

# *World-Systems before Capitalism*

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Within the broad category of radical history, which seems to be the same as political economy, there is no question that the dominant paradigm has been laid out by Immanuel Wallerstein in his world-system model. Since the first volume appeared in 1974 his work has set the agenda, leaving orthodox Marxists, let alone modernisation theorists, liberal market analysts and empiricists floundering in his wake. It even seems that post-modernists, after their brief florescence, have returned to the obscurity they deserve. Wallerstein's work produced a host of rebuttals, modifications, and elaborations. Yet from the beginning even the most trenchant critics have never questioned the value of his enterprise; rather they have been concerned to improve it, to a greater or lesser extent modify it, but they still recognise its seminal importance.

I propose in this short tribute to Soumyen Mukherjee, himself well known for his promotion of 'radical' history, to sketch some recent trends in world-system research, and then to present a very sketchy analysis to show how these recent works may have some utility for looking at the history of East Africa and India in the early modern period.

This is not the place to provide a detailed overview of Wallerstein's model of the modern world-system.<sup>1</sup> Very briefly, Wallerstein believes that from about 1500 there evolved in western Europe a modern world-system, which is to be seen as a new sort of world-economy because it was capitalist. For this reason it has lasted much longer than previous examples of world-economies, and since the late nineteenth century has incorporated the whole globe. This then is a dynamic system in which change occurs, unlike A. G. Frank's rather static dependency theories of nearly three decades ago. Indeed, the model may even be predictive, for Wallerstein believes and hopes that this capitalist system will collapse within the next century or so, leading to a socialist world government.

Within the modern world-system Wallerstein delineates three

zones, linked by unequal exchange designed to extract a surplus and convey it to the dominant areas. These three zones, which are primarily differentiated by different labour systems, are the dominant cores to which the surplus flows, the peripheries from which it is extracted, and the semi-peripheries which act as a cushioning or mediating zone between the two extremes of core and periphery. Here is another element of dynamism, for areas can rise and fall, enter and then leave the core, move from semi-peripheral to core, or to peripheral, status. The three types of zones are not necessarily conterminous with particular states, though from time to time there have been hegemonic states within the cores.

Outside this modern world-system there were, until it incorporated the whole world in the late nineteenth century, areas which were deemed to be external. Trade between external and modern world-system areas was in luxuries, and unlike necessities these cannot create systemic relations. This distinction has been one of the most criticised of all aspects of Wallerstein's work, yet while he has shown openness and flexibility in some other areas, here he stands firm. In a recent essay he retains the distinction, and stresses that it is a key one analytically.

Wallerstein's grand design is not yet completed, for the fourth volume has yet to appear. Nevertheless, he has been active in responding to criticisms, and producing elaborations of this schema.<sup>2</sup> There are several overviews of early critiques of his work.<sup>3</sup> I intend now to look at some of the more important modifications and critiques which have appeared in the 1990s. But this is a fertile field indeed; space and my own no doubt only partial reading mean I can only sketch a few recent pieces which have struck me as interesting, or indeed merely have come to my attention. Just as the sketch above of the fundamentals of Wallerstein's work is far too brief and does little justice to the complexity of his model, so also my survey of the recent literature will reveal huge gaps and ignore many other no doubt seminal contributions.

Right from the start some critics have claimed that the modern world-system is too 'economist', for it ignores other ways in which people and societies have been linked. Chase-Dunn and Hall, whose work we will return to later, note that there are all sorts of exchanges—in trade, information, military exchanges for example. Even if one only looks at material exchanges, these can be gifts, tribute, commodity trade, etc. A more sustained attempt to look at non-material ties has been put

forward by Voll. He starts, as is usual, by noting 'the luxuriant productivity of this [world-system] perspective'.<sup>4</sup> He wants to describe non-material elements that tie places together; his example is the Muslim world c. 1000–1800. He finds that Dar al-Islam is 'a special example of a large-scale human group' and quotes McNeill on this: 'What is common to all groups, surely, is a pattern of communication among members, sufficiently frequent and sufficiently standardised as to minimise surprises and maximise congruence between expectation and experience so far as encounters within the group are concerned.' Voll says: 'This pattern of communication in the Islamic world is not primarily based upon exchange of goods, coordination of means of production, or a large network of economic activities. Instead, it is built on the shared sources of the Islamic experience, which provide the basis for mutually intelligible discourse among all who identify themselves as Muslims within the Dar al-Islam.'<sup>5</sup> 'The Muslims might be said to have created the "Islamic world-system", identified by a distinctive set of sociomoral symbols for the definition of proper human relationships.... I am suggesting that both [the modern world-system and the Islamic world-system] are relatively comprehensive social systems that can qualify as world-systems, even though the primary identifying characteristics are drawn from different dimensions of the social system as a whole.'<sup>6</sup> Thus the modern world-system is not the first long-lasting world-system without a world-empire, and yet the Islamic world-system was not a world-economy.

On the one hand, in the light of my recent work on the integrating function of the hajj in the early modern period,<sup>7</sup> this is a perspective with which I am very sympathetic. Nevertheless, a rigorous political economist, and I think we could include Wallerstein here, would merely say that these links, while they exist no doubt, have no important consequences. Or, to put it another way, any Marxist or neo-Marxist would still insist that we are talking here about superstructure, not base. Were we to look at the material base we would find a very different sort of world-system, more likely systems, in the very area Voll is describing, and of course this base, or these bases, determine the superstructure.

Wallerstein saw the creation of capitalism in western Europe from the sixteenth century as the decisive event in recent world history. The problem is that, like it or not, capitalism did develop first in this area,

not somewhere else, and this process did expand to affect the whole world and leave the rest of the world in a subordinate material position vis-à-vis Europe. Yet this sometimes leads to charges that he is 'Eurocentric'. Attempts to rectify this, notably by Abu-Lughod and Frank and Gills, are implicitly, sometimes explicitly, aimed to avoid this perceived bias, for they aim to identify world-systems before (European) capitalism.<sup>8</sup> This seems to be an ill-conceived complaint. Wallerstein and his followers stress Europe not for racist reasons but because objectively this is where the portentous development of capitalism did occur, and for the last 500 years this has been the one seminal fact in world history. There is however a related matter, which is that Wallerstein has sometimes, and with some justice, been criticised for knowing more about Europe than about the areas which Europe peripheralised. This however, it seems to me, can easily be rectified by accumulating more empirical data. It is hardly a central flaw of perspective.

The main thrust of recent world-system work (or maybe this statement merely reflects my own pre-modern research interests) is devoted to investigating the nature of world-systems before capitalism, that is before say 1500. However, it is of course possible to have world-systems existing after this in areas not yet incorporated, for example East Asia before the nineteenth century. The idea is to look at connections within and between societies, to challenge any idea of discrete states making their own history unaffected by other areas. All this is of course a direct contradiction of older modernisation 'theories'. A very successful early attempt to do this was Eric Wolf's well known text, which stressed connections in the world at 1400.<sup>9</sup>

Wallerstein's contributions here are at best sketchy, for they play little role in his main concern, which is with the nature of the modern world-system. He found two sorts of earlier world-systems, namely world-empires and world-economies, the latter of course being non- or pre-capitalist. Both were inherently unstable. World-empires sooner or later collapsed, as their rulers lacked the capacity to enforce their will over their vast territories and also because as rulers they had to defend their whole domain. World-economies were destined to be taken over by world-empires. World-economies are more or less a residual category; he noted early on that there are world-empires, and then for 'convenience and want of a better term', there are world-economies. 'Prior to the

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modern era [and the modern world-system], world-economies tended either to be converted into empires or to disintegrate.' However, we must give him credit for being aware that this is unsatisfactory. He noted in 1990 that the new challenge for world-system theorists is the 'elaboration of world-systems other than that of the capitalist world-economy.'<sup>10</sup> Earlier he said that we 'shall have to rework our knowledge of world historical data (as well as expand it) in order to analyse coherently how pre-capitalist economies functioned, which will—I believe—open many doors for us'.<sup>11</sup>

The master then is sympathetic, and indeed he himself, sometimes in collaboration with others, has contributed here. As one example, of relevance to my own empirical concerns, with Ravi Palat he wrote on India as a pre-capitalist core. They sketch the growth of trade, and the subsequent accumulation of riches in the two most commercialised areas, Coromandel and Gujarat, and in an innovative way tie this in to wet-rice cultivation. But this of itself does not have to mean there was 'an increasingly singular divisioning of labour to which we refer when we use the concept of a world-economy'. It could just show an exchange of preciosities between two autonomous systems, such as between India and Europe in 1500–1750. However, in fact this trade 'represented a transfer of the products of lowly-remunerated labourers located elsewhere along the Indian Ocean littoral to South Asia'. This was especially to be seen in the huge rise of coarse cotton cloth production in Gujarat and Coromandel, and the consequent 'deindustrialisation' of other regions in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Indeed, in this pre-capitalist world-economy there are semi-peripheries too. Bengal exported rice to Coromandel and raw silk to Gujarat, but at the same time it sent cloths to Indonesia, and has the janus-faced character of a semi-periphery. The emerging core zones of Gujarat and Coromandel 'progressively drew upon sources of subsistence and raw materials for artisanal manufacture from increasingly distant regions—leading to the incorporation and subsequent peripheralisation of the latter zones within an emerging world-economy centred around, and integrated by, transport across the Indian Ocean'.

Thus there was 'from the eastern coasts of Africa through the Arabian peninsula and the Indian subcontinent to the Malay archipelago ... an evolving world-economy ....' Yet this was not the same as a capitalist world-economy, in other words a modern world-system, partly because

there was no ruthless drive to accumulate, but also because the basis lay in the nature of wet-rice cultivation. Various things flowed from this, including different political structures. Thus what happened after 1400 in the Indian Ocean area was different from Europe, and the result was that in Europe a capitalist world-economy emerged, while in the Indian Ocean area it did not, especially as there was no real subsumption of labour to capital, which is a crucial part of the development of capitalism.<sup>12</sup> This is to be seen as an important step forward by Wallerstein himself as we try to specify more clearly the nature of world-economies before capitalism. Before 1500, their chosen terminal date, there is no modern world-system but there is a world-economy based on India, and no doubt others elsewhere. The question then becomes what is the situation once the modern world-system emerges after 1500. India, we are told, remains external to this until the late eighteenth century, and so presumably the world-economy centred on India continued, until bits were chipped away from it and incorporated in the expanding modern world-system. When the core, India, was peripheralised this world-economy obviously was ended.

Yet at another level this is a familiar story, especially in their view of how capitalism is to be differentiated from capital. Here and elsewhere he stresses the absolute centrality of the 'ceaseless accumulation of capital',<sup>13</sup> though a more orthodox Marxist, such as Eric Wolf at least on this point, would make more of the dramatic difference between capital as money, and capitalism, and would note the key fact that capital must penetrate and control production in order for there to be capitalism.

Several other scholars have produced larger works devoted to describing early world-economies. The results have been mixed. Janet Abu-Lughod's book<sup>14</sup> was sympathetically reviewed by Wallerstein.<sup>15</sup> Abu-Lughod finds a world-system in the century 1250-1350 whose heartland was the Middle East, but which included Europe, China and the Indian Ocean. The linkage at this time of these areas, based on long distance trade, resulted in an economic upturn in them all. This is a world-system which linked a number of world-systems, each of which had cores, semiperipheries and peripheries making up an integrated production system. None of these world-systems was dominant; rather there was co-existence and mutual tolerance and profit within the larger world-system. In short, she finds a benign interacting group of world-systems, or world-economies. There was no single

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hegemonic power, and this is a contrast with what grew out of it, the capitalist world-system dominated by Europe. One core was the 'Arabo-Persian imperial centres' another 'the towns of developing western Europe'. Thus we can see that world-systems are not all the same, and also that they can change.

All this is well taken, yet she seems to be comparing two different things. She claims that there are different sorts of world-systems, some like Wallerstein's with cores which are dominant, others like hers where there are cores but no hegemony. This may be true, but she neglects to note that Wallerstein's world-system is capitalist, and surely this makes all the difference, for this requires cores to be dominant. Nor indeed does a pre-capitalist world-system necessarily have cores which are not dominant, as we have just noted Palat and Wallerstein pointing out. Indeed, I am uneasy about her whole notion of a core which is not dominant, and what follows from this, the notion that this was a benign, non-extractive, world-system: it seems to me that core and dominance are inextricably linked, indeed one implies the other either in a capitalist system or any other. If areas are linked in a hierarchical world-economy there must be some unequal exchange. Only if there is no hierarchy within the system (and in this case is it a system at all?), or if one looks at relations with areas external to the system, will there be a benign and non-exploitative relationship. Later we will note Chase-Dunn and Hall claiming that there is something which they call core/periphery differentiation, and they seem to imply that this also does not involve inequality. This is one among many areas where more research and reflection is needed.

Returning to Abu-Lughod, one could also point to a less than rigorous use of terminology, yet this is important in this sort of work. She uses 'world economy' and 'international trade economy' interchangeably, and sometimes refers to Wallerstein's 'modern world system' whereas in fact he always has 'modern world-system'. The hyphen is crucial, for it assumes integration and cohesion.

In all this, Abu-Lughod is not denying that something changed in the sixteenth century when capitalism appeared, even if she fails to go into this very much. Her work is important and useful. A. G. Frank's recent work, sometimes in collaboration, is much more dubious. First in an article, very tolerantly published by Wallerstein in his journal *Review* in 1990, and subsequently in a co-edited book, he has put

forward the extraordinary notion that the present world-system (not world-system) goes back to at least 2500 BC. There has been only one world-system in all of history. Late in its career this world-system was first joined and then dominated by Europe. However, Frank refuses to see this as marking a major break: 'I will also question the supposed historical uniqueness and perhaps the social-theoretical relevance of the modern capitalist mode of production.' Networks and world-systems have existed long before capitalism, and he quotes Chase-Dunn that 'any regularised and repetitive exchange of material goods which substantially affects the welfare of a population or the maintenance of a power structure constitutes part of a single world-system network'.<sup>16</sup>

Soon afterwards Frank collaborated with Gills to edit a book where the same points are made more strongly. Thus 'the contemporary world-system has a history of at least 5,000 years'. Wallerstein and his followers think that what marks off the period from about 1500 is the process of 'continuous capital accumulation', but they claim to find this long before 1500 in their continuing world-system.<sup>17</sup>

Frank's earlier work on dependency in Latin America was often criticised as being too static, finding essentially the same impact since 1500, and indeed Wallerstein's main contribution was to modify dependency theory to make it more dynamic. Precisely the same comment could be made about Frank's more recent writings. If one finds a world-system for the last 4000 or whatever years, then one really is ignoring change. We need rather to emphasise change, to disaggregate the data (just as needs to be done with Eric Wolf's overly broad notion of a tributary mode of production which encompasses most of world history) to get beyond such general, and so not very heuristic, descriptions. Also, in a maybe unreconstructed way, I still feel capitalism makes a difference; nor is this just an article of faith, it can be demonstrated. More orthodox Marxists have often complained that Wallerstein finds the evolution of capitalism far too early, and indeed I would myself follow Marx and Eric Wolf, among others, in finding capitalism appearing in the eighteenth century, regardless of various proto-capitalisms and whatever before this. Nevertheless, while Frank and Gills, and Abu-Lughod, are obviously right to say there were connections and trade and even accumulations of capital (which however did not intervene in the productive process) long before capitalism—indeed this is a very familiar point indeed—capitalism



objectively made a most fundamental difference. To his credit Frank in his edited volume allows both Amin and Wallerstein to say this. It is refreshing to see Wallerstein and Frank both finding space in their own publications for views diametrically opposed to their own!

Amin stresses that there were connections and regional systems in the tributary systems before the rise of European capitalism, but 'capitalism is a qualitatively new age in universal history which started around 1500'.<sup>18</sup> Wallerstein also continues to emphasise the 'dramatic caesura that the creation of a capitalist world-economy imposed on the world'.<sup>19</sup> However, as Wallerstein himself has said we need to specify much more clearly the nature of world-systems before capitalism. Janet Abu-Lughod has contributed here, but I must say that Frank's efforts can hardly be seen as a step forward.

Chase-Dunn and Hall have produced a much more satisfactory and challenging contribution. In the lead chapter for their edited collection<sup>20</sup> they follow the others in saying that there have been world-systems long before capitalism. Some of these are stateless, but most are state-based. However, it is incorrect to assume that in these systems one has to find the sort of core/periphery (this is their usage) relations that one finds in the capitalist system. Rather than assuming this, they ask that scholars look in a fresh way at 'the existence and nature of intersocietal inequalities'. Even though one may well find, in state-based world-systems, a core which accumulates resources by exploiting peripheries, intersocietal hierarchies could also be quite different from those which developed under capitalism.

They also confront Wallerstein's perceived economism by noting that there are all sorts of exchanges: trade, information, presumably, along Voll's lines, even religion. Even if one only looks at material exchanges, these can be gifts, tribute, commodity trade, etc. Here they agree with Schneider and say that exchange of prestige goods is not epiphenomenal at all. They can be very important as elites can use them to get or maintain power. Thus, at least by implication they find that luxuries, as well as necessities, can create systemic relations. Similarly, Braudel's claim that hegemony, even before capitalism, was always based on economic domination is questionable. They claim that more often in these world-systems it was political and military power which created inequality.

As they say, all exchange is not unequal exchange. Thus there

are broadly two types of core-periphery relations in pre-capitalist world-systems. First is core/periphery differentiation, where there is interaction between societies in a world-system, as compared with core/periphery hierarchies, where there is domination which can include political domination, extraction of resources, and unequal exchange. One task is to measure degrees of intersocietal exploitation, and this is very difficult, especially when the kinds of resources which are socially valued differ.

Finally, they produce a list of world-system types. They follow Wolf's three modes of production, and find the Indian Ocean to be an example of 'commercializing state-based world-systems in which important aspects of commodification have developed but the system is still dominated by the logic of the tributary modes'. In the core of these commercialising world-systems, in which the core seems to be an empire, there is more use of money, of credit and interest, of wage labour, and of price-setting markets. In the core-empires the rulers use sophisticated means to tax merchants, 'and outside the bounds of empires, in interstitial semiperipheral regions, autonomous city-states controlled by merchant and production capitalists created and sustained market relations between empires and peripheral regions'. They say these centralised empires will be more exploitative towards peripheries than earlier empires, as they are better at concentrating resources at the centre. But of course they are not nearly as efficient at extracting resources as was the later capitalist core in the modern world-system. Nor indeed are peripheries essential in these tributary empires. They claim that in China the mode of production was tributary certainly, but accumulation was mostly accomplished without exploiting peripheral areas. There may be a problem here in that their identification of empires as the cores implies much more integrated and effective premodern empires than may be justified. In other words, empires may in their own territory include the whole range of cores, peripheries, and semiperipheries, as indeed Palat and Wallerstein claimed in the case of India. True, they are writing of India during one of its periods of political fragmentation, but I am sure that when India was united in one empire, say under the Mughals in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, there still were core and peripheral areas.<sup>21</sup>

There is a large congruence here between what Palat and Wallerstein have to say, and the Chase-Dunn and Hall model. Both, unlike Abu-

Luhod, are pointing to precapitalist world economies in which there can be exploitation and extraction. Palat and Wallerstein in their case study are explicit on this point, while Chase-Dunn and Hall accept this as being likely, at least in their state-based systems. Empirically there is little question that India, or parts of India, must be seen as the core of an Indian Ocean world-economy. It is for other specialists to apply these insights to areas such as the Middle East or Southeast Asia, the two areas where Palat and Wallerstein find the greatest impact from the Indian core in this pre-modern period. My own contribution will be to sketch in a very preliminary way how these models can elucidate connections in one part of this world-economy, that is across the Arabian Sea between India and East Africa. In particular I will present a little of my on-going research on East Africa to show how we can approach its history in an international context.

East Africa has been subjected to a variety of political economy analyses. In the 1970s Marxists, inspired by Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, engaged in what finally turned out to be a rather fruitless debate over modes of production in Africa.<sup>22</sup> More recently the field has been held by *dependista* writings inspired by the early A. G. Frank. Rodney, Sheriff, Alpers and Bhila all produced empirically grounded books which claimed to find a continuous history of underdevelopment in East Africa going back to the fourteenth century, or even earlier.<sup>23</sup> A strong point of their analyses was that they avoided Eurocentrism by finding that the Portuguese in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries continued an existing system of exploitation rather than initiating a new process. The crucial break came late in the eighteenth century when the East African slave trade expanded very greatly under the auspices of the Omani state of Zanzibar, or even a century later with European colonialism. In other words, when industrial capitalism replaced merchant capital East Africa was subjected to a much more efficient exploitation than previously. But this is seen as an intensification rather than something completely different. Empiricist writers such as Newitt and Austen have found this perception of a seamless web to be unconvincing.<sup>24</sup>

The distinction to be made is between the Swahili coast and the interior of East Africa, and especially between the coast and the states around the Zambezi river on the Zimbabwe plateau, notably Great Zimbabwe and then the Mutapa state. In the early modern period the

main exports from these states were ivory and gold (slaves came later). Imports were mostly Indian-made cloths and beads. Ostensibly then we are looking at the export of raw materials, and the import of manufactures, and this seems to show a clear first world/third world situation of exploitation. This perception is reinforced when we note the vast profits that foreign traders were making from this exchange. However when we look at the relative values of these goods we find something different. Both gold and ivory were produced using discretionary, male, labour, and this was not extracted from more 'productive' activities such as embryonic manufactures or food cultivation. Nor was either product highly prized in the interior states. Gold is most valuable in a monetised economy, and these were not. Ivory, culturally so important for jewellery and ornamentation in India, was sometimes used for fencing in the African interior. Elephants were usually hunted for their food, not their tusks. As for imports, low cost beads and cloths from India were highly prized in Africa. This concept of relative values is quite in accordance with Wallerstein's luxury-necessity dichotomy, for he notes that 'each side tends to have different cultural definitions of value.'<sup>25</sup> The result was mutual windfalls for both sides in this most unusual trade between India and the African interior, a benign situation congruent with Abu-Lughod's analysis of a rather different area of research. In the absence of any sign of exploitation of the interior, or any hint of unequal exchange, these areas must be regarded as being external to the Indian core.

The Swahili city states strung along the East African littoral acted in a classic compradorial way as *mediators* between the overseas core and the interior. The coast was linked to the interior through a whole hierarchy of intermediaries. Richard Wilding very aptly noted that we need to distinguish three main trade units: the hinterland network; the coastal interface; and the Indian Ocean network.<sup>26</sup> On the coast foreign traders sold to the Swahili, who themselves at this time never went inland, for both cultural and economic reasons. Rather they negotiated with particular tribes in their *umland*,<sup>27</sup> and these then with long-distance traders who accessed the far interior. There is some evidence of deindustrialisation in these ports: thus Spear claims that 'The weaving industries of Kilwa, Lamu and the Benaadir were severely curtailed by Indian cloth imports'.<sup>28</sup> More generally the terms and conditions of trade and of production were not controlled by these Swahili middlemen.

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Thus Kilwa's wealth came from its control of the gold trade through Sofala, and demand for gold fluctuated world-wide and affected very greatly Kilwa's prosperity. Nevertheless, in one of the better periods the early thirteenth century palace complex at Kilwa is described as being 'as spacious as any roofed stone building south of the Sahara until modern times'.<sup>29</sup> In their janus-faced nature, and in their subordination to the Indian core, the Swahili coast can be seen to be a classic semi-periphery, in Chase-Dunn and Hall's terms autonomous city-states controlled by merchant and production capitalists in an interstitial semiperipheral region; they consider that such city-states tie in an imperial core with a peripheral area. However, if we accept the sketch above of the nature of trade and production in the interior, then we have the rather unusual situation of a semiperiphery connecting a core area with an external one. Implicitly at least this may fit precisely with the Palat and Wallerstein sketch, for while they locate the East African coast within the world-economy centred on India, they say nothing about the African interior.

Space precludes a more extended discussion. It is my hope that even this sketchy analysis will at least show the utility of world-system research in any discussion of the history of the Indian Ocean, and in a small way will contribute to one of the most fruitful areas of world-system research today, that is the nature of pre-capitalist world-systems.

### Notes

- 1 The literature is vast indeed. For a full statement of the model see Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System*, 3 vols, New York, 1974–89, and as examples of thorough-going but sympathetic critiques Theda Skocpol, 'Wallerstein's World Capitalist System: a Theoretical and Historical Critique', *American Journal of Sociology* 82.5 (1977): 1075–90, and Jane Schneider, 'Was There a Pre-Capitalist World-System?', *Journal of Peasant Studies* 6.1 (1977): 20–9, reprinted in Christopher Chase-Dunn and Thomas D. Hall, eds, *Core/Periphery Relations in Precapitalist Worlds*, Boulder, 1991.
- 2 See Wallerstein's three volumes, or for a synoptic view Terence K. Hopkins and Immanuel Wallerstein, 'Patterns of Development of the Modern World-System', *Review* 1.2 (1977): 111–45. For other summaries see Thomas Richard Shannon, *An Introduction to the World-System Perspective*, Boulder, 1989 and M. N. Pearson, *Before Colonialism: Theories on Asian-European Relations, 1500–1750*, Delhi, 1988, Chapter 1.
- 3 In André Gunder Frank and Barry K. Gills, eds, *The World System: Five Hundred Years or Five Thousand?*, London, 1993, p.294.

- 4 For example Ravi Arvind Palat and Immanuel Wallerstein, 'Of What World-System was Pre-1500 "India" a Part?', in S. Chaudhuri and M. Morineau, eds, *Merchants, Companies and Trade*, forthcoming (my thanks to Dr Palat for sending me a typescript); Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein, *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities*, London, 1991, and numerous articles in his house-organ, *Review*, Fernand Braudel Center.
- 5 See especially T. R. Shannon, *An Introduction*, M. N. Pearson, *Before Colonialism*, Chapter 2, and the special number of *Review* 12.2 (1990) titled 'World-Systems Theory Fifteen Years On: What Have we Learned?'.
- 6 Chase-Dunn and Hall, eds, p.9.
- 7 John Obert Voll, 'Islam as a Special World-System', *Journal of World History* 5.2 (1994): 214.
- 8 Voll, pp.219–220.
- 9 Voll, p.226.
- 10 M. N. Pearson, *Pious Passengers: the Hajj in Earlier Times*, Delhi and London, 1994; and a new edition published as *Pilgrimage to Mecca: the Indian Experience*, Princeton, 1995.
- 11 On 'Eurocentrism', see for a start Edward Said's *Orientalism*, London, 1978, and *Culture and Imperialism*, London, 1993, and the English translation of Samir Amin, *Eurocentrism*, London, 1989.
- 12 Eric R. Wolf, *Europe and the People without History*, Berkeley, 1982, Chapter 2.
- 13 Wallerstein, *Modern World-System*, I, 348.
- 14 Immanuel Wallerstein, 'World-System Analysis: The Second Phase', *Review* 12 (1990): 291.
- 15 Immanuel Wallerstein, 'Africa in a Capitalist World', *Issue: A Quarterly Journal of Africanist Opinion* 3.3, Fall (1973): 10.
- 16 Palat and Wallerstein.
- 17 For example, in Frank and Gills, eds, p.293.
- 18 Janet Abu-Lughod, *Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250–1350*, Oxford, 1989; for a short version see her 'Restructuring the Premodern World-System', *Review* 13.2 (1990): 273–86 and her contribution in Frank and Gills, eds.
- 19 In *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 24.1 (1992): 128–31.
- 20 Abu-Lughod, *Before European Hegemony*, pp.5–6, and generally pp.8–40 and 364 et seq for her main ideas.
- 21 André Gunder Frank, 'A Theoretical Introduction to 5,000 Years of World System History', *Review* 13.2 (1990): 155–248, especially pp.164, 181.
- 22 Frank and Gills, eds, p.3.
- 23 Amin, in Frank and Gills, eds, p.247.
- 24 Wallerstein, in Frank and Gills, eds, p.295.
- 25 Chase-Dun and Hall, eds, pp.5–44.
- 26 Chase-Dun and Hall, eds, p.23; by commodification they mean that goods, land,

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wealth and labour have become commodities.

- 27 For my views on the Mughal empire see 'Land, Noble and Ruler in Mughal India', in Sir Edmund Leach, S. N. Mukherjee and John O. Ward, eds, *Feudalism: Comparative Studies*, Sydney, 1985 (Sydney Studies in Society and Culture, no. 2) pp.175–96, and a comparative view in 'Merchants and States', in James D. Tracy, ed., *The Political Economy of Merchant Empires*, New York, 1991, pp.41–116.
- 28 See Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, 'Recherches sur un mode de production africain', *La Pensée* 144 (1969): 61–78, and an English version, 'Research on an African Mode of Production', in Martin A. Klein and G. Wesley Johnson, eds, *Perspectives on the African Past*, Boston, 1972, pp.33–51. For an overview of Marxism in Africa see Robin Law, 'In Search of a Marxist Perspective on Pre-Colonial Tropical Africa', *Journal of African History* 19.3 (1978): 441–52.
- 29 Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, Washington, 1982 [first pub. 1972]; Abdul Sheriff, *Slaves, Spices and Ivory in Zanzibar: Integration of an East African Commercial Empire into the World Economy, 1770–1873*, London, 1987; E. A. Alpers, *Ivory and Slaves: Changing Patterns of International Trade in East Central Africa to the Later Nineteenth Century*, London, 1975; H. K. K. Bhila, *Trade and Politics in a Shona Kingdom: the Manyika and their Portuguese and African Neighbours, 1575–1902*, London, 1982. See also Gaudens P. Mpangala, *Major Issues in Tanzanian Economic History*, Part 1, 'Pre-Colonial Economy and Social Formations', Dar es Salaam, 1992.
- 30 For a short version of Newitt's views see M. D. D. Newitt, 'East Africa and the Indian Ocean Trade: 1500–1800', in Ashin das Gupta and M. N. Pearson, eds, *India and the Indian Ocean, 1500–1800*, Calcutta, 1987, pp.201–23 and for an overview of Austen's see Ralph A. Austen, 'African Commerce without Europeans: the Development Impact of International Trade in the Pre-Modern Era', *Kenya Historical Review* 6 (1978): 1–21 and for a fuller version his *African Economic History: Internal Development and External Dependency*, London, 1987.
- 31 I. Wallerstein, 'The Ottoman Empire and the Capitalist World-Economy: Some Questions for Research', *Review* 2.3 (1979): 390–1.
- 32 Richard Wilding, *The Shorefolk: Aspects of the Early Development of Swahili Communities*, *Fort Jesus Occasional Papers* 2 (mimeo, 1987): 7.
- 33 Used in the precise sense of an area which is culturally, economically and politically related to a particular town or city.
- 34 Thomas Spear, *Kenya's Past: An Introduction to Historical Method in Africa*, London, 1981, p.133.
- 35 J. E. G. Sutton, 'Kilwa', *Indian Ocean Review* 7.4 (1995)10–11.

