

Not in my Name: Representation and its Discontents

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There are not many truisms in political theory, but the view that representation is intrinsic to political mobilisation and beyond that to any system of governance is probably among them. Some people will hold power; other people will be subject to it. Some people will speak on behalf of a group, political cause or identity and thus represent it; others will recognise themselves as being the object of this discourse and be represented by it. 'Speaking for others' and 'being spoken for' is, according to Hanna Pitken – the doyenne of theorists of representation – fundamental to understanding the dynamic of politics. As she puts it:

In modern times, almost everyone wants to be governed by representatives ... ; every political group or cause wants representation; every government claims to represent.¹

As her comments imply, representation is intrinsic to retellings of the trajectory of modernity across both the right, as per analyses by figures such as Fukuyama and Huntington, and those on the left such as Laclau and Mouffe, Jurgen Habermas and Agnes Heller.² Where once, so we are told, monarchs ruled in an unrepresentative, despotic fashion, the revolutions of 1688, 1776, 1789 and so on inaugurated representative systems that permitted the progressive unfolding of self-governance as groups and minorities hitherto excluded or unrepresented came to be included in democratic systems. The joy

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The lecture is dedicated to friend and former colleague, John McClelland, who delighted in the ambivalence of political theory, caught between the demand for providing justifications for order and the unruliness of 'the mob'.

that attended Barack Obama's election as the first black president of the United States expressed this sentiment in the clearest terms. Where until recently African-Americans were excluded from the franchise, now not only are they included, but one of their number has been elected as the leader of the most powerful country in the world. The struggle for recognition and inclusion is and has been the struggle to be represented – to have one's identity, ethnicity, colour recognised for the purpose of being part of the political community.³

So it seems unexceptional to think of representation as an inescapable feature of the rhetorical and theoretical landscape – and there are many different traditions of theorising which make the case in convincing ways. Liberal democrats have long argued that representation is the key to overcoming the vestiges of monarchical despotism and ensuring the accountability and rotation of elites. From the other end of the theoretical spectrum, Marx noted in *The Civil War in France* that potentially revolutionary class forces could not represent themselves but had to be represented – or brought into being as a political force under the aegis of a party.⁴ And there are many newer variants on the same theme. Gayatri Spivak famously argued that 'the subaltern' cannot represent itself, it has to be represented.⁵ Laclau has argued that populism – a political form normally associated with the right – is better understood as the universal logic of political mobilisation. Speaking for others, and particularly for the 'nation', 'people' or other large aggregate group, is a prerequisite for an effective politics.⁶ So there are powerful voices lined up to assure us that our intuitions are correct: representation will always be with us. But will it? Must we be represented? Is representation really intrinsic to political life?

'Not in my Name'

My interest in the question is prompted by a number of factors – one of which (I have to confess) is plain irritation at the ease with which politicians, community leaders, spokespeople and other public figures invoke one's name in support of all manner of policies, proposals, actions and initiatives with which one might disagree. How often does

one hear a statement about the views, needs, wishes or interests of, say, 'Australians', 'the majority of right-minded people', members of this or that community etc.? Being represented in this sense seems to equate to the suffocation of debate, opinion and voice. Representation can seem like an exclusory device designed to ensure that different positions are either ridiculed or silenced – or both. We are too *easily* represented, when we might want actually to be listened to. The brittleness of these rhetorical strategies seems designed precisely to ensure that those in positions of prominence maintain them; and those without remain voiceless.

However, irritation at the everyday practice of representation is only one source of suspicion that there is more to the story of representation than the enthusiasts admit. We are after all living in an era that cultural and aesthetic theorists describe as one suffering from a 'crisis of representation'.⁷ Ordinarily when this term is used it is to denote the crisis of pictorial and literary representation – the failure of art to engage the senses to induce the Kantian sublime or Lukacs' historical realism. It is now commonplace to talk about certain forms of art as 'post-' or non-representative. But this crisis does not afflict merely the arts. It also afflicts politics. Taking liberal-democratic politics first, our desire to join political parties is greatly diminished. Voting is in decline – precipitously so for sub-national elections. Our interest in the thoughts and views of the political class is faint except for moments where it exposes itself – sometimes literally so – to ridicule and contempt. We don't want to be represented – or more's the same, we don't want much to do with those who think they represent us. The term 'polly' – as in 'our pollies are bloody useless' – was a new one to me when I arrived in Australia in January 2009. But its effete and faintly absurd air sums up a typical disdain in these parts for the political class.

What goes for liberal-democratic or official politics also goes for non-electoral forms of politics. It is not just the political mainstream, but also traditional radicalism, that is in crisis. The idea that a single party, whether communist or socialist, could represent the needs and interests of great swathes of humanity in the manner described by Marx, Lenin and company has an undeniably sepia-tinted quality.

Political scientists have a habit of equating this withdrawal from the realm of representative politics as a sign of our apathy and lack of interest. We don't want to be represented, so therefore we must be uninterested in politics.

As I think will be obvious even to casual observers of politics, the conclusion hardly follows from the premise. What we have seen over the course of the past 40 years is rather an eruption in what I term 'unofficial politics', which is to say forms of politics unmediated by electoral or representative devices.⁸ Where once the study of 'political participation' concerned voting and joining parties, now it has to engage with all manner of processes. These include direct action, summit protests, political carnivals, and a repertoire of electronic protest techniques including pinging, hacktivism, digital graffiti and reinscription. It includes 'political consumption' which itself includes boycotting – or ignoring goods tainted with negative ethical connotations – and *buy-cotting* – or explicitly favouring goods because of their positive ethical connotations – 'shopping for human rights' as Michele Micheletti puts it.⁹ We can also mention a repertoire of activisms inspired by anti-representational movements such as the Situationists, Lettrists and the splendidly entitled Psycho-Geographical Association. Contemporary activisms, including subvertising, ad-busting, billboard liberation, clowning (CIRCA), detournement and 'idling', owe a great deal to such movements, prominent in the first great anti-representational event: the Paris uprising of 1968.

Much contemporary activism is quite explicitly offered as a counterpoint to and critique of representative politics. Thus, to take a couple of examples which I have studied at close hand over the past few years, the World Social Forum (WSF) is explicitly constituted as a non-party and non-representative space. The Charter of the WSF explicitly forbids anyone to speak in its name and the WSF does not have representatives of an official or endorsed kind.¹⁰ Political parties are banned from representing themselves or being represented in the deliberations of the forum. The Zapatistas, the quintessential iconic movement of the alter-globalisation movement, enact practices familiar to students of indigenous movements of rejecting the

mantras and rubric of representative politics. They practice an ethic of 'governing-obeying', which inverts the traditional relationship between political leadership and an otherwise amorphous mass that has to be spoken for and mobilised.¹¹ Fed up with traditional leftists advising him that he needed to lead or represent the masses, Subcomandante Marcos, one of numerous spokespeople for the EZLN (*Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional*), scribed a pamphlet, the title of which gives a reasonable flavour of his opinion on the matter. It translates from the Spanish as 'I shit on all the revolutionary vanguards of this planet'.¹²

What these initiatives indicate is the emergence of a new kind of politics, a politics that seeks to develop non- or post-representative procedures of the kind that makes a tangible break from the inherited legacy of both mainstream electoral politics and traditional oppositional and radical politics. This would be a politics in which it is not just some voices that count or are heard, but one in which many, possibly all, voices count. Or so it seems. However, even enunciating the matter in these terms gives the lie to the problem of a post- or anti-representational politics. In adumbrating ways in which we want to preserve and enhance a plurality of voices, are not participants to this discourse themselves merely seeking to hide from the unavoidable performative feature of representation? Are they not representing what they imagine 'we' need or want as political animals?

'Representation' in denial

There is certainly some substance to the critique. To go back to the examples just discussed, the World Social Forum does not have official representatives, but this fact alone does not prevent the emergence of all manner of *unofficial* forms of representation that in turn represent a threat to the image of an initiative that seeks to give a voice to those who in the current global constellation have none.

To run through but a few anomalies, whilst the Forum might not have official representatives, it has a governing International Committee (IC) composed of members of key organisations without which the WSF would be unable to function for lack of funds.

These include the Brazilian PT (*Partido dos Trabalhadores*), *Le Monde Diplomatique*, supporting NGOs and charitable organisations such as Caritas. This in turn means that it is very largely composed of individuals from the wealthy North, whereas of course the WSF has hitherto convened in the global South. Indeed a quarter of the membership of the IC is from Scandinavia – a region with less than one per cent of the world's population. Here we see the problem in glaring terms. Through denying the need to discuss its composition, the IC comes to look 'unrepresentative' at a perhaps more intuitive level, in turn raising quite legitimate questions about its authority to act. Knowing this to be the case, the IC notoriously removed itself as a visible aspect of the WSF process, occupying an ambivalent space as a quasi-body lurking in the shadows.

The anomalies go on. It is not at all clear what the status of the founding Charter of the WSF is – whether it is a binding document, a set of guidelines or a mere statement of intent or purpose. Indeed it is not clear which among a number of documents is actually the real Charter, there having been various local emendations along the way making it doubtful which of them is the real or legitimate version.¹³ It is not clear, in other words, who or what is seeking to dictate the terms and conditions of the social forum process itself. Despite the ban on political parties, it is clear that they are intrinsic to the functioning of the forums – the European Social Forum in London was largely organised by the Socialist Workers Party and arguably would not have happened without the logistics and organisation they supplied. And on we could go.

The Zapatistas, everyone's favourite anti-capitalist army, occupy a similarly ambivalent position. This is an army (or is it a movement?) with no representatives, but rather 'spokespeople', including of course the enigmatic Marcos. In his own discourse Marcos insists that he is no representative, but merely an 'echo' for what he hears around him.¹⁴ The metaphor of the echo is of course intended to convey the sense that he himself does not mediate, reinterpret or filter the thoughts and feelings of the indigenous people with whom he interacts (Marcos is himself Mestizo). Rather he is a neutral vehicle for the expression of views and opinions that would otherwise remain unheard. He gives

a voice to the voiceless, power to the powerless.

Such poetic evocations should not blind us to the paradox implicit in his position. Those who feel the echo metaphor to be another populist device to remove the sense of distance between the represented and, yes, the representor, in this case Marcos, are surely justified in being suspicious. Populism after all trades on what in Marxian parlance is called 'substitutionism' – or the substitution of the needs, views and interests of a collective mass of people with those of a single individual – who provides a mere 'echo' of what he or she hears.

So again, in seeking to enact an apparently anti- or post-representative stance, what we end up with is the sublimation of the formal function of the representative claim. The net result is arguably something worse or pernicious. Official forms of representation at least do not deny that there is a point of mediation or separation between the represented and the representor – and of course in democratic systems mechanisms exist to ensure that such representatives are accountable, usually in the form of direct election. As a long-time observer of and participant at a number of World Social Forums, I am embarrassed to say that I don't know who if anyone elected the International Committee. I do know however that no one elected Subcomandante Marcos.

So it looks as if a non- or post-representative politics might be a contradiction in terms – and designed merely to obfuscate the representative claim. Participants in these forms of politics are hostile to representation and representative politics but, at the same time, enact practices that are 'all-but-representative' in nature. A Spivakian reading would conclude that such initiatives are at best naïve and at worst in denial about the need to be reflexive in relation to the terms and conditions of any political discourse or process of contention. A Laclauian would no doubt object that the circularity of these gestures leads not to the opening up of spaces to new voices, but to dissipated energy and political ineffectiveness.¹⁵

Representation as 'disjunctive synthesis'

Understandable though these reactions are, my own view is that we need to probe a little further, not least to avoid the circularity that the critics of the critics seem themselves to be trapped in. Rather, like Plato's *Pharmakon*, representation appears in the work of theorists such as Laclau and Mouffe, Anne Phillips, Iris Young and Will Kymlicka, to name but a few, both as poison *and* as cure – the cure for our lack of engagement or involvement in democracy is more representation, or a better finessed model of representation that better captures our individual group identity, subject position, ethnicity, sexuality or some other formula hitherto left out of the equation.¹⁶ Rarely amongst these ruminations does one get a sense that representation, and the notion of representing others, might itself be a part of the problem to be examined. Typical is a paper I heard at a recent conference on indigenous politics, where a speaker intimated that the lack of engagement by Aboriginals in Australia's representative system was a sign of a lack of aspiration on the part of Aboriginals to get involved in our vibrant democratic culture. This seemed an oddly complacent position even to a recent arrival to these shores such as myself. Shouldn't we at least try, I thought, to examine the matter from the other way round, and ask ourselves why Aboriginals should have the faintest degree of interest in structures that were erected by a colonial power on the back of the conquest of their territory.¹⁷

As this response suggests, analysing representation in ahistorical terms misses one of the vital components enabling us to understand the dynamic of anti-representational discourses and practices. This is the *context* in which such strategies and procedures have arisen and been contested. It also overlooks the manner by which representation can, as my earlier comments indicate, be seen less as a method for *including* the hitherto excluded in systems and processes of governance than as a method for *excluding* those who might otherwise have enjoyed a degree of self-governance. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri capture the ambivalent double-edged quality of representation when they describe the concept as a 'disjunctive synthesis'.¹⁸ What

they mean is that when we talk about the practice of representation we are describing a gap or separation between those who represent and those who are represented – which is the disjuncture. But at the same time we are describing a relationship that binds or unites in some important sense. The represented and the representor are part of a single ‘synthesis’ – a socio-economic metabolism that transcends the multiple identities or elements that compose it.

The description is I think useful because it reminds us that representation operates around a separation between those who are holders of power and those who are subject to it. It also alerts us to the fact that this process is enacted in the name of a *synthetic* or constructed entity – typically a nation, people, territory or cause that must be invoked and brought into being to provide the context for this differential and asymmetric relation. We need to be represented because we are part of a larger aggregate entity which if not invoked would be brought into question, or perhaps disappear altogether. Thus, at the heart of representation is the question of aggregation and how, historically, political units such as ‘the nation’, ‘the people’, ‘the movement’ come into being.

The passive voice in which I am describing these moves should however be setting alarm bells ringing amongst the more discriminating listeners in the audience. It should alert us to a problem in accounts in which structures assume agentic properties, as they do in Hardt and Negri’s account. The process that Hardt and Negri speak to is hardly organic and self-developing, as seems to be implied in a term like ‘synthesis’. As recent post-colonial theory documents, this process of aggregation as ‘synthesis’ has historically been far from passive, quiescent and consensual. Rather, as commentators such as Dipesh Chakrabarty, Partha Chatterjee, Achille Mbembe, Uday Singh Mehta and the ANU scholar Heather Rae have shown, it is one that is bound up with impositional histories of state-building and imposed governmentality associated with colonial expansion.¹⁹

The irony is that, by contrast to more contemporary narratives that imagine the unfolding of modernity to be an essentially auto-telic, peaceful and participatory process, classical liberals have traditionally been almost unembarrassed about the impositional

character of representation and processes that subtract power from the marginal and indigenous to the metropolitan elite. To take some classic examples, Hobbes saw representation as a useful tool to overcome the arbitrariness of absolutism and elite rule whilst at the same time convincing us that absolutism was in our self-interest. Representation, as he explains in chapter 16, Book 1 of *Leviathan*, was a means of transforming a 'multitude' into something singular and unified – and thereby of escaping life in the state of nature which he memorably characterised in chapter 13 as 'nasty, poor, solitary, brutish and short'.²⁰ It was also of course a mechanism for ensuring absolute power under the guise of legitimate authority – which in an era of growing scepticism about the 'divine right' of kings was becoming a pressing matter for defenders of the ruling status quo. Hobbes thus crushes the idea that societies can subsist without the overwhelming power of the state, in turn ensuring that any absolutist power is able to lord it over previously self-governing and self-reproducing communities under the guise of being a 'representative'.

A century later the authors of *The Federalist Papers* offer an updated defence of representation in the face of the absolutist British Empire, thereby guaranteeing for themselves immortal status as defenders of American democracy.²¹ However, as a closer reading of the text reveals, the authors were much less vexed about absolutism than about the perils of democracy in general and of Thomas Jefferson's vision in particular. Jefferson argued that if democracy meant anything it meant ordinary people governing themselves. To Madison, Hamilton and Jay this was as alarming a prospect as British redcoats mounting the barricades at Bunker Hill. As they saw it, the uncertainty and contingency of popular rule militated against the establishment of the strong state they felt America needed (and of course still needs according to realist commentators). Representation would usefully provide a buffer between ordinary people and the state, thereby guaranteeing that the needs and interests of the state as interpreted by representatives were preserved above all other considerations. Again, the argument that democracy should somehow engage the participation of ordinary people was waived in the name of national interests and elite rule.

Of course for a more or less definitive rendition of representative democracy we need to turn to J. S. Mill and his famous essay on *Representative Government* of 1861. Mill is rightly regarded amongst democratic theorists as giving us the fundamentals of representative democracy. When he says therefore that the purpose of representation is 'not to permit people to govern themselves, but to prevent them from being misgoverned',²² we need to take seriously the idea of representation as a means of separating the public from power as opposed to seeing power as the preserve of the *demos* as would seem to be implied in the concept of democracy. Mill was a true Victorian and unembarrassed about his opposition to unfettered democracy. Whilst he was firmly for universal suffrage, including, notably, women's suffrage, he was firmly against 'one man one vote – or indeed one woman, one vote'. In his view 'wise' people deserved more than one vote. Indeed they deserved as many as three or four extra votes. The absurdity of plural voting to the contemporary ear should not allow us to forget that plural votes existed in the United Kingdom as recently as 1948. Before the 'Representation of the Peoples Act' abolished the practice graduates of Oxford and Cambridge as well as owners of business premises enjoyed two votes by virtue of being, respectively, clever and rich.

Representation and its critics

It is against such a background that we can begin to make sense of the little documented critique that emerges alongside arguments *for* representation – in the life and work of the Ranters, the Jeffersonians, Rousseau, the followers of Godwin and radical or Quakerite Protestantism, in the work of socialist thinkers such as Marx and Proudhon and of anarchist and libertarian figures such as Bakunin and Tolstoy. In their view the rationale of representative democracy was nation-building and outward expansion, the disciplining of the mob so that it could be useful and servile, and the protection of private property against the vagaries of a *demos* unencumbered by considerations of duty or *noblesse oblige*. Yes, it was also about the rotation of elites so as to prevent pathologies associated with nepotism

and absolutism; but it was still, as liberals unambiguously argued, the elites who should rule. Representation was a form of security – security for the bourgeois imperial state and for those whose interests it served. The idea of liberal-democratic representation as a vehicle for popular self-governance was very far from the minds of those who bequeathed the ideas about how the state should ideally function and to what end. Liberal-democracy presented the classic ‘disjunctive synthesis’: a means of legitimating the rule of private property, whilst giving us the impression that this is being advanced in our interests and indeed in our ‘name’.

Of course the objection might be maintained that this conception of representation has been superseded by developments over the past hundred years, which saw the emergence of social democracy and with it the welfare state. With the needs and interests of ordinary people for education, housing and healthcare brought to the fore, so the idea of people being represented in spaces of power by those who had a genuine concern for their welfare takes on a patina of credibility. On the other hand, with the steady erosion of such services in the wealthy North and the crushing of social democracy in the global South over the past three decades, such a stance has become ever more difficult to maintain. As, for example, Naomi Klein documents in *The Shock Doctrine*, global elites acting in collusion through institutions supposedly set up to aid development have conspired to ensure that welfare programmes were eradicated across Latin America, the Middle East, Asia, large parts of Africa and indeed across parts of the developed world such as Russia and Poland.²³ The result is, again, that ordinary people are faced with forms of power that are so impregnable and so far distant as to look unchallengeable. In a context where the IMF or the World Bank can impose structural adjustment programmes that make a mockery of national manifestos, political commitments and party loyalties, should it really be a surprise to find that faith in representative institutions is on the wane?

What is perhaps more curious to find is that faith in the healing properties of inherited oppositional discourses such as socialism and communism is equally in decline. As the thrust of the critique presented here suggests, the contemporary condition is one in which

we wish to speak for ourselves and not be spoken for, whether those doing the speaking are candidates for election or oppositional figures with radical plans for redemption. What is at stake in this double refusal – the refusal to be represented by those in spaces of power and by those who would annex those spaces in the name of a ‘another world’, to mobilise the slogan of the World Social Forum?

Whither representation?

If the key to unlocking the dynamic of representation is ‘disjunctive synthesis’, then the key to what lies beyond or outside it is the restoration or recuperation of what Michael Mann terms ‘social power’, which is to say the power generated from below by groups and communities who take on the business of social reproduction.²⁴ Experiments like those in the Chiapas, at the World Social Forum, the emergence of various movements of the poor, excluded and indigenous across Latin America, Asia, Africa, the setting up of self-governing communes, collectives, cooperatives across the developed and developing world are witness to the desire of ordinary people to empower themselves through reducing or eliminating dependency on bodies and processes over which they otherwise have little control. They address in direct terms ‘disjuncture’ – or the sense of being cut off or separated from the power to reproduce social relations without reference to the needs or wishes of distant elites. In many instances, particularly in the case of indigenous movements, this takes the form of a recuperation of power and resources that were once accessible to them, but which were lost in processes of primitive accumulation, dispossession and conquest. In developed societies, they are attempts to countermand the power of corporations and states – to drain off some of this concentrated power so that otherwise marginalised groups and communities can dictate the terms and conditions of their own livelihood.²⁵

Finally, just as evident as the desire to overcome the disjuncture caused by dispossession or exclusion is the manner in which these experiments have tended to resist incorporation into some larger synthetic entity, whether that be an ideology, such as socialism, an

über-agent such as the working class, or meta-project under the guise of a populist movement acting in the name of the people or the nation. Again the Zapatistas are an intriguing reference point, not merely because they have in their own terms rejected the revolutionary inheritance of ideology and vanguardism, but also because of their refusal to unify the miseries of the world in a singular agent. Initiatives such as the 2006 *Otra Campaña* which saw the Zapatistas visit various regions of Mexico to develop a dialogue with all manner of groups and movements show this logic clearly. Rather than developing an ideology or programme that calls upon others to follow them, they sought to develop a dialogue with other indigenous peoples, movements of the poor and oppressed, sweatshop labourers, teachers and academics. The result was not a Party or a programme but an alliance or network, a movement of minorities, in the sense used by Deleuze and Guattari – that is to say an *immanent* synthetic movement based on relations of affinity and solidarity.²⁶ This would be by contrast with a *transcendent* movement based on a totalising or universalist discourse that reduces participants to by-standers.

Contrast the kinds of initiatives associated with the Zapatistas – or the WSF for that matter – with the feeble pseudo ‘consultations’ promoted by our representatives – the Australia 20/20 summit comes to mind as a splendid local example. Experiments such as these in building networked forms of power, horizontal relations, forms of cooperation based on affinity and solidarity as opposed to hierarchy and command may not be able to escape what I would call the *pragmatics* of representation. Someone after all will speak for, write for, such movements, seek to articulate priorities, preferences, strategies etc. What they prefigure however are forms of mobilisation and being-together that seek alternatives to an increasingly passive and ritualistic political spectacle, itself a function of representative processes and institutions that were created to prioritise economic privilege over meaningful democratic discourse. Above all, they seek to close the disjuncture created and maintained by elites and the kinds of transcendent synthesis that puts the needs of the state or the nation above those of subject peoples, the indigenous, the marginal, the poor and the powerless. Forty years ago, Hanna Pitkin

was able to write that ‘almost everyone wants to be governed by representatives’ without striking a false note; I would be interested to learn whether the evergreen Professor Pitkin would be quite so confident in her assertion today.

Notes

- 1 H. F. Pitkin, *The Concept of Representation*, Berkeley and London, 1972, p. 2.
- 2 See for example A. Heller, ‘Past, Present and Future of Democracy’, *Social Research* 45.4 (1978): 866–89; C. Mouffe, *The Democratic Paradox*, London, 2000; J. Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*, Cambridge, 1989; E. Laclau, *New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time*, London and New York, 1990; F. Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, New York, 1992; S. P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*, New York, 1996.
- 3 A. Honneth, *The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts*, Cambridge, Mass., 1995; N. Fraser and A. Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition?: A Political-Philosophical Exchange*, London, 2003.
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- 5 G. C. Spivak and G. M. MacLean, et al., *The Spivak Reader: Selected Works of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak*, New York, 1996.
- 6 E. Laclau, *On Populist Reason*, London and New York, 2005.
- 7 F. Jameson, *Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*, Durham, NC, 1991.
- 8 S. Tormey, *Anti-Capitalism: A Beginner’s Guide*, Oxford, 2004.
- 9 M. Micheletti, *Political Virtue and Shopping: Individuals, Consumerism and Collective Action*, New York, 2003.
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- 12 Subcomantante Insurgente Marcos, ‘I Shit on All the Revolutionary Vanguards of This Planet’. <http://flag.blackened.net/revolt/mexico/ezln/2003/marcos/etaIAN.html>.
- 13 See the essay by Sen, *World Social Forum*.
- 14 S. Tormey, ‘“Not in My Name”: Deleuze, Zapatismo and the Critique of Representation’, *Parliamentary Affairs* 59.1 (2006): 138–54; A. Robinson and S. Tormey, ‘Beyond Representation? A Rejoinder’, *Parliamentary*

Affairs 60.1 (2007): 127–37.

- 15 See for example L. Thomassen, 'Beyond Representation?', *Parliamentary Affairs* 60.1 (2007): 111–26.
- 16 M. A. Wenman, 'Laclau or Mouffe? Splitting the Difference', *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 29.5 (2003): 581–606; I. M. Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference*, Princeton, N.J., 1990; W. Kymlicka, 'Social Unity in a Liberal State', *Social Philosophy & Policy* 13.1 (1996): 105–36; C. Mouffe, *The Democratic Paradox*, London, 2000.
- 17 The paper is unpublished to my knowledge.
- 18 M. Hardt and A. Negri, *Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire*, New York, 2004.
- 19 D. Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*, Princeton, 2000; P. Chatterjee, *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories*, Princeton, N.J., 1993; H. Rae, *State Identities and the Homogenisation of Peoples*, Cambridge and New York, 2002; J. A. Mbembe, *On the Postcolony*, Berkeley, 2001; U. S. Mehta, *Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-Century British Liberal Thought*, Chicago, 1999.
- 20 T. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, London, 1968.
- 21 J. Madison, A. Hamilton, et al., *The Federalist Papers*, London, 1987.
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