

SOME ASPECTS OF DEFENCE IN THE EIGHTEEN FIFTIES IN NEW SOUTH WALES

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THIS paper is confined to some of the political aspects of Colonial and Imperial defence, and does not discuss technical strategy; nor are even the political aspects of naval defence discussed. The paper suggests that the activity of Sir William Denison in New South Wales, coming after the attempts by Earl Grey to reduce Imperial military expenditure, and the activity of John Robert Godley in the War Office, and of his friends, were important factors in the ending of the British garrison system in colonies which had achieved some measure of responsible government.

The views of all three men took account of the growth of the Australian colonies, and those of Grey and Godley were part of separate strands of thought which formed a pattern of opinion in favour of reducing British military expenditure. Trends and events elsewhere in the Empire were observed and influenced opinion. In fact, New South Wales and Victoria were less obviously open to criticisms of their military contribution than were the more complicated societies of South Africa and New Zealand.

The eighteen fifties and eighteen sixties in the Australasian group generally saw the occasional war scares, such as the Crimean War, the fear of the French, and the American scares of 1859 and 1861, the Polish scare of 1864. The colonies, aware of their growing pastoral wealth and gold, developed some transitory interest in building fortification and in having available some military forces with which to man them. More significantly the period also saw the culmination of the attempts to relieve British military pressure and to lessen the dispersion of garrisons abroad. It was a period in which, in Eastern Australia, New South Wales and Tasmania acquired a large measure of control over their internal affairs and in which Queensland and Victoria were created with large measure of self-government. They were pre-occupied with its exercise even sometimes when the military aspect of the external world seemed threatening. There was a tendency to accept greater responsibility for defence, but against a background of continual Imperial strength. The long-run estimate may be that the sum total of achievement was small in the colonies, but this should not obscure the importance of the changes in the weight of participation in defence activities which occurred in these years as between the colonies and the mother country.

By the beginning of the eighteen sixties, the military preparedness of the Australian colonial group was still affected by British colonial military policy. Though a large measure of responsible government had been attained in New South Wales,

Queensland, Victoria and South Australia, decisions as to peace and war were made by the Imperial Government, which also formulated and conducted British foreign policy. The control of the Queen's troops, including decisions as to their movement, also remained in Imperial hands. Even before the constitutional trends matured, however, local legislatures were expected to contribute some at least of the money for fortification and even sometimes some for troops. Given the importance of the Imperial Government's control, it would be incorrect to consider Australian military arrangements without some reference to the wider context of British military colonial policy generally.

SOME BRITISH OPINION IN REGARD TO IMPERIAL GARRISONS IN THE COLONIES

The direction of later Utilitarian, and also Radical, thought, of the influence of the Manchester School, and of the Colonial Reformers, was conducive to the cutting down of Imperial expenditure on colonies ; and military expenditure was an important part of this, especially in the case of colonies that made provision for much of their civil expenditure. There were wide differences among those who argued for economy in colonial military expenditure ; the *Sydney Morning Herald*, for instance, not ineptly summed up¹ one such difference between the reformers led by Molesworth and those led by Cobden when it said that one recognized the colonists as part of the British family and the other as mere rivals in the art of money-making. Colonial reformers, such as Adderley (later the first Viscount Norton)² and John Robert Godley, looked back nostalgically at the military self-reliance of the old American colonies ; they probably saw the self-reliance out of relationship to the challenge or threat,³ and some saw the costly assumption of greater Imperial charges in Colonial defence as one of the ultimate factors in the discontent and changes leading to the Revolution of 1776. Both those, whom we would perhaps describe loosely as Imperialists and anti-Imperialists, were a significant force in Britain making for the reduction in Imperial military expenditure. The concomitant of such developments as representative government—and even more so of responsible government—the repeal of the Navigation Laws, and the disappearance of exclusive markets or markets whose exclusiveness had been protected by Imperial legislation and arrangements, was seen to be some responsibility for self-defence—and not always just as a *quid pro quo*. If some relationships onerous to colonies disappeared, the arguments became stronger for economies to be derived from lessening Imperial responsibilities.⁴ But it was sometimes seen, as colonial nationalism developed, that a moral corollary of political self-government was a capacity and will on the part of the colonial community to defend itself.⁵

If official opinion was more significant than public opinion, perhaps public opinion was less anti-Imperialist in the sense of favouring dismemberment than has been thought.⁶ Some may not have always wanted to be pressed too sharply on the implications of their attitude or may not have always realized them fully, and Gladstone was cautious⁷ as to the possibilities of persuading public opinion to reduce

expenditure and to support firm official policy. Bodelsen has suggested⁸ that the public were fairly indifferent. At any rate, by the middle eighteen fifties there was certainly strong senior official opinion in favour of reducing expenditure, though there was much searching after the content of the Imperial relationship.⁹ Given responsible government, given Imperial control of foreign policy, what was the tie between colony and mother country? Was it that the "new" community was protected by the old? If there was some content in the Imperial relationship other than that of military protection and obedience, did the obligation of protecting outweigh the advantages and benefits to the mother country, and would the relationship be appreciated by the colony if it was not given military protection?

Some of the dissatisfaction with the colonial military policy in the fifties arose from the impression that the arrangements were expensive without being efficient. In the House of Commons, Adderley said¹⁰ of the present arrangements that not only were they needlessly expensive, but that not one single colony of the British Empire was in a state of adequate defence and security in the event of war breaking out. Both the majority and minority reports of the Committee on the Expense of the Military Defences of the Colonies¹¹ agreed in this. Elliot, Assistant Under-Secretary for Colonies, expressed his agreement with Godley, then Assistant Under-Secretary in the War Department, and Hamilton (of the Treasury) that no success but rather disaster would be likely to emerge from "scattering the land forces of the Empire over the numerous outlying possessions of a great maritime and colonizing state" such as Great Britain. "The mistress of the seas is mistress of whatever colonies she pleases to hold or to take; and if she ceases to be mistress of the seas, it is not forts or garrisons which will save her colonies." Mr. Arthur Mills, the Chairman of the Select Committee of 1861, interpreted¹² the evidence of General Burgoyne, who was the Inspector-General of Fortifications, and Rear-Admiral Erskine and Admiral Elliott as being that, notwithstanding the great cost of defence, a large number of the colonies were not defensible. Some of these fortifications might have been wrongly designed, as for instance, was considered the case in the controversy over the fortifications of Sydney Harbour. But the wider question was whether the arrangements were such as to be useful in the contingencies and situations for which they were designed. It was argued that the fortifications were frequently built where they could not be sufficiently garrisoned in the absence of local militia or volunteer forces, and it was argued that these fortifications in time of war might be turned by the enemy. The general trend of thought was that the vital matter was English supremacy at sea,¹³ even if in fact the Navy endured retrenchments. Lord Grey totally disapproved¹⁴ of the whole policy of large expenditure upon fortifications in colonies; the experiences of the past seemed to him to suggest "that almost the whole of the money had been absolutely wasted; that with respect to some of those fortifications erected at great expense, the wisest thing we could now do would be to blow them up again". Gladstone's view was that the system, if it could so be called, as Merivale questioned, that was in existence was "founded upon a state of things in the condition of this Empire relatively to other powers which has entirely passed

away". He suggested that the modern quickness and constancy of communication meant that England was the very centre of those communications, and they could be supported upon the principle of keeping the great mass of force at home, and applying it as they may require.¹⁵ "If France in a war with England struck at the heart of the Empire, England", said Robert Lowe,¹⁶ "I should hope the government today would be inclined to keep every man in England and even bring troops from the colonies. We should think we could afford to lose a place like Sydney, but London we could not afford to lose from the Imperial point of view." The Duke of Newcastle argued¹⁷ that a consequence of the electrical telegraph would be that an enemy's fleet would take care to avoid those colonies in which they knew that England had a sufficient garrison and attack the weaker ones. Accordingly, referring to the Australian colonies, he thought¹⁸ it would be preferable to defend them with a Navy by intercepting the foreign attack from Europe. He would concentrate the land forces then as far as was possible (but it was "a matter of degree"). Godley, defending his plan of throwing the responsibility of defending themselves upon the colonists, argued that they would be less effectively defended by English garrisons, "which are uniformly inadequate", and which, in addition, rendered the colonists unprepared to defend themselves.¹⁹ The present arrangement would increase the number of British troops dispersed throughout the world in distant places, and this would weaken Britain in a future war.²⁰ In effect, England would have a large portion of her forces locked up in distant parts of the world, and her own resources for any general war proportionately diminished. When he was examined in 1861, Godley's hostility to dispersion was tempered by his deference to the general principle of "letting the colonists settle for themselves what is the best way of defending themselves".²¹ His main aim was to throw upon the colonists the habit of responsibility of self-defence, and it was a secondary but very important object to diminish the Imperial expenditure.²²

The concern of the Select Committee was perhaps more with the cost to the United Kingdom of the existing arrangements than with their technical efficiency. The Committee did regard as important the effects on the colonists of not having the responsibility of their own defence. This question of responsibility was emphasized not only by Godley, but, of course, by Gladstone, and by others such as Adderley, who were constantly referring to the virtues in this respect of the Old Colonial System in its earlier phases. On the other hand, this concern over the expense of extensive colonial fortifications was the stronger because of the military misgivings as to their efficiency and because of a tendency to concentrate in the time of Anglo-French and Anglo-Russian tension on the defence of the Empire's heart. Even if there was a failure to work out the detailed implications of a reliance on naval strength for naval policy and the extra cost and burden which Empire imposed on Admiralty, the presence of a powerful Navy was assumed.

There were, like Grey, Newcastle and Fortescue,²³ some who were very careful about reducing the Imperial commitments irresponsibly.²⁴ But the pressure of the Radicals was strong, and Secretaries of State and Parliamentary Under-Secretaries

were unwilling to give them levers which they could use to press them more drastically. Without drawing over-explicitly their attitudes, statesmen of different political beliefs and with different views as to the maintenance of Empire believed in a need to reduce military expenditure on the colonies, though there were differences as to the extent to which this was to be done and at what cost it was to be put into effect.

There was, however, in the late eighteen fifties, fairly complete agreement that British colonies were entitled to some military assistance from the mother country because of the danger to them which could arise from their involvement in British foreign policy over which they had no control.²⁵ On the other hand it was sometimes felt that, especially in the case of Canada, Britain might be involved because of the involvement of her colonial subjects.²⁶ There was also very general agreement in principle that the Imperial troops should not bear the responsibility for internal defence in countries governed under a system of responsible government. Some of this feeling came from an anachronistic fear on the part of Colonial Reformers, who feared the suppression of local political ambitions, the coercion of local opinion, by Imperial troops, but sometimes it derived from the opinion that the maintenance of law and order and the conduct of political policy were functions which should accompany one another.²⁷

There was, of course, some qualification and subtlety in the enunciation of this principle as to internal defence in the case of internal problems arising out of or accentuated by British policy—as in the West Indies. It was argued whether the natives were to be regarded as subjects of the Queen or as foreigners, and whether the conflict between settler and native was a local matter or a matter of Imperial concern.²⁸

One should not take too seriously Lord Herbert's remark²⁹ when, as Secretary of State for War, he was asked about the use of Imperial troops in the putting down of riots. "All service is good for British troops; they do it all exceedingly well and it makes a variety for them." Herbert did agree that it would be very objectionable if British troops were used for political purposes in a colony, although he was not convinced that it was easy to draw a distinction. Lord Grey's proposals of 1847 and 1851 were much assisted in New South Wales by the spectre of the reception of convicts, and then by the gold discoveries.

THE TREND OF POLICY TO REDUCE BRITISH MILITARY EXPENDITURE ON THE COLONIAL EMPIRE

Indeed, probably one of the earliest incidents in the trend, in its more visible phases, to reduce British military colonial expenditure was the action by Lord Grey, as Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, in ordering the reduction of the garrison in New South Wales and a transfer of fortifications to the care of the colonial Government. Grey regarded his despatch of November, 1846,³⁰ to Sir Charles FitzRoy, then Governor of New South Wales, as "the first step to carrying into effect the principle that the colonies, excepting important military and naval stations, can only look to the mother country for military support in any danger to which they may be exposed from a powerful foreign enemy; that Her Majesty's troops are

not to be expected to undertake the duties of police and of maintaining the internal tranquillity of the colony"³¹ There was no particular local provocation for Grey's despatch to FitzRoy.

The need to increase the home forces arising out of tension between England and France was conducive to a reduction in the colonial forces, as the Duke of Wellington's long-held concern over the smallness of the home army was confronted by the determination of the Treasury to reduce total military expenditure at a time when the government was no less than usually sensitive to radical opinion in Parliament.³² The need to transfer forces to New Zealand from New South Wales was the occasion on which Grey raised this matter in regard to New South Wales.

Grey did not negotiate.³³ He was perhaps more fortunate than some of his successors, in that he did not have to deal with a responsible ministry with independent revenue. Grey argued that the Australian colonies, and we may here confine our discussion to New South Wales, were entitled still to look for their fair share of that protection which it is the "object of Her Majesty's Naval and Military Forces to extend to all parts of the British Empire".³⁴ But the British Government thought that with such an increase in wealth and population, the colonies could reasonably be expected to bear part of the heavy charges borne by the inhabitants of the United Kingdom.

Grey's scheme was that the colonists would provide any additional means of local defence which might be required, and fortifications and local militia; in addition, any Imperial troops above the amount fixed by the Imperial Government were to be paid for by the colonial Government, assuming the Imperial Government had them available to supply on colonial request. They were to make provision for more police or other types of local force. In practice, at this stage, it was a matter of paying for more Imperial troops, the minimum number of which was to be determined and paid for by the Home Government. There is, perhaps, a tendency to identify local interests in defence and internal defence sometimes, though later the view was probably more widely held that the Queen's troops, whether paid for by the colony or not, should not assist in maintaining internal order.

One reason for some opposition in the colony to Grey's proposals was that the colony was not so certain of its immunity from foreign attack, in particular at this time it feared there would be local repercussions if England and France were to come into collision over Tahiti.³⁵ This divergence in views well illustrates the general problem. The British Government not unnaturally regarded³⁶ the Australian community as peculiarly isolated from foreign attack, and no doubt its particular estimates were better founded than those of colonial public opinion. Colonial opinion thus insulated, relying on British naval protection, interested in the growth of the colonial society and economy, had not that constant preoccupation with measures for the integrity of the realm which had grown with the Imperial experience of Great Britain. When the colony became aware of threats, its interest was intense, if spasmodic and short-lived. The period was one in which there was occasion for anxiety in the Australasian group, particularly in regard to the French in Tahiti and

New Caledonia. In fact, during the Crimean War there was probably more anxiety among the Imperial proconsuls in regard to possible attacks by "our friends the French" from New Caledonia and "our relations the Americans" than in regard to visits by the Russians.³⁷

The despatches of the Governor, Sir Charles FitzRoy, and the debates of the New South Wales Legislative Council show³⁸ concern that enough forces be present to provide against internal disorder; though the Legislature's debates reveal mixed feelings and a fear lest the colony might be saddled with the whole military expenditure. The Governor was aware of the charged atmosphere over the land question, and both Governor and Council were aware of possible uses for troops in a colony which had been penal.

Of course, the relevance of convictism could be seen differently from the Imperial point of view. A motion in the New South Wales Legislative Council in 1850, protesting against the withdrawal of troops because of its inopportuneness "from the aspect of internal police and crime", evoked a reply from Earl Grey that if the police were needed because of the former presence of a penal establishment, the wealth of the colony was largely due to the presence of convict labour.³⁹

Though not surprisingly, Dr. John Dunmore Lang discounted⁴⁰ the need for troops, FitzRoy—now Governor-General in and over New South Wales and the other colonies—wanted an increased military force as a result of the influx of population and the expected problems of law and order in the gold colony, and the extra troops were made available at the colonial cost.⁴¹

By the middle of the eighteen fifties, circumstances had changed and the need arose for manning fortifications, whose building had been delayed by colonial sensitivity over the delay in securing responsible government. By this time, however, Sir William Denison was Governor-General and the Crimean War stimulated local interest in defence, if it also was the occasion for review and change in the military administration in Great Britain.

If the Colonial Reformers argued that representative and responsible government had as a corollary greater colonial responsibility for self-defence, somewhat the same connexion was made in New South Wales. For instance, it is significant, even if it was a matter of bargaining rather than of conviction, that the New South Wales Legislative Council in August, 1849, adopted Mr. Lowe's argument⁴² that the management of wastelands should be transferred to the colony, in return for which the colony would pay for such military forces as the colonial Assembly to be established decided was necessary for its protection. The *Herald* was critical⁴³ of this, but considered the colony should not forget its own duties as well as its rights.

The policy of reducing Imperial military commitments was, as the reason for it would suggest, a general Imperial policy not confined to the Australian group. An attempt had been made to apply it in British North America and at the Cape. In New Zealand, attempts had been made to secure greater local contributions, another form of colonial responsibility.⁴⁴

Soon after the Whigs came to power, Grey took advantage of the Oregon Settlement to reduce the numbers in British North America. He indicated in 1847 and 1848 that the British Government could not assume responsibility for the salary of the Governor-General of Canada until it secured relief by the partial assumption by the colony of its defence costs. The Governor-General, Elgin, agreed with Grey, but was aware of the encouragement which the proximity of America could give to separatist feeling if the Secretary proceeded with anything but great caution, and he convinced Grey of the distinction between what "ought, in reason, to be the arrangement and what can be so".⁴⁵

It was not only a matter of encouraging the faithful among the colonists, and avoiding encouragement to separatists. The other major factor was the relations with the United States of America.

But the transfer of ordnance lands and barracks was made, and if the tempo of reduction varied to such an extent that it was not always even reduction, there is no doubt about the intention of the policy. "The policy of Her Majesty's Government", wrote⁴⁶ Labouchere in 1855, "continues the same, and they desire to place their main dependence on the well-proved loyalty and courage of Her Majesty's Canadian subjects." Elgin, back in the House of Lords, in 1856 was concerned lest the act of increasing the garrison, connected with the British-United States differences over recruiting and the Clayton Bulwer Treaty of 1850, should be regarded as suggesting that the earlier reductions were accidental. They had been the "result of a policy deliberately adopted and steadily and consistently carried out", and would have taken effect even if the Crimean War had not occurred.⁴⁷

The Maritime Provinces did not seem so wealthy or so capable of self-reliance as Canada, and the great harbour of Halifax was regarded as "one of the most important positions in a strategical point of view in North America".⁴⁸ So the same pressure was not put upon them, and it was the unevenness of the arrangement that led Godley to refer to the inconsistency and inequality of arrangements in North America, the only area apart from Australia in which he thought the Grey arrangements had been applied.⁴⁹ The number of troops stationed in Canada did not exceed the minimum paid for by the Imperial Government.⁵⁰

The demands for the Crimean expeditionary forces accelerated the trend. From 1857, when relations with the United States improved, the economy path was retrodden and further explored, for with the Indian Mutiny there was another reduction.⁵¹ In New Zealand, too, an arrangement was initiated for the colony to contribute £5 per soldier, though this, too, was prejudiced by the breaking out of the Maori Wars, which had quadrupled the number of troops in New Zealand. The total cost to Britain apparently exceeded⁵² £80 per soldier, not including transport, so New Zealand was not to contribute a very large proportion.

At the Cape there had been constant effort on the part of the Colonial Office to diminish the number of troops, and "they have been as constantly increased again, upon some apprehension arising".⁵³ There had been attempts "in the most eloquent manner and constantly repeated to call upon the Colony to contribute to

its own defences".⁵⁴ The number of troops between 1857 and 1861 was reduced by half.⁵⁵ The German Legion had been recruited, and even after this the cost in 1861 was about £500,000, and the Duke of Newcastle considered⁵⁶ that between £500,000 and £750,000 a year was the average cost in the 'fifties of South African military defence, with or without native wars. Though Newcastle pointed out that the Cape was the bastion on the route to India and the place for keeping Imperial reserves, the Duke agreed that it was relations with the natives which substantially caused the number of troops there to vary.⁵⁷ By the end of the eighteen fifties the expense was diminishing and might be looked upon as "in the course of progressive reduction".⁵⁸ Merivale, who early in 1861 had left the Permanent Under-Secretaryship for the Colonies to take the corresponding post in the India Office, agreed rather with the variation, in reference to New Zealand and the Cape, of Mr. Arthur Mills, "oscillating expenditure sometimes more, sometimes less, depending upon the breaking out of a native war".⁵⁹

SIR WILLIAM DENISON—THE DEFENCES IN NEW SOUTH WALES—THE POSITION WHEN HE ARRIVED AND DURING HIS ADMINISTRATION OF NEW SOUTH WALES

By this time, Sir William Denison had been for some years in New South Wales; in fact, his term was just ending. By profession an engineer, in 1842 he had won respect, and indeed his knighthood, for his inspection of the Bermuda defences. During his term as Lieutenant-Governor of Van Diemen's Land, he maintained his interest in defence matters, both inside and outside the Colony.⁶⁰

Denison's previous interests and his occupancy of the Governor-Generalship at this particular time are by themselves sufficient to account for his giving much thought to defence matters. Temperamentally he was an active and energetic man, anxious to participate in affairs. Though the role of the representative of the Crown in decision-making declined after the attainment of responsible government, it is unlikely that Denison welcomed a more passive role. Even if he thought the Governor-Generalship an idle office which should be discontinued⁶¹ (Denison continued to be Governor-General), he was interested in questions affecting the various colonies such as steam postal communication. This, after all, was the man who wrote to an acquaintance in February, 1857: "I am President of a Philosophical Society and I have succeeded in organizing an Agricultural Society. For both of these I have to write. This gives me something to do."⁶² His long comments and appreciations on military matters may have given satisfaction to himself as well as interest to his readers.

But in New South Wales, Denison encountered several matters which engaged and perhaps deepened his interest. The first he noticed even on his way to Government House: "the conviction of the inefficiency of the works now in progress forced itself on me as I was entering the harbour. I lost no time in making myself acquainted with all that had taken place both with relation to these works and the defences in general."⁶³

It sounds almost like one of the stories about General von Moltke. It seems perhaps strange that anyone entering the harbour as it must have looked on a fine January day in 1855⁶⁴ would have had time or inclination to dwell on this. It may have been an almost spontaneous piece of professional observation. The fortifications were obviously incomplete. The forts whose long-drawn-out conception had been quickened by the Crimean War were some of them still unfinished, though the rowing-boat which had been doing service at Sydney Heads had been replaced.

When Denison came he found what came to be called the Grey Plan in operation—in the sense of being the guiding principle—in New South Wales. Grey had suggested in 1850⁶⁵ that, if the colonial Government desired to build fortifications by military labour, the British Government, without charging for pensions or for transport, would station an additional regiment of sappers and miners in the colony provided the colonial legislature voted their full pay.

Grey's proposal was considered fairly favourably by the Executive Council,⁶⁶ and was recommended by the Government to the Legislative Council in November, 1851,⁶⁷ but the matter had been held up on the issue of the local Legislature's desire to control colonial territorial as well as colonial general revenue,⁶⁸ and fortifications, too, were not given much attention until 1853. In August, 1851, meanwhile, as we noticed, FitzRoy had appealed for an increased military force on the grounds that more were needed to assist civil power to keep law and order in the new circumstances. Pakington, the Secretary of State for War and Colonies,⁶⁹ agreed to send two service companies to New South Wales, the whole expense and upkeep to be defrayed by the colony.

The British Government hoped that the Legislature would see the "justice and policy . . . in consequence of the high cost of living which has become the consequence of the recent discoveries of Gold" of making extra allowances to the officers. If the obligations were not met, the troops would be withdrawn. The Legislative Council had, in fact, at the beginning of October, 1852, agreed⁷⁰ in principle to make provision for the pay and subsistence of the troops within the colony. The subsequent military estimates were for the most part passed. The fears of external aggression, which were occasionally expressed in the colony at that time, perhaps to some extent influenced the acceptance of Grey's scheme and the colonial expenditure it implied. For instance, the possible arrival of filibusters from California was mentioned by Dr. Douglass⁷¹ in the Legislative Council in 1853 when urging the appointment of a Select Committee to inquire into the means of defending and putting Sydney Harbour into a proper state of defence, and the Governor-General assured the Legislative Council, when proroguing it late in December, 1853, that he had adopted measures for beginning temporary works of defence.⁷² He had asked the Colonial Office for a company of sappers and miners, but such was the demand for troops that it was, in fact, impossible to send out sappers or miners or artillery at that time.⁷³

Perhaps inspired by some such agitation as to the Government's inactivity, the Colonial Secretary had obtained at the end of May, 1854, a report on the progress made in the Harbour's defence works, and on the basis of this report the Governor-

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Fort Macquarie, built by Francis Greenway on Bennelong Point, taken from the south c. 1865

Photo—New South Wales Government Printer



General found himself able to inform the Legislative Council early in June⁷⁴ that the defence works were in a satisfactory state of progress. He had every confidence that with aid from a naval force in Sydney Harbour the colony had ample means of repelling a privateer's attack, and the vigilance of a French and English naval force in the Indian and Pacific Stations would be an adequate security that any attack more serious than that of a privateer would be easily frustrated. Almost at the end of the month the message announcing the declaration of war on Russia by England arrived.⁷⁵

In spite of the apparently pressing need and the public agitation, in spite of suggestions to meet the emergency by removing the Treasury even twenty miles into the interior,⁷⁶ the debate over the fortifications vote did not occur for some time. Dr. Lang believed it was the bounden duty of Britain to protect the colonies while she exercised sovereignty, but his opinion that if the colonies separated tomorrow no foreign power would think of interfering with them did not receive much support.⁷⁷ By November, 1854, however, the defence works were rapidly progressing, but it became known soon after Denison's arrival that the Governor-General had ordered part of the work to be stopped.⁷⁸ Denison thought that the works which had been agreed on were technically adequate, but for reasons of cost and the difficulty of manning them efficiently, he directed that a fresh scheme be prepared.

THE LOCAL MATTERS INFLUENCING THE FORMULATION OF DENISON'S VIEWS ON AN APPORTIONMENT OF DEFENCE RESPONSIBILITY BETWEEN THE COLONIES AND THE MOTHER COUNTRY

The controversy which developed over the relative desirability of the two schemes of fortification was of some importance, as in the short-run it delayed the adequate protection of Sydney Harbour and also involved Denison in the defence question locally. One scheme—that which Denison found half completed when he arrived—put the main emphasis on works at the harbour's mouth; the most important advantage of his plan seemed to him to be that the batteries near the port could be more easily and more economically manned.

Late in February, 1855,⁷⁹ the Executive Council had considered Denison's views, and in view of the inability "under the altered circumstances of the colony to keep the several works at the entrance of the Port efficiently garrisoned, and the facility of garrisoning works in the City" deferred to Denison's opinion and advised the suspension of the works at the entrance. They anticipated "the concurrence of the Legislative Council", but considered that the other works of defence should be proceeded with immediately, the erection of entirely new batteries to wait "until an opportunity shall have been afforded of taking the views of the Legislative Council".

Several times the alterations were questioned by the Legislative Council, and the matter was not finally resolved until the end of August, 1855. Although there was some concern over possible foreign aggression, there was a great deal of apathy and some indifference.

Mr. (later Sir) Stuart Donaldson, for instance, felt⁸⁰ that it was preposterous that an enemy might really levy contributions to the tune of £5,000,000. If they came with that intention they would have to return very disappointed, for nothing would be easier than to remove the gold bullion in the banks to Parramatta by the railway. The *Herald*⁸¹ was moved to write that the people of New South Wales were a pattern of philosophical indifference, and the Government on several occasions found its estimates were not passed.⁸² Some of the opposition was regarded as a matter of party-political motives, suggesting, perhaps, that this topic seemed of secondary importance.⁸³ The *Herald* had taken⁸⁴ the point of view that the constitutional question of Denison's departure from the Council's enactment for the original fortifications was secondary to which was the better plan of defence. Some of the hesitation was undoubtedly due to this sensitivity over Denison's initiative, although a censure motion was defeated. The suspension of the works had perhaps caused all the more controversy because they had been reluctantly undertaken as a new duty and as an obligation to face a problem with which it had been previously the responsibility of the Imperial Government to deal.

Towards the end of 1856, Denison, knowing the work was progressing, desired that the works be manned without delay, and was "the more anxious with regard to this as the prospect of war with America does not appear to be so remote as I would wish".⁸⁵ Reasons of economy and difficulty of recruitment had prevented the police from being used to the extent earlier hoped, and so Denison came to feel that a permanent military force was absolutely essential.

The response to the external threat, the example of the Volunteer Movement in England and the feeling of self-reliance inspired the formation of the Volunteer Corps in New South Wales in 1854. With the absence of a military tradition in the colony and the lessening of the external danger, the Movement lapsed until 1860. In this year, again following the revival of threat in Europe and example in England, the second Volunteer Movement began, with its legislative sanction contained until 1867 in the 1854 Act of the New South Wales Legislative Council. Denison was very aware of the limited role the Volunteer organization could play, though he exerted himself in reviving the Corps. Since the Volunteer Corps did not significantly contribute to a solution, its treatment has been reserved for another paper.


Not regarding volunteer corps or militia as the chief force, Denison managed to secure the agreement of his Executive Council to the presence of several artillery companies and an infantry regiment. He thought these were immediately necessary. As well as the size of the force, he thought that the expense and the distribution of costs between the Colony and the mother country had to be decided.⁸⁶ The total number of troops would be about 600, but the increase was within the maximum number for which the Imperial Government would provide ordinary pay and allowances, and the colonial Government would have to pay only the extra allowances. The Assembly, with some fear of foreign attack, by a small majority agreed to the allowances, but did not deal with the wider question.⁸⁷ By July, 1859,⁸⁸ Denison again consulted the Executive Council as to whether the Colony wished to retain some

DEFENCE IN THE EIGHTEEN FIFTIES IN N.S.W.


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SYDNEY HARBOUR DEFENCES—SATURDAY AFTERNOON PRACTICE.



SYDNEY HARBOUR DEFENCES—RAISING ONE OF THE 18-TON GUNS.

Photographs from the *Illustrated Sydney News*—from a copy in the Mitchell Library, Sydney

additional companies which it was already planned to send away, which they could do by incurring some expense. The Executive Council preferred not to act without parliamentary authority. These attitudes may well have led Denison to think it dangerous to leave decisions as to the number of troops to a colonial Parliament.

The discussions over the number of imperial troops and over the colonial allowances in 1857 and 1858⁸⁹ in the Legislature are interesting as illustrating some colonial views as to the responsibility for colonial defence, the lack of sustained colonial interest and the extent to which the absence of local control sometimes prejudiced local support.

It is difficult to separate out and characterize particular colonial attitudes, for the subject may not have ranked very importantly in the minds of colonial parliamentarians. There was in 1856 Mr. Arnold, speaking⁹⁰ with less than justice, as the *Herald* pointed out,⁹¹ who said in the Legislative Assembly that the real use of the military and naval officers "appeared to be to give a brilliancy to public fetes, and to midnight balls". There was the republicanism of Dr. Lang which was not shared by the respectable inhabitants. References to republicanism, one suspects, sometimes were not to a republican form of government, but rather to the popular party which did not necessarily espouse separatism.⁹² Perhaps "anti-British" social sentiment was underrated and, on the other hand, is confused with separatist sentiment. Perhaps both are given attention at the expense of a preoccupation with internal problems of growth in its various forms and a remote insularity in regard to overseas matters not confined to the radicals. This insularity was probably fundamentally the hope of being free from troublesome contact with European events and their consequences, even if it sometimes showed itself among respectable inhabitants in reference to the British connexion—which seemed the channel of contact. There seems also to have been some awareness, naturally without complete foresight of the eventual results, that colonial relationships were likely to change. The *Herald* agreed repeatedly that New South Wales should not cut the painter and that if she wished for British help she should make some contribution. There were some factors in common with other colonial societies, though there were important differences.

Though the Legislative Council voted the fortification money, it did not discuss the question of principle involved in manning the forts. In January, 1857, however, the desire for economy, the more stringent financial circumstances of a colony which seemed more tranquil, can be seen in the debates⁹³ of the Legislative Assembly over a motion which stated that the two Imperial companies stationed in the Colony at colonial expense were unnecessary and should be dispensed with after 1857. Though the motion was lost, the discussion cannot have seemed reassuring for the manning of the fortifications. At any rate, the incident probably made Denison conscious of the changes which would occur in the Colony's willingness to pay for troops.

Apart from such methods as addresses and petitions, the Legislature's only regular means of influencing the number of troops was through its willingness to pay

extra troops above the minimum paid for by the Imperial Government, and through its attitude to providing colonial allowances for all the troops.

The changes of mind of the Legislature both in Victoria and New South Wales created a problem in providing what the Imperial authorities regarded as adequate numbers if even a part of the troops paid for by the British Government received colonial allowances. The problem was basically that of harmonizing the decisions of the Imperial authority and the colonial legislature, the latter not beset with conflicting demands for troops, and expecting that it could change its mind at will.

In the luxury of comparative isolation and when misgivings as to internal disorder had proved largely unfounded, the stirrings of local self-consciousness and feelings fairly typical in a colonial community emerging from dependence found some expression. In 1850, Mr. Donaldson had considered Britain should bear the expense, as New South Wales was a British dependency. Opposing Dr. Lang's views, William Charles Wentworth had said that the military force was the only link which attached them to the parent state, and with this link broken they would cease to be a British dependency. Wentworth⁹⁴ had been protesting against a proposal to diminish Imperial responsibilities, but he had been thinking of "a body of gentlemen to supply their [the British soldiers'] place—a yeomanry or national guard . . ." who would fight against the rapine and violence of lawless mobs. Three years later his view was still "if . . . they were left to defend themselves at their own expense then . . . the British Crown had no further hold on our allegiance".⁹⁵ Wentworth's earlier comment⁹⁶ on one of Grey's military despatches, probably uttered in great heat, was also perceptive in the light of the subsequent course of events. The *Herald* reported him: "Let them get rid of British interference altogether and adopt those principles of responsible government, of which he for one, owned himself a supporter, and in hastening the approach of which he felt that there was one ingredient in the despatch." And thus the paradox that in the early fifties the fight for one aspect of self-government held up the attainment of another, some self-defence in the community, which did not move so quickly to assume financial and direct physical responsibility for defence. One member, Mr. Jones,⁹⁷ in the debate on Cowper's motion that the services of two companies of the British Army stationed in the colony at the colonists' expense should be dispensed with, could refer to expenditure for the maintenance of a *foreign* military force.

On the other hand, Mr. Parkes thought the colony should rely on its own resources, and even if this view was not always, in his own career, followed by executive action, it was an opinion which is often to be found in the community, for instance, in the *Sydney Morning Herald*, and it differed from complete reliance on Imperial measures.

In July, 1858, Mr. Deas Thomson asked⁹⁸ the Solicitor-General in the colonial Government of New South Wales, "considering the state of our relation with some of the most important foreign powers manifested by the news received from England, what steps had been taken for placing the recently erected forts on a footing of efficiency, as regards their armament . . . and the means of working them effectively". Mr. Lutwyche, the member of the Colonial Government, replied with a frankness

which we have come to know in recent times, " that in all the steps which the colonial Government had undertaken in reference thereto, the proper defence of the Colony had always been carefully kept in view. Correspondence had taken place between the Colonial and Home governments, but this could not be spoken of as it had not been concluded, but it might not be perhaps too much to say that the question as to the advisability of raising a local force had not escaped the notice of the Government ". The *Herald* very understandably concluded⁹⁹ that it was clear that the Ministry did not intend to make defensive preparations unless it heard of an actual declaration of war, when it would be too late to do so. In the event, the estimates for the two extra companies and for the Royal Artillery to be maintained by the colony were passed,¹⁰⁰ and in December, 1858,¹⁰¹ the Assembly was invited to consider a larger military force.

The second incident which may have helped to form Denison's views, the sending of troops to India, to which troops' income the Colony contributed at least allowances, raised this question of control. Denison had in 1858 ostensibly to withdraw undertakings given to Canning in India. In view of some circumstances connected with a misunderstanding over the horses to be sent, Denison did not press the matter of the right of the General in Command to direct the removal of the artillery to India,¹⁰² but when he received a request for reinforcements from New Zealand in 1859, he informed the General what force he thought could be spared. He suggested that the military commander act at once, and when the Governor-General communicated to the Executive Council and to the Legislative the steps which were necessary, he did so " in terms which should not raise the question of the right or power of the General in Command to dispose of the military forces in the colonies to the best of his judgement and when any occasions of urgency might arise ".

DENISON'S SUGGESTIONS FOR SHARING THE DEFENCE COSTS

Early, however, Denison became concerned¹⁰³ lest the view gained ground that England was indifferent to the state of the colonies. Leaving their defence entirely to them encouraged this impression. On the other hand, the insistence that the mother country assume the defence of the colonies was only valid on the assumption that the relation between the two was that of parent and child. This analogy, however, offered " no safe ground upon which to establish complicated systems of political instruction ".¹⁰⁴ The obligation arose from the involvement of the colonies in the mother country's foreign policy and because of her Imperial commerce.

His discussion of the nature of the threat showed that Imperial and colonial communities might both have interests in the colonial area, and there was an underlying belief in empire. A colonial military force would raise difficulties and problems, and in the absence of constant danger in Australia was not likely to be efficient.¹⁰⁵ He, therefore, suggested that the Colony defray a proportion of the cost of the regular (Imperial) troops, and the proportion might be readily estimated as half the pay and allowances of the total force required.

The Colony would then provide the accommodation and would erect and maintain all the fortifications which it might be deemed advisable to construct, while the

Imperial Government would organize troops, submit them to discipline and put them under its own military law. Troops must not be asked for under the fear of invasion and then sent away when the fear ended. On the other hand, if the Colony paid for the troops from England, and these troops were liable to be recalled either altogether or in full detachments, at the will of the military authorities in England, just grounds for complaint would be given to the Colony.

The third incident which almost certainly contributed to Denison's thought is relevant here: the issue of the right of the Colony to control Imperial troops raised when a detachment was sent to New Zealand. In the case of the Artillery, which had been brought out to aid and protect the harbour at the express request of the colonial Government, which had paid for their transport, and had also borne the cost of their pay and allowances, the Legislature considered this force to be different from the infantry in New South Wales and to be to some extent under the control of the local Government.

The Legislature did complain, and Denison felt in April, 1860,¹⁰⁶ that "further steps might be taken to vindicate the so-called right of the colonial Government to the entire control of this portion of Her Majesty's forces". It would be far better that the sum should be repaid to the Colony than that the "Government or the Legislature should be given an opening to claim the right of controlling the movement of the troops". It is important to notice that Denison was not furthering colonial control but seeking a system that would preserve Imperial goodwill and the freedom of administrative and strategic control to Great Britain. Denison was at first misunderstood¹⁰⁷ on this point, and the integrity of the Imperial control was insisted upon at the Admiralty and the War Office¹⁰⁸ (although Lord Herbert did not take it so seriously in regard to the Army as distinct from the Navy¹⁰⁹) and also by witnesses such as Newcastle before the 1861 Select Committee of the House of Commons.¹¹⁰ Denison believed that the colonial Legislature should indicate the troops for which it would pay, and a decision as to the number was to be made by the Imperial authorities. The question of control was one of which Denison had become well aware, and his idea was that a clear antecedent admission of joint liability would remove colonial claims to control of any particular part of the force.

The position of the Governor vis-à-vis the colonial Legislature in respect of colonial troops is a controversial one in British Imperial constitutional history. The case of Sir George Grey in New Zealand was more a matter of the Governor vis-à-vis the General commanding, but two other cases raising the extent of the Governor's authority over some force which the responsible colonial Government, at any rate partially, financed, occurred during the Governorships of Sir Bartle Frere and Sir Hercules Robinson in South Africa and New South Wales respectively.

It seems that Denison's half-and-half division of expense between the Colony and the Imperial Government was drawn from ideas and proposals concerning steam and postal communication.¹¹¹ In this case, and also that of the marine survey, the Australian group generally was to share half the cost with the United Kingdom.

THE CONVERSION OF DENISON'S SUGGESTION INTO A PLAN:
THE ACTIVITY OF GODLEY IN THE WAR OFFICE

Denison regarded it as a good rough-and-ready measure, easy to administer, that the Colony and the United Kingdom should share equally the cost of Imperial troops. Though this scheme was developed to apply to the Australian colonies specifically, it became the Denison Plan in contradistinction to the Grey Plan. To Godley, and perhaps to Hamilton, it had the attraction of uniformity.¹¹²

To Godley¹¹³ it was a "system" according to which colonies such as Nova Scotia and New Brunswick would not receive special consideration because of small resources, and it was a means of changing the inertia and administrative inequities and the ways in which her colonies took advantage of Britain; of changing arrangements by which colonial allowances contributed by some colonial governments imposed on the British Government the expensive task of making up gross remuneration in other colonies. (In fact,¹¹⁴ in Australia, at least, the colonial granting of colonial allowances followed a suggestion emanating from the United Kingdom.)

Arthur Koestler has written¹¹⁵ of the myth that can so quickly grow up around a man once he is dead, and we must beware of the tendency of biographers to exaggerate the role of the rarity of their subject. But Adderley, another Colonial Reformer, who regarded himself as Godley's closest friend, described¹¹⁶ him in a letter to another mutual friend as "one of the most leading minds and soundest judgements and most uncompromising consciences we may ever come in contact with". Not all would agree with Adderley's comment on Godley's judgement, which in matters of colonial defence was based on his view of colonial self-reliance, which perhaps can be attributed partly to his High Church training and beliefs. Godley appears almost brusque and off-hand in his evidence before the 1861 Committee, until one remembers that he was declining in a painful illness and must have been making a supreme effort.

In fact, his exertions in the circumstances of his health in the late eighteen fifties appear either to suggest very great strength of character or to emphasize the strength of a feeling he was known to have in regard to the adjustment of colonial relations, or perhaps to suggest both.

According to Lord Robert Cecil,¹¹⁷ the feeling for self-reliance was apparent even in Godley's days in Canterbury. Earlier he had suggested to Gladstone the urgency of colonial reform, and he passed through New South Wales in 1852 on his way back to England at a time when he saw it in the ferment of change and was impressed both with the vulgarity and the crudeness of its life and with its growing wealth. His reaction¹¹⁸ harmonized with his view that the fundamental error of the Whigs was the derivation of power from below, being in their concern with natural rights rather than with duties.

In 1855, Godley was appointed to the Directorship of Ordnance and Stores in the War Department, making ample acquaintance with the confusion so significant in the Crimean War. He became Assistant Under-Secretary of State for War in 1857, and so remained until his death. Apparently he chafed under the Permanent Under-

Secretary, Sir Benjamin Hawes, whose resistance to innovation was also arousing Florence Nightingale to fury. The separation of War from Colonies and the incompetence revealed in the War Department threw up the possibility of various reforms to Godley, some on quite a large scale.

Godley's letters to Adderley¹¹⁹ show his concern at the quality of the political direction of England, and in military matters he was disgusted at the recruitment of the German Legion for South Africa and the brushing aside of a Canadian offer for an expeditionary force for the Crimea. It fell to him to inspect the German Legion in quarters at Portsmouth, and his conviction that hiring mercenaries was not the way to mend a shortage of good troops or to breed self-reliance or healthy colonial relationships was reinforced by his having seen them. Later, in 1860, Godley came to regard New Zealand as a test case for the self-reliant policy, viewing with contempt the colonial reaction to the onset of native troubles. "Their only notion on the approach of danger was to shriek for troops and abuse the Imperial Government."¹²⁰ He was not opposed to colonies or to the maintenance of empire, rather he wrote of the "nationalization" of the British colonies.¹²¹

As the *Lyttleton Tablet* at Harrow put it,¹²² "aequalium mentes ad majorum praecepta quibus Colonisae non tam regendae sunt quam creandae inter primis revocavit".

Gairdner, Elliot and Merivale in the Colonial Office were all interested in this question, as their annotations on incoming despatches show. Barkly in Victoria, Young in Tasmania and MacDonnell in South Australia were also bringing up the business which raised the whole question of the principles of the apportionment of responsibility for colonial defence, but as laymen, and not always with the same wide scope and compass as that which was in Denison's despatches.¹²³

Some particular questions in the late 'fifties and early 'sixties were the status of Her Majesty's Colonial Vessel *Victoria*,¹²⁴ the payment of the transport of the 40th Regiment to Victoria, as well as the payment of the cost of the Headquarters' staff in Australia. These questions were being raised in despatches which reached an England whose Government was trying to economize in spite of the troubled European circumstances and of an expanding empire. The desire for economy was not confined to the Manchester School. Disraeli, the Chancellor of the Exchequer in Derby's second Cabinet, was trying hard but unsuccessfully to carry out Gladstone's proposals to abolish the income tax by 1860. One avenue was to prune the army estimates.¹²⁵

THE RESULT OF THE APPOINTMENT OF THE 1859 INTER-DEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE

It was, therefore, not surprising that Carnarvon, writing for Lytton, should have indicated¹²⁶ to Denison in May, 1859, the intention of the Government to appoint an inter-departmental committee to consider the whole question of colonial military expenditure. The Committee's appointment was thus foreshadowed a month before Herbert, Newcastle and Gladstone succeeded Peel, Lytton and Disraeli at the War, Colonies and Exchequer portfolios in Palmerston's second Cabinet, and even then

rather belatedly because, in fact, General Peel, at the War Office in Derby's second Cabinet, had in March formally initiated the appointment of the Committee, which started its work quickly. Hawes in his letter referred to the "absence of any firm and general principle for the guidance of the Secretary of State in determining the numerous questions of military expenditure which continually arise in most of the colonies".¹²⁷

The principle within which the Committee was to deliberate was that the mother country was to assist in the defence against aggression on the part of foreign civilized nations and (in a less proportion) formidable native tribes; but except in the case of pure garrison posts, she was not to assume the whole cost. The Colony was to contribute its own force or money to the Imperial force. Its internal defence was to be a local responsibility.

The Committee consisted of Hamilton, Elliot and Godley. It found itself divided. Godley was jubilant¹²⁸ in winning over Hamilton to his views, but the Colonial Office representative wrote a minority Report to which Godley wrote a rejoinder. Herbert and Gladstone strongly approved Godley's report, though Herbert was prepared for slower results than was Gladstone.¹²⁹ According to Carrington,¹³⁰ there was a division in Cabinet, Gladstone arguing for the adoption of this report for reasons of economy, Palmerston more typically concerned with defence. This can be seen as one facet of the differences in this Cabinet. Gladstone would have favoured the move because of his belief in self-reliance and its moral importance for a self-governing community, apart altogether from his desire as Chancellor of the Exchequer to economize.

THE CONTINUING INTEREST AND THE SELECT COMMITTEE

After a strong hint by Godley, whose close friend he was, Adderley secured¹³¹ the publication of this report. The grateful Godley had to caution him against being the only enthusiast in Parliament, and he was indeed fortunate in having Adderley's energetic interest.¹³² Godley wrote¹³³ to Adderley that he regretted he could not, because his official position made it impossible, write to *The Times*. Now and again he had some scruples about commenting indirectly to Cabinet Ministers other than his own Minister. Newcastle and Gladstone were his friends; "it is", he wrote,¹³⁴ "hardly fair to Sidney Herbert that one of his subordinates should be perpetually bullying and harassing one of his colleagues".

In 1859, Adderley indicated that he would move for a Select Committee of the Commons, and Herbert then announced to the Commons the existence of the Departmental Committee, in fact already known to Adderley.¹³⁵ In March, 1860, Adderley again advocated that a Select Committee be appointed, and remarked¹³⁶ that the Departmental Committee had been made a pretext for stopping his committee of inquiry. Even the publication, as a result of his nagging, of the Departmental Committee's Report only provided him with an occasion for speaking.¹³⁷ Cecil, thinking that Godley and Hamilton had exceeded their terms of reference, and that a departmental report which was not unanimous was not a substitute for an announcement of Government policy, considered that the appointment of a Select Committee

would best resolve the question, and Arthur Mills agreed with him. In June, 1860, Herbert announced that the Government would deal with the subject of colonial military expenditure without referring it to a Committee,¹³⁸ but in March, 1861, Arthur Mills, a Colonial Reformer, secured its appointment¹³⁹; the Prime Minister, Palmerston, who, thought¹⁴⁰ Godley, was "most reactionary in all his notions on this question", was sceptical of its value but did not oppose it.¹⁴¹ Adderley sat most actively—if the expression is permissible. It is said that the Committee was carefully picked by the Colonial Reformers and that Godley himself was consulted as to the choice of a chairman.¹⁴² He certainly helped Adderley to plan his campaign, though the members of the Committee were not all of the same mind—for example, Fergusson, Fortescue and Childers.¹⁴³

Probably the demands for reinforcement in New Zealand had added force to the need to resolve this question and to appoint a Committee. Certainly Adderley and Godley had been in touch with what was happening in New Zealand, and although in 1858¹⁴⁴ the Colonial Office had indicated its adherence to the Grey system, the despatch of 26th July, 1860, signed by Sir George Cornwall Lewis,¹⁴⁵ firmly indicated, in reply to an appeal for aid from New Zealand, that the intention of the British Government was not to extend its commitments indefinitely nor to undertake unaided the major responsibility for conducting the war.

The Australian group did not emerge badly in any comparison of the gross colonial contribution to local defence. Leaving aside the qualifications to any ready acceptance of the close accuracy of the returns, the colonies contributed about one-tenth of nearly £4,000,000 spent on the military defence of colonies, and New South Wales and Victoria and Ceylon contributed a third of this colonial contribution.¹⁴⁶ Tasmania and Western Australia were in a special category because of the recent convict past of the one and the presence of convicts in the other. Even Godley agreed¹⁴⁷ that the Australian colonies had paid more than their fair share. The Australasian group, including New Zealand, was one of the foci of attention. But if New Zealand is excluded, the scale of its group's own contribution was not a direct grievance,¹⁴⁸ nor was the size of the garrison very significant in the total Imperial force, though in a time when expansion tugged at economy every battalion in the colonies could be the subject for review.

THE GENERAL ARGUMENT OF THE TWO COMMITTEES AND THE MILLS RESOLUTION

The existing arrangements, the majority Report and the Select Committee argued, dispersed troops, failed to encourage self-reliance, and led to unequal and inadequate colonial contribution. Military expense at the Cape resulted in a drain which was not counterbalanced by benefits such as the provision of a market, or a field for emigration. The majority Report stated that disputes arose with bitterness about liabilities, as in the case of the transport of Victorian troops, "... There being no recognized principles of mutual relations to which appeal can be made or upon which a permanent settlement can be founded. While, therefore, it seems

right that the colonies should as a rule decide on the content and nature of their own defences and have generally the management of them, it is unjust to throw the whole burden of the expense on the less interested party." The presence of scattered Imperial garrisons was undesirable, and the right system would be one based on local effort and local resources. "The maintenance of dominion over scattered and distant territories depends on the nature of the country and the populations or upon the command of the seas."

Godley objected to the scattering of British troops, but it was for the colonists to settle if British troops were to be wholly withdrawn. In general, the Imperial Government's contribution, as Godley's views developed, was to take the shape of money only, and in his remarks on Mr. Elliot's memorandum he stated that the burden of the majority Report was that the whole system of defence, including the amount of the force, would be decided in the Colony. He seems to suggest local control and local forces, and yet, on the other hand, on one occasion at least, he had doubted¹⁴⁹ if one could be colonist and soldier at the same time; he would not¹⁵⁰ express an opinion when asked if it would be better for the colonists to arm and train their own men. He probably did not face up fully to the implications of local control or perhaps it was to be local control of local troops, not of Imperial troops, for in the majority Report the Imperial troops sent to the colonies would be at the Imperial Government's disposal should any emergency require them to be withdrawn. Godley and Hamilton believed that the adoption of their plan would reduce the colonial demands for garrisons. Perhaps Godley was interested not in the total economy of the forces of the Empire, but in the economy of the United Kingdom's forces.

Godley and Hamilton did not approve the Grey arrangement, because they regarded the basis on which it rested, the garrison system, as unsound. The Denison Plan, if there were to be Imperial troops stationed in the Colony, could be open to this objection, though from a financial aspect, as distinct from the drain in manpower, the mother country might not be incurring so much liability.

The Grey Plan, wrote Hamilton and Godley, was not flexible and required negotiation with changing circumstances. Here again, the new plan, too, would require negotiation as to the total of troops unless the Colony was prepared to accept the Imperial Government's figures without demur, or unless, if the Colony were to take the initiative, the Imperial Government would accept its arrangements and perhaps commit itself to the allocation of military force.

The argument of joint interest was denied by Godley and Hamilton; the obligation of the mother country arose as a matter of honour and duty from British control of foreign policy. Even a small garrison in a colony was taken as a symbol of British responsibility and could discourage self-reliance. The majority Report divided the colonies into two groups: one group included "military posts . . . in which for objects altogether independent of and distinct from the defence of particular countries in which they are situated the Imperial Government thinks it necessary to maintain garrisons", for instance, Malta and Gibraltar. The second class comprised all the rest of the colonies: "all those where troops are stationed primarily, if not

exclusively, for the defence of the lives, liberties and property of their inhabitants". The Denison Plan was to be adopted in these. The mother country was to specify the maximum amount beyond which she would not contribute without further agreement. This classification rejected an argument of joint interest, and the consideration of factors, such as a colony's capacity to pay and the amount of its resources, was thus irrelevant to Godley.

When the Select Committee of 1861 adopted a very similar classification, Sir George Cornwall Lewis commented,¹⁵¹ "it is not expressed with much clearness or precision . . . we apprehend that the dependencies of the second as well as the first class are maintained chiefly for objects of Imperial policy. If this were not assumed to be the case, they would probably not be maintained at all."

If the colony was really to decide the size of forces as well as the system of defence, Godley's assumption that the Imperial military expenditure would be reduced rested on the correctness of his hope that the colonies would be encouraged to prune their provisions. His view of scattered garrisons and fortifications—which had much support from lay and service thinking—perhaps made this seem less regrettable from a strategic point of view, and his conclusion seemed by Australian and Canadian experience to be given some weight.

Godley pointed out that, theoretically, if the Imperial Government determined its allocation under the Grey measure with reference to Imperial interests, the Colony might still leave colonial interests unprovided for. This should not have caused him concern if he believed that colonial interests were not necessarily Imperial interests, and if he believed Imperial economy would lead to colonial self-reliance. Godley's assumption was apparently that half the cost of troops and fortifications was still less than the Imperial "quota" together with incidental expenses.

Of course, Godley apparently believed that relations with the natives were primarily a matter for the colonists, who should have to bear a larger share in the military conduct of, and payment for, wars which might be a result of their actions and policies.¹⁵² If this were so, one would imagine that the Grey scheme would have provided the basis for an Imperial case for economizing; as a matter of politics, however, it may have been easier to concentrate the attack on the military methods and arrangements.

The Colonial Office representative (and the Ministerial view in the Commons was very similar) differed from the other members of the Inter-departmental Committee, both in his conception of the colonial relationship and of Britain's interests in colonies, and also on the plan by which the British Government was to allot troops.

Elliot regarded Britain and the colonies as having joint interests, and this appears in his criticism of Godley's opinion that a uniform arrangement should be applied. He criticizes Godley's view that poor nations are like poor individuals (assuming they are obliged to contribute equally with Britain) ". . . they are not nations but members of one immensely powerful nation". Britain's interests included the supply of raw materials and native policy. "I freely admit that poorer communities will have inferior roads and landing places, schools, gaols, houses and hospitals. The

deficiency is not to be supplied from the Imperial purse ; but if in these islands the very existence of society depends on having a small military force, may not the provision of it be fairly deemed the duty of the sovereign power ? ” This remark caused Godley to regard Elliot as favouring the “ eleemosynary principle ”. To Godley, varying resources or exposure to danger were not reasons for not imposing a common rule.

To Elliot the presence of Imperial troops was important as a symbol of the strength of the British Empire, which could be mobilized for the defence of the colony, and he considered the colonies differed so much that no uniform system was possible.

To Elliot, Godley's second group was too heterogeneous for a uniform rule, including, for instance, as well as Canada and Australia, South Africa and New Zealand which, with their problems and relations with natives, required different arrangements from those which pertained in North America and Australia, and in most of the colonies in the latter two groups the Grey system was being applied. Elliot did not regard it as possible to establish “ any self-acting rule which shall be a substitute for the judgement and firmness of the Minister for the Crown for the time being. To deal with cases on their merits appear to me the tasks and duties inseparable from the function of governing colonies which can never be superseded by the machinery of a system however ably conceived and logically constructed.” This sensible attitude suggests that one should realize the limitations on applying even the Grey system, and when we have spoken of its application in the eighteen fifties it has been in this qualified sense.

It does seem that Godley was using the Denison Plan as a formula with which to disturb the status quo. This is perhaps supported by his letters to Adderley, by the opening remarks of his rejoinder to Elliot, and it is the view reached after considering the evidence and report of the 1861 Committee. It is also Sir George Cornwall Lewis's impression. The Colonial Office argument¹⁵³ was that insofar as the system could be applied, it was already operating to a considerable extent, and Elliot's view was the realistic one for one who believed in empire, that the military expense problem could not be solved as a separate problem, it was a matter of “ native policy ” and other questions. Carrington's judgement¹⁵⁴—“ The Colonial Office, true to precedent, obstructed any innovation ”—seems ill-expressed, particularly when a few pages later there is a reference to Earl Grey's work almost a decade before that of Godley.

The Report of the Select Committee recognized that the colonies had a claim arising from the consequences of Imperial policy. It did not consider a uniform rule applicable, but considered that the colonies in the second group should bear the main cost of their military defence, and urged that Australia and New Zealand, South African, Ceylon and the West Indies were fit subjects for reduction of expenditure or personnel. The British Government was to have regard to local resources, to the colonies' danger from external attack, and to the general exigencies of the Empire. Apparently in the interests of reducing expenditure, negotiations would be avoided, and Grey's example followed. In regard to New Zealand, the Committee's general

recommendation was slightly qualified by its awareness of the Maori problem, and while Britain formally controlled native policy, in South Africa and similar communities local efforts and local organizations were to provide security against warlike tribes and domestic disturbance as far as possible.

The Report was made on the assumption that expensive colonial military expenditure was undesirable. Mills, the Chairman of the Select Committee, denied that he was in favour of the dismemberment of colonies.¹⁵⁵ He said the inquiry assumed that Britain was to maintain her empire, develop colonial resources and qualify them for present self-government and eventual independence. The very formulation of "colonial military expenditure" rather than "Imperial military expenditure on colonies" is, however, indicative. The Committee did not consider much technical military evidence. It assumed apparently that naval defence was an Imperial matter, and that it was available, and was independent of colonial fortifications.

The House of Commons, debating the Select Committee's Report, passed a resolution moved by its Chairman,¹⁵⁶ recognizing colonial claims to Imperial aid which arose as a consequence of Imperial foreign policy and expressing the opinion that colonies exercising the right to self-government ought to undertake the main responsibilities of providing for their own internal security. The resolution was not very startling and rather general.

But if the Select Committee's Report and the resolution did not embody the Denison-Godley scheme in detail, they certainly reflected the spirit of Godley, but not that of Denison, and the inquiries of 1859-1862, combined no doubt with the events of those years, at least made interest in the question more vocal, and probably increased this interest. The Mills resolution provided¹⁵⁷ parliamentary support for, and the discussion favourably stimulated public approval of, the efforts of the executive Government to reduce expense, and this was the policy pursued in the 'sixties, and it led to the withdrawal of British garrisons. The colonial response in New South Wales to the sentiments of the Reports and the motion was mixed. Irritation at the opinions of colonies and the colonial relationship which had been expressed was accompanied by a realization that the growing community must accept responsibility.¹⁵⁸ As Sir George Cornwall Lewis pointed out, the movement for reduction was not a colonial one, although the growth of some colonial communities in wealth and status and the occasional disputes over control and financial responsibility were the basis of administrators' interest in this matter as one of policy.

The proposal of Cardwell,¹⁵⁹ who appeared in this matter both while at War and at Colonies, for a colonial contribution for each Imperial soldier in the 'sixties in New South Wales, the form which the reduction policy took, in some respects resembled Denison's Plan rather than Grey's, and the problems of H.M.C.V. *Victoria* and the passing at Westminster of the Colonial Naval Service Act of 1865, as well as the legislation in some of the colonies, indicated the increasing, though only gradually successful, tendency to rely on colonial participation in kind and control as well as in money and defence, as did the new Volunteer Movement in New South Wales.

THE ROLE OF DENISON'S SUGGESTIONS AS A CATALYTIC AGENT

Perhaps the years 1859 to 1862 rather than 1870, the date of the last withdrawal of Imperial garrisons in Australia, are the significant dates, if significant dates have to be sought. And the bias of our starting point—New South Wales in the eighteen fifties—must not cause us to exaggerate Denison's influence, yet both his plan and the raising of the question persistently just at this time attracted attention in England. Of course, there were the long-run factors and influences, but the formulation of policy, the decision-making process, implies, at least very often, the attempt to recognize and give expression to these influences, to see that problems exist and must be resolved.

Almost always, a number of people contribute, and their appreciations of the problems are within the framework of different assumptions and even beliefs. Denison and Godley were such protagonists, and the Protectionist Movement in Canada was one such factor, the lesson of which was generalized. Stacey has written¹⁶⁰: "the Canadian tariff of 1859 was in fact a large nail in the coffin of the garrison system, but it was to be ten years and more before the lid was screwed down above the corpse." His metaphor is difficult to apply to the whole problem, as most are, without distorting the historical facts. The garrison system died partly through the efforts of Grey and Denison, both somewhat insensitive to colonial feeling, but Denison realizing more deeply the implications of the growth of the colonial community, whose existence they both valued. But the development of colonial military activity in an Empire bigger, but with looser bonds, provided ultimately for substantial Imperial co-operation.

William Denison, Lieutenant-General, Knight-Commander of the Bath, Captain-General and Governor-in-Chief in and over our Territory called New South Wales, Governor-General in and over all our Colonies of New South Wales, Van Diemen's Land, Victoria, South Australia and Western Australia, brother of the Bishop of Salisbury and of the Speaker of the House of Commons, would probably have been affronted if his function was seen as that of an undertaker, yet his plan was probably the most useful nail for Godley's hammer. Certainly his enterprise—so different an undertaking—did nothing in spite of the strong Imperial sentiment of its author to slow up the screwing down.

REFERENCES

Unless otherwise stated, references to manuscript and archival material are to documents in the Mitchell Library, Sydney.

¹ *S.M.H.*, 8th October, 1851, p. 2, cols. 2, 3.

² Adderley, C. B., *Review of "The Colonial Policy of Lord J. Russell's Administration by Earl Grey, 1853"*; and of *Subsequent Colonial History*, London, 1869, pp. 3, 5. Cf. also Godley's letters to Adderley, 12th June, 26th October, 1860, in Adderley, C. B. (ed.), *Extracts from Letters of John Robert Godley to C. B. Adderley*, London, 1863, CLXVIII, CLXXXV, pp. 298, 294, 2995.

³ Cf. Beer, G. L., *British Colonial Policy, 1754-1765*, N.Y., 1901, Ch. 1; *The Old Colonial System, 1660-1754, Part I. The Establishment of the System, 1660-1688*, vol. I, N.Y., 1912, ch. 2, and Stacey, C. P., *Canada and the British Army, 1846-1871. A Study in the Practice of Responsible Government* (Imperial Studies No. 111), London, 1936. Also *Report of the Select Committee on Colonial Military Expenditure together with The Proceedings of the Committee, Minutes of Evidence, etc.*, ordered to be printed 11th July, 1861, *H.C.P. Reports*

- Committees* 9, 1861, vol. XIII, Godley's evidence, 2nd May, 1861, Qns. 2070, 2160, but note his qualified opinion. Merivale indicated the different circumstances in a note on Lecture XXI in his *Lectures on Colonisation and Colonies delivered before the University of Oxford in 1839, 1840, 1841*, in the 1861 ed., London, pp. 586-590.
- ⁴ Cf. Earl Grey, *The Colonial Policy of Lord John Russell's Administration*, vol. 1, London, 1853, Letter 3, p. 43. Mr. Arthur Mills, H. of C., *Hansard*, CLXV, 4th March, 1862, col. 1035. Henry, third Earl Grey, was Secretary at War, 1835-1837, and Secretary of State for War and Colonies, 1846-1852, in Lord John Russell's first Cabinet.
- ⁵ See, e.g., Gladstone's evidence, *Report Select Committee, op. cit.*, 6th June, 1861, Qns. 3869, 3870. W. E. Gladstone was Parliamentary Under-Secretary for War and the Colonies, 1835; Secretary of State for War and Colonies, 1845; Chancellor of the Exchequer in Palmerston's first Cabinet for a short time, in Palmerston's second Cabinet and in Russell's second Cabinet; Prime Minister, 1868-1874, and for several terms subsequently.
- ⁶ Cf., and also for his description of the Commons during the debate on the Mills resolution, Parkes, Henry, *Australian Views of England, Eleven Letters written in the years 1861 and 1862*, London, 1869, Letter VI, 26 March, 1862, pp. 57 *et seq.* G. W. De Kieweit suggests in his *British Colonial Policy and the South African Republics, 1848-1872* (Imperial Studies No. 3, London, 1929, pp. 44, 45), that English colonial opinion was pessimistic. Cobden (*Hansard*, LXX, H. of C., 22nd June, 1843, col. 205) said he was not opposed to the maintenance of colonies but desired a reorganization of the colonial system.
- ⁷ Gladstone, *Report Select Committee, Evid.*, 6th June, 1861, Qns. 3784, 3829, 3830.
- ⁸ Bodelsen, C. A., *Studies in Mid Victorian Imperialism*, Copenhagen, 1924, p. 41. On the other hand, consider the comment of W. A. Townley, "English opinion on the Australian Colonies Government Act (1850)." *Hist. Studies Aust. and N.Z.*, vol. 5, no. 17, 1951, "... no reader of the debates on the . . . Bill can fail to notice the wide and deep-seated interest in the problems of colonial government."
- ⁹ E.g., *The Economist*, vol. XX, no. 967, 8th March, 1862, p. 256, no. 982, 21st June, 1862, p. 674. This was the problem that Adderley was trying to grasp when he was questioning Gladstone, *Report Select Committee, Evid.*, 6th June, 1861, Qn. 3869. See also Newcastle's answer, 16th March, 1861, Qns. 3008, 3010.
- ¹⁰ *Hansard*, CLV, 22nd May, 1859, col. 9395.
- ¹¹ Return to an Address dated 25th April, 1860. Copy of Report of Committee on Expense of Military Defences of the Colonies, ordered to be printed 4th May, 1860, *H.C.P. Accounts and Papers*, 3, 1860, vol. XLI, pp. 573 *et seq.*
- ¹² *Hansard*, CLXV, H. of C., 4th March, 1862, cols. 1033 *et seq.*
- ¹³ E.g., Gladstone's evidence, *Report Select Committee*, 6th June, 1861, Qn. 3798.
- ¹⁴ *Report Select Committee, Evid.*, 9th May, 1861, Qn. 2565.
- ¹⁵ *Ibid.*, *Evid.*, Qn. 3816.
- ¹⁶ *Ibid.*, *Evid.*, 27th May, 1861, Qn. 3377.
- ¹⁷ *Ibid.*, *Evid.*, 16th May, 1861, Qn. 3085.
- ¹⁸ *Ibid.*, Qn. 3088.
- ¹⁹ *Ibid.*, *Evid.*, 2nd May, 1861, Qn. 2071.
- ²⁰ *Ibid.*, Qns. 2141, 2143, 2144.
- ²¹ *Ibid.*, Qn. 2099.
- ²² *Ibid.*, Qn. 2101.
- ²³ The fifth Duke of Newcastle, Secretary for War and Colonies in Aberdeen's Cabinet to June, 1854, then Secretary for War; Secretary for the Colonies in Palmerston's second Cabinet until 1864. Chichester Fortescue, Parliamentary Under-Secretary for the Colonies, 1857-1858, and again from June, 1859, to October, 1865.
- ²⁴ Newcastle, *Report Select Committee, Evid.*, 16th May, 1861, Qns. 2992, 3018, 3021.
- ²⁵ See, e.g., Sir Stuart Donaldson's evidence, *Report Select Committee*, 13th May, 1861, Qn. 2653. Godley (*Evid.*, 2nd May, 1861, Qn. 2133) believed that this was the only fact that gave the colonies any claim to imperial defence assistance.
- ²⁶ Godley, *Report Select Committee, Evid.*, 2nd May, 1861, Qn. 2177.
- ²⁷ Cf. Knaplund, P., "Wakefield on Colonial Garrisons, 1851", *Canad. Hist. Rev.*, vol. 5, no. 3, 1924, and the evidence of Robert Lowe, 27th May, 1861 (*Report of Select Committee, Qns. 3390, 3391*), with which Gladstone associated himself (Qn. 3863). Godley's views in his letter to Adderley, 9th March, 1855, *Letters, op. cit.*, CXXXIX, p. 243. C. Fortescue's opinion is to be found in *Hansard*, CLXV, 4th March, 1862, col. 1049.
- ²⁸ See, e.g., paragraph 17 of the *Report Select Committee*. Cf. Gladstone's recognition (Qn. 3860) of the Cape and New Zealand as cases needing "all due reserve in the application of his general opinion, but it was by no means a reason for departing from the principle that the colonies should be charged with their own defence". Cf. the evidence of Godley, 2nd May, 1861 (Qn. 2129), and Herbert, 30th May, 1861 (Qn. 3659).

- ²⁹ *Report Select Committee*, Evid., 30th May, 1861, Qn. 3656. Sidney Herbert, Secretary for State for the Colonies in Aberdeen's Cabinet until February, 1855, created Lord Herbert of Lea, 1860. Secretary of State for War in Palmerston's second Cabinet (formed June, 1859) until July, 1861.
- ³⁰ Grey to FitzRoy, 2, Military, 24th November, 1846, *H.R.A.*, I, vol. 25, pp. 263, 264.
- ³¹ Earl Grey, *op. cit.*, pp. 44, 45.
- ³² Treasury Minute, 22nd September, 1846, and Communication from Treasury to Colonial Office, CO. 323/231, cited Knapland, P., "E. G. Wakefield on the Colonial Garrisons", *op. cit.*, p. 228, note. Cf. Wellington to Grey, 954, Military, 12th December, 1846 (W.O., I—598, pp. 319–327), pressing for an increase in establishment. Grey's reply, 21st December, 1846 (pp. 331–345), indicated that the Government's view was that the present total establishment could not be increased, and the matter must be met by reducing the proportion of the regular infantry serving abroad. The long-standing difficulties of providing for forces in the United Kingdom for relief of the colonial garrisons and forces were indicated by Sir Henry Hardinge and Lord John Russell (*Hansard*, LII, H. of C., 9th March, 1840, cols. 1086 *et seq.*, and LVI, H. of C., 5th March, 1841, col. 1373). Mr. Buxton told the House of Commons (*Hansard*, CLXV, 4th March, 1862, col. 1040) that the Duke of Wellington always resisted any proposal to reduce "armed force in our colonies; because in his time the feeling at home had been strongly against the maintenance of a large standing army, he thought it prudent to keep as large a force as possible away from the country".
- ³³ Grey, *Report Select Committee*, Evid., 9th May, 1861, Qn. 2588.
- ³⁴ Grey to FitzRoy, 11, Military, 4th March, 1848, repr. *S.M.H.*, 23rd June, 1849, p. 3, col. 2.
- ³⁵ *S.M.H.*, 24th April, 1848, p. 2, col. 3.
- ³⁶ Cf., e.g., Grey to FitzRoy, 7, Military, 19th October, 1847, repr. N.S.W. Legislative Council, *V. & P.*, 1848, pp. 319–320.
- ³⁷ Cf. Denison to Murchison, 21st May, 1858, in Denison, W., *Varieties of Vice Regal Life*, London, 1870, vol. 1, p. 309.
- ³⁸ N.S.W.L.C., 4th September, 1850, reprinted. *S.M.H.*, 5th September, 1850, p. 2, cols. 2–4. N.S.W.L.C., 1st September, 1852, reprinted. *S.M.H.*, 2nd September, 1952, p. 2, cols. 6, 7.
- ³⁹ Grey to FitzRoy, 50, Military, 7th April, 1851, repr. N.S.W.L.C., *V. & P.*, 1851, vol. 2. Ordered to be printed 17th October, 1857.
- ⁴⁰ N.S.W.L.C., 12th September, 1850, reprinted. *S.M.H.*, 13th September, 1850, p. 2, col. 3.
- ⁴¹ FitzRoy to Grey, 148, 18th August, 1851 (*Transcripts from Missing Despatches from Governor of New South Wales, 1847–1855*, pp. 2410 *et seq.*). In the event, FitzRoy's fears were unfounded.
- ⁴² *S.M.H.*, 13th August, 1849, p. 2, col. 3. Robert Lowe, a member of the N.S.W. Legislative Council, 1843–1850, Vice-President of the Board of Trade, 1855–1858, Vice-President of the Committee of the Privy Council on Education, 1859–1864; Chancellor of the Exchequer in Gladstone's first Cabinet.
- ⁴³ *Ibid.*, 11th August, 1849, p. 2, cols. 2, 3.
- ⁴⁴ Elliot, *Report Select Committee*, Evid., 22nd April, 1861, Qn. 433.
- ⁴⁵ Grey to Elgin, 30th September, 18th November, 1847, 22nd March, 18th May, 29th December, 1848, in the Grey-Elgin Correspondence, quoted Stacey, *op. cit.*, pp. 68–72.
- ⁴⁶ Labouchere to Head, 2nd May, 1856, reprinted as Appendix 16, *Report Select Committee*. Henry Labouchere was Secretary of State for the Colonies in Palmerston's first Cabinet from October, 1855.
- ⁴⁷ Elgin, *Hansard*, CXLII, H. of L., 27th May, 1856, col. 673 *et seq.* Lord Panmure, the Secretary for War, said that it seemed "expedient to the Government to add to the force at present in the British North American Provinces and that not only on Colonial but on imperial grounds".
- ⁴⁸ Elliot, *Report Select Committee*, Evid., 18th April, 1861, Qn. 72.
- ⁴⁹ Godley, J. R., "Remarks on Mr. Elliot's Memorandum appended to the Report of the Committee on (*sic*) the Military Defence of the Colonies", printed as Appendix 19 to the *Report Select Committee*.
- ⁵⁰ Stacey, *op. cit.*, p. 86.
- ⁵¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 90, 106, 107. The number was not reduced to the level of 1854–1855.
- ⁵² Newcastle, *Report Select Committee*, Evid., 16th May, 1861, Qns. 3071, 3082, 3083—note his qualifications. Elliot's figure was £80 (22nd April, 1861, Qn. 383).
- ⁵³ Merivale, *Report Select Committee*, Evid., 6th May, 1861, Qn. 2278.
- ⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, Qn. 2279.
- ⁵⁵ Newcastle, *Report Select Committee*, Evid., 16th May, 1861, Qn. 2955.
- ⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, Qn. 3120.
- ⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, Qn. 3116.

⁵⁸ Herbert, *Report Select Committee*, Evid., 30th May, 1861, Qn. 3664.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, Merivale, Evid., 6th May, 1861, Qn. 2302.

⁶⁰ Some of Denison's activities in New South Wales in regard to defence are recalled in his complaint on being placed on the seconded list in Denison to Labouchere, 58, 5th April, 1858 (*Despatches* from Governor of N.S.W., vol. 80, pp. 633 *et seq.*).

⁶¹ Denison to Sir George Grey, 18th April, 1854, in *Varieties, op. cit.*, vol. 1, p. 261. In spite of his view of his office, Denison in matters such as defence, marine survey and postal communications did act more broadly than one might have expected of the Governor of New South Wales.

Though he wrote to Gore Brown (Gen. Govt. Despatches to Lt.-Governors, 4/1653, p. 978) on 13th July, 1860, protesting "both as Governor-General of Australia and as a military man" against the dissemination of troops in small detachments in New Zealand, none of his Commissions designated him Governor-General of Australia. The Secretary of State, Sir George Grey, had written to Denison (62B, 2nd November, 1854, in Secretary of State's Despatches to Governor of N.S.W., July-December, 1854), associating himself with Lord Grey's views and concluding, "I have therefore thought it advisable to issue to you a Commission of Governor-General similar to that held by Sir Charles FitzRoy, because though the Commission gives you no power to interfere in the internal administration of the respective Colonies, it will place you in a position of superior rank which will entitle you to take the lead in any mutual arrangements to which the Colonies may hereafter come." A despatch from Sir George Grey (No. 1, dated 2nd October, 1854, Secretary of State's Despatches to Governor of N.S.W., July-December, 1854), transmitted three Commissions from the Queen. The first, "constituting and appointing you to be Governor-General in and over Her Majesty's Colonies of New South Wales, Van Diemen's Land, Victoria, South Australia, and Western Australia". Second, "Constituting and appointing you to be Captain-General and Governor-in-Chief in and over Her Majesty's Colony of New South Wales". And the third, "Appointing you to be Vice-Admiral of the Colony of New South Wales". The Commissions in the "Register of Governor's Commissions, No. 1 (N.S.W., *Col. Sec. Papers*, 4/430) contain (pp. 372-384) a Commission dated 21st September, 1854, appointing Denison Vice-Admiral. There is (pp. 385-387) a Commission, which refers to a Commission of even date appointing him Captain-General and Governor-in-Chief in and over our Territory called New South Wales and which itself appoints him "Governor-General in and over all our Colonies of New South Wales, Van Diemen's Land, Victoria, South Australia, and Western Australia". This is dated 20th September, 1854. There is another Commission dated 20th September, 1854 (pp. 388-396), appointing Denison Captain-General and Governor-in-Chief in and over our Territory called New South Wales. This presumably is the Commission to which the Commission copied on pp. 385-387 refers. Molesworth, in a despatch to Denison (23, 8th September, 1855, Secretary of State's Despatches to the Governor of N.S.W., June-December, 1855), sent the new Commission "amended in those particulars which the introduction of that system [Responsible Government] renders it necessary to change". This had been foreshadowed by Russell (Russell to Denison, 31, 20th July, 1855, in the same volume). This fresh Commission, dated 8th September, 1855 (ordered to be printed by the N.S.W. Legislative Council, 18th December, 1855, and a copy of which is to be found in N.S.W. Colonial Secretary's Box of *Inward Despatches*, 4/3345), revokes a Commission dated 20th September, 1854, constituting Denison to be "Governor-in-Chief over our Territory called New South Wales" and issued new Letters Patent. Thus, unless there was yet another Commission revoking the other Commission of 20th September, 1854, Denison remained Governor-General. In spite of the diminished powers, in Denison's person the office was more than titular. His successor as Governor, Sir John Young, when asked by Major-General Pratt to communicate with the other Governors, remarked that the "discontinuance of the Governor-Generalship seems to imply on the part of the authorities at home the opinion that such intercommunication should cease, and however desirous I may be to co-operate with you on all occasions and to give the Military all the facilities and assistance in my power, I cannot venture on such a responsibility" (Young to Pratt, 25th February, 1862, *Government House Miscellaneous Correspondence*, 1861-1869, vol. 2, p. 40, 4/1666). And on at least one occasion he refused to act as a channel between a complainant and the Secretary of State in regard to the Governor of Tasmania "... the office of the Governor-General having been abolished the writer was advised to forward this through the Governor of Tasmania." (Young to Crowther, 13th January, 1866, *Government House Miscellaneous Correspondence*, 1861-1869, vol. 2, pp. 198, 199.)

⁶² Denison to Harness, 20th February, 1857, in *Varieties, op. cit.*, vol. 1, p. 380.

⁶³ Cf. Denison to Sir George Grey, 29, Military, 9th March, 1855 (*Despatches* from Governor N.S.W., vol. 77, 1855).

- ⁶⁴ Denison had arrived on 17th January, 1855 (*Moore's Almanac*, 1856, p. 23). The newspaper reports indicate that on Sydney Harbour itself it was fine (*S.M.H.*, 20th January, 1855, p. 4, col. 6, p. 5, col. 1), fortunately, in view of the hurriedly arranged ceremonies in honour of Denison's arrival.
- ⁶⁵ Grey to FitzRoy, 21st June, 1850, repr. *S.M.H.*, 25th August, 1851, p. 2, col. 7.
- ⁶⁶ N.S.W. Executive Council, Min. 51-17, 6th May, 1851, printed with the despatch in N.S.W.L.C., *V. & P.*, 1851, vol. 2, as No. 2 in "Defences of Port Jackson", ordered to be printed 11th November, 1851.
- ⁶⁷ Governor's Message, 24, 11th November, 1851, in N.S.W.L.C., *V. & P.*, 1851, vol. 2.
- ⁶⁸ N.S.W.L.C., 19th November, 1851, reprinted. *S.M.H.*, 20th November, 1851, p. 2, cols. 4 *et seq.*
- ⁶⁹ Pakington to FitzRoy, 3, Military, 14th May, 1852, repr. N.S.W.L.C., *V. & P.*, 1852, vol. 1, pp. 772-773, as No. 2 in "Increases to the Military Forces", ordered to be printed 7th September, 1852.
- ⁷⁰ N.S.W.L.C., 1st October, 1852, reprinted. *S.M.H.*, 2nd October, 1852, p. 4, cols. 4 *et seq.*
- ⁷¹ N.S.W.L.C., 12th July, 1853, reprinted. *S.M.H.*, 14th July, 1853, p. 2, cols. 1 *et seq.*
- ⁷² N.S.W.L.C., 22nd December, 1853, reprinted. *S.M.H.*, 23rd December, 1853, p. 4, col. 4.
- ⁷³ Newcastle to FitzRoy, 12, Military, 3rd June, 1854, reprinted. N.S.W.L.C. *V. & P.*, 1854, vol. 1, p. 529.
- ⁷⁴ N.S.W.L.C., 6th June, reprinted. *S.M.H.*, 7th June, 1854, p. 4, col. 5.
- ⁷⁵ N.S.W.L.C., 28th June, 1854, reprinted. *S.M.H.*, 29th June, 1854, p. 5, col. 1.
- ⁷⁶ N.S.W.L.C., 20th July, 1854, reprinted. *S.M.H.*, 21st July, 1854, p. 4, col. 6.
- ⁷⁷ N.S.W.L.C., 6th September, 1854, reprinted. *S.M.H.*, 7th September, 1854, p. 4, cols. 4, 5.
- ⁷⁸ *S.M.H.*, 20th November, 1854, p. 5, col. 2, 9th March, 1855, p. 4, cols. 1, 2, 3.
- ⁷⁹ The executive and legislative deliberations on this matter are to be found in N.S.W.L.C., *V. & P.*, 1855, vol. 3, pp. 1015 *et seq.*, and in N.S.W.L.C., 5th June, 22nd August, 1855, reprinted. *S.M.H.*, 6th June, p. 4, col. 6, p. 5, cols. 1 *et seq.*, and 23rd August, 1855, p. 8, col. 1.
- ⁸⁰ N.S.W.L.C., 2nd August, 1855, reprinted. *S.M.H.*, 3rd August, 1855, p. 3, col. 3.
- ⁸¹ *S.M.H.*, 9th August, 1855, p. 4, cols. 3, 4.
- ⁸² N.S.W.L.C., 15th August, 1855, reprinted. *S.M.H.*, 16th August, 1855, p. 3, cols. 5, 6, p. 4, cols. 1, 2, 3, and 17th August, p. 4, cols. 5, 6, and 22nd August; reprinted. *S.M.H.*, 23rd August, 1855, p. 3, cols. 2 *et seq.*, p. 4, cols. 1, 2, 3.
- ⁸³ N.S.W.L.C., 15th August, 1855, reprinted. *S.M.H.*, 16th August, 1855, p. 4, cols. 5, 6.
- ⁸⁴ *S.M.H.*, 23rd August, 1855, p. 4, col. 6, p. 5, col. 1.
- ⁸⁵ Repr. N.S.W.L.A., *V. & P.*, 1856-1857, vol. 3, pp. 691 *et seq.*
- ⁸⁶ Denison's Minute (repr. as No. 3 in "Defences of the Colony", N.S.W.L.A., *V. & P.*, 1859-1860, vol. 2, pp. 643 *et seq.*, and Denison to Labouchere, 127, 14th August, 1856, in Secretary of State's Despatches from the Governor of N.S.W., vol. 79, 1856-1857, p. 188).
- ⁸⁷ *S.M.H.*, 22nd January, 1857, p. 2, col. 4.
- ⁸⁸ Extract Minute 59-28 of N.S.W. Executive Council, 18th July, 1859 (No. 10 in "Defences of the Colony", repr. N.S.W.L.A., *V. & P.*, 1859-1860, vol. 2, p. 657).
- ⁸⁹ E.g., N.S.W.L.A., 18th November, 1858, reprinted. *S.M.H.*, 19th November, 1858, p. 4, col. 6.
- ⁹⁰ N.S.W.L.A., 9th December, 1856, reprinted. *S.M.H.*, 10th December, 1856, p. 5, col. 2.
- ⁹¹ *S.M.H.*, 12th December, 1856, p. 5, cols. 4, 5.
- ⁹² This is conjectural and cannot be established until more work is done on political groupings at the time. Part of the difficulty stems from the ambiguous use of the word "republican". Denison wrote to Labouchere, 18th April, 1856 (in *Varieties, op. cit.*, I, pp. 346 *et seq.*) that 20 Liberals or Republicans had been elected. Not all the Liberals were Republicans. Sir Stuart Donaldson stated in 1861 that the very respectable class of colonists was in favour of the British connexion and opposed to the removal of troops. A small separatist party favoured this (*Report Select Committee, Evid.*, 13th May, 1861, Qns. 2730, 2731, 2732, 2746, 2768, 2790, 2791). And the *Sydney Morning Herald* the next year wrote editorially (29th March, 1862, p. 6, col. 3) that "if ever there were any considerable party in the colonies for separation they are dwindled down to a rump a faction now utterly squat, bald, horny and effete". For what his impressions are worth, the American Robert B. Minturn, in his *Journal from New York to Delhi by way of Rio de Janeiro, Australia and China* (London, 1858, pp. 33, 34) was struck by the strongly anti-republican feeling. The attitude towards defence preparations could well have been a matter of what it seemed more urgent to do, even of temperament, rather than particularly a matter of connexion with a "conservative" motherland whose political system was that of constitutional monarchy. In addition, where the local application did not seem to threaten the safety of the colony, there is no reason to suppose that the colonials were entirely exempt from such factors—or rather such elements of thought—as in the United Kingdom in Fortescue's view were responsible for the neglect of the Army. Here the English Channel was wider. Utilitarians and classical political economists were read even if *laissez faire* did not prevail so completely.

- ⁹³ N.S.W.L.A., 6th January, 1857, reprinted. *S.M.H.*, 7th January, 1857, p. 3, cols. 1-5.
- ⁹⁴ N.S.W.L.C., 12th September, 1850, reprinted. *S.M.H.*, 13th September, 1850, p. 2, col. 3.
- ⁹⁵ N.S.W.L.C., 7th October, 1853, reprinted. *S.M.H.*, 8th October, p. 7, cols. 2-5, 10th October, 1853, p. 2, cols. 2 and 3.
- ⁹⁶ N.S.W.L.C., 26th May, 1847, reprinted. *S.M.H.*, 27th May, 1847, p. 2, col. 5.
- ⁹⁷ N.S.W.L.A., 6th January, 1857, reprinted. *S.M.H.*, 7th January, 1857, p. 3, col. 2.
- ⁹⁸ N.S.W.L.C., 25th August, 1858, reprinted. *S.M.H.*, 26th August, 1858, p. 4, col. 2.
- ⁹⁹ *S.M.H.*, 30th August, 1858, p. 2, col. 1.
- ¹⁰⁰ N.S.W.L.A., 23rd September, 1858, reprinted. *S.M.H.*, 24th September, 1858, p. 8, col. 4.
- ¹⁰¹ N.S.W.L.A., 18th November, 1858, reprinted. *S.M.H.*, 19th November, 1858, p. 4, col. 6, p. 5, cols. 1 and 2.
- ¹⁰² This incident will, it is hoped, be the subject of an article elsewhere. Denison so phrased his formulation in his despatch to the Secretary of State, 48, 16th April, 1860, reprinted. N.S.W.L.A., *V. & P.*, 1861, vol. 1, p. 1315.
- ¹⁰³ Denison to Labouchere, 18th April, 1856, *op. cit.*
- ¹⁰⁴ *A Minute on the Organisation of the Military Force Required for the Defence of the Australian Colonies*, No. 12, in Papers reprinted. N.S.W.L.A., *V. & P.*, 1859-1860, vol. 2, pp. 659 *et seq.*
- ¹⁰⁵ For Denison's suggestion of a regiment to be called the Australian Rifles and partly recruited in the colonies, see, e.g., Denison to Pratt, 16th March, 1860 (*Government House Miscellaneous Correspondence*, 1855-1861, vol. 1, pp. 508 *et seq.*).
- ¹⁰⁶ Denison to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 48, 16th April, 1860, *op. cit.*
- ¹⁰⁷ Stanley to Denison, 6, 11th March, 1858, and Denison's Minute, No. 3, in Papers reprinted. N.S.W.L.A., *V. & P.*, 1859-1860, vol. 2, p. 646.
- ¹⁰⁸ An important letter from the Secretary to the Admiralty to Mr. Merivale, 24th January, 1857, was enclosed in Stanley to Denison, 6, 11th March, 1858 (Secretary of State's Despatches to Governor of New South Wales, 1858, p. 144).
- ¹⁰⁹ Lord Herbert, *Report Select Committee*, Evid., 13th May, 1861, Qn. 3579.
- ¹¹⁰ *Report Select Committee*, Evid., 16th May, 1861, Qns. 3060, 3062, 3063.
- ¹¹¹ See Denison's note on Barkly to Denison, Circular, 28th December, 1860 (N.S.W. *Col. Sec.*, *In Letters*, Box 60). The marine survey arrangement followed Denison's military proposals. See Fortescue's comments on Barkly to Newcastle, 49, 16th May, 1860 (*Transcripts missing Despatches from Governor of Victoria*, 1860, p. 2159). It was not until the end of 1859 that the Victorian Government took the matter up with the Government of New South Wales, and with the Admiralty (*Victorian Parliamentary Debates*, vol. VI, L.A., 8th May, 1860, Mr. Service, p. 1096, col. 2). Denison had written in connexion with steam postal communication, a circular despatch to the Lieutenant-Governors on 16th March, 1855 (Genl. Govt. Despatches to Lt.-Governors [4/1653], pp. 41 *et seq.*).
- ¹¹² Godley, in evidence before the Select Committee (2nd May, 1861, Qns. 2067, 2068), described Denison as "one of the ablest and most experienced of our colonial governors".
- ¹¹³ In his *Remarks on Mr. Elliot's Memorandum*, *op. cit.*
- ¹¹⁴ Pakington to FitzRoy, 3, Military, 14th May, 1852, *op. cit.*
- ¹¹⁵ Koestler, A., "In Memory of Richard Hillary", in *The Yogi and the Commissar and other Essays*, London, 1945.
- ¹¹⁶ Adderley's preface in *Letters*, *op. cit.*, p. vi.
- ¹¹⁷ *Hansard*, CLVIII, H. of C., 31st May, 1860, col. 1833.
- ¹¹⁸ Carrington, C. E., *John Robert Godley of Canterbury* [Christchurch-Auckland, etc.], 1950, p. 152.
- ¹¹⁹ Godley to Adderley, 17th February, 1855, CXXXXV, 29th August, 1856, CLIII, 30th September, 1856, CLIV, *Letters*, *op. cit.*, pp. 240, 250, 253.
- ¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 289, Godley to Adderley, 12th June, 1860, CLXXXVIII.
- ¹²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 286, Godley to Adderley, 23rd October, 1859, CLXXIII.
- ¹²² Childe-Pemberton, W. S., *Life of Lord Norton (Right Hon. Sir Charles Adderley, K.C.M.G., M.P.)*, 1814-1905, *Statesman and Philanthropist*, London, 1909, p. 179.
- ¹²³ E.g., the comments on the despatch, Macarthur to Labouchere, 2, Military, 15th December, 1856 (actually signed 3rd January, 1857. *Despatches from Governor of Victoria*, 1856-1857, pp. 3901 *et seq.*); these comments are in *Transcripts Missing Despatches from Governor of Victoria*, 1854-1856, p. 1235: J.B., 22nd April, "... there are few matters better deserving careful consideration than those relating to military expenditure in the colonies—but the decisions must be come to on communication and discussion between the Secretaries of State and the Chanc. of Exc. . . ." See also the comments on Barkly to Labouchere, 2, Military, 18th July, 1857, in *Transcripts*, *op. cit.*, 1857, pp. 1476 *et seq.*

- ¹²⁴ Barkly to Newcastle, 2, Military, 27th January, 1859, 55, 11th June, 1860 (Secretary of State's *Despatches* from Governor of Victoria, pp. 4389, 4648 respectively). Some of the considerable body of memoranda and correspondence can be found in Lewis to Denison, Circular, 10th August, 1860, Enc. the Admiralty memorandum, 18th July, 1860 (N.S.W. *Col. Sec. in Letters*, "Sydney Defences, 1861-1871", Box 77).
- ¹²⁵ See Buckle, G. E. (in succession to Monypenny, W. F.), *The Life of Benjamin Disraeli, Earl of Beaconsfield*, vol. IV, 1855-1868, London, 1919, pp. 133 *et seq.*, 255.
- ¹²⁶ Carnarvon to Denison, 39, 5th May, 1859 (Secretary of State's *Despatches* to Governor of N.S.W., 1859, p. 171). This was in reply to 156 of 26th October, 1858. The minutes in this incoming despatch copied in *Enclosures Despatches from Governor of N.S.W.*, 1858, p. 123, do not mention the appointment of the Committee.
- ¹²⁷ Gladstone said, *Report Select Committee*, Evid., 6th June, 1861, Qn. 3767, that the Report was in preparation when he came to office and was presented soon afterwards. The Majority Report as printed in *H.C.P.* was dated 24th January, 1860, and Elliot's memorandum, as printed, was dated 28th January, 1860.
- ¹²⁸ *Letters, op. cit.*, CLXXIII, 23rd October, 1859, p. 286.
- ¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 9th November, 1859, CLXXV, p. 287.
- ¹³⁰ Carrington, *op. cit.*, p. 202; Knapland, P. (*Gladstone and Britain's Imperial Policy*, London, 1927, p. 88), suggests that this was a difference of opinion over defence expenditure generally, and that there was agreement over the withdrawal of garrisons.
- ¹³¹ Sidney Herbert first objected (*Hansard*, CLVI, H. of C., 5th March, 1860, col. 2220) but announced on 30th March, 1860, that the Report would be published (*Hansard*, CLVII, H. of C., col. 1642).
- ¹³² Godley to Adderley, 3rd June, 1860, CLXXVII, *Letters, op. cit.*, p. 288.
- ¹³³ *Ibid.*, CLXXXV, 26th October, 1860, pp. 294-295.
- ¹³⁴ Godley to Adderley, 28th October, 1860, CLXXXVI, *Letters, op. cit.*, p. 295.
- ¹³⁵ Herbert, *Hansard*, CLV, H. of C., 25th July, 1859, col. 404. Carrington (*op. cit.*, p. 203) states that Adderley was then aware of the appointment of the Committee. The first letter to him from Godley about it, which is published in the *Letters*, is dated 23rd October, 1859 (*Hansard*, CLXXIII).
- ¹³⁶ *Hansard*, CLVI, H. of C., 30th March, 1860, col. 1638.
- ¹³⁷ *Hansard*, CLVIII, H. of C., 31st May, 1860, col. 1826 *et seq.*
- ¹³⁸ *Hansard*, CLIX, H. of C., 12th June, 1860, cols. 331, 332.
- ¹³⁹ *Hansard*, CLXI, H. of C., 5th March, 1861, cols. 1400 *et seq.*
- ¹⁴⁰ Godley to Adderley, 13th August, 1861, CXCVII, *Letters*, p. 304.
- ¹⁴¹ *Hansard*, CLXI, H. of C., 5th March, 1861, cols. 1419 *et seq.*
- ¹⁴² Carrington, *op. cit.*, p. 203.
- ¹⁴³ This can be seen in the *Proceedings* showing how the resolutions were formulated, as well as in the bent of questions. Some of Godley's suggestions are in his letter to Adderley, 4th June, 1861, CXCIV, in *Letters, op. cit.*, p. 301.
- ¹⁴⁴ Stanley to Denison, 6, 11th March, 1858 (Secretary of State's *Despatches* to Governor of N.S.W., 1858, p. 144). In November, 1859, Newcastle, enclosing this despatch and one of Grey's despatches of 1849, referred to this as the principle which "has for some time past been adopted by Her Majesty's Government" (Newcastle to MacDonnell, 22nd November, 1859, Secretary of State's *Despatches* to the Governor of South Australia, 1859, p. 120).
- ¹⁴⁵ Lewis to Gore Brown, repr. *S.M.H.*, 9th October, 1860, p. 3, cols. 3 and 4: Cecil (*Hansard*, CLXI, H. of C., 5th March, 1861, col. 1413) considered that the motion for the Select Committee stemmed from this rather than from the Inter-Departmental Committee's Report. The important fact is that there were significant events closely observed by reformers and policy makers. Sir George Cornwall Lewis, Home Secretary in Palmerston's second Cabinet until July, 1861, when he became Secretary of State for War, until his death in 1863. Author of *The Government of Dependencies*, and of an important article on colonial defence in the *Edinburgh Review*, vol. CXV, 1862. While the Duke of Newcastle was attending the Prince of Wales in Canada, Sir George Lewis signed many of the Colonial Office despatches.
- ¹⁴⁶ Chichester Fortescue, speaking on the resolution for a Select Committee (*Hansard*, CLXI, H. of C., 5th March, 1861, cols. 1406 *et seq.*), said that the expenditure was nothing like £4m. a year. He argued that the tables in the Godley report were constructed on an erroneous principle and included all the military posts such as Malta and Gibraltar. The figure of £2m., at which they put their expenditure, if such places were excluded, was obtained in "a very extravagant year . . . most favourable for those who wished to complain of the existing colonial system . . . when the number of troops at the Cape was certainly enormous"—the number there was 107,000 then, whence by the last return the number of troops at the Cape and Natal was only 4,300. A year later, Fortescue (*Hansard*,

- CLV, H. of C., 4th March, 1862, col. 1053) said the entire cost for the year ended March, 1860, including India and Imperial ports, and new self-governing Colonies, "in spite of exceptional cases was a fraction over the sum of £1,000,000". There was also the likelihood that Colonial contributions were underestimated because of payments made directly to the military authorities and not passing through the Imperial Exchequer. On this, see the evidence of Mr. Whiffin, Assistant Accountant General in the War Department, before the Select Committee, 25th April, 1861; Mr. Childers and Mr. Elliot agreed, too (Evid., 18th April, 1861, Qn. 265), that if the police were included, the proportion in which the military expenditure in Victoria was divided between the Imperial Exchequer and the Colonial Treasury would be greater on the Colonial side than was indicated in the return. The police item would, of course, alter the real contribution of Victoria relatively to that of some other dependencies.
- ¹⁴⁷ *Report Select Committee*, Evid., 2nd May, 1861, Qn. 2102. On the basis of the figures of Average Amounts provided from Imperial and Colonial Funds for Military Expenditure in the Colonies in the years 1853-1857, it seems clear that the equal sharing of the cost in N.S.W., Victoria and South Australia would have resulted in increased Imperial expenditure, assuming similar totals *ceteris paribus*; but the equal division of cost in British North America, the Cape and New Zealand would more than have offset this, and the total saving to the Imperial authorities would have been about £1¼ million. Table II in "Returns showing Average Amount . . . of military forces maintained in east colony . . . 1853-57", ordered to be printed by the H. of C., 6th August, 1859, *H.C.P., Accounts and Papers*, 3, 1859, vol. XVIII. The average force in N.S.W. and Victoria for the years 1853-57 totalled 2,500, a small proportion of the total of the colonial garrison.
- ¹⁴⁸ Note Stanley's figure of an average number, 1853-1857, of 2,500, *Report Select Committee*, 6th May, 1861, Qn. 2267, and the Returns as appendix to the Report, and also the Return of 1859.
- ¹⁴⁹ Godley to Adderley, 29th August, 1856, CLIII, in *Letters*, pp. 250, 251.
- ¹⁵⁰ In 1861, Godley spoke of the Imperial contribution as though it were to be in the form of money only (*Report Select Committee*, Evid., 2nd May, 1861, Qn. 2069). In Qn. 2111, he regarded the Mother Country's contribution as consisting of money towards the expenses of a local force, not necessarily or always, but as a rule. In Qns. 2112-2113, he referred to the difficulties of raising local troops of equal efficiency, but he thought (Qn. 2116) this a good bargain. Probably these represent his final view.
- ¹⁵¹ Lewis, G. C., "Military Defence of the Colonies", *Edinburgh Review*, CXV, 1862, p. 106.
- ¹⁵² *Report Select Committee*, Evid., 2nd May, 1861, Qns. 2131, 2132. Elliot thought that so long as English authority restrained the settlers in South Africa "from defending themselves [against the natives] in their own way, it is bound to find some efficient substitute".
- ¹⁵³ Merivale did not consider Grey's arrangements as a "system" (*Report Select Committee*, Evid., 6th May, 1861, Qn. 2522), nor did he think that any general system could be laid down. Newcastle was doubtful (16th May, 1861, Qn. 3055): General Peel's principle was a theory "which looks extremely well on paper", but was not one which would bear minute examination "or which can be carried out in practice" (Qn. 2945). Even Herbert's expression of agreement with Denison's plan was very broad (30th May, 1861, Qn. 3547), and when asked if he agreed generally with Peel's principles he remarked (Qn. 3545), "I believe that all Secretaries of State for War hold that opinion more or less". Similarly Fortescue had doubts as to laying down a uniform rule (*Hansard*, CLXV, 4th March, 1862, col. 1052).
- ¹⁵⁴ Carrington, *op. cit.*, pp. 201, 203.
- ¹⁵⁵ *Hansard*, CLXV, H. of C., 4th March, 1862, cols. 1033 *et seq.*
- ¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁵⁷ Godley became quite excited at the support in British journals for the reduction of colonial military expenditure (Godley to Adderley, 12th September, 1861, CLI, *Letters, op. cit.*, p. 306).
- ¹⁵⁸ For some statements of colonial opinion on the denial of British responsibility for colonial defence, see *S.M.H.*, 24th March, p. 4, cols. 2 and 3; 29th March, p. 6, cols. 2 and 3; 2nd April, 1862, p. 4, col. 3. The emphasis was on criticism rather than on the positive assumption of local responsibility.
- ¹⁵⁹ E. Cardwell, Chief Secretary for Ireland in Palmerston's second Cabinet until July, 1861, when he became Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. In April, 1864, he became Secretary of State for the Colonies. He was Secretary of State for War in Gladstone's first Cabinet.
- ¹⁶⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 110.