22. *The Sacred and the Profane*, p.181.
23. *Patterns in Comparative Religion*, p.455.
24. *Yoga*, p.100.
25. *The Sacred and the Profane*, pp.209-210.
26. Ibid., p.211; see also *Yoga*, pp.167 and 212.
27. "Methodological Remarks on the Study of Religious Symbolism", p.98.
28. *Images and Symbols*, p.19.
29. The term homologization is used also to express cultural assimilation of foreign symbols, practices and rites, e.g., *Yoga*, pp.108, 109, 112, 113, 143; however, we will restrict our discussion to the assimilation of different symbolic meanings.
30. See *The Sacred and the Profane*, p.197; and *Yoga*, pp.113, 120.
31. *The Sacred and the Profane*, p.166.
32. Ibid., p.168.
33. See *Yoga*, p.110.
34. *Patterns in Comparative Religion*, p.451.
35. *Religion and Nothingness*, p.14.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid., p.4.
38. Ibid., pp.4-5.
39. Ibid., p.5.
40. Ibid., p.6.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid., p.10.
43. Ibid., pp.16-17.
44. Ibid., p.55.
45. For other structures of religious awareness and behavior, see F.J. Streng, "Three approaches to Authentic Existence: Christian, Confucian and Buddhist", *Philosophy East and West* XXXII/2 (1982), pp.15-44; and F.J. Streng, *Understanding Religious Life*, 3rd ed., (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1985).
46. J. Wach, R. Otto, and M. Eliade go beyond a pure typology and assume that religion expresses a universal religious essence. See also R. Baird, *Category Formation and the History of Religions* (The Hague: Mouton, 1971).

Missiology, Methodology and the Study of New Religious Movements

Garry W. Trompf

Missiology is a legitimate field of enquiry, because unless time is spent in reflecting on the nature and effects of missions, and indeed on whether the missionary influence of Christianity is to be welcomed, one cannot understand a good part of modern world history (and a part which is to do with large masses of people, not just a coterie of headline-rating policy-makers).[1] Do missiologists have a near-consensus methodology, however, and is it important to establish their activity as a scientific discipline? This paper indends to go some way towards answering these questions, yet to do so only by focussing on a manageable issue. I have chosen as a springboard for discussion the typology of (socio-)religious movements within the history of Christianity, because the problem of describing 'new developments' which have emerged within or on the fringes of the Christian fold (since New Testament times) nicely illustrates the tension between (a) the use of a vocabulary and interpretation which suits the needs of the believing community, and (b) the adoption of verbiage and analytical categories to satisfy the requirements of science. A big conundrum to be faced, after all, is whether missiology is a discipline which has been expected, if not designed from the start specifically to serve the *ekklesia katholika* and not to rate among the special 'social sciences' (so-called). A consideration of the terminologies both missiologists and social scientists can employ to analyze religious movements will help unravel this puzzle, which has everything to do with the issue of missiology's methodogical bases.

It is strange to imagine that the terminologies we use to describe social movements have an 'archaeology', and that we have to dig carefully if we are to gauge the amounts of prejudice or distortion they carry as remainders/reminders from the past.[2] English words and phrases we use to describe religious movements and tendencies in particular all seem to come naturally out of a 'contemporary usage' — out of the twentieth century vocabularies which are yours and mine — but in fact each has some intriguing background history, in many cases reaching beyond the centuries in which the English language now familiar to us took its shape. If all that an 'archaeological' investigation would reveal, of course, was that words change their

connotations over time, we might perhaps rest in the satisfaction that, so long as we can establish current meanings, exercises in historical linguistics are simply of antiquarian concern. Yet on transcending such a narrowly etymological tack, it will surely occur to us that it is not the semantics of individual words which have the genuine interest or contemporary relevance, so much as the bearing key terms have come to have to each other through time, and the thought involved which has brought them into a living inter-relationship. What may soon strike us from such an investigation, indeed, is that whole outlooks and ideologies are built up on 'language-edifices', and that modes of description or typologies can therefore reflect certain perspectives on life, even 'mind-sets'. Placing verbiage 'archaeologically' then becomes extremely important because it enables us to 'locate' every thinker in the historical map of discourse. At the very least the process will help one spot the differences between traditionalism (or 'old-fashioned' thought) and approaches which are rampantly neologistic or jargonistic! On becoming adept, however, one experiences the sheer joy of being able to tell Marxist from Christian, liberal from conservative, Durkheimian from structuralist, or expatriate from Third World national (to cite but a few, albeit pertinent examples)!

Over the last one hundred years there has been a steadily increasing effort by Western scholars to characterize religions and religious movements from a cross-cultural perspective, and thus a relative internationalization of Western hermeneutical tools and terminologies has resulted.[3] It is of fundamental importance for the following discussion to appreciate, however, that all serious modern (Western or international) discourse about religious movements and tendencies within the history of Christianity largely derives from two quarters: from Christian theological language on the one hand (especially as refined in the discipline of historical theology), and from social studies (or sciences) which are putatively free of religious presuppositions on the other. Here lies the basis of key methodological disparities in the present-day study of religious phenomena, and the issues can never be clearly understood without an 'archaeology of knowledge'.

During its long and complex history, the Church (if one may here date to envisage it as one macro-phenomenon) has bequeathed to its countless partisans both the linguistic equipment to help differentiate them from groups not ostensibly within the Fold (or from those not 'truly Christian'), and more significantly, sets of categories to distinguish the various tendencies of thought and practice within Christianity's rich ecclesiastical and missionary experience. Thus — appealing to the most basic examples — the faithful or the *populus fidelium* have been contrasted with pagans, heathens, infidels or unvelievers; the heretics or those of heterodox positions exposed *vis-à-vis* orthodoxy (or 'right opinion' as dictated by Bible and tradition); and the many and varied (trans)formations in ongoing Christian history

divided up into a vast collection of institutional and theological 'camps' — of orders both monastic and lay, of daily practice whether rigorist or lax, of theological stances ranging between the philosophical and mystical, and of fresh pressures for devoutness and social concern called reform, renovation, restitution, renaissance, revival, renewal, (re-)awakening and the like.[4]

Now it is hardly plausible to pass off this ecclesial tradition of categorization and distinction as 'unscientific'. After all, there is no modern system of social classification, however 'secular', which does not owe something to it. Virtually all the terms we now use to denote the types of religious roles or leadership, for instance, hail from Christian reflection on biblical, church and 'world' history. All that rather fundamental talk about prophets, sages, priests, monarchs, saints, lawgivers, scribes, diviners, necromancers, witches, etc. is the result of a long-term Christian interlacing of Hebrew, Graeco-Roman and northern European designations, and also betokens Christian thinkers' ongoing usage of *scientiae* (or bodies of knowledge) which existed prior to Christianity or somewhat independent of it. What is more, we should not imagine the history of distinctly Christian modes of classification to have stopped short with the fragmentation of a united Christendom, or with the newer forces of nationalism, rationalism, naturalism and secularism. Not only is every missiological conference and journal a part of both these modes' resilience and adaptability, but so many techniques for drawing distinctions have emerged out of the complex world of theological polemics, moral casuistry and church historiography over the last five centuries.[5] Just think of the importance of the suffix 'ism' (German: *ismus*; French: *isme*), which has been pinned to most of the world's major religions, to virtually all key ideologies and intellectual tendencies, and to a host of sectarian and denominational opinions. It results from a drawn-out complicated process going back to the Church Fathers (who distinguished *Iudaismus* from *Christianismus* in Latin) and winds on, through the Christian humanist Erasmus (who bestowed such favour on the relevant suffix), into the *volgari* French and English by the sixteenth century (with novel English terms like 'Caluianisme', 'puritanisme', 'Arrianisme', 'Mahumetisme') and into German by the seventeenth.[6] After these very theological days, by Englightenment times scholars of all shades began making it the vogue to "colligate" a host of processes, movements and *Weltanschauungen* into the more familiar 'isms' of current jargon.[7] Marx and Engels without *ismus* would have been like giraffes without necks! (and not just this do they owe to the language of the Christian past).[8]

There have been crucial stages in the history of the Church, however, when her protagonists have been accused by employing their conceptual inheritance with a certain blindness to critical issues or with a view to feathering their own nests. For many latter-day exponents of 'objective' study in the West, the Church appears to have left us with a one-eyed science ('theology' in its broadest

dimensions) only useful for insiders and potential converts. When one considers the emergence of Social Science out of Enlightenment and nineteenth century naturalistic philosophies, therefore, as well as the sbusequent settlement of the curriculum divisions of anthropology, sociology, geography, psychology, history and the rest in modern tertiary institutions, one can expect to discover terminologies and conceptual tools being framed to counter the time-honoured influence of theology (and of Christianity in general). After all, most of the so-called founding fathers of social science were 'positivistic' (and philosophically naive?) enough to claim that they could describe the world and its affairs as they actually were rather than view them *sub specie aeternitatis*, and that they were advancing humanistic pragmatics worthier and more rational than the traditional Mission to Christianize the Earth.[9] They fostered a tension between 'science' and 'religion' — even if some of them proffered (highly idiosyncratic) solutions to this oppugnancy they themselves had exacerbated.[10]

At times individual advocates and schools of 'social science' have accentuated this tension into open conflict, wilfully (and in part justifiably) accusing theologians as opponents of reason (the Encyclopaedists), peddlars of a pseudo-science (Comte), misguided idealists blind to historical realities (Marx), and students of projections or illusions (Feuerbach, Freud). And even if much of the sting of the older debates has since dissipated into a mere throb, virtually all contemporary practitioners of the 'secular' disciplines of social enquiry surely pride themselves on principles of impartiality which they usually suspect are inherently lacking in the theologian. These principles, they will contend, were laid down (however inadequately at first!) with the 'commencement' of their disciplines as modern, scientifically-grounded enquiries, which possess sets of categories designed to sift 'facts' as they stand, not contrived to show how phenomena look beside the measuring-rod of Christian orthodoxy.

When it comes to the study of religious movements and tendencies, indeed, it is *gang und gabe* for them to assert, with extraordinary confidence, that they possess a terminology which is devoid of the old prejudices of questionable theological assumptions, and that they can write with fresh vigour of religion using appellations which are non-judgemental and applicable across all cultural boundaries. Of such verbal stuff, the dreamed-up classifications of the contemporary social sciences have been made: "revitalization movement" is a new die-hard favoured among Anglophone anthropologists (since 1956), but not lacking in competitors — with talk of "nativism" or (of late, and to suit those of socio-psychological bent) "crisis cults": sociologists have preferred to hear the alliteration of "millenarian movement" (since 1957)[11] while political scientists tend to make more of 'protest' and the voices of the 'oppressed': not to mention social psychologists on 'superstitious behaviour' (newly understood), 'cognitive dissonance', etc. A little reading and we find

ourselves faced with a veritable barrage of novel vocabularies and typologies, all packages as alternatives to traditional ways of discussing religion. Our interest often combines with confusion, and we may wonder whether there is a firm base in this apparently shifting sea.

For those who are concerned to understand religion (either because it interests them or seriously affects their lives), and who are to some extent caught in the vortex of competing 'language games' (looking for an exit), there will be a natural tendency to welcome the up-to-date typological styles of the social sciences in the name of charity, supposing (or just plain hoping?) that they are genuine efforts at 'fairness'. It is in the spirit of this kind of 'cricket' that various Christian thinkers — and I think especially of missiologists, whose game is much more explicitly in the service of the Gospel — have accepted such developments as language forums of neutral ground. These days, we may note, Christians of the more liberal vintages react against the hackneyed phrases of Evangelical and conservative Catholic theologies, and prefer to legitimate their reactions by a show of learning in the social sciences. They reckon their own stances to be more caring and less bludgeoning precisely because they have done more sociological homework and have recourse to less oppressive frames of reference. Such attitudes also pay off when it comes to prestige and respectability in the world of learning. Besides, to consolidate my previous point, the champions of the Church have always been appropriating pertinent insights and usages from beyond theology's pale, although we must admit that for this reason even the most hidebound Christian traditionalists could easily appropriate social scientific categories to suit their own distinctly biassed stance. It is already evident, for instance, that missionaries or other Christian commentators on 'new religious movements' in the Third World can use such terms as 'cult', 'cargoism', millenarists', 'nativism' and other epithets more as a means of depreciating unacceptable activities — impurities they believe *ought* to go by such peculiar titles!

This last, crotchety approach, aparadoxically, for all its obvious lack of charity, at least has the merit of reminding one that the spirit of fairness (of open-ended even-handedness!) is often conspicuously absent among those who have allegedly invented the neutral, moderating terminologies - social scientists themselves. *Their* most common error, needless to say, is some form of reductionism. Religion is not given a right to be an independent (let along all-embracing!) reality, but is helped to be something else in disguise: mere epiphenomena, for instance, as the ideational or emotional side-effects of socio-economic relations (Marxism); an instituionalized neurosis (Freudianism); society reconfirming its own importance, even sanctity (Durkheimianism), and so on. One wonders, indeed, whether some of the newest terminology has been born out of such contriving depredation. The American anthropologist Weston la Barre, for one, is so concerned to document new religious movements in Third World

contexts as 'crisis cults', precisely because he believes all religion originates from 'psychotic' reactions to crisis situations.[12] His fledgling, apparently handy catch-phrase, then, is a direct product of his psychologism, and in this light becomes some kind of snare for the unsuspecting. At the hands of some anthropologists and sociologists, moreover, who are personally antipathetic toward any claim over Absolute Truth, 'revitalization' and 'millenarian movement' can be a subtle ploy to so level all religious phenomena that, while the theologian is not noticing, earliest Christianity (to take a *key* example) is passed off as just another episode in "major culture-system innovation", or 'messianism', 'millenarism', or 'cognitive dissonance'.[13]

Admittedly, all efforts at the neutralization of language almost inevitably have a flattening effect, and one might treat this as a necessary setback if we are going to accept any change at all. When Max Weber developed his typology of religious leadership, for instance, and represented the 'charismatic leader' and 'prophet' as fundamental for transition-points in the history of religions, it was bound to follow that Moses, Jesus and Muhammad would be considered under this same rubric, and any stress which Weber might have liked to make (as European or as covert believer?) about the untold specialness of Christianity's founder was quietly shelved.[14] One can see the point of that; just as one would sympathize, to take a slightly different situation, with the political scientist who wishes to disembarrass himself from a reading public which is not ready to see *political* significance in strange Third World cultists given over to some fantastic expectations. Political scientists tend to domesticate their material — writing of it as protest activity, cases of micronationalism, efforts at community development (it is better than rhetoric about fanaticism!)[15] — and thus these movements become more 'democratically' considered (even if their profoundly religious bases are commonly left neglected). This 'levelling consequence' of linguistic compromise, in these cases, most of us will calmly put down to a certain inescapability, or perhaps a natural outcome of translating from one discourse to another, rather than to any implicit piece of foul play.

Liberal theologians, however, or missiologists, missionary anthropologists, or Christian reflectors of similar ilk who have followed the tuneful pied piper of social science with too much alacrity, are quite vulnerable to being walled up in a mountain of sheer relativism if the post-Christian values often inhering to the new terminologies are childishly swallowed in the one concoction.[16] Here we see the Christian (or religious) social scientist had best resort to neo-nominalism if he wishes to safeguard 'his faith' and 'the Faith', taking the newer, non-theologically loaded phraseology as instruments of fairness and empathy, but explicitly dissociating the usage of social scientific terms from any reductionist, doctrinaire, or reifying implications they have already been 'made to' possess in the existing literature. This is the pursuit of the Middle Path between a

conscientiousness about one's own personal commitments and the sense of responsibility that one ought to listen and not pass adverse judgement on any persons or activities until we have weighed the evidence. Such a duo of principles, foretunately, is a defensible position for personally committed Christians, and is the one crucial point around which faith and so-called 'phenomenology' can be said to subsist. The leading exponents of phenomenology call us to "bracket" our preconceptions while we are researching; our 'information-collection' and even our analysis of it should reflect as little as possible our personal prejudgements or favourite theories.[17] Liberal Christian scholars can readily take this as part of the Middle Course and be satisfied (hopefully with caution) that the adoption of as much neutral terminology as possible, or of as much social scientific categorization as can be thoroughly neutralized by high-principled prior definition, is grist to the mill of an unadulterated methodology. If they choose to return to any personal or 'believing' stance, this is clearly not debarred to them by phenomenology, but it would be expected to come after applying research methods and as an independent conclusion.

Strong traditionalists might well reply that all is like walking on a tightrope and that to be 'middling' is not merely to be 'muddling' but to compromise the Faith (whether as the truth of the scriptures or the pronouncements of the Church). They prefer to rely on the strength of a Christian positioning, holding that Truth as clearly defined or understood (albeit by respective schools and spheres of consensus) is the criterion by which you assess all human activities. If movements being studied twist this Truth they are in need of correction, if not opposition; if they mix Christianity with non-Christian views and practices they are 'syncretistic' (in the perjorative sense),[18] or as the more recent and more conservative missiological epithet has it, 'Christo-pagan'.[19] If terms in vogue among social scientists are used of these activities — such as cargo cults, millenarian movements, etc. -this is, as I suggested before, one means by which traditionalists help create the picture that orthodoxy has been impaired by exaggeration, confusion and even deliberate falsehood. Here we have a whole theological (and *eo ipso* methodological) trajectory which cannot be passed off lightly, and one taking on both Catholic and Protestant forms. It impresses for being strong-minded; one knows what is being stood for; there is much less vacillation and a cutting through much refuse to defend imperishable revelation. The Faith and the Church would have a perilous existence without such steadfastness, and such opportunity for polemical clarity. The only trouble is, however, that the defence of Christian Truth is now almost universally considered among methodologists not as confirmation of *the* Truth, but as palpable bias. Quite a paradox — brought on us by the changes of modern intellectual history. Gone are the days when it would have been difficult for the Christian theologian to rank his faith as one of the various *religiones*, for that involved the notion that revealed Truth was on a par with the various attempts

to find God by *homo naturalis.*[20] Since the coming of the Enlightenment we have had religions; all are in apparent competition and each with a different set of axes to grind.

On further reflection, it falls out that there are basically two competing views of objectivity in missiological method (as applied, above all, to the study of religious movements). On the one hand, we find those whose criterion of objective truth is so biblically- or tradition- rooted, that they hold religious shifts within Christianity can only be validly assessed through the normative frames of reference provided by revelation or the received faith. On this understanding, the tools for the proper judgement of human activity (especially as to whether it conforms to God's will or deviates from it) are provided by God Himself in scripture. On the other hand, there are those who consider that (relative) objectivity can only be attained by attempting to stand outside one's religious tradition in (temporary) suspensions of prior theological, or simply theoretical, judgement. These people opt for a "methodological atheism", as Peter Berger would term it, or a commitment to using categories for description from various sources of research on the grounds that they give a fair, accurate unprejudiced account of social realities. The specialist missiologists in this position, if my learned colleague Jan Jongeneel's written statements be taken to exemplify them, wish to preserve and insist upon the crucial working distinction between missiology as scientific enquiry *(Wetenschap, Wissenschaft)* and missiology as theology.[21]

Is there no reconciliation between these two poles? It is hard to expect one. Understandably, someone deeply committed to the belief that a pre-specified, biblically-based kind of Christianity ought to take root in a given region (Melanesia, for example), is bound to be suspicious of scholars who seem too interested in, or too positive towards, new movements among potential converts which seem to diverge widely from accepted orthodoxy (such as cargo cults). In contrast, those who know these movements well, and have brought social scientific (as well as perhaps theological) insights to bear on them, can insist that these so-called deviations are saying something significant to missionaries, and that a purely dogmatic assessment will uncharitably pass them off as nonsense.[22] Should the conservatives even have some place for natural reasoning as one of God's gifts, however, they will quite naturally suspect liberals who employ a whole range of social scientific verbiage to be arguing independently of 'solid truth', in a relativist vaccum which can never satisfy the quest for certainty, and which is always subject to endless debate and provisionality, until recourse is had to the finality of the Word, or ecclesial pronouncements, to resolve matters. For the conservatives, admittedly, there may be some point in deciding whether a movement is active or passive, apocalyptic or uninterested in history, etc., but the crucial point is whether the members of the movement are confused, misguided, and in need of help for either correction or improvement, and so any research which obfuscates this point is of

technical or academic but of no practical Christian value for world evangelization.[23] The liberals' reply is likely to be that unless the 'scientific' investigation of these movements is carried out they are in danger of being misunderstood, or interpreted through such a lense as to exacerbate whatever misunderstandings have already arisen between a given group and the wider Christian community. An appeal to traditional *authority*, or to the stereotypes of heresy bequeathed from the distant past, not only will appear to stultify free research,[24] but to be a conscious act of paternalism or implicit depreciation as well.

The strain detected in the analysis can be lessened, I believe, by a better appreciation of the strengths and weaknesses of each basic position, and I have filled out the above characterizations to do just that. The two apparently uncomplimentary methodological stances do not *have* to be harmonized; in stating one's assumptions, honestly appraising them in the course of one's analyses, and in acknowledging the existence of alternative approaches, the researcher will have done sufficient duty by a modern multiple audience. It is some consolation, however, that at least one avenue towards concordance is open. Phenomenology, significantly, at least in the systematic account of it given by its *doyen* Edmund Husserl, calls us to 'parenthesize' in our consciousness, not merely theological dogmas, but all forms of theoretico-scientific categorization, as we attempt to grasp the world's phenomena 'more naturally' *(natürlicher)*, or 'as such' *(als Solches).*[25] It was not possible, perhaps not even wise, in Husserl's view, for this positioning to be a permanent one, for eventually or in the main we all have to rest on our deepest (and more theoretical) commitments about the nature of reality; yet the patience, careful listening, even mercy inherent in this approach to others' doings is quite in tune with the injunctions against hasty judgement, or against not 'jumping to conclusions', let alone against bearing false witness, which one finds in the Bible (e.g., Matt. 7:1-5, Rom. 14:1-10, cf., Exod. 20:16, etc.).

Notes

1. On the world-wide expansion of Christianity, see esp. D.B. Barrett (ed.), *World Christian Encyclopaedia*, Oxford University, Oxford and Nairobi, 1982. On this expansion affecting 'the common people', e.g., A.R. Tippett, *People Movements in Southern Polynesia*, Moody, Chicago, 1971.
2. Cf., M. Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (trans. A.M.S. Smith), Tavistock, London, 1974, esp. pt.4.
3. This is not to assert that Western categorizations have been welcomed in the cultures to which they are applied. For problems concerning the large Muslim bloc, for example, see E.W. Said, *Orientalism*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1980, pt.3.

4. The literature is enormous. For background, H.E.W. Turner, *The Pattern of Christian Truth (Bampton Lectures 1954)*, Mowbray, London, 1954; G.W. Trompf, *The Idea of Historical Recurrence in Western Thought*, University of California, Berkeley, Los Angeles and London, 1979, s.v. esp. renaissance, renovation, restitution.
5. Cf., e.g. J. Pelikan, *The Christian Tradition*, University of Chicago, Chicago and London, 1971-, esp. vols. 1-2.
6. For longer term background, II Macc. 2:21, 8:1, 14:38, IV Macc. 4:26, Gal. 1:13-4 (on *Ioudaismos*), cf., G.W.H. Lampe, *A Patristic Greek Lexicon*, Clarendon, Oxford, 1961, pp.675, 1530, etc. For historical linguistics, e.g., W.C. Smith, *The Meaning and End of Religion*, New American Library, New York, 1964, pp.58-9, 244-8, cf., F. Maurer and F. Stroh, *Deutsche Wortgeschichte*, Heinz Rupp, Berlin, 1959-60 edn., vol.1, p.349; W. Tuegg, *Cicero und der Humanismus*, Rhein, Zurich, 1946, p.2, C.T. Onions (ed.), *ODEngEtymol.*, Clarendon, Oxford, 1966, p.487.
7. See Maurer and Stroh, op. cit., vol.2, pp.432, 477-8, 500, 517.
8. As is perhaps best reflected in F. Engels, *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific* (in Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, ET, Foreign Language Publishing House, Moscow, 1948, vol.2, pp.116-55).
9. Trompf, "Social Science in Historical Perspective", in *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, 7, 1977, esp. pp.113-24, 136.
10. E.g., H. Spencer, *First Principles*, Watts, London, 1937 edn., pt.1, ch.5. Auguste Comte's effort to establish a Religion of Humanity is another case in point.
11. A.F.C. Wallace, "Revitalization Movements", in *American Anthropologist*, 58, 1956, pp.264-81; R. Linton, "Nativistic Movements", in ibid., 45, 1943, pp.230-40; W. la Barre, "Material for the History of Studies of Crisis Cult; a Bibliographic Essay", in *Current Anthropology*, 12, 1971, pp.3-14; H. Desroche, "Note", to *Archives de sociologie des religions*, 4, 1957, pp.86-91, cf., N. Cohn, *The Pursuit of the Millennium*, Secker and Warburg, London, 1957, on chiliasm's use in sociological literature.
12. *The Ghost Dance*, Doubleday, New York, 1970, esp. pp.43-68, 342-55, cf., *The Human Animal*, University of Chicago, Chicago, 1955, pp.238-66.
13. E.g., Wallace, loc.cit., p.264; L. Festinger, et al., *When Prophecy Fails*, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, 1958, ch.1, cf., J. Gager, *Kingdom and Community*, Prentice Hall, Englewood-Cliffs, 1975; D.E. Aune, 'Christian Beginnings and Cognitive Dissonance Theory' (unpublished typescript), n.p. (USA), 1974.

14. Weber, *The Sociology of Religion* (1922), (trans. E. Fischoff), Methuen, London, 1963 edn., ch.4, cf., his *Grundriss der Sozialokonomik*, Morh, Tubingen, 1925, vol.3, pp.124 ff.; although I note that the phrase "charismatische [geistbegabte] Lehrer" was being used in Biblical and theological studies at least as early as 1910 (cf., H.F. Hackmann, "Heidenmission: III, geschichtlich", in F.M. Schiele and L. Escharnack (eds.), *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, Tubingen, 1910, vol.2, col.1980.
15. E.g., J. May, "The Micronationalists", in *New Guinea and Australia, the Pacific and Southeast Asia*, 10, 1975, pp.38-53; R. Rotberg and A. Mazrui (eds.), *Protest and Power in Black Africa*, Oxford University, New York, 1970; cf., M.A.H.B. Walter, "Cult Movements and Community Development Associations: revolution and evolution in the Papua New Guinea countryside", in *IASER Discussion Paper*, 36, 1981, pp.1-30.
16. See P. Berger, *Invitation to Sociology; a humanistic perspective*, Doubleday, Garden City, 1963, esp. pp.48-52.
17. So, E. Husserl, *Cartesianische(n) Mediationen (Husserliana 1)* (ed. S. Strasser), Nijhoff, The Hague, esp. sects. 62-5.
18. In a recent lecture H.W. Turner objected to the term 'syncretistic' (used by missiologists) and 'syncretic' (as used by anthropologists) in opting for the more normal term 'synthetist(ic)', yet cf., "A Typology for African Religious Movements", in *Journal of Religion in Africa*, 1, 1967, p.6; "Independent Churches of African Origin and Form", in *The Churches of Africa: Future Prospects (Concilium: Religion in the Seventies)*, (eds. C. Geffre and B. Luneau), Seabury, New York, 1977, p.106.
19. Cf., e.g., T. Yamamori and C.R. Taber (eds.), *Christopaganism or Indigenous Christianity?* Carey, South Pasadena, 1975.
20. Note W.C. Smith, op. cit., p.76.
21. Berger actually borrowed his phrase from Anton Zijderveld. Cf., Berger, *The Social Reality of Religion*, Faber and Faber, London, 1969, pp.100, 179-88, 204. Jongeneel's distinction was first made in Indonesia, cf., *Pembimbing ke dalam Ilmu Agama dan Teologi Kristen*, BPK, Jakarta, 1978, but here I foreshadow his work in progress, *Inleiding tot de studie der missiologie*, esp. ch.4, and thank him for both sharing its contents and appraising my own article.
22. Cf., esp. J. Strelan, *Search for Salvation*, Lutheran Publishing House, Adelaide, 1977, ch.4.
23. The position reflected in D.A. McGavran, Understanding Church Growth, Erdmann, Grand Rapids, 1970 etc., esp. pt.3, chs. 8-9, pt.5 (but the term evangelization is not favoured).

24. For background to post-mediaeval reactions against over-reliance on traditional textual authorities, see R.G. Collingwood, *The Idea of History* (ed. T.M. Knox), Clarendon, Oxford, 1946, p.69 et seq.
25. Husserl, op. cit., sect. 62.

Origins of the Hindu Renaissance in Java: Monism in the Early Writings of W. Hardjanto Pradjapangarsa

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Movements to revitalize Indic religious traditions to meet the challenge of Western culture in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries are by now well documented for India, Sri Lanka, Japan, and mainland Southeast Asia.[1] Less well known are the movements to reform the Hindu and Buddhist traditions of Java and Bali along 'modernist' lines towards the end of the period of Dutch occupation and since independence (1949) under the banner of the Indonesian state. Like India and other Asian nations where traditions of Indian origin have for long been a part of the fabric of village and court life, Indonesians in rescuing their Indic heritage from the rubbish-heap of outmoded customs have in some instances chosen to emphasize ritual, moral codes and belief (on the Protestant and orthodox Islamic models) and in other cases have chosen to emphasize the occult and mystical aspects of their heritage. The Balinese-based Hindu Council (Parisada Hindu Dharma) exemplifies Indonesian Indic reform that pushes to the fore exoteric traditions. In contrast the Javanese Hindu organization Sadhar Mapan, founded in 1971 in Surakarta, Central Java, by W. Hardjanto Pradjapangarsa, elevated Javanese mystical traditions to the position of greatest importance. The evolution of this variant of Javanese Hinduism through the founder's early pre-Hindu writings forms the subject of this study.

My approach to reconstructing the evolution of this variant will be to present schematically the 'argument' which runs through Hardjanto's pre-Hindu writings. I will show that basic to his argument and explicitly stated was a distinction between monistic and dualistic religious systems. Scholars use the term 'monism' in a variety of ways, but common to the various usages is the notion that there is but a single reality. In contrast, 'dualistic' ontologies see reality as consisting of two fundamentally different qualities (e.g., mind vs. matter, spirit vs. matter, or, as with the Indonesian dualists alluded to here, Creator Spirit vs. created spiritual beings). Hardjanto presented his system as monistic and sought to convince his readership of the absolute superiority of that system. Knowing that he advocated monism helps us to understand his rejection at the beginning of his career in the 1950s of 'Islam Jawa' ('Javanese Islam'),[2] the religion with which his teachers identified. It also helps us to understand his later affiliation