretation (Schreiber & Pekarik, 2014), LPA is a model-based technique that offers diagnostic measures to drawn statistical comparisons between models (Magidson & Vermunt, 2002; Schreiber & Pekarik, 2014).

To estimate the MANCOVA, we used SPSS Version 25. To estimate the LPA, we employed the ‘tidyLPA’ package in R (Rosenberg et al., 2018). This package provides an interface to estimate which among four model parametrizations describes the data best, based on the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) and the Integrated Complete data Likelihood criterion (ICL) (Rosenberg et al., 2018). Both criteria can also be used to select the number of mixture components (e.g. classes). In addition to the BIC and ICL indicators, Likelihood Ratio Testing (LRT) was used to further inform the number of clusters for a specific parametrization model. This test generates a p-value to compare increases in fit by sequentially adding components/clusters. The rule of thumb is that the lower values of the BIC/ICL are the better the model fit. However,

researchers also stress that the conceptual interpretation of the model should be taken into account when deciding the preferred solution (Howard & Hoffman, 2018). The theoretical interpretability was the most decisive criterion in selecting the preferred cluster solution. For conceptual/theoretical clarity, we selected the best model out of a range from a one-component to a five-component model.

Results

The results of the MANCOVA in Table 1 indicate that there were statistically significant differences between natives' value orientations and those of migrants in nine out of ten items. The exception here was the item regarding abortions ($F = 2.75, p = .064$), where no significant difference between natives and forced migrants could be discerned. Looking at the mean scores, it is apparent that natives reported higher scores on all items than forced migrants, which indicates that the differences in value orientations that exist are indeed in the direction that we may have expected: FMV are more conservative than native values. However, there was notable variance among these mean score discrepancies. Whereas native mean scores were only 0.34 and 0.59 higher than those of forced migrants for attitudes towards homosexuality and female dress freedoms respectively, discrepancies were markedly greater when it came to views on honour killings (3.26), religious attacks (2.96), transgender equality (2.4) and sexual consent (2.12).

Table 1. The results of MANCOVA comparing value preferences of natives and migrants controlling for socio-demographic variables

	Natives	Forced migrants	<i>F</i> -scores; <i>p</i> -values
Homosexuality is morally acceptable.	5.48	5.14	11.82; .000
Abortion should be legal.	5.43	5.15	2.75; .064
Authoritarian governments are better than democratic ones in times of difficulty.*	4.67	2.89	96.46; .000
People should be free to choose their religion and practice it freely.	6.24	5.29	46.20; .000
Men make better leaders than women.*	5.05	3.42	65.81; .000
If a (heterosexual) woman invites a (heterosexual) man back to her place after a night out, she is tacitly consenting to sex.*	5.37	3.25	111.84; .000
Women should be able to wear revealing bikini swimwear in public.	5.24	4.65	14.32; .000
Some people think that it is justifiable to end a family member's life if that person has committed adultery or had non-marital sex. Indicate to what extent you personally agree that this practice can be justified under such circumstances.*	6.21	2.95	389.90; .000

If one's child or friend decided to identify as a transgender person, it would be justifiable to love them or like them less than one did before they made the change.*	5.44	3.04	114.16; .000
Some people think that attacks on civilians are justifiable if they are in defence of one's religious beliefs. Indicate to what extent you personally agree that this practice can be justified under such circumstances.*	6.11	3.15	302.35; .000

Note: Controlling for age, gender, level of education. Items with * have been reverse coded so that a high score (highest possible score = 7) indicated 'progressive' values.

Model selection in LPA

Table 2. Model-fit indices of the latent profile analysis (natives)

Number of profiles	LL	BIC	ICL	LRTs
1	-11574.15	23281.16	-23281.15	-
2	-10958.45	22124.71	-22159.74	< 0.001
3	-10678.98	21637.38	-21731.65	< 0.001
4	-10612.54	21580.03	-21852.65	< 0.001
5	-10467.15	21362.80	-21665.68	< 0.001

Note: N = 816. BIC = Bayesian Information Criterion, ICL = Integrated complete-data likelihood criterion, LRTs = Likelihood ratio tests.

For natives, a five-component model seemed to be the best statistical fit (see Table 2). However, the three-component model was selected because a good increase in statistical fit appeared when the third profile was added. Especially the changes in ICL indicated that both the three- and five-component model had distinct clusters when compared with their preceding model. Following a conceptual comparison of the three-component model with the five-component model, it appeared that they were not fundamentally different from each other in light of the theoretical clarity that could be gained from continuing with the more parsimonious model.

Table 3. Model-fit indices of the latent profile analysis (forced migrants)

Number of profiles	LL	BIC	ICL	LRTs
1	-2308.12	4717.58	-4718.91	-
2	-2089.45	4336.10	-4342.36	< 0.001
3	-2041.56	4296.31	-4304.00	< 0.001
4	-2014.10	4297.19	-4315.88	< 0.001
5	-1968.68	4261.13	-4279.02	< 0.001

Note: N = 163. BIC = Bayesian Information Criterion, ICL = Integrated complete-data likelihood criterion, LRTs = Likelihood ratio tests.

The same strategy was followed for the analysis of asylum seekers and refugees (Table 3). Again, the BIC and the ICL pointed in the same direction concerning the preferred parametrization, with a five-component model providing the best statistical fit. However, the decrease in both BIC and ICL was highly limited following the inclusion of the third profile. Therefore, we again selected the three-component model for further analyses.

Latent Profile Analysis

To provide an interpretation of the different profiles of forced migrant and native value scores, we calculated the mean value scores within each profile along with the latent profile membership proportions (MP) (Table 4 and Table 5). These were then compared to the overall average for natives and migrants separately. All profile means were tested to be significantly different from the overall sample mean at $p < .001$. We first discuss the results for the migrants' scores (three-component model; Table 4), and then follow up with the discussion of the results for natives (three-component model; Table 5).

Forced migrants in the first profile (Conservative gender and power values; 63% of migrant sample) tended to hold more conservative views on gender (female leadership and transgender equality) and power issues (authoritarian governance, religious attacks, honour killings and consent). On the other side, they also held significantly more progressive values on certain cultural elements like homosexuality, abortion, and religious freedom. Forced migrants in the second profile (Progressive gender and power values; 29% of migrant sample) reported nearly the exact opposite, holding more progressive views on gender and power issues, while at the same time exhibiting more conservative attitudes towards homosexuality, abortion, and religious freedom. The final profile (Predominantly progressive; 8% of migrant sample) represents the most progressive group of forced migrants. They held significantly more progressive values than the 'average' migrant in our sample on seven out of ten items. Only their views on female sartorial freedom, authoritarianism and transgender equality were more conservative than the mean, however in the case of the latter two items the difference was small.

Table 4. Within-profile mean scores of forced migrants (N = 163)

		Conservative gender and power values	Progressive gender and power values	Predominan- tly progressive values
	Overall means	Within-profile means		
Homosexuality is morally acceptable.	5.14	5.51	4.26	5.57
Abortion should be legal.	5.15	5.53	4.31	5.31
Authoritarian governments are better than democratic ones in times of difficulty.*	2.89	2.44	3.89	2.62
People should be free to choose their religion and practice it freely.	5.29	5.53	4.71	5.59
Men make better leaders than women.*	3.42	3.12	3.61	5.06
If a (heterosexual) woman invites a (heterosexual) man back to her place after a night out, she is tacitly consenting to sex.*	3.25	2.76	3.93	4.54
Women should be able to wear revealing bikini swimwear in public.	4.65	5.18	3.88	3.39
Some people think that it is justifiable to end a family member's life if that person has committed adultery or had non-marital sex. Indicate to what extent you personally agree that this practice can be justified under such circumstances.*	2.95	2.43	3.88	3.54
If one's child or friend decided to identify as a transgender person, it would be justifiable to love them or like them less than one did before they made the change.*	3.04	2.66	3.95	2.64
Some people think that attacks on civilians are justifiable if they are in defence of one's religious beliefs. Indicate to what extent you personally agree that this practice can be justified under such circumstances.*	3.15	2.60	3.88	4.74
<i>Latent profile membership proportions</i>		0.63	0.29	0.08

Note: All profile means were tested to be significantly different from the overall sample mean at $p < .01$.

Table 5. Within-profile mean scores of natives (N = 816).

		Moderate values	Conservative values	Progressive values
	Overall means	Within-profile means		
Homosexuality is morally acceptable.	5.48	4.17	5.38	6.00
Abortion should be legal.	5.43	4.52	5.20	5.83
Authoritarian governments are better than democratic ones in times of difficulty.*	4.67	4.74	3.96	4.83
People should be free to choose their religion and practice it freely.	6.24	5.98	5.72	6.48
Men make better leaders than women.*	5.05	4.71	4.38	5.36
If a (heterosexual) woman invites a (heterosexual) man back to her place after a night out, she is tacitly consenting to sex.*	5.37	5.11	4.45	5.71
Women should be able to wear revealing bikini swimwear in public.	5.24	4.69	5.14	5.47
Some people think that it is justifiable to end a family member's life if that person has committed adultery or had non-marital sex. Indicate to what extent you personally agree that this practice can be justified under such circumstances.*	6.21	6.36	4.70	6.56
If one's child or friend decided to identify as a transgender person, it would be justifiable to love them or like them less than one did before they made the change.*	5.44	5.17	4.60	5.77
Some people think that attacks on civilians are justifiable if they are in defence of one's religious beliefs. Indicate to what extent you personally agree that this practice can be justified under such circumstances.*	6.11	6.24	4.30	6.55
<i>Latent profile membership proportions</i>		0.22	0.17	0.61

Note: All profile means were tested to be significantly different from the overall sample mean at $p < .01$.

Following the presentation of the LPA, we also wanted to investigate how the different native profiles were distributed between the countries under study. Important differences emerge when we take into account respondents' country of residence. The results in Table 6 show that the largest share of the British, French, and Spanish samples (a little over 60%) belonged to the progressive category, while the share of respondents with conservative values was smallest in these countries. In Australia, the pattern changes somewhat: although the share of respondents with progressive values is still the largest (54%), those with conservative values now make up the second-

largest category with 25.5%. The strongest deviation from this pattern is found in Poland. Despite the fact that the largest share of Polish respondents held progressive values (41.7%), this was only slightly larger than the share of respondents with conservative values (40.4%). This high share of conservative respondents far eclipses those in the other countries under study.

Table 6. Cross-tabulation analysis of value profiles by natives' country of residence (N = 816)

	Australia	France	Spain	Poland	UK
Value profile					
Moderate values	20.4%	27.8%	25.6%	17.8%	18.3%
Conservative values	25.5%	12.2%	12.5%	40.4%	17.7%
Progressive values	54.1%	61.0%	61.9%	41.7%	64.6%
<i>Total</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>

Note: All profile means were tested to be significantly different from the overall sample mean at $p < .01$.

As for natives, results show that the first profile (moderate values; 22% of native sample) represents respondents with moderate to somewhat conservative values. Mean scores for most items in this profile lie (slightly) below or above the overall mean for natives, with the largest discrepancies found in views on homosexuality and abortion. Subsequently, this profile somewhat resembles the 'Progressive gender and power values' profile among forced migrants. The second profile (conservative values, 17% of native sample) represents respondents who consistently held more conservative values than the overall mean for every single value item. The third profile (progressive values, 61% of native sample) represents the largest group of native respondents. This group scored consistently higher than the overall mean, indicating more progressive values on all perspectives.

Discussion

This study's primary objective was to compare values of natives in France, Spain, Poland, the UK and Australia with those of European forced migrants. Based on findings from previous European studies on the link between religion and values, we hypothesised that some of values held by (predominantly Muslim) forced migrants would be more conservative than those held by natives. Our results were consistent with this prediction, revealing significant discrepancies between forced migrant and native values across 9 of the 10 value items. In each case, FMV were found to be more conservative than those of natives. However, discrepancies concerning views on homosexuality, female sartorial freedom and religious freedom were fairly minor. Those related to opinions on authoritarian governance were almost twice as large, although the native mean score for this item (4.67) indicated that their stance on the issue was unclear. Similarly, although native views on female leadership were more progressive than those of forced migrants, the mean score for the latter group (3.42) was relatively neutral. The most pronounced discrepancies were found in attitudes towards transgender equality, honour killings, religious attacks and sexual consent. In

the case of these four items, native values appeared to be relatively partisan. Consequently, it is the findings concerning these four items that appear to be the most supportive of the FRPP symbolic restrictionist argument.

When we considered the results of the latent profile analyses, in which we investigated whether different classes of natives and migrants existed with regards to these value scores, we again found some relevant discrepancies. Among native respondents, we found three very distinct classes: progressives, moderates and conservatives. Most of these native respondents (61%) fell into the progressive category, as their value orientations were consistently positive across all items. Those whose value orientations varied across items accounted for 22% of the native sample, with conservatives making up the remaining 17%. Although the three classes we were able to identify in the forced migrant sample were not the same as those in the native sample, a significant difference in the distribution of value orientations was apparent. Forced migrants who were deemed (predominantly) progressive constituted only 8% of the sample. The largest group of forced migrants were those who were predominantly conservative (63%). This group differed from the conservative native group in their more progressive attitudes towards homosexuality, abortion, religious freedom and female dress freedom, which explains why only small discrepancies were observed for these items in the aggregated analysis.

Despite these significant discrepancies between FMV and the values of the total sample of host country participants, it is important to recognise the cross-country variation within the latter sample. In France, Spain, the UK, and to a lesser extent, Australia, most respondents held predominantly progressive values. Although just over a quarter of Australians belonged to the conservative group (compared to 12.2% in France; 12.5% in Spain; and 17.7% in the UK), more than twice as many Australians still fell into the progressive category. The Polish sample, on the other hand, was divided evenly between progressives (41.7%) and conservatives (40.4%). Consequently, while we discovered some significant value discrepancies between forced migrants and host country natives in general, Polish value orientations appear to be more closely aligned with FMV than those of the other host societies in this study.

Conclusion

To our knowledge this is the first study to have compared native and FMVs using the same questionnaire. Our analysis allowed us to measure the extent to which symbolic threat perception – as understood through ITT – in large, forced migrant host societies has a basis in reality. This research was essential because such threats are feasibly evoked by emerging FRPPs, whose policies have the potential to endanger the welfare of millions of people who have been forced to relocate abroad in order to escape persecution. Our findings revealed that 9 values held by forced migrants are significantly more conservative than those held by natives. Four of these incongruities appear to represent threats to established host society liberties, namely those concerning transgender equality, religious attacks, honour killings and sexual consent. However, while our results appear to support aspects of the FRPP symbolic threat narrative, they should not be interpreted as vindication of such policies.

Firstly, we need to stress that our forced migrant sample may not be very representative, as one can reasonably assume that the majority of forced migrants do not have the means to complete an online questionnaire. Secondly, our findings also

revealed that a significant percentage of forced migrant respondents either opposed or held neutral views on the 4 problematic items. Thus, while the enactment of restrictionist asylum policies might prevent potentially dangerous forced migrants from settling in given societies, such policies discriminate against people on the basis of association and also put the lives of large numbers of virtuous forced migrants further at risk. Furthermore, our findings showed that the value orientations of nearly half of the Polish sample were largely consistent with majority FMV. Thus, perceptions of symbolic threat are considerably less valid in Poland than in the other 4 countries of this study, all of which, ironically, have exhibited a more liberal approach to refugee settlement in recent times. Future studies might seek to investigate exactly where these value congruencies lie and whether a similar level of value compatibility exists in other countries where exclusionist FRPP discourse is pervasive. Finally, by abandoning legitimate asylum seekers who are potentially dangerous, first world countries are reducing the chance of value moderation and likely perpetuating the violence and injustices taking place in the conflict-stricken countries they were trying to escape. Robust social integration programs have the potential to function as liberating or acculturating agents. Such programs might exist as part of a broader civic integration program that also implements measures to identify and monitor potential threats to civil society. A limitation of this study was that we were not able to analyse the effect of time spent in host societies on FMVs. We encourage future scholars to investigate trends of the forced migrant acculturation process along with the barriers to moderating their extreme values.

Disclosure of interest

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

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Table A1. Descriptive overview of native respondents by country (N = 816)

	Australia	France	Poland	Spain	United Kingdom
Gender					
Male	40.1	38.4	45.4	56.0	45.7
Female	59.9	59.8	53.4	42.3	54.3
Other/rather not say	-	1.8	1.2	1.8	-
Religious beliefs					
Christian	58.0	52.4	90.2	54.2	61.6
Jewish	0.6	0.6	0.6	1.2	0.7
Buddhist	2.5	-	-	0.6	0.6
None	33.1	45.7	8.6	42.9	35.0
Other	5.7	1.2	0.6	1.2	2.0

Note: Percentages.

	Australia	France	Poland	Spain	United Kingdom
Age	51.46 (18.43)	41.94 (12.18)	38.13 (12.16)	39.43 (10.67)	42.59 (14.26)
Educational attainment	1.63 (0.48)	1.52 (0.50)	1.53 (0.50)	1.46 (0.50)	1.54 (0.50)
Income	4.62 (2.58)	3.84 (2.48)	3.41 (2.37)	4.13 (2.54)	4.05 (2.48)

Note: Mean scores, standard deviation between brackets. Educational attainment was measured on a six-point scale (1 = primary school, 6 = PhD).

Table A2. Descriptive overview of asylum seeker and refugee respondents (N = 163)

Gender	
Male	77.3
Female	22.7
Religious beliefs	
Christian	8.6
Sunni Muslim	84.7
Shia Muslim	2.5
Other denomination of Islam	4.3
Region of birth	
Asia	65.2
Middle East	34.8

Note: Percentages. Empty categories of religious beliefs and region of birth were not presented.

Age	32.70 (5.89)
Educational attainment	1.15 (0.36)

Note: Mean scores, standard deviation between brackets. Educational attainment was measured on a six-point scale (1 = primary school, 6 = PhD).