

SCHISM IN GREEK SOCIETY UNDER AXIS OCCUPATION: AN INTERPRETATION

The occupation of Greece between April 1941 and November 1944 by Germany and its allies, Italy and Bulgaria, provoked civil strife of remarkable intensity. The hatred which arose between the antagonists often exceeded that which most Greeks felt for the occupying forces. Thus on their own admission the leaders of the communist-dominated National Liberation Front (EAM) hated the Greek collaborationist troops more even than the latter's German patrons (Grigoriadis, 1964: 5. 150). The co-leader of the Greek Communist Party (KKE), Giorgis Siantos, referred even to rival resistance groups as "scum" (Chatzis, 1977-1979: 2. 503). The main group to which he referred, the National Democratic Hellenic League, EDES, was, according to a close observer, "certainly more concerned about EAM than about the Germans" (Baerentzen, 1982: 150). The Greek collaborationist forces tended to be still more ruthless than the Germans in fighting against EAM and its army ELAS (Fleischer, 1980-1982: 194). For George Papandreou overseas (the prime minister of what was widely recognised, in the last six months of the occupation, as the legitimate government) a major preoccupation was "the extension of the terroristic occupation of Greece by EAM" (Papandreou, 1945: 125). Civil strife flared up immediately after the German withdrawal. According to convincing sources, about 1,800 people were massacred by ELAS at Meligala in Messenia; while at Kilkis in Macedonia, 6,000 ELAS forces incurred 356 casualties in destroying an army of 9,000 collaborators.¹

The factors which produced such conflict are still poorly understood, although some scholars—notably Hagen Fleischer, John Hondros and Giorgos Margaritis—have revealed valuable evidence.² Among their findings are the complexity of motives for participation,

¹Daskalakis, 1973: 1. 202, 208, 216; Mitsopoulos, 1987: 404-407.

²Hondros, 1983: 119-120; Fleischer, 1980-1982: 191-192; Margaritis, 1989: 505-515.

and the resulting heterogeneity of the opposing sides. The lines of division cut across most of the obvious fissures in Greek society before the occupation—between social strata, regions, ethnic groups, and the dominant political camps, the mainly republican Venizelists and the mainly monarchist s.

Yet one pre-war division persisted, that between the KKE and the traditional political and social hierarchy represented by both political camps. This division acquired central importance during the occupation, being modified when the KKE won allies by creating EAM. The schism was manifest by December 1942, when, at a KKE conference, Siantos declared his firm opposition to the desire of most politicians to restore “the old bourgeois regime” (Chatzis, 1977-1979: 1. 329). Communist cadres, holding as they did the key posts in EAM, began to see it as the prototype of a new form of government. The reaction by the diverse representatives of the old order was expressed by the quisling prime minister Ioannis Rallis when he wrote, retrospectively, of the spring of 1943 :

The foundations of our social order were quaking. The state had to prepare for its defence, if it was to live. It was certain that the great empire [Britain], which by sentiment and geographical position had always been the protector of Greece, would not tolerate the rule of criminal and subversive elements. (Rallis, 1947: 42; my translation)

By 1944, those holding such views had enough in common for the terms *ethnikofron* (of sound patriotic opinions) and *ethniki parataxis* (national camp) to be used to describe anti-communists in general.³ In most areas, EAM activists now wielded sweeping and to them unaccustomed powers, while the national camp was visibly embodied in the respectable society and official establishment of the larger towns (Arseniou, 1977: 2. 209). In their struggle for survival, the opposing sides strove to recruit supporters from all regions, most social strata, and various political parties. Thus the complex alignments which appeared throughout the country, during the occupation, were largely a consequence, direct or indirect, of the strategies adopted by the

³Kanellopoulos, 1977: 418, 590; Chatzis, 1977-1979: 2. 179; Papastratis, 1989: 535.

competitors for national power.

The complexity of alignments was increased by the localisation of political life during the occupation. Travel by road or rail was severely disrupted; radios scarce because most were confiscated by the enemy or EAM; and newspapers strictly censored by the enemy or by EAM. Thus political leaders had difficulty in controlling distant branches of their respective organisations. The leaders of EAM, and of some opposing organisations, were for long periods dispersed between Athens and the provinces. For their part, the rank-and-file members of each organisation knew little about other groups apart from the distorted accounts by their own leaders. The result, noted by the British observer C.M. Woodhouse, was that on both sides there was a cleavage between the protagonists in the struggle for national power, who felt some sense of direction, and their rank-and-file followers, who usually had no desire for civil war and were little influenced by ideological motives. (Woodhouse, 1948: 57-58).

The prize in the power-struggle was control over the state, which—by comparison with those of other non-totalitarian regimes in pre-war Europe, even in the Balkans—was remarkable for its centralisation, and the extent of its influence over society. This fact lent extraordinary importance to Athens as the metropolis. Another feature, shared by other Balkan states before the war, was an extensive spoils system giving the ruling party control over most branches of the state including the armed forces and police, which had been repeatedly purged by successive parties in the twenty-five years before 1941. Based on an—and therefore right-wing—establishment built up since 1933, the dictatorship of Ioannis Metaxas (1936–1941) had increased the state’s powers to an unprecedented extent.⁴ However it shared key characteristics of preceding, parliamentary regimes. One was implicitly to accept the hegemony—economic and military—of the Western powers, chiefly Britain and Germany. The other characteristic was to treat the KKE as beyond the pale. In persecuting it, Metaxas’s police minister, Konstantinos Maniadakis, utilised the experience acquired by the police under previous governments, Venizelist and , and pulverised

⁴Close, 1990a; Jelavich, 1983: 2. 240; Mouzelis, 1978: 24, 99; Mouzelis, 1986: 9-12, 31-32, 42.

the party's organisation. By 1940, the great majority of communist cadres were in captivity, while most other members were discredited among their comrades by having signed public recantations.⁵

EAM was the response by the KKE to the Axis invasion and the subsequent deterioration of governmental authority. The few party members who were at large when the Germans invaded, with thousands of *dilosies* (members who had won their liberty by recanting) still loyal to the party, were gradually reinforced by escapees from jails and prison islands. Eventually an estimated 670 out of 1,870 cadres escaped, not including the party leader Nikos Zachariadis who was deported to Germany.⁶ The construction of EAM was in large part due to the initiative of lower-ranking communist cadres, in their attempt to resist the enemy and also satisfy the needs of the population. Sectors of EAM established in this largely spontaneous way were the relief organisation National Solidarity (EA); the village councils and tribunals which multiplied from mid-1942; the neighbourhood committees in Athens which appeared in 1943; and many of the guerrilla bands which prevented requisitions of food by enemy troops. The early establishment of the trade union federation Workers' National Liberation Front (EEAM), in July 1941, was due to the traditional skill of urban cadres in this type of work. When EAM was founded as a national umbrella-organisation in September, the KKE was still in effect leaderless, because the future co-leaders, Giorgis Siantos and Giannis Ioannidis, had not yet escaped from jail. When they did, they found an organisation which to a considerable extent had a momentum of its own.⁷

Junior cadres could take such action because few were in doubt about the party's broad strategy: a continuation of the Popular Front policy adopted on orders from the Comintern in 1935 and continued, as far as possible, under the Metaxas dictatorship. The policy demanded

⁵Solaro, 1975: 119, 122-124; Chatzis, 1977-1979: 1. 52-53; Elefantis, 1976: 257, 265-266, 288-289.

⁶Chatzis, 1977-1979: 1. 93; Fleischer, 1988: 142-143; Solaro, 1975: 123.

⁷Chatzis, 1977-1979: 1. 68-69, 76-78, 93-94; 2. 339; Arseniou, 1977: 1. 21-36; Peponis, 1970: 59; Zepos, 1945: 1-2; Zoidis *et al.*, 1967: 235; Bouras, 1983: 53.

alliance with a broad spectrum of opinion against "fascism" (i.e. the dictatorial right), and remained especially relevant because one of its original motives was defence of Greek territory.⁸ The KKE leaders failed, however, to win over any parties other than the small groups—socialist or agrarian—which co-operated in founding EAM. They continued as late as December 1943 to seek co-operation with bourgeois politicians, and tried to prevent EAM activists from offending powerful interest groups, for example, ordering respect for the property rights of landowners, the prerogatives of the Orthodox Church, and the pre-war legal codes. The most significant concession by the KKE leaders was to accept British patronage of the organised resistance, and the prospect of British hegemony after liberation. Here they swallowed their repugnance for British "imperialism", being forced to do so by the pro-British feelings both of the population, and of the non-communists who formed most of EAM's membership. The communist leaders also concealed their control of EAM, in deference to the massive prejudice which persisted against them, even among radical Venizelists alienated from the pre-war political system. The KKE control of EAM soon became common knowledge in the political hot house of Athens; but in most rural areas it seems to have remained little known for much of the occupation.⁹

The policy of conciliating other parties began to conflict with the very success of EAM. Being professional revolutionaries, and operating in a vacuum of government authority, the communist cadres at all levels created a political system which systematically displaced the old one, without apparently worrying how to reconcile this process with their leaders' desire to win over bourgeois politicians. As a result of the party's efforts, EAM came to exercise authority of some sort or another over most of the population through its army, police, terrorist squads, law courts, local government, taxation, newspapers, services for health and education, and its system of communications and food distribution. After local activists established grass-roots organisations, they called for

⁸Grigoriadis, 1964: 5. 245-246; Partsalidis, 1978: 15-18; Fleischer, 1988: 140; Arseniou, 1977: 1. 30-32; Katiforis, 1989: 501.

⁹Fatsea, 1989: 491-493; Zalokostas, n.d.: 150; Mitsopoulos, 1987: 124, 127; Anagnostopoulos, 1950-1973: 2. 326.

co-ordination of their efforts at a regional level, and later at a national level. The culmination of this process was the formal establishment in August 1943 of a national army (ELAS), and in March 1944 of a provisional government (PEEA). ELAS, although it began in the form of guerrilla bands, was intended by its founders, in November 1941, to be organised eventually as a regular army. This, when it appeared, had professional officers, regiments, divisions, and a central command. PEEA was flanked for a time by a popularly elected parliament, and issued printed decrees and its own currency.¹⁰

The mass of party cadres even at senior levels tended to treat EAM as a revolutionary government, rather than the basis for a post-war party in a pluralistic political system. For example, a member of the party politburo, Dimitrios Glinos, told the prominent politician Themistoklis Sofoulis in September 1943 that EAM/ELAS, including its projected provisional government, were permanent, and that other parties would have to join them. ELAS representatives, including the military commander Stefanos Sarafis, when countering British criticism that ELAS was too large and centralised for guerrilla purposes, made it clear that its purpose was to liberate the whole country including the capital, and to prevent thereafter the return of a right-wing dictatorship.¹¹ After the establishment of PEEA, communist cadres in ELAS announced that “the people in arms had acquired its revolutionary authority”, and organised discussions among troops of the country’s reconstruction after liberation. Meanwhile local activists destroyed the old system of government where they could, forcing police in most regions to withdraw by stages from the villages to the centres of larger towns, burning their archives, and, by a campaign of assassinations and kidnappings, preventing important posts like those of nomarch from being filled.¹² The fascist enemy was interpreted by EAM as including senior officials both of the quisling administrations and of the Metaxas dictatorship. Nor were other resistance organisations, or their news-

¹⁰Bouras, 1983: 55-57; Chatzis, 1977-1979: 1. 209; PEEA, n.d.: 27; Couvaras, 1982: 30-31.

¹¹Chatzis, 1977-1979: 2. 195; Arseniou, 1977: 1. 366-370; Mitsopoulos, 1987: 104-105; FO 371/37208/155, R 12299.

¹²Daskalakis, 1973: 1. 188, 200, 286; Hondros, 1983: 149; Zalokostas, n.d.: 289; Mitsopoulos, 1987: 104-105, 212.

papers, tolerated by EAM—even after the liberation—in any areas save a few which its opponents controlled militarily.¹³

The KKE leaders could not decide how to reconcile this unfolding revolution with their aim of conciliating the bourgeois parties and their British patrons. Consequently they lurched between phases of defying the British (October 1943 – January 1944, and June – July 1944) and phases of submission to them (June – August 1943, and August – November 1944). Despite the communists’ apparent revolutionary proclivities, the effectiveness of their organisations attracted some eminent allies: for example, ELAS attracted officers like Sarafis, and PEEA attracted the participation of professors such as Alexandros Svolos. But then, in mid-1944, the KKE leaders found that by defying the British they risked alienating Svolos and the large body of middle-class opinion which he represented, inside and outside EAM. As a result—and probably, too, because of the attitude expressed by Soviet delegates—they decided to send representatives to the Cairo government of Papandreou in August 1944.¹⁴

A weakness of PEEA, in confronting the Cairo government, was that it was supported by a very small minority of those with leading positions in pre-war society. The bulk of the official establishment remained attached to the camp. Most politicians were actually repelled by the organisational success of EAM, because they could neither compete with it nor win followers within it. Admittedly, the organisational success of ELAS attracted about 1,850 professional army officers; but of them two-thirds—including the great majority of senior officers—had been out of action since 1935, when they were purged for complicity in a Venizelist uprising. Many had since then shared with communists the experience of persecution by the s; and some had, partly as a result, adopted socialist views of some kind: examples being Sarafis, and the member of PEEA Evripidis Bakirtzis.¹⁵

At the lower levels of several professional groups, EAM had

¹³FO 371/43694, 43695, 43699; Peponis, 1970: 54-55, 123; Zalokostas, n.d.: 91.

¹⁴Chatzis, 1977-1979: 2. 276, 283-285, 317-318, 463-465; Ioannidis, 1979: 210-215; Bouras, 1983: 51, 128; Zalokostas, n.d.: 261; Stavrakis, 1989: 16-17, 23-32.

¹⁵Gerolymatos, 1989: 293; Elefantis, 1976: 244; Sarafis, 1980: 40-46.

greater success, securing the participation, from patriotic and humanitarian motives, of hundreds respectively of parish priests, school-teachers, intellectuals, lawyers, and doctors. Professionals who were alienated in some way from the pre-war establishment were probably attracted by EAM's general opposition to traditional privileges (such as the status of the official form of the language, *katharevousa*). Among students at universities and high schools, the followers of EAM seem to have numbered many thousands. Among clerical workers, they seem to have numbered tens of thousands, and to have formed some of the best organised trade unions in EEAM. Their radicalism was obviously due in part to the extreme scarcity of basic necessities during the occupation, which proletarianised much of the lower middle classes.¹⁶ The strong support for EAM among many with intellectual training or interests illustrates R.V. Burks' conclusion, based on studies of Greece and other underdeveloped countries, that such people tended to be especially disturbed by their own countries' backwardness and poverty in relation to the Western powers, and especially attracted by the communists' promise of political participation and of modernisation in the economy and social services. The key activists in rural areas tended to be professional people, such as the high-school teacher of literature who single-handedly built up the organisation in Euboea. The appeal of EAM to the educated, and its dependence on the printed word, seems to explain why in many areas it tended to be supported by the more prosperous of workers and peasants. Conversely the fact that EAM in Macedonia was opposed almost solidly by the Tourkophone refugees from Asia Minor seems to have been due to their backwardness and social isolation, which apparently discouraged EAM from seeking their support and made it easier for the enemy to woo them. Thus prominent leaders of anti-EAM bands in Macedonia—Anton Tsaous, Mihalaga, Kisa Batzak—had Turkish *noms de guerre*.¹⁷

¹⁶Zoidis *et al.*, 1967: 193, 524-525, 534; Logothetopoulos, 1948: 131-132; Sakellariou, 1983: 57, 66-68.

¹⁷Anagnostopoulos, 1950-1973: 2. 1: 324; Grigoriadis, 1964: 3. 27-29, 32, 55; KE tou KKE, 1981: 1. 94; Konstantaras, 1964: 71; Burks, 1971: 27, 63-64, 71-72; Thomadakis, 1981: 73; FO 371.37201/162, R 2569; Hondros, 1983: 120; Zoidis *et al.*, 1967: 488-492; Margaritis, 1989: 508; Mitsopoulos, 1987: 183.

Part of EAM's promise of modernisation was the emancipation from patriarchal authority of youth and of women. Young people as in other occupied countries were especially drawn to resistance, perhaps because they had less to lose and were more idealistic than adults. They were enrolled in a nation-wide youth organisation—a counterpart to the now defunct movement established by the Metaxas dictatorship—which played a vital role, for example, providing 60% of ELAS in 1944. Women were promised full equality after liberation, and were widely employed, though relatively little in leading roles, and disproportionately in relief work and the commissariat.¹⁸

Elite groups which EAM did not even try to woo were the major industrialists, merchants, and bankers. They were condemned by communist ideology as exploiters and representatives of Western interests. They were also alienated by the communists' success in organising employees of various kinds. Such organisation was, for communists, a traditional area of expertise to which they were biased by ideology, and also in many cases by their own social origin. During the occupation, EAM in the cities and provincial towns organised frequent and often successful strikes—sometimes on a massive scale—for aims which included higher pay, better food rations, and the cessation of labour conscription. Still more direct means were used to extract goods from the wealthy. In many parts of the country EAM commonly led workers or peasants in raiding the storehouses of merchants accused of black-marketeering. EAM also took over the pre-war police function of controlling prices of basic necessities. Rich people were commonly subjected to demands for protection money. Some of the largest donors to EAM were businessmen making profits from contracts for the Germans, and reinsuring themselves by donating to EAM against the risks of German departure.¹⁹

On the margins of the capitalist class were small-scale employers and retailers who were socially hard to distinguish from workers, because the majority of the latter were employed in family enterprises

¹⁸Sweets, 1986: 167; Dedijer, 1974: 609; Peponis, 1970: 57; Fleischer, 1988: 311; KE tou EAM, 1943: 33.

¹⁹Zoidis *et al.*, 1967: 107-108, 111, 114, 116, 142-145, 182-186, 223, 385-386; Thomadakis, 1981: 77-78; Laiou, 1989: 305; Zalokostas, n.d.: 57, 162; FO 371/37207/222, R 11750.

and were of recent peasant origin. Thus many small-scale employers in towns belonged integrally to communities which were dependent on EAM's welfare services and dominated by its methods of coercion. Also favourable to EAM were locally prominent businessmen in some communities dominated by EAM—for example, in Roumeli, the Thessalian plains, Euboea, and Lesbos. In some of these cases, support for EAM apparently became identified with regional loyalty.²⁰

In the countryside, an overtly class-based strategy was impossible, because owners of relatively large estates were of negligible importance and rural society was dominated by smallholders. In this society, it was normal for a family or village to act as a unit. Where villages were divided within themselves, economic stratification was only one of several possible causes of division, and probably more important in the Peloponnese and Roumeli, where land distribution was more unequal. Thus some relatively wealthy peasants were alienated by the progressively rated taxation, or forced requisitions, of EAM, or by its insistence on higher wages for labourers. A different sort of division was the split in Karpofora (Messenia) between two camps each consolidated by inter-marriage, and aligned before 1941 with Venizelists and s respectively. The village of Imera, in western Macedonia, split because it actually contained two communities, each consisting of refugees from different parts of Asia Minor. Economic links were often significant. For example, some members of Kalarrytes, in the Pindus ranges, supported ELAS because they traded with Thessaly, while all the inhabitants of Syrako, only about four hundred yards away across a gorge, supported EDES because they traded with Epirus. In other cases, political divisions derived from family feuds. Sometimes the reasons for choice of allegiance were purely personal. An ELAS officer, for example, mentions one soldier who, having made a girl pregnant, was forced by his battalion commander to marry her, and in resentment against this coercion, later deserted and became leader of an anti-communist band.²¹ The multiplicity of motives produced complex

²⁰Daskalakis, 1973: 809; Grigoriadis, 1964: 4. 439; Arseniou, 1977: 1. 344; 2. 228-229; Anagnostopoulos, 1950-1973: 2. 325-326; NARS 868.00/ 7-2347, dispatch 17.

²¹Aschenbrenner, 1987: 115; Baerentzen, 1982: 157; Margaritis, 1989: 506, 508; Konstantaras, 1962: 97.

geographical patterns, in which villages of apparently similar social character but opposed loyalties might be intermingled, as in parts of Laconia or western Macedonia.²²

As EAM expanded, it encountered stronger opposition in some regions than in others. In apparently all provinces, EAM grew earliest and won the most enthusiastic support in larger towns, presumably because of communists' experience in trade union organisation, and the facilities in towns for printed propaganda and other means of mass communication.²³ The organisation of women aroused less opposition in towns than in villages, partly perhaps because women were more likely to work outside the home. Later in the occupation, the centre of EAM power shifted to some extent. Its army ELAS strengthened its hold on most rural areas, while in many small towns the EAM organisation was forcibly suppressed by the enemy helped by Greek collaborationist troops. By these means, in Macedonia in 1944, the enemy dominated the market towns of Florina, Kastoria, Kozani and Nigrita, while EAM/ELAS controlled many of the surrounding villages (KE tou KKE, 1981: 1. 92, 94).

Diverse factors influenced EAM's chances of initial expansion in the countryside. Its early expansion in Roumeli was due at least in part to the local connections of Aris Velouchiotis, who proved himself an able guerrilla leader. In the Thessalian plains, the party benefited from the radical tradition of peasants who had earlier in the century gained their land after struggle against oppressive landlords, and in the process won the sympathies of urban intellectuals. But in the mountains of western Thessaly EAM/ELAS suffered from lack of this tradition, and found, interestingly, that the local klephtic tradition was no help to it. In Macedonia, EAM benefited from the communists' pre-war strength among industrial workers and tobacco workers in towns. In western and central Macedonia, EAM also benefited, after mid-1943, from the sympathy of most Slavophones, whom it allowed to form their own

²²Margaritis, 1989: 512-513; NARS RG 84, 1945, W.H. McNeill, "The political embroglio", n.d.

²³Margaritis, 1989: 512; Papathanasiou, 1988: 2. 608-609; Grigoriadis, 1964: 3. 290; FO 371/37205/113, R 9254; Peltekis archive, file 6, G1.7, Capt. M. Ward, "report on visit to Greece, 21 Oct. to 25 Dec. 1943".

organisation and communicate with their compatriots in Yugoslavia. But this sympathy provoked strong antagonism from some Greek-speaking inhabitants, including many of the Asia Minor refugees, who associated Slavs with Bulgarian and Yugoslav expansionism. Those refugees, however, who came from the Caucasus region were pro-Russian and so favoured communism. In southern Greece and Crete, where the Slav menace was less immediate, EAM was strongly supported by the refugee communities, presumably because they had been radicalised by their loss of status in the 1920s, and now formed much of the urban working class. In eastern Macedonia and Thrace, the severity of the Bulgarian occupation crippled resistance until 1944 when the Bulgarians' authority was weakened by German reverses on the Russian front. An additional obstacle, in Thrace, was the presence of Turkish Muslims, who were indifferent to Greek quarrels. Much of Epirus was held against EAM by EDES, which was strongly reinforced by the British. In the Peloponnese, EAM was hindered by especially strong German forces, and also by a monarchist tradition, sustained by traditionally close links with the official establishment in Athens. In Crete, EAM was hindered by the fact that there, more than generally on the mainland, non-communist community leaders bestirred themselves relatively early in resistance.²⁴

However, what is also impressive about EAM is the widespread character of its appeal. EAM organised people to defend their living standards and prepare for a better society after liberation. Thus it won an enthusiastic response from many villagers as well as townspeople, in nearly all regions, even among communities which before 1944 had very little contact with its leadership, like the towns in Evros and the exiles in Egypt. This response enabled EAM to build up ever stronger organisational resources—including welfare services, trained cadres, and repressive machinery—all over the country. At the end of the occupation, these organisational resources were so great that they overwhelmed many of the pockets of resistance which remained.

²⁴Anagnostopoulos, 1950-1973: 2, 1: 320; Arseniou, 1977: 1. 137-138; FO 286/1165, British Consul-General in Salonika to Leeper, 14 Apr. 1945; 286/1166, anon. "notes on Crete, 26 Mar.-6 Apr. 1945"; 286/1181, British Consul in Patras, 29 Aug. 1946; Grigoriadis, 1964: 5. 184-185; Kofos, 1964: 124; Mitsopoulos, 1987: 32; Woodhouse, 1948: 91-93.

Coercion was needed nearly everywhere by EAM/ELAS in order to deter informers, suppress crime, and extract requisitions and levies. Military force became an increasingly important component of its authority as ELAS expanded steadily, during 1943 and 1944, through the mountain villages of the Peloponnese, Roumeli, Thessaly and Macedonia. Some *kapetanioi* were thugs who terrorised their respective localities. The KKE leaders realised that such people discredited EAM, but lacked the means to check them before they did irreparable damage. An added difficulty was that a prominent offender was the most famous of guerrilla leaders, Aris Velouchiotis, who was hard to control because of his prestige within ELAS. Nearly all of the key regional and district officials of EAM were communists who, as such, were unwilling to tolerate other values, and were embittered towards the old political order by their pre-war experience of persecution. Feeling surrounded by enemies, they saw rival resistance groups as agents of the British or the Axis, or simply as competitors for scarce resources. It was in the same spirit that the communist leaders ordered attacks on EDES. In 1944, as EAM gained ground at the expense of the quisling administration, its agents assassinated and executed supporters of other organisations with increasing frequency.²⁵

After the Metaxas regime was destroyed by German invasion, the strongest champions of the traditional order were at first the quisling administrations. Until April 1943 they were dominated by a dissident sector of the Metaxist establishment which was Germanophile and quite talented. Many of the Germanophiles had supported King Constantine's pro-German stance in the First World War, or had been educated in Germany, or (if they were businessmen) depended on German markets or investments. Politically dominant at first were several of Metaxas's generals such as the first prime minister Georgios Tsolakoglou.²⁶ While persecuting the associates of the dead Metaxas, Tsolakoglou and his ministers held values similar to his. Like him, they disliked political parties, and revered the concepts of social order, family,

²⁵Chatzis, 1977-1979: 2. 288, 503; Couvaras, 1982: 65, 71; Grigoriadis, 1964: 5. 201-202; Ioannidis, 1979: 200-201; Kasimatis *et al.*, 1988: 364-365; Peltekis archives, file 6, G1, p. 7g, Capt. M. Ward, "Report on visit to Greece, 21 Oct.-25 Dec. 1943"; Sarafis, 1980: p. lx.

²⁶Fleischer, 1988: 354-355, 363; Archer, 1944: 204; Hondros, 1983: 78.

religion, country. Like Metaxas, Tsolakoglou impressed on the police their exalted role as representatives of state authority. The administration headed from April 1943 by Ioannis Rallis differed from its predecessors in being dominated by professional politicians, who as a group had been persecuted by the Metaxas regime, and for the most part favoured a return to a parliamentary system after the war. Consequently this government was better known and trusted than its predecessors by politicians and local party bosses.

The quisling prime ministers claimed that their aim was to continue essential services, maintain law and order, and intercede with the enemy on behalf of their countrymen. In these tasks they won considerable sympathy from what might be called the official establishment, or in other words all those whose appointment was controlled or influenced by the pre-war government: for example, public officials, army and police officers, directors of major banks, judges, university professors, bishops, officials of co-operative associations and trade unions. Also sympathetic were those institutions which had been obliged to co-operate closely with the pre-war government: chambers of commerce, manufacturers' associations, and professional associations. Army officers continued to draw salaries, and many senior ones received official appointments. Most bourgeois politicians acknowledged that the quisling governments were performing some valuable functions.²⁷

Within the quisling administrations there was a spectrum of responses to the enemy, from effective collaboration to covert obstruction. *Willing* collaborators were few because the enemy occupation was extremely harsh. Thus influential resistance organisations could operate within the administration: National Revolution (EE) based in Athens, and Defenders of Northern Greece (YBE, later PAO) based in Salonika. Each recruited hundreds of supporters from high-ranking officials, especially army officers.²⁸ Of those who collaborated with the enemy, few felt devotion to Nazi Germany or to fascist ideals. Some prominent members of the quisling administrations (like Georgios Merkouris, who was appointed Governor

²⁷Tsolakoglou, 1959: 163; Logothetopoulos, 1948: 33; Antonakeas, 1945: 30-32, Rallis, 1947: 23-24, 78.

²⁸Papathanasiou, 1988: 1. 46-47, 312-313; Antonakeas, 1945: 11-12.

of the National Bank) claimed to be fascists, or adhered to fascist groups. But fascism in Greece had limited meaning: for example, its advocates had to eschew militant nationalism, and seem to have held conventional religious values. The fascist groups which had existed before they were suppressed by Metaxas, and reappeared after the German invasion, were treated with contempt by most right-wing Greeks and even by the Germans themselves. Consequently they lost significance early in the occupation.²⁹

Another body which was active in collaboration was the gendarmerie, or rather a large part of it. The Special Security had been established by the Venizelos government in 1929 to persecute communists and other political opponents, and grew to a well-equipped force of 1,645 under Metaxas. Now it was relied on by the quisling administrations to persecute resisters in the cities. In addition, ordinary gendarmes were regularly employed for this and other forms of collaboration, including the requisitioning of food for Axis troops. In 1944 many were employed in combat against resisters. Yet it is clear that most gendarmes served the Germans only under duress. If they failed to do so, loss of livelihood was the least they had to fear: torture, execution, and reprisals against their families were likely penalties. Thus the enemy executed 782 during the occupation, out of a total force of about 14,000. Most gendarmes helped resisters (at least non-communist ones) if they could. Seven hundred defected to EDES; and an estimated 1,600 even defected to EAM/ELAS (though probably some of these were coerced). Even the Special Security showed reluctance to collaborate. The Rallis government could not find a qualified officer willing to command it, and had to appoint a junior officer dismissed long before for political reasons. The city police was still more reluctant. The chief of its Athens branch, Evangelos Evert, repeatedly evaded orders to act even against communist resisters yet avoided dismissal by Rallis because he was valued by the British, whose officers he assisted. Thus he kept his force of 3,000 untarnished for use by a free Greek government against EAM after the liberation. The zeal which some gendarmes showed in military collaboration with the

²⁹Close, 1990b: 16; NARS, Dept. of State, R. & A. 872, report 26 April 1943; Fleischer, 1988: 359-360.

Germans, in 1943–1944, was mainly due to anti-communism. While keeping systematic watch over communists, most of their colleagues, however—including at least some in the Special Security—tried to avoid betraying them to the Germans.³⁰

From the start of the occupation, the quisling administration devoted much effort to resisting attempts by the occupation forces to dismember northern Greece. After the German invasion, the Bulgarians effectively annexed Thrace and eastern Macedonia, while the Italians annexed northern Epirus and the Ionian Islands. The Bulgarians then encouraged separatist feeling among Slavophones in western Macedonia, while Italians did likewise among the Romanian-speaking Koutsovlachs in western Thessaly and western Macedonia, as well as among the Chams (Albanian Muslims) of western Epirus. The occupation forces offered these minorities inducements to collaborate, in the form of food rations, posts in local administration, or employment in militia forces. The Greek police and other officials worked strenuously, and often at risk to their own lives, to thwart these separatist activities. Later, they were alarmed by the sympathy which EAM showed to Slavophones in western Macedonia. Understandably, then, the collaborationist administrations and the conservative resisters felt a sense of mission about the preservation of Hellenism in the north.³¹

Rallis pursued another mission as well: the prevention of communist takeover before the British arrived. To this end he used his official authority, and his influence with the Germans, in an attempt to reconstruct the Greek military forces, in a form which became known as security battalions. Hoping to make them a bulwark of respectable society, he managed to recruit many youths of rich families, presumably as officers (Rallis, 1947: 65; Zalokostas, n.d.: 288). His obvious hope was to revive state authority, and make himself necessary after liberation to other anti-communist groups, to which he tried to

³⁰Daskalakis, 1973: 1. 251-252, 289; Katsimanglis, 1974: 151; Rallis, 1947: 116-117; Spais, 1970: 262; FO 371/37204/25, R 7213; Zoidis *et al.*, 1967: 235.

³¹Arseniou, 1977: 1. 69; Daskalakis, 1973: 1. 249-250, 265-268, 274, 286-287, 290, 294; Papathanasiou, 1988: 1. 20-23; Rallis, 1947: 141; Troebst, 1989: 259.

build bridges, by for example helping the resistance leader Dimitrios Psarros, as well as members of EDES, and British officers in hiding. Possibly he believed what he and the commanders of the security battalions repeatedly told their officers, which is that they enjoyed tacit British approval (Hondros, 1989: 265, 271-273). Rallis's initial aims in establishing the security battalions earned widespread sympathy from bourgeois politicians and respectable society. Besides Rallis, who had been an extreme monarchist, an influential group of republican politicians, who included Rallis's Minister of the Interior Anastasios Tavoularis and were associated with the ex-dictator Theodoros Pangalos, planned to use the battalions for their own ends.³²

The Germans thwarted the politicians' schemes, arresting the Pangalos group for their contacts with resisters, and bringing the majority of the battalions under their direct command and close supervision (Fleischer, 1980-1982: 190, 193). The SS Commander in Greece eventually reported that the strength of the security battalions reached 22,350—a figure which excluded several thousand irregular fighters in bands raised directly by the Germans in Macedonia, and on a lesser scale in Thessaly. The collaborationist forces operated chiefly in the Peloponnese, Roumeli, Attica, and central and western Macedonia. Of the thousand or so army officers in these units, some were Venizelists who had been forcibly retired in the 1930s and were lured back into service by restitution of rank and pay. Eventually, however, a majority were monarchists who were pressed into service, often by threats such as loss of salary. Many recruits were refugees from resistance bands dissolved by ELAS—an illustration of the widespread tendency in 1944 for people to seek security in one armed group or another. The Germans, for the bands which they themselves raised, were forced to recruit criminals or disreputable characters: the commander of one unit, the illiterate ex-chauffeur Dangoulas, became known as “the beast of Salonika”, and was considered by a police officer as a “disgrace” to the city (*Eleftheria*, 1965: 31 January, 15). In all collaborationist units the majority of privates were motivated simply by economic need. So were the masses of humble informers on whom the Germans relied

³²Anagnostopoulos, 1950-1973: 2. 381; Peltekis archive, file 7, no. 63, S. Apostolidis, 2 Nov. 1945.

throughout the occupation. For example, Lt.-Col. Nicholas Hammond reported that, in Salonika in July 1943, the Germans employed “mainly youths, waiters and concierges”.³³

The collaborationist troops became ruthless both in combating ELAS, and also in terrorising and plundering civilians. These atrocities, and their association with the Germans, caused many to become demoralised, and made the collaborationist troops extremely unpopular even among communities which had originally sought their protection. These moral weaknesses help to explain why ELAS quickly overpowered the forces after the Germans’ withdrawal (Douatzis, 1982: 58-64, 247; Kanellopoulos, 1977: 654).

Another type of collaborator consisted of those businessmen who profited by fulfilling contracts for the Germans or by black-marketeering, amidst conditions of desperate want for most people. The traditional dependence of businessmen on official favour seems to have become greater than ever in the difficult conditions of the occupation; and certain quisling ministers were closely associated with profiteers. There was a conspicuous group of businessmen who made large fortunes, and these included parvenus as well as old-established businessmen. But there were many smaller-scale profiteers as well, among whom merchants and retailers of food were numerous (Antonakeas, 1945: 28, 34-35; Papathanasiou, 1988: 1. 104). In provincial towns, businessmen or bankers were among the leaders of local society whose co-operation was normally sought by occupying troops. The proportion of the total population which in some way profited from the occupation was estimated by the Germans at about 10% in mid-1943. They were obviously doomed if EAM came to power; and seemed likely to drag down with them urban capitalists as a whole. Thus it was for their own survival that manufacturers and black marketeers contributed lavishly to the funding of the security battalions, and indeed diverted to them the funds which they had formerly donated to conservative resistance groups. When, for example, security battalionists paraded through Athens on New Year’s Day, 1944, they

³³Douatzis, 1982: 27; *Eleftheria*, 1965: 26 January, 5 and 31 January, 15; Fleischer, 1980-1982: 192; FO 371/37204/ 25, R 7213, Hammond; Grigoriadis, 1964: 3. 312-314; Psychoundakis, 1955: 155-156.

were applauded by inhabitants of the wealthier quarters.³⁴

Nearly all politicians—estimated in total by one of them, Komninos Pyromaglou (1975: 330), at about eight hundred—had been denied the practice of their profession since the establishment of the Metaxas dictatorship in 1936. Those of front rank had also been kept under confinement, and thus were seriously out of touch with public opinion, and more particularly with their local agents and supporters. Now, their professional training and their personal circumstances made it hard for them to engage in any sort of resistance activity; and during the first two years of the occupation very few did so, except a few rather uninfluential politicians in EAM. By 1943, the success of EAM in mobilising their former supporters threatened to prevent most politicians from ever returning to their old vocation. Several, led by the elder statesman Sofoulis, tried too late to organise a resistance group which might contain EAM. Late in 1943, the same task was attempted by diverse representatives of the old order in Athens, including some politicians, several minor resistance organisations, *nouveaux riches* profiteers, old-established businessmen and bankers, and the head of the church, Archbishop Damaskinos, whom most wanted to act as figurehead of a united front. But these people were disunited by, among other things, their political ambitions, and by disagreement over relations with the monarchy and with the security battalions. By January 1944, businessmen tended to seek salvation in the security battalions, while politicians looked with increasing hope to the British and their client government in Cairo. When George Papandreou escaped to Cairo to become prime minister of this government in April, several other politicians accompanied or followed him. Thus the government-in-exile acquired authority for the first time in Greece, and became the rallying-point for the national camp.³⁵

Senior officers of the regular army also reacted, belatedly, to the challenge posed by EAM. Although themselves, they showed increasing willingness to overlook their differences with Venizelist

³⁴Arseniou, 1977: 2. 228-289; Papakonstantinou, 1952: 211; Thomadakis, 1981: 67-69, 75; Zoidis *et al.*, 1967: 234.

³⁵Benetatos, 1963: 136; Chatzis, 1977-1979: 2. 178-182, 292, 294, 361; FO 371/37207/240, R 11752; 371/37208.166, R 12331; 371/43689/11, R 10083.

officers. In May 1943, the former Commander-in-Chief Alexandros Papagos, with five other generals who had held aloof from the quisling government, established the Military Hierarchy to encourage officers to participate in resistance activity, and in doing so to defend the threatened social order. Although the six generals were arrested in July, their organisation continued to function and in time enrolled 2,500 officers—possibly a majority of professional officers on the active list in Greece.³⁶ Many junior officers had from patriotic motives begun resistance activity earlier in the occupation. During 1943 hundreds more officers formed guerrilla bands in the Peloponnese, Sterea Ellada, Epirus, and central and western Macedonia. It is clear that a large proportion of the officers who thus became active in 1943 were mainly interested in combating ELAS.³⁷ By the end of 1943, about 2,500 others had joined the exiled army in Egypt. They included Konstantinos Ventiris, a committed Venizelist and leader of an anti-communist resistance group in Athens. He now became Chief of General Staff under Papandreou, and a link between fervent anti-communists in Egypt and Greece. He secured the appointment of one colleague, the monarchist Thrasyvoulos Tsakalotos, to command the Mountain Brigade (the main Greek unit operating with the allied armies after April 1944), and another monarchist colleague, Panayotis Spiliotopoulos, to co-ordinate the anti-communist forces in Athens in the last two months of the occupation. Spiliotopoulos in turn ensured the co-operation of the members of the Military Hierarchy, and of the police when they finally cut their links with the quisling administration (Leontaritis, 1986: 14-15; Margaritis, 1984: 177-178). Ventiris, Tsakalotos, and Spiliotopoulos would all play prominent roles on the national side in the civil war in 1946–1949. They sympathised with the anti-communism of officers in the security battalions, as probably did most officers of the regular army and most ministers in Papandreou's government before EAM joined it. Seeing that they might need to use the security battalions against EAM, Papandreou and the British

³⁶Chatzis, 1977-1979: 1. 376-379; Grigoropoulos, 1966: 262; Zalokostas, n.d.: 102.

³⁷Baltogiannis, 1986: 156; Gerolymatos, 1989: 293; Margaritis, 1989: 510; Peltekis archive, file 6, no. 8, Lt-Col. R.P. McMullen, 15 Feb. 1944; Zalokostas, n.d.: 102.

Headquarters in the Middle East refrained for eight vital months (6 January – 6 September 1944) from denouncing them.³⁸

By November 1943, all except two of the guerrilla bands formed by army officers had been dissolved by ELAS. The two were EKKA, which survived precariously north of the Gulf of Corinth amidst ELAS forces, and EDES, which by January was confined by ELAS pressure mainly to western Epirus. Both depended on British supplies. EKKA may have reached a strength of eight hundred combatants, but was destroyed in April 1944 by ELAS *kapetanioi* who massacred perhaps over four hundred of its members and supporters. EDES reached a peak of 7,000 combatants in 1944, and was eventually dispersed by ELAS after the liberation. Each organisation was founded in 1941 by a Venizelist officer: EDES by Napoleon Zervas, an adventurer of indeterminate but anti-communist principles like his former associate Pangalos, and Dimitrios Psarros, who, like his old friend Sarafis (military commander of ELAS) had been forcibly retired in 1935 and had since adopted social democratic ideas. Both organisations lost their radical and republican character; and indeed, from the autumn of 1943, became a haven for right-wing officers and police who were escaping from or fighting against ELAS. Other such officers fought against ELAS in the streets of Athens and Piraeus, as participants in monarchist organisations like ED or "X". The ferocity of this feuding is indicated by the statement of a member of ED, Christos Zalokostas, in September 1944, that EAM militiamen were "murdering on average two [of our lads] each day, officers, young students, officer-cadets".³⁹

By 1944, the varied representatives of the old order felt a sense of common purpose in resisting the apparent dictatorial ambitions of EAM. But this stance increasingly implied defence of a social and political order which offered little hope for the post-war period. Admittedly, many anti-communists, including some who were socially conservative, hoped for a fairer society after the war. Indeed, given the poverty being suffered by most of the population, all political

³⁸Chatzis, 1977-1979: 2. 192; Grigoropoulos, 1966: 266; Hondros, 1989: 270-271; Papastratis, 1984: 211; Spais, 1970: 264.

³⁹Zalokostas, n.d.: 94, 232, 289; Arapis, 1988: 20-24; Daskalakis, 1973: 1. 189; Hondros, 1983: 105, 140; Papagiannopoulos, 1981: 90, 144; Papathanasiou, 1988: 2. 576-577; Pyromaglou, 1975: 305-307.

organisations had to make generous promises of social welfare. EDES and EKKA, for example, each at first adopted social democratic programmes, as did Papandreou before he became prime minister. But the groups opposed to EAM made few preparations to implement their promises, and neglected them as they became part of an alliance in which the most cohesive and determined element consisted of conservative army officers. Such officers distrusted political programmes as a distraction from their military objectives, and as likely to arouse latent divisions between monarchists and republicans. The poverty of their policies gave conservative groups additional motive to bang the nationalist drum by alleging that EAM wanted to alienate Slav-occupied areas in the north, and by holding out the specious prospect of territorial expansion at the expense of Albania and Bulgaria.⁴⁰

The conservatives' lack of programme was symptomatic of their weakness in political organisation, which in turn was epitomised by EDES in Epirus. Fortified by gold sovereigns and supplies from the British, Zervas enlarged EDES by laborious negotiations with local notables, and by enlisting the help in various regions of old military acquaintances. He held EDES together by personal authority; but lacking political ideals, and bad at choosing subordinates, he failed to organise it effectively.⁴¹ The case of EDES shows how inadequate were the political methods characteristic of the old order. As a result of the conservatives' political incapacity, their organisations in the metropolis were fragmented, and the distribution of their bands in the provinces was haphazard. The bands were, for example, comparatively numerous in the Peloponnese because a disproportionate number of professional officers hailed from this region. The efforts in 1943 of the Panhellenic Liberation Organisation (PAO) in Salonika, and of National Action (ED) in Athens, to send officers "to the mountains" to form bands were feeble by ELAS's standards. The organisations lacked funds, and the officers lacked a supply system, or understanding of guerrilla warfare.

⁴⁰FO 371/43699/131, R 21461; Kasimatis *et al.*, 1988: 124-130; Papathanasiou, 1988: 1. 105, 140, 144, 163-165; 2. 576-577; Pyromaglou, 1975: 305-307.

⁴¹Baerentzen, 1982: 126-128, 153-154; Baltogiannis, 1986: 160-162, 179; FO 371/37204/26, R 7213; Pyromaglou, 1975: 312-313.

Thus it was partly for lack of an effective alternative at this time that some hundreds of professional officers, who included some monarchists, joined ELAS.⁴²

Because of their weakness, the conservative organisations could not help the people who in all parts of the country clamoured for protection against EAM/ELAS. Many villages saw EAM/ELAS as a menace because it taxed them and provoked enemy reprisals. Usually, however, they had to defend themselves, some by force and with fortifications. In eastern Macedonia, it was only at the initiative of a British liaison officer that Greek army officers were brought from Salonika in 1944 to staff the anti-EAM bands of Anton Tsaous and others, who for their part were reluctant to accept outside leaders. Rallis as prime minister received appeals for protection from various regions, especially from local notables—such as presidents of communities, lawyers, party agents, businessmen, state officials—who had either represented the Metaxas regime, or before then supported the bourgeois parties.⁴³

In the political vacuum created in 1941 by the German invasion, the sole dynamic force among Greeks was the Communist party. An aspect of this dynamism was aggressiveness, and it was this aggressiveness, more than any factor, which accounts for the civil strife which broke out in all parts of the country. It fuelled the expansionism of EAM which created a common interest between an authoritarian monarchist like Rallis and a social democrat like Psarros. By the time of liberation, there were few localities where EAM and representatives of the old political order did not regard each other with fear and hatred. Among these few were some islands, such as Chios, Samos, and Crete, where hostilities were perhaps restrained by a sense of community and of regional patriotism. Even here, tensions were soon heightened by the effects of conflict elsewhere.⁴⁴

After the Germans' withdrawal, the newly arrived government of

⁴²Grigoriadis, 1964: 3. 31; FO 371/37205/46, R 8725; 371/37206/137, R 10450, 10454; Papathanasiou, 1988: 2. 716-717.

⁴³Arseniou, 1977: 2. 209, 227; FO 371/37204/113, R 7535; Papathanasiou, 1988: 2. 580, 653-655; Rallis, 1947: 146-147; Sarafis, 1980: 145.

⁴⁴Argenti, 1966: 106-109; Carabott, 1989: 314; FO 371/43695/72, R 18615; Woodhouse, 1948: 89.

Papandreou wielded authority only over EDES territory, some islands, and the metropolitan region which had been ceded to it militarily by EAM/ELAS. Everywhere else, the latter retained or assumed authority. After its clashes with collaborators in the wake of the German retreat, EAM/ELAS imposed strict order. While refraining from executions or looting, it jailed many alleged collaborators, and picketed the main roads. Thus two political systems confronted each other, the chasm between them bridged precariously by the presence of six EAM ministers in Papandreou's government. In effect this was an example of the "multiple sovereignty" which, according to Charles Tilly, characterises a revolutionary situation (Tilly, 1978: 191). During the month after the Germans' final withdrawal, the two sides strengthened themselves militarily, and made no progress in negotiations on demobilisation of forces (Papathanasiou, 1988: 2.687; Zafiroopoulos, 1956: 1. 80). After these negotiations reached an impasse, open fighting erupted—for independent reasons—on 1 December in eastern Macedonia, and on 3 December in Athens (Alexander, 1981: 164-165; Konstantaras, 1964: 300). There followed the largest bout of conflict so far; and this led ultimately to one of the most intense of the many civil wars which Europe has seen this century.

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Η ΛΕΙΤΟΥΡΓΙΑ ΤΗΣ ΑΜΦΙΣΗΜΙΑΣ ΣΤΟ ΘΟΛΟ ΤΟΥ ΚΥΡΙΑΚΟΥ ΧΑΡΑΛΑΜΠΙΔΗ

Με τη συλλογή ποιημάτων ο ΘΟΛΟΣ¹ ο Κυριάκος Χαραλαμπίδης διευρύνει ένα θέμα που είχε δώσει στην αμέσως προηγούμενη ποιητική του συλλογή την *Αμμόχωστο Βασιλεύουσα* (Χαραλαμπίδης, 1982). Εκεί μίλησε για το χώρο, με το νέο έργο μιλά για τους ανθρώπους, ώστε να συμπληρωθεί η ανθρωπογεωγραφία του τόπου του. Όπως στην *Αμμόχωστο Βασιλεύουσα* από την πόλη "φάντασμα", την υπαρκτή και συνάμα ανύπαρκτη πόλη, γίνεται μια μετάβαση στον Ουρανό (γίνεται Βασιλεύουσα στον Ουρανό και στην καρδιά του ποιητή), επομένως σταδιακά η πόλη υφίσταται μια εξαύλωση και "ανάληψη",² κάτι αντίστοιχο συμβαίνει στο ΘΟΛΟ. Ο ίδιος ο τίτλος του έργου εξάλλου οδηγεί στο θόλο του ουρανού, οπότε παρατηρείται η ίδια πορεία από τη γη στον ουρανό ή ακόμη υποδηλώνεται η έννοια του θόλου του ναού, οπότε οδηγούμαστε και πάλι σε μια θρησκευτική και μεταφυσική διάσταση του θέματος.

Το έργο αμέσως με την έκδοσή του δημιούργησε αρκετό ενδιαφέρον. Η βράβειυσή του από την Ακαδημία Αθηνών το ίδιο έτος (1989) έδωσε την αφορμή να προσεχτεί περισσότερο και να σχολιαστεί ευρύτατα. Ακολούθησαν αρκετές κριτικές —περιορισμένες οι περισσότερες στο είδος της βιβλιοπαρουσίασης— που δημοσιεύτηκαν κυρίως στον ημερήσιο και περιοδικό τύπο.³ Με την εργασία αυτή

¹Χαραλαμπίδης, 1989. Όλα τα αποσπάσματα που ακολουθούν προέρχονται απ' αυτή τη συλλογή και ο αριθμός σελίδων παραπέμπει πάντα σ' αυτή.

²Ο χαρακτηρισμός πόλη "φάντασμα" και πόλη της "ανάληψης" είναι από το σχετικό άρθρο του Γ. Κεχαγιόγλου, 1983: 78.

³Βλ. Α.Χ., 1989, Ιωαννίδης, 1990, Λουκά, 1991, Μερακλής, 1990, Μπαλάσκας, 1989, Μπουκάλας, 1989, Νάτσου, 1989, Πιερής, 1990, Σταματίου, 1989, Τριανταφυλλόπουλος, 1990.

Βλ. και τις ακόλουθες συνεντεύξεις: Μαυρή, 1989, Μιλτιάδου, 1990, Σποντά, 1990, Τσιμιλλή-Μιχαήλ, 1990, Χατζηθωμάς, 1990, Χαρα-
MODERN GREEK STUDIES 1, 1993