https://openjournals.library.sydney.edu.au/OEW <p>Organizations play a critical role in any economy, undertaking numerous activities from production, to solving problems and generating new ideas and innovations. The Organizational Economics Workshop, held at The University of Sydney and jointly organised by The University of Sydney and The Australian National University, examines a broad range of economic issues relating to organizations, including: incentive contracts with external and internal parties and managerial remuneration; the organization of production, the use of labour and wage structures; the design of hierarchies; the allocation of decision making protocols within organizations; and the optimal allocation of ownership and alternative ownership structures. The Workshop started in 2007. The Workshop is a place for the presentation of both theoretical and empirical research into organizations.</p><p>The Organizational Economics Proceedings is a refereed journal of papers presented at the Workshop. The journal aims to be a forum the quick dissemination of new insights into the internal workings of organizations. Consequently, the Organizational Economics Proceedings also welcomes submissions of original research into organizations from researchers throughout the year. The journal does not require authors to forgo their copyright, so articles published in the Organizational Economics Proceedings can also be submitted and published in other journals.</p> en-US <span>Authors who publish with this journal agree to the following terms:</span><br /><ol type="a"><br /><li>Authors retain copyright but grant the journal the right of publication. </li><br /><li>Authors are able to enter into separate, exclusive agreements with other publishers.</li><br /><li>Authors are permitted and encouraged to post their work online (e.g., in institutional repositories or on their website) prior to and during the submission process, as it can lead to productive exchanges, as well as earlier and greater citation of published work (See <a href="http://opcit.eprints.org/oacitation-biblio.html" target="_new">The Effect of Open Access</a>).</li></ol> [email protected] (Andrew Wait) [email protected] (Vanessa Holcombe) Fri, 03 Oct 2014 16:33:47 +1000 OJS 3.3.0.13 http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss 60 https://openjournals.library.sydney.edu.au/OEW/article/view/8081 <p>The protability of a rm is jointly determined by it's organizational structure and the market structure. To explore the eects of market factors on optimal organizational structure we develop a real-time information processing model of a multi unit rm in a dynamic duopoly environment. Our model is the rst to match with recent empirical nding We nd decentralization dominates for products with short lifecycles but in general there is no unique optimal organization structure over time - when product market competition is intense, decentralization outperforms centralization in the initial phase of the product lifecycle, centralization is superior in the intermediate phase, and decentralization outperforms again at the nal phase. Thus organizational change also appears to be a natural part of the lifecycle as well as a response to economic shocks. Moreover, we also nd that the performance of decentralization is superior when: (i) consumer tastes are more homogenous; (ii) consumers are more sensitive to store practices; and (iii) a larger number of markets are served.</p> Kieron Meagher, Wen Wang Copyright (c) https://openjournals.library.sydney.edu.au/OEW/article/view/8081 Fri, 03 Oct 2014 00:00:00 +1000 https://openjournals.library.sydney.edu.au/OEW/article/view/8080 <p>We examine decentralization { the use of more than one decision maker - in small- to medium-sized organizations, with a particular focus on family rms. If a rm has a single decision maker, almost all are male with a average of 15 years managerial experience. Our estimation results suggest that larger rms decentralize more often, as do rms with newer owners, organizations with a greater proportion of managers and rms in which non-directors have a signicant ownership stake. On the other hand, centralization (using one key decision maker) is more likely in rms that use network communication technologies and benchmark rm performance. In regards to family rms, the relationship between ownership and decision making is nuanced. Overall, however, family-owned businesses are more likely to centralize, and this is particularly true when a family member is the director or proprietor. Furthermore, both first- and second-generation family rms have a greater tendency to be centralized than non-family businesses.</p> Andrew Wait, Jack Wright Copyright (c) https://openjournals.library.sydney.edu.au/OEW/article/view/8080 Fri, 03 Oct 2014 00:00:00 +1000