

## LAND, NOBLE AND RULER IN MUGHAL INDIA

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*Introduction* This contribution to the conference on 'Feudalism: a comparative study in social and political structures of pre-modern societies' makes almost no overt attempt to enter the continuing debate over the applicability of European feudal models to pre-British Indian society. Nevertheless, several of Bloch's themes in his classic statement have struck sympathetic chords. There is first what I take to be his general concern, which is to analyse the social order of feudal Europe, and the nature of social ties and social classifications within this order. In these matters not only military, legal and institutional matters are of interest, for he includes a discussion of ideas, of the 'medieval mentality'.

What follows is a modest, preliminary, and very imperfect attempt at a holistic description of the Mughal polity. I am not trying to fit Mughal India into a feudal European 'box', either in the sense that feudal was used by Bloch and his many followers, or in a Marxist sense. Eric Wolf has recently reminded us of the dangers of the latter approach. He finds only three modes of production: capitalist, tributary and kin-based. Included in the second are states with strong centres, as well as weaker states, the former often being known as an Asiatic mode, and the latter as feudal. These are, however, 'oscillations within the continuum of a single mode'. 'Reification of "feudalism" into a separate mode of production merely converts a short period of European history into a type case against which all other "feudal-like" phenomena must be measured. The concept of the Asiatic mode of production, in which a centralized state bureaucracy dominates unchanging village communities of hapless peasants, similarly suffers from an ahistorical and ideological reading of Asian history'.<sup>1</sup>

The same problems arise if one takes implicit theory and models unmodified from Bloch and his Annalist followers. Their concepts are usually derived solely from the European experience, and

most often apply only to Europe. When they venture beyond Europe, as does F. Braudel, this Eurocentrism becomes glaringly and painfully apparent.

A collection of essays edited by Richard Fox demonstrates (inadvertently) the problems very clearly.<sup>2</sup> It includes Burton Stein's attempt to fit the Colas into Southall's segmentary state box. It appears that with a little pushing and shoving they can be squeezed in. It would need an expert on South Indian history to evaluate the validity of the encapsulation, but two general points can be made. First, and positively, it is more fruitful than now discarded aristocratic or bureaucratic models. Nevertheless, the trumpeting in this book which accompanies their discovery that premodern Indian states were not like modern nation states arouses in me at least an acute sense of *déjà vu*. Second, the question which has to be posed in response to Stein, is so what, or why bother? Does his finding that the Colas were segmentary, even if 'true', advance usefully our knowledge of this state, or any other premodern one, in India? This point is particularly important because Stein at times so far forgets himself as to talk of 'medieval Indian' states, not just the Colas. I would suggest that it is one thing to use for what they are worth concepts and ideas from other social science research, but to place (or force) a whole structure derived from a very different society onto an Indian state seems perilous and ultimately not very useful.

There are two, related, ways forward. First, a prime fault of the Fox book is that it ignores almost entirely Islamic states in India. Thus Fox quotes various critiques of Wittfogel's model, but not the only one (that by Irfan Habib)<sup>3</sup> which considers it in a specifically premodern Indian context. This is scandalous, for Muslims ruled large parts of premodern India for long periods (600 years in the Doab). In these states people and ideas from the Islamic heartland were influential. Thus the recent very interesting work on Islamic states and government structures is useful. A short list of some of the subjects currently under discussion should bear this out. There is first the concept of fitness as a criterion for holding office, of obvious significance in Mughal succession disputes. The notion of the *amirate* by seizure relates to wider concepts of the attitudes of the *ulama* to government, and to the perpetuation of Mughal prestige and status into the nineteenth century.

At a more philosophical level, the consensus seems to be that the *ulama*, at least the best ones, were profoundly suspicious of secular government *per se*. Government, as in some other societies, was seen as a regrettable necessity, the only way to avoid imperfect man's innate propensity to anarchy. Al-Ghazzali himself quoted a *hadith* which had Muhammad saying 'The best princes are those whom the *ulama* visit, and the worst *ulama* are those who visit princes'. Even more pithily, al-Ghazzali wrote 'We know it is not allowed to feed on a dead animal; still it would be worse to die of hunger'.<sup>4</sup> The basic point is simply that Islamic political

theory and practice certainly contributed to the 'mentalities' of the Mughals and other Indian Muslim rulers, and must, along with recent research on the Islamic heartland, be used to illuminate our studies of Indian Muslim politics and society.

One crucial advantage in doing this is that instead of using African or European models we will be using indigenous ones. This, then, is the way forward, and Ron Inden's work has already provided us with an example of what can be done. Inden, it is true, uses and acknowledges extra-Indian theory, but what he has achieved is essentially to generate powerful social science theory, and explanations of change, out of indigenous Hindu materials. As he says, in his sources 'are descriptions and explanations not of day-to-day events but of the major structural transformations that occurred over time in Bengali Hindu society. Even more important, these views of how and why changes took place in the past informed the actions of those who knew them'.<sup>5</sup> I would argue that whether or not he is 'right' is not the important issue. His contribution is to show that native sources can provide adequate theory to explain change in Indian society. His own work deals with Hindu society; Muslim India awaits our attention.

One final point concerning theory must be stressed again. I am in no way advocating parochial, or totally Indian-specific, theory. Quite the reverse, as will be demonstrated, at least implicitly, in what follows. We should remember that Inden was powerfully influenced by extra-Indian theory, notably the kinship models of David M. Schneider. In essence I am advocating the widest possible reading of, and use of, theory of all sorts to write history thoroughly grounded in the experience and culture of India. What I oppose is attempts to squeeze Indian reality into ill-fitting theoretical strait-jackets formulated in other times and other places. In what follows I attempt to investigate social and especially political structures in Mughal India, stressing both synchronic and diachronic aspects.

*Land* The general consensus of opinion sees the Mughal state as rather limited in its functions: to protect the land and Islam, and in return to take revenue from the subjects. The Mughals themselves fostered this view, for Abul Fazl describes the role of a king in very restricted and nebulous terms: he should preserve harmony and justice, stop conflict, and establish law and order.<sup>6</sup> I consider this to be more normative than practical, for I will argue at the end of this paper that in fact the Mughals had much wider aspirations than this. But even the normative texts say the ruler should be intent on conquest of land. The results of this conquest require a little more analysis, for this touches on the question of land ownership.

As Habib has shown, in Mughal India there was no idea of land ownership in any western sense by the state or the king. Land revenue was not a rent paid by a landholder because he was using royal property. Rather, at least in theory, he paid it as, in Abul

Fazl's terms, 'remuneration of sovereignty,' in return for the protection and justice provided by the king.<sup>7</sup> There was private transferable property in urban areas, and saleable rights over land and its occupancy in rural India. This was not, however, land as private property in any European sense. In Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries land and many other resources were increasingly

becoming private property, and private property was becoming an individual right unlimited in amount, unconditional on the performance of social functions, and freely transferable, as it substantially remains today.<sup>8</sup>

Hence the confusion of the early Europeans, and many later ones too, when they got to India. Finding, they thought, land not capable of being sold or mortgaged, and noting frequent transfers of *jagirs* (assigned land), they waxed lyrical on the autocratic evils of Mughal government as compared with the supposed benefits of contemporary Europe.<sup>9</sup> This different concept of land, in combination with the admitted prevalence of official extortion, even led some to talk of a rule of escheat in Mughal India.

The question of land ownership is not in fact a very useful one, for the Mughals wanted not ownership but control, specifically control over extraction of the surplus product from the land. To achieve this they needed power (which in India consisted of control over resources, especially land and the people on it) not ownership, and indeed we will argue that the main thrust of their policy was to extend this power, reduce the role of some intermediaries in the hierarchy of extraction, and so have for themselves more and more of the surplus. But this ultimate aim was not achieved; it remained only an aspiration, for various intermediaries, both *zamindars* (landholders) and *mansabdars* (office holders), had rights and interests which they could and did defend.

Habib claims that nearly all the surplus produce of the empire went to the state: the state was the main agent of exploitation.<sup>10</sup> This raises several points. First, it seems to ignore the amounts siphoned off by various layers of *zamindars*, who cannot be considered part of the state. Second, the state was not monolithic. There were various tensions and interests which divided king and noble, and factions within the nobility. Third, we obviously need to know what was done with this surplus. Moreland made much of the waste and profligacy of the Mughal elite, as compared with the rectitude and propensity to save exhibited by the Indian Civil Service of his day. Recent research however tends to show that the enormous salaries of the top nobility, which Moreland stressed so much and compared so scathingly with the modest remuneration of comparable British officials,<sup>11</sup> went mostly on military necessities. The best summary, which draws partly on work by A. Jan Qaisar, is in an article by Irfan Habib. He finds about two-thirds of a noble's salary going to meet the cost of the military contingent he was required to have available.

Deducting other minor expenses, a noble had perhaps one-quarter of his total salary available for living expenses, and much of this was in any case spent in a way which generated production, albeit of luxury goods.<sup>12</sup> I have no desire to defend the truly colossal Mughal expenditure on military matters, but the point is that this was not the sort of wasteful expenditure which Moreland and many later followers stigmatized. Nor, incidentally, is it any longer so certain that the nobles were so extravagant that, despite their huge salaries, they frequently died in debt.<sup>13</sup> The evidence is far from conclusive, but some nobles at least left large estates.<sup>14</sup>

Many writers have pointed to, and anathematized, Mughal expenditure on tombs and palaces while the bulk of the population hovered near starvation.<sup>15</sup> In fact, the best known and most expensive of all Mughal buildings, the Taj Mahal, took seventeen years to build, and cost a reputed Rs. 185 lakhs. The total revenue of the empire in 1647 was Rs. 22 crores.<sup>16</sup> Thus for each year of its construction the Taj took only 0.5 percent of the total revenue of the empire.

To talk of land only as something which created a surplus to be spent, whether wisely or not, is to do the Mughals and their nobles an injustice, for land was not only of economic importance. Control of land involved prestige and status, most clearly seen in comparison with sea and water. Only silly merchants went around in boats, like worms clinging to a log. A noble was fittingly employed galloping over the plain with his troops. The emperors roamed widely over their land. Indeed, S. Blake's work shows their capital to be not fixed, but located wherever on their land they happened to be.<sup>17</sup> Their peripatetic travels combined several motives - demonstration of power, training for the army, supervision of the process of surplus extraction, recreation - but not least was simply the desire, even need, to see and feel physically, even sensually, the land. Hence the lingering, even passionate, descriptions of land and its products in the memoirs of both Babur and Jahangir, and in the *Ain-i Akbari*.<sup>18</sup>

The economic, and also semi-mystical, nature of land is revealed in Mughal attitudes to plunder. They looted and plundered areas where they were only raiding and, to their regret, had no intention of staying. Such behaviour they saw as being the ultimate challenge and insult to an enemy. Mahmud of Ghazni was only the first of many Muslim rulers who appreciated that the best way to rub a neighbour's nose in the dirt of his inferiority was to raid and plunder over his land. Concerning the first Muslim raid into Gujarat, in 1299, Misra comments, 'And as the immediate object of the Turkish leaders was not immediate conquest, they allowed their soldiers to gorge themselves to the full.' But when they came back in 1305 to conquer the soldiers did not sack and destroy.<sup>19</sup> The economic reason for this was clearly set out by Jai Singh in 1666. In combination with Sivaji his imperial army had looted and destroyed Bijapur. The unfortunate consequences were, as

he pointed out in a letter to Aurangzeb, that 'when there is no possibility of the lands being populated for three years at least, how can people agree to come to that side [that is, to desert Bijapur and join the Mughals] in the hope of getting the  *jagirs* ?<sup>20</sup> But attitudes to land were not solely economic. Land which was plundered was not just unproductive; it had been violated. To destroy land and things on it was not only to destroy resources, it was almost an unnatural act.

It must be stressed that all land was not the same. Fertile land, populated by fat meek peasants, was clearly different from arid, infertile, or mountainous areas, both because of the differing possibilities for surplus extraction and because one was pleasant to the eye and mind, the other not. Ibn Khaldun saw a key relationship in Islamic societies as that between tribal raiders from the highlands and settled agriculturalists on the plains. In India this notion seems to apply particularly in Gujarat, but could have application elsewhere in the empire, such as the Punjab, except that here the raiders came from the desert. Related to this is Schwartzberg's finding that from late Sultanate times many former islands of settlement in India were joined and integrated.<sup>21</sup> If so, the resultant tensions await further research. The Mughals did, at least, differentiate in their revenue schedules between different sorts of land and crops. Indeed they even, realistically, divided up land according to the degree of submission of its inhabitants. The three divisions were  *zor talab*  (seditious), medium, and  *raiyati*  (submissive). Areas were assigned in accordance with the presumed military capacity of the  *jagirdar*  (assignment-holder) concerned. A governor got as  *jagir*  land which was one quarter  *zor talab*  and three quarters medium. At the other extreme, small  *mansabdars*  got one quarter medium and three quarters  *raiyati* .<sup>22</sup>

Political and military factors could tie in with fertility and peasant submission to produce varying perceptions of land. Misra and others have noted how control, and attitudes to land, varied according to distance from the centre of the empire. For the Mughals the area of prime concern was the Doab, the  *subas*  (provinces) of Delhi, Agra, Oudh and Allahabad. In this area Mughal prestige was inextricably connected with land control. Here central authority had to be strong, and tax collection rigorous. Here was where  *khalisa*  (crown) land was likely to be found, or princes to hold their  *jagirs* . A.R. Khan finds 61 chiefs holding  *mansabs*  (ranks) of 200 or more under Akbar. Of these men with quasi-independent power bases, only four came from the heartland,<sup>23</sup> for the Mughals were reluctant to allow any control other than their own in this area.

*Zamindars*  It is something of a cliché that Mughal expansion was aimed primarily at extending horizontal control over land, not at achieving deeper vertical penetration into society. As we will see, Mughal efforts to achieve more power usually did not affect the lowest levels, but the point needs to be elaborated in order that it will be clear exactly which levels in society are

under discussion later. Most of the land in the empire was either *jagir* (assigned) land, or *khalisa* (crown) land. The Mughal nobility (*mansabdars*) were usually paid by means of these *jagirs*; they could be moved from one to another at the will of the emperor. Less than one-fifth of them were also *zamindars* (landholders) who had hereditary control over an area of land separate from their, or someone else's, *jagir*. These people, the chiefs, constitute the first of Nurul Hasan's useful three-way division of *zamindars* in the empire. Below the chiefs were the intermediary *zamindars*, basically revenue collectors known as *desais*, *desmukhs*, or *chaudhuris*, and usually having local kin or caste connections. At the bottom were primary *zamindars*, peasant land holders, including holders of one or more villages. There are various complications to this simple schema. Thus primary *zamindars* controlled at the local level virtually all land in the empire, while chiefs of course did not. A *zamindar* could be primary in one place and intermediary in another. Nor are the categories really completely discrete. A more accurate depiction would show a continuum of *zamindars* ranging in power from the top Rajput to the lowliest peasant holder, with all those holding rights over land fitting in somewhere.<sup>24</sup>

Revenue was collected, and immediate control exercised, through the intermediary *zamindars*. The chiefs were a different problem, and will be considered shortly. As for the lowest level, a peasant's contact with the state (remembering that this is a very limited conception) was at best spasmodic, as when the imperial elephants trampled his crops. Usually he had nothing to do with it, far less the lumpen rural proletariat below him, the tenants and landless labourers.

Government relations with the intermediary *zamindars* were not static. The Mughal administration connected with them, encouraging them to pay revenue and control the populace. In *khalisa* land this was the prime relationship. In the hereditary domains of the chiefs, imperial authority was much less in evidence, while in the majority of the empire, that assigned as *jagirs*, agents of the *jagirdar* worked alongside the imperial officials to collect the revenue which made up their master's pay. Given this structure, there were two distinct ways in which a ruler could extend his control. He could reduce the role of the *zamindars*, especially the intermediaries, and send his officials down to a lower level. Second, the ruler could reduce the power of, or even remove, the *jagirdars*, and turn his administrators into a totally salaried class, paid from a central treasury which derived most of its funds from land which was now all *khalisa*.

The first method, obviously a root and branch change, was seldom attempted, and was never successful. In the early fourteenth century the idiosyncratic Muhammad bin Tughluq tried to send state power down even to the village level in the Doab. He found that he could destroy a village, but not create one, remove an intermediary *zamindar* but not replace him.<sup>25</sup> Indeed his attempts

were typically aberrant, for no other Muslim Indian ruler seems to have attempted this. This was wise, for the intermediaries, bolstered by local knowledge and power, were virtually irreplaceable. Their kin, caste and lineage connections could extend horizontally over a considerable area, making them formidable opponents. Most rulers perforce came to terms with them and trod lightly. In 1563 Bijapur conquered the fertile Raichur doab from Vijayanagar, and then set about trying to replace the Kannada *nayaks* who had worked for Vijayanagar with Bijapuri nobles, thus making the land into *jagirs*. This effort succeeded only in the most militarily accessible areas. In the rest the *nayaks* remained. One local *nayak* 'received' his own villages from the king of Bijapur, and then appointed his own administrators. The only real change was that he might, if pressed, pay tribute from time to time.<sup>26</sup>

Such intermediaries were capable of causing endless trouble. Sinha's study of the heartland *suba* of Allahabad finds numerous 'rebellions' by intermediary *zamindars* and small chiefs. Many areas and *zamindars* were *zor talab* (seditious), and others were listed as *mashrutshuda*, turbulent. Yet ultimately these *zamindars* operated from a weak base. In military terms they were no match for the Mughal armies. Final power rested with the imperialists; intermediary *zamindars* could be a nuisance, but nothing more. Unlike the nobles they had nowhere else to go. Their power and authority was based on their own local hereditary position. As such they had to be at least passively loyal to whomever was in power at the capital. A noble could be footloose as a last resort, for he had no landed base, but an intermediary *zamindar* did.<sup>27</sup>

It would, in any case, be a mistake to see these intermediary *zamindars* as being continually pressed by the state. Most medieval Indian Muslim states lacked the power, and apparently the desire, to control let alone replace them. More typical was a *modus vivendi* where conflict and competition and contact took place primarily over the amount of land revenue to be paid. An intermediary in the heartland might be held to a commission of five or ten percent, but even there, given a limited number of officials, amounts payable were subject to haggling. In remote areas land revenue gave way to tribute collected when opportunity offered. The Mughals did not attempt much in the way of vertical penetration, and did not try to replace these intermediary *zamindars*. For the Mughals the real political action lay in relations with the nobles and chiefs. If less of the surplus went to them there would be more for the ruler. The nobles and chiefs, not the intractable intermediary *zamindars*, represented the soft area which might yield to Mughal probing.

*Ruler and Noble* We have now to consider general Mughal relations with the nobles and chiefs (or top level *zamindars*) of the empire. There were here some problems and opportunities which were common to nobles and chiefs, and some which were peculiar to chiefs, for only these latter rivalled the Mughals as ultimate holders

of land. In this section we will consider on-going relations with nobles, and in the next with chiefs, both these sections being primarily synchronic. The last section, more diachronic, will analyze briefer and more unusual Mughal thrusts.

The *jagir* system, in which nobles collected their pay by being assigned an area of land from which they collected the land revenue, involved constraints and checks going both ways. Some of these are illustrated in the system of transferring nobles, so that they drew their salaries, and held positions, in the same area for only a few years. The rationale for this was sound. A noble left alone to collect revenue in an area where he was also perhaps the main imperial official would rapidly build up local ties and strengths, and would be tempted to disobey imperial authority, especially if this appeared to be weakening. This tendency to fissiparousness had indeed appeared time and time again in the *iqta* system of other Islamic lands. The Mughals thus introduced transfers. Two disadvantages followed. The standard British critique, sometimes based on contemporary evidence, was that this made the *jagirdars* rapacious. They went into a *jagir* aiming to squeeze all they could out of it before the inevitable transfer. They had no interest in long term economic development. This does not really seem to have been a major problem, at least while the empire was functioning smoothly. The system of parallel officials, one group working for the empire and one for the *jagirdar*, and the overwhelming power and prestige of the emperor combined to keep extortion within acceptable, even predictable, bounds.

A larger problem was that, unlike the various *zamindars* and chiefs, the *jagirdars* had no permanent stake in any part of the country. This decreased their propensity to defend an area they could not see as 'theirs.' One solution was that tried by Aurangzeb late in his reign when the Deccan wars were going badly. He insisted that all *mansabdars* fighting in the south have their *jagirs* there too. Yet it was a delicate equation, for transfers also, as intended, reduced a noble's power vis à vis the ruler. As we shall see, the Mughals apparently wanted to reduce the *jagirdars* even further, but there were other options. Apparently in Gujarat one method was to pay the army half in cash from the central treasury and half in permanent land grants.<sup>28</sup> Such a method could perhaps create nobles who were both dependent on the centre and yet also felt bound to defend an area in which they had a permanent stake.

Land was not a uniform commodity in Mughal India. Rather it was carefully and consciously graded in accordance with its fertility and also the docility of the local peasants. Thus, as we noted, more powerful nobles got more turbulent areas as *jagirs*. These differences could be used to punish a noble, and on the other hand led to considerable discontent among the nobility. A *jagirdar* assigned a turbulent area could find himself forced to hire temporary troops in order to collect his revenue. Thus his net receipts fell, and he had less money with which to pay

his own permanent troops.<sup>29</sup> Nobles whose loyalty was suspect would, ironically, be given *jagirs* close to the centre and on the plains. Jai Singh advised Aurangzeb that if Sivaji's son 'be granted a *jagir* in Aurangabad, it would be politic, as the resumption or continuation of the *jagir* would be in our power.' At this same time (1665) when the Mughals took by treaty many of Sivaji's forts, they kept for themselves the difficult ones in the mountains. Sivaji was left with indefensible forts and land on the plains.<sup>30</sup>

An expanding empire had obvious advantages for both nobles and emperor. For the latter, an increase in land under his central authority obviously increased his power. Further, tensions within the nobility could be relieved by sending off restless nobles to conquer somewhere. Once achieved, the new area would be divided up into *jagirs* and allocated to deserving nobles, or kept as *khalisa*. For the nobles there were also advantages. A noble engaged in conquest felt himself to be fulfilling his duty, to be fitly engaged in a culturally sanctioned activity. While he conquered, the emperor would keep up his contingents and reward him when he succeeded.

There was, however, a rather different sort of imperial expansion, one which was risky but potentially very advantageous. This was the practice of allocating a noble a *jagir* in as yet unsubdued territory, and in effect telling him if he wanted to be paid he had first to conquer.<sup>31</sup> This practice seems to have declined in the seventeenth century; by this time a noble conquered an area under imperial direction and the area was then routinely allocated in *jagirs*. Making a noble conquer in order to be paid obviously put great strains on loyalty: why should a successful conquerer then turn around and meekly make the conquered area into *jagir* land?

Land and its control and distribution was the crucial relationship between noble and emperor. There were however other areas of interaction, which were based on Mughal notions of their own status and prestige vis à vis the nobility. It seems that the Mughals were little affected by the dubious position of rulers in Islamic political theory.<sup>32</sup> In part this was because they claimed to be something more than mere secular rulers anyway, but they also adopted and adapted Mongol ideas, seeing themselves then not as first among equals but very definitely as far superior to any person not of Mughal blood. Thus to marry one's female kin to a Mughal was a great honour for any noble, but Mughal women were married to Timurid or Safavid princes, to descendents of saints or the Prophet, to no one at all, but not to ordinary nobles.<sup>33</sup>

In this context face to face contact was crucial. For the noble it was obviously advantageous to be seen by the emperor while engaged in some culturally valued activity. This could be a single handed heroic feat of arms, or general bravery, or the offering of a valued gift, or the apt capping of a couplet. The important thing was to make oneself known. In fact for the average *mansabdar* or aspiring *ahadi* ('gentleman-trooper') this was not just important,

it was essential for recruitment and then for promotion. A chief could in effect insist on being coopted because he controlled land and so had a more or less independent base. Non-chiefly nobles, the vast majority, were dependent on kin and patronage ties, and ultimately on personal favour.

Personal contact was also a crucial mechanism used by the emperor to bond his nobles, and to reward and chastise them. A noble who refused a summons to court was *ipso facto* in revolt. Conversely, a noble who had failed was sent to a new posting without being allowed to come to court. The Mughals did this consciously. Hence their insistence that all nobles at the capital attend court twice daily. Hence Abul Fazl's claim that 'His Majesty sees through some men at the first glance and confers upon them high rank.'<sup>34</sup> The face to face exchange of presents was part of the system, as were the formalized prostrations and the way nobles called themselves *murid* and the emperor *pir-o-murshid*.

Various bodily substances were used to bind a noble to an emperor. An extreme, and very powerful, example was the real or symbolic breast milk of a Mughal woman. Much more routine was the use of robes of honour, and other articles from the body of the emperor. Robes (known as *sar-o-pa*, or *khilat*) were used in strictly graduated ways. On public occasions such as the emperor's birthday they were given out to everyone at court. It was much more powerful (because much more of the imperial bodily substance was transferred) to receive a robe which the emperor had himself worn. Still more powerful was an article of clothing removed from next to the skin of the emperor, such as an undershirt. Most potent of all was an article of clothing or jewellery transferred from the head of the emperor.<sup>35</sup>

This stress on contact and sight was clearly extremely personalized, and so was limited. In a large empire it was physically impossible for such a system to operate well: the larger the empire the greater the number of nobles and thus only the very top could be bonded in this way. Further; a large empire must include more and more diverse nobles, even primitives who did not accept or understand the whole underlying ethos, or who could not follow the elaborate ceremonial. Such people failed to win imperial favour, but from the other perspective they also failed to be bonded. Sivaji illustrates both tendencies perfectly.<sup>36</sup>

A final element in the noble-emperor equation was the composition of the nobility. Again there were various advantages and disadvantages to be weighed up. In the early thirteenth century Muhammad of Ghur used his so-called Slave Order, a fraternity of Turkish slaves trained by him, appointed by him, and in theory totally dependent on him. Yet their very homogeneity was a threat, for the Order became inbred and overly cohesive for the safety of the ruler. The Mughals preferred racially and religiously diverse nobles: who balanced each other and left the emperor unchallenged on top. Even these factions could at times curtail the imperial

freedom of action; again Sivaji provides an example, but there are many others.<sup>37</sup> A bickering nobility could be ineffective, but a united one could be threatening.

The total picture is one of lack of independent power for the nobles vis à vis the emperors, indeed almost total subservience. The most dramatic illustration of this is seen in their general inability to employ the ultimate weapon of revolt. With very few, and unsuccessful, exceptions the non-landed nobles perforce remained loyal, for they had no base and no autonomous power. Even their own contingents were mixed ethnically,<sup>38</sup> and were perhaps not totally loyal to or dependent on their nobles. Nobles could never participate in politics at the highest level - that is, decide who should rule while a monarch was alive and effective. It was only in the wars of succession that they participated in this ultimate choice. Yet, most significantly, even here they acted not for themselves or their peers in an attempt to make a noble the emperor. They acted on behalf of whichever prince they were bound to by patronage ties or other bonds. Perhaps most revealing of all is the almost contemptuous way in which the ultimately victorious prince would let the defeated supporters of his rivals join up with his new regime. These nobles were no threat to a Mughal emperor, and had nowhere else to go. Yet this bleak picture must be tempered a little, for there were colossal rewards available to them. A loyal and successful noble controlled vast resources, a point recently stressed by S. Moosvi and J.F. Richards.<sup>39</sup>

*Ruler and Chief* Chiefs also never dreamed of becoming emperor, but because they controlled their own land they operated from a more powerful base, and posed different problems and opportunities to the Mughals. A case study will illustrate the mechanisms of control used. It concerns the Baghela rulers of the Bandhogarh area, in the southern part of Allahabad *suba*. The area was mostly covered in dense jungle. The terrain was difficult, and the Baghelas had a strong fort. At first they held the upper hand. They only reluctantly came to Akbar's court, and paid homage to him. He apparently tried to bond them by marriage alliances with noble families. Finally he seems to have lost patience. In 1597 Mughal armies conquered the fort. A revolt in 1610 was crushed by the Mughal Rajput Raja Maha Singh, and Jahangir gave him the area in *jagir* as a reward. The Baghela raja was however confirmed as chief in his own area. Greater Mughal control was seen in 1634 when the Baghelas were used by Shah Jahan against the neighbouring refractory Bundela chiefs. In 1655 the final submission occurred. At this time the position of the raja, attacked by the Bundelas and under suspicion at court, was weak. He was given a *mansab* and gifts, thus becoming part of the imperial service. His own area was retained, but now as his *watan* ('homeland') *jagir*, and so subject to imperial revenue regulations. The ruling family remained loyal and continued to receive *mansabs*, though not very large ones.<sup>40</sup> Once such people

had been absorbed they posed no threat and minor appointments were enough to retain their loyalty.

From the imperial side, not all chiefs were worth bothering about. Those in remote, unproductive or non-strategic areas could be ignored. On the other hand, some chiefs needed to be defeated because of their threat and power. The question then became whether to incorporate them in the nobility, or simply dispossess them, or reduce their status to that of an intermediary. The Rajputs were usually incorporated but until the 1680s there was no attempt to dispossess them. In fact their attraction to the Mughals - their kin followings, their martial prowess - was also their safeguard. Better a scourge to be used against others than a thorn in one's own breast. Consequently, those Rajputs who submitted early to Akbar and possessed these other two qualities did well under the Mughals, notably the Kachhawas of Amber. On the other hand, as noted, in the heartland imperial power was greater, and independent chiefs less tolerable, so they were mostly dispossessed.

There were however other variables. In particular, A.R. Khan points to a distinction between tribal chiefs, their power based on kin, and territorial chiefs whose power base was more diffuse.<sup>41</sup> He fails to spell out the implications of this potentially important distinction, but possibly the career of Raj Singh, the Sisodian Rajput ruler of Mewar, illustrates this point. The Sisodians appear to have been less exclusive and factionalised, and so were supported by more local elements in their area, than were some neighbouring Rajput ruling families. Thus Raj Singh operated from an exceptionally strong local power base. Yet he could only go so far. Early in his reign, in 1654, he acted too independently and was chastised by Shah Jahan. From this he learnt to balance. On the one hand he sent his sons to court as tokens of submission, and generally took care not to challenge the Mughals. On the other hand, although he accepted a high *mansab* he never fought for the Mughals, he never went to court, and his clan never offered princesses to the Mughals.<sup>42</sup> Nevertheless, the Mughals apparently considered him to be loyal enough, and did not try to force him to be incorporated more completely.

The Mughals used several finely graded mechanisms to incorporate a chief. At one extreme a chief gave his daughter to a Mughal, and got for himself a *mansab* and a *jagir*. His homeland became *watan-jagir*, and so subject to imperial revenue regulations. Other variants included being required to do military service for the Mughals, but only in one's own area, as opposed to making one's troops available for distant operations. Whether or not one paid personal homage was, in light of the earlier discussion of bonding, crucial. Some chiefs came personally, but only had interviews with a prince. Some married their daughters to the emperor, some to princes, and some only to nobles. On the other hand, some chiefs sent as token of submission only their son, or even only a functionary in their state. The amount, and regularity, of tribute payment was important, but any amount was better

than having one's area become *watan-jagir*, that is, having *peshkash* (tribute) replaced by a payment of revenue based on land production.

Another mechanism was the holding of hostages at court. A chief's daughter or sister married to a prince was a tacit hostage for the good behaviour of the male relation. Perhaps more important, the Mughal's claimed paramountcy over the chiefly areas, and especially the right to determine succession to the *gaddi* (throne). True, the choice of the clan elders was usually accepted, but the threat was always at least potential, and more than once actual. The Mughals could also attempt to destabilize a chief by opening relations with his own dependent sub-chiefs.

Many chiefs willingly accepted the Mughal embrace, for this way lay greater power. Thus in 1666 the Rajput Jai Singh and the Maratha Sivaji combined to attack Bijapur. Both gained from participating in this imperial effort. Jai Singh as an independent Rajput ruler could not have hoped to operate so far afield, while Sivaji, thanks to Mughal help, could plunder more effectively than usual. For some chiefs, their revenue from *jagirs* was greater than that from their homelands. Many chiefs thus did not need to be defeated; Mughal enticements were sufficient, and the chiefs were the suitors. Further, Mughal prestige with the Rajputs was such that their acceptance meant an increase of power at home, especially as Mughal legitimation could be backed up with force. Chiefs recognized by the Mughals were less dependent on local clan and kin ties, and *jagir* income could be used to buy more local support. Raj Singh chose to stay out, but most wanted to come in.

Nevertheless, the chiefs did often have options of sorts. They could offer only passive allegiance, and ultimately they could revolt. True, while the empire functioned the revolts were sooner or later defeated, but at least, thanks to their landed base, this was an option. In this important, perhaps ultimate, area they had more autonomy and more choice than did the other nobles.<sup>43</sup>

*Mughal Thrusts* The preceding discussion has stressed, in a mostly synchronic way, continuing emperor-noble relations, but we have seen hints already of a gradual increase in Mughal power, a slow bearing down on nobles and chiefs. We need now to consider other examples of this slow accretion of imperial power, and finally investigate particular, more sudden, Mughal thrusts.

We shall consider first wider Mughal ideas about their role in society. Most writers seem to agree that a premodern Muslim ruler might give charity and provide social services, but only as a rich and pious individual, not as a head of a government which had welfare obligations. Habib and Athar Ali both stress the limited role of the government in this area. Thus Shah Jahan's canals were dug for royal, not developmental, purposes. There was some famine relief, and grants of land to scholars, but the general attitude was hands off.<sup>44</sup>

This depiction seems to stress practice, not theory or aspiration.

The Mughals seemed to want to do more, or appear to be doing more. This can be seen in the important matter of control over land (remembering again the fundamental fact that more land under imperial control meant more surplus for the emperor to extract). The state tried to extend areas under cultivation. Loans were given for developmental purposes, such as for wells and dams. Graduated concessions on the revenue demand were offered for five years to those who brought new land under cultivation. Conversely, peasants were forbidden to leave their land, and absconding peasants were either forced or induced to come back. In one area R.1 and expenses was offered to those who returned.<sup>45</sup> Indeed, *zamindars* seem to have competed for peasants, treating them well so they would stay, and trying to inveigle them to desert other *zamindars*. The odd men out here were the *jagirdars*, who with short tenures presumably were not so concerned about this. But for the empire, and all sorts of *zamindars*, peasants were a commodity of prime importance.

A related method of extending land under cultivation was the system of *madad-i-ma'ash* land grants. These were usually hereditary and were given to deserving scholars, divines (not necessarily Muslims), and retired officials for their subsistence. The total area was not large, but the significant point is that these grants were usually given to land which was cultivable but not yet cultivated, or, according to another source, in areas half of which were settled and half waste. Frequently they were located in *zor talab* areas. The advantages are obvious for the state. More land was brought under cultivation, and a locally-based, totally dependent, rural class created. As a bonus, a reputation for piety was acquired. True, these grantees kept the revenue of the area for themselves, but even so their areas were made more secure, and the amount of land ultimately at the disposal of the emperor was increased. As creatures of the emperor, and his apologists and propagandists, these were ideal people to have in border or turbulent areas. Eaton has shown that even *sufis* could be warriors: Jahangir was not thinking only of divine help when he called his grantees his 'Army of Prayer.'<sup>46</sup>

Two comparable on-going processes may also be noted. First, in the seventeenth century the salary of a noble's contingent was reduced, and due to various changes in methods of payment the net income of the nobility under Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb also declined.<sup>47</sup> Second, according to Nurul Hasan the Mughals tried to get even primary *zamindars* (presumably only the larger ones who controlled several villages and were located in the Doab) to register their transfer deeds with state appointed *qazis*.<sup>48</sup> The success of this attempt was probably very limited, but it points to a desire to extend imperial cognizance, but presumably not control, to a very low level in rural society.

The Mughals made several other, more abrupt, attempts to extend and intensify their control over land and resources. The well-known wars of expansion, a constant in Mughal history, are

obvious examples. More interesting are efforts to reduce the power of the two groups above the intermediary *zamindars* and below the emperor, the nobles and the chiefs. We can first consider Mughal behavior when they conquered an area. The pattern is very much of a rapid and thorough shakeup in which attempts were made to reduce the power of chiefs and increase the flow of revenue to the centre. Todar Mal spent six months in Gujarat in 1573, and assessed, using measurement, 64 out of 198 *parganas*, essentially those in the fertile lowlands. In these areas revenue was to be at a fixed rate, for ten years, based on the area and quality of land held; this system was later applied in the heartland.<sup>49</sup> When Akbar conquered Khandesh the revenue demand went up 50 percent. In Hyderabad in 1689-90 a settlement was done down to *pargana* level, and selective increases in demand of an average of 13 percent were imposed.<sup>50</sup>

A more dramatic example comes from Rajasthan in the famous revolt of 1679 onwards. Jaswant Singh, ruler of Marwar, died without heirs, though two of his queens were pregnant. Leaving aside the details, Aurangzeb's actions now show a clear desire to use this golden opportunity to subordinate a part of Rajasthan. He appointed his own nominee as the new raja, and brought Jodhpur state, the central part of Marwar, under direct imperial control. His aim was in fact to absorb Marwar and reduce the independence of neighbouring Mewar. In this he was largely, if temporarily, successful. Initially he faced various localized revolts, testimony to the difficulties in the transition from living under a chief to living in *jagir* land. But ultimately the rebels all sued for *mansabs* and pardon. This success, presumably a portent for the future, was of course nullified by the contemporary problems in the Deccan.<sup>51</sup>

The Rajputs as particularly powerful chiefs and *mansabdars* had in fact been under covert attack for some time. Their problem was that they had been bonded so successfully they could hardly move. They needed the empire far more than the emperor needed them. Using Athar Ali's division of Aurangzeb's reign into two periods, 1658-78 and 1679-1707, we find that of all the nobles whom he lists as *zamindars* (essentially holders of *watan jagirs*), in the first period 83.7 percent of the *zats* (personal ranks) of such people were held by Rajputs, and 11.33 percent by Marathas and Deccanis. But Aurangzeb wanted to use his resources to buy these last two groups, while he correctly saw that he could ignore the Rajputs. Thus in the second period, the Rajput proportion of *zats* of all *zamindari* nobles fell to 58.2 percent, while the Marathas and Deccanis rose to 32.33 percent. Aurangzeb was trying to incorporate the southerners. Once this was achieved he could then swallow them completely, just as he was close to doing with the Rajputs.

A century earlier, there are signs of a general thrust by the emperor Akbar in the 1570s. First, and most interesting, was his so-called *karori* experiment, carried out in 1574-75 and including

the whole empire except Gujarat, Bengal and Bihar, which had all been conquered very recently. The idea was to remove all the *jagirdars* and, for revenue purposes, divide up the whole empire into equal areas directly subordinate to the crown. In each of these areas an official called a *karori* was to collect land revenue and send it to the centre. Nobles were all to be paid in cash from the proceeds of these collections. Other reforms included a reorganization of the provincial divisions of the empire, the introduction of branding of horses so nobles' contingents could be checked, the ten year land revenue settlement of 1580, and the so-called Infallibility Decree of 1579, the significance of which has recently been greatly downplayed.

These reforms amounted to the most massive thrust ever attempted by a Mughal ruler. They were in fact too massive, for they produced the widespread revolt of 1580-83. Two significant events occurred during this revolt which show clearly what was bothering the nobles. One high official on his own authority gave back *jagirs* to the nobles in order to avoid an immediate rebellion. The main agent used by Akbar to implement these reforms was a high official called Shah Mansur. He was framed by evidence concocted by some of the highest nobles, and executed as a rebel, much to the delight of the other nobles.<sup>52</sup>

The nobles apparently realised the implications of an extension of *khalisa* land, which essentially would have reduced their prestige and already limited room for manoeuvre. It is questionable whether salaried nobles would have fought so well to protect land over which they now had no control at all; perhaps for this reason, and also because of the revolt, the *karori* experiment was dropped. Habib in fact claims it was meant to be only temporary, but this seems unlikely, only a rationale to disguise the backtracking. Certainly later Mughals continued to thrust in this area. Not only was *khalisa* land usually the best land, but the area of *khalisa* rose. In the late 1580s one quarter of the total assessed revenue of the three heartland provinces of Delhi, Oudh and Allahabad was in *khalisa*. Under Jahangir it fell dramatically, apparently to below 5 percent in the whole empire. The more efficient and ruthless Shah Jahan raised it to one fifteenth by his fourth year, and later to one eleventh. The proportion later declined a little, presumably as Shah Jahan's ambitions slackened, but by Aurangzeb's tenth year it was up to one fifth. In fact, the receipts from *khalisa* land under Aurangzeb in his thirty-fifth year were one third higher than for Shah Jahan's thirty-first year.<sup>53</sup>

Aurangzeb's true intentions were shown in his incorporation of Jodhpur into the *khalisa*, and his behaviour in the Deccan after the conquest of Golconda. Despite a serious shortage of land available to be assigned to *jagirdars*, he elected to keep 44 percent of receipts from land in Hyderabad in *khalisa* and so directly under his own control.<sup>54</sup>

If this interpretation of Mughal policy as one of almost constant

searching for weak points, of every opportunity for greater imperial power being taken, is a true one then it has important implications for our whole view of the nature of the Mughal ethos. Far from being 'constrained by Islamic theory, they actively tried to extend their power within a defined area of society. What is needed now is much closer research into their 'mentality' and their actions.

Two preliminary points can be made about these attempts at greater control. First, they did not extend very far down into rural society. The end seems to have been the intermediary *zamindars*. Thus they represent essentially a juggling, a struggling for position, in levels of society above the intermediary *zamindars*. Second, these attempts do seem to have aimed not just at positional change, but at real structural change in the position and power of the elite. The ultimate aim was to change radically the character of the nobles and chiefs, to reduce their power, and replace them, or transform them into officials paid in cash and totally dependent on the emperor. It is true that this would have involved only enlarging already existing classes, for there were already some nobles paid in cash from the centre, and a standing central army. Nevertheless, when all were paid in cash, and no one had contingents of his own, this would have created a situation radically different from what has been seen as the classic Mughal system, for it would have been essentially a change from a quasi-patrimonial to a fully prebendal system. Such a system would probably have tended towards an orientation and ethos closer to that of a modern bureaucracy, completely subordinate not to a parliament or other representative body but to a genuinely autocratic Mughal emperor. The difficulties of such a transition, indeed radical change, are shown in the very small success achieved. It is, in any case, most doubtful that any emperor had any clear design in his mind. Rather, as with any other ruler, he groped towards closer control and more power, with only minimal success. Technological barriers were especially important, and finally the probings produced a reaction in such events as the Rajput Revolt and the Maratha rebellion which contributed, with other factors, to the fall of the empire. Such a transformation might have saved the dynasty, had it been achieved, but it can be doubted whether in fact this or any other basic transformation was possible in seventeenth-century India.

Instead, the structure of power in Mughal India remained relatively constant. A powerful emperor impinged most directly on that majority of his nobles who had no landed base and therefore no possibility of independent power. These nobles were enormously wealthy, and greatly subservient to their emperor. Nobles who were also chiefs (less than 20 percent of the total) had more, though still limited, independence. Their advantage, the possession of a landed base, was largely nullified by imperial power and policy. Emperor, nobles, and their clients made up the ruling group in the empire. While the emperor's control over this group was nearly total, the group's impact on the rest of Mughal India was slight

in the extreme. The only recurring relationship between ruler and subject was the collection of land revenue. This was mediated through the notoriously refractory intermediary *zamindars*. Below them were the great mass of the population, in no way concerned with or affected by the ambitions or policies of the emperors. The contrast with the many variants of feudalism are plain to see. Compared with classic feudalism, this political system was more centralised at the peak, and much more autonomous and disaggregated below this small elite. A glittering array of nobles danced attendance on the emperor, but their shadow lay light over the rest of India.

#### NOTES

1. Eric R. Wolf, *Europe and the People without History*, Berkeley, 1982, pp. 80-82.
2. Richard G. Fox, ed., *Realm and Region in Traditional India*, n.p., n.d., c. 1977, especially B. Stein, 'The Segmentary State in South Indian History'. See also my review of this book in *South Asia*, n.s. 1, 2, Sept. 1978, pp. 120-22.
3. Irfan Habib, 'An Examination of Wittfogel's Theory of "Oriental Despotism," ' *Enquiry*, n.s. no. 6, pp. 54-73.
4. See my 'Premodern Muslim Political Systems,' *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 102.1, 1982, pp. 47-58 for a fuller treatment of these points and bibliography.
5. See his *Marriage and Rank in Bengali Culture*, Berkeley, 1976, and with McKim Marriott, 'Caste Systems,' in the 1974 *Encyclopedia Britannica*, and with Ralph Nicholas *Kinship in Bengali Culture*, Chicago, 1977.
6. Abul Fazl, *Ain-i Akbari* (trans. H. Blochmann and others, 3 vols., Calcutta, 1939-49), i, 1-3; see also Abul Fazl, *Akbar Nama* (trans. H. Beveridge, 3 vols., Calcutta, 1902-39), iii, 755-7.
7. Irfan Habib, *The Agrarian System of Mughal India. 1556-1707* (Bombay, 1963), pp. 111-2.
8. C.B. Macpherson, 'Capitalism and the Changing Concept of Property', in *Feudalism, Capitalism and Beyond*, eds R.S. Neale and E. Kamenka (Canberra, 1975), p. 109. Similarly, R.H. Tawney described Tudor policy, 'which marks the transition from the mediaeval conception of land as the basis of political functions and obligations to the modern view of it as an income-yielding investment.' Quoted in Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston, 1966), p. 6.
9. François Bernier was the prime offender here, a classic Eurocentrist. See *Travels in the Mogul Empire*, eds A. Constable and V. Smith (London, 1914), pp. 5, 65, 205, 211-14, and especially 224-38.
10. Habib, *Agrarian System*, pp. 257, 190-6.
11. W.H. Moreland, *India at the Death of Akbar* (Delhi, 1974), p. 68.

12. Irfan Habib, 'Potentialities of Capitalistic Development in the Economy of Mughal India', *Journal of Economic History*, xxix (1969), 35-60; see also several articles by Shireen Moosvi, notably 'Share of the Nobility in the Revenues of Akbar's Empire, 1595-96', typescript, and 'The Magnitude of the Land Revenue Demand and the Income of the Mughal Ruling Class under Akbar', *Medieval India: A Miscellany*, iv (Bombay, 1977).
13. Moreland, *India at the Death of Akbar*, p. 262.
14. Habib, 'Potentialities', p. 58.
15. For example, W.H. Moreland, *From Akbar to Aurangzeb* (Delhi, 1972), pp. 195-203, 304-5.
16. E.B. Havell, *A Handbook to Agra and the Taj* (New Delhi, 1970), pp. 74-75; A. Jan Qaisar, 'Distribution of the Revenue Resources of the Mughal Empire among the Nobility', *Proceedings of the 27th Indian History Congress* (Aligarh, 1967), p. 239. Moreland quotes a figure of Rs. 917 lakhs (*From Akbar to Aurangzeb*, p. 196). This figure seems to be quite fabulous if, as he also claims, the palace at Agra cost only Rs. 60 lakhs. And even if his figure is correct, this is still only 2.5 percent of total revenue, and may be compared with modern expenditure for space exploration or military 'needs'.
17. Stephen P. Blake, 'Dar-ul-khilafat-i-shahjahanabad: The Padshahi Shahar in Mughal India, 1556-1739' (unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Chicago, 1974).
18. For the travels see, for example, lists in Beni Prasad, *History of Jahangir* (Allahabad, 1962), and in S. Blake, 'The Patrimonial-Bureaucratic Empire of the Mughals', *Journal of Asian Studies*, xxxix (1979), 91. For flowery descriptions of the land, see almost any chronicle, such as *Ain*, iii, 7, 10-11.
19. S.C. Misra, *The Rise of Muslim Power in Gujarat* (London, 1963), pp. 63, 65. Stein, however, goes quite astray when he says 'As in most parts of medieval India war was predatory in South India: the objectives were not territorial, but the seizure of treasure'. B. Stein, 'The Segmentary State', p. 13.
20. Jagadish Narayan Sarkar, *The Military Despatches of a Seventeenth Century Indian General* (Calcutta, 1969), p. 119.
21. J. Schwartzberg, 'The Evolution of Regional Power Configurations in the Indian Subcontinent', in *Realm and Region*, ed. Fox, p. 222. The Dutch merchant Pelsaert also noted the difference between mountains and plains, and described Jahangir as 'King of the plains or the open roads only'. W.H. Moreland and P. Geyl, *Jahangir's India* (Delhi, 1972), pp. 58-59.
22. Irfan Habib, *Agrarian System*, p. 283 f.n. M. Athar Ali,

- The Mughal Nobility under Aurangzeb* (New York, 1966), p. 79 has a different reference and one different proportion.
23. A.R. Khan, *Chieftains in the Mughal Empire during the Reign of Akbar* (Simla, 1977), pp. 207, 228. It might be legitimate to include *suba* Lahore also. Here there were seven chiefs, but six of these were Gakkhars, from the extreme northwest of the *suba*, and thus really far from the heartland, which can hardly be considered to extend much past Lahore city.
  24. See S. Nurul Hasan, 'The Position of the Zamindars in the Mughal Empire', *Indian Economic and Social History Review*, i (1964), 107-19, and S. Nurul Hasan, 'Zamindars under the Mughals', *Land Control and Social Structure in Indian History*, ed. R.E. Frykenberg (Madison, 1969), pp. 17-31. The two articles are virtually identical. See also Habib, *Agrarian System*, chapter v.
  25. Misra, *Rise of Muslim Power*, pp. 4, 50.
  26. R.M. Eaton, *Sufis of Bijapur, 1300-1700* (Princeton, 1978), p. 84 and f.n.
  27. Compare with *ibid*, pp. 191-3.
  28. Misra, *Rise of Muslim Power*, pp. 208-9.
  29. J.F. Richards, *Mughal Administration in Golconda* (Oxford, 1975), pp. 196-7.
  30. J.N. Sarkar, *Military Despatches*, pp. 55, 79.
  31. See A.R. Khan, *Chieftains*, pp. 148-50, and S.N. Sinha, *Subah of Allahabad under the Great Mughals* (New Delhi, 1974), pp. 49, 106.
  32. See my 'Premodern Muslim Political Systems', for a fuller treatment of these points.
  33. A.R. Khan, *Chieftains*, p. 238.
  34. *Ain*, quoted in M. Athar Ali, 'Foundation of Akbar's Organization of the Nobility - An Interpretation', *Medieval India Quarterly*, iii (1959), 296.
  35. I am at present engaged on a long-term investigation of Mughal symbols and myths. Some preliminary findings will be published in my introduction to a selection of the works of F.W. Buckler, which I am editing, and which will be published in the series produced by the Centre for South and Southeast Asian Studies of the University of Michigan. Meanwhile see a good study by J.F. Richards, 'The Formulation of Imperial Authority under Akbar and Jahangir', in *Kingship and Authority in South Asia*, ed. J.F. Richards (Madison, 1978), pp. 252-85.
  36. See J.F. Richards, *Mughal Administration*, pp. 132-3 for other examples from the Telegu region.
  37. See my 'Shivaji and the Decline of the Mughal Empire', *Journal of Asian Studies*, xxxv (1976), 221-35; A.R. Khan, *Chieftains*, pp. 44-45; M. Athar Ali, 'Towards an Interpretation of the Mughal Empire', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (1978), 38-49.
  38. See R.A. Alavi, 'New Light on Mughal Cavalry', *Medieval*

- India: A Miscellany*, ii (1972), 70-98.
39. S. Moosvi, 'Share of the Nobility', and J.F. Richards, 'Mughal State Finances and the Premodern World Economy', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, xxiii (1981), 292.
  40. S.N. Sinha, *Subha of Allahabad*, pp. 2, 5, 27-31, 38-39, 49-50, 54-55, 75-76, 115.
  41. A.R. Khan, *Chieftains*, pp. 3-7.
  42. Robert C. Hallisey, *The Rajput Rebellion against Aurangzeb* (Columbia, MO, 1977), pp. 43-45, a book which however needs to be used with great caution. See especially the review by N. Ziegler and R. Saran in the *Journal of Asian Studies*, xxxviii (1979), 389-91.
  43. This section on chiefs draws heavily on A.R. Khan, I. Habib, S.N. Sinha and S. Nurul Hasan.
  44. I. Habib, *Agrarian System*, pp. 255-6; M. Athar Ali, *Mughal Nobility*, pp. 144-5, 165-6.
  45. S. Nurul Hasan, *Thoughts on Agrarian Relations in Mughal India* (New Delhi, 1973), p. 27. See *The Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri* (trans. A. Rogers and H. Beveridge, 2 vols., New Delhi, 1968), i, 7-8 for Jahangir's attempt to encourage cultivation and settlement in waste lands.
  46. Hasan, *Thoughts*, p. 21; Habib, *Agrarian System*, pp. 298-310; Eaton, *Sufis*, pp. 217, 219; S.N. Sinha, *Subah of Allahabad*, pp. 117-21.
  47. Athar Ali, *Mughal Nobility*, p. 53.
  48. Hasan, *Thoughts*, pp. 30-31.
  49. M.S. Commissariat, *History of Gujarat* (2 vols., Bombay, 1938-57), ii, 7.
  50. J.F. Richards, *Mughal Administration*, p. 150.
  51. See M. Athar Ali, 'Causes of the Rathor Revolt of 1679', *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress* (Delhi, 1961), pp. 135-41, and Hallisey, *Rajput Rebellion*, *passim*, for details.
  52. Habib, *Agrarian System*, pp. 271-5; P. Hardy, 'Commentary and Critique', *Journal of Asian Studies*, xxxv (1976), 261; A.L. Srivastava, *Athar the Great* (3 vols., Agra, 1967-73), i, 162-5, 228-9, 239-74. M. Singh has cast doubt on the existence of the whole *karori* experiment: 'A Fresh Analysis of the 19 Years Revenue Rates', *Journal of Indian History*, liv (1976), 363-73.
  53. Habib, *Agrarian System*, pp. 270-73.
  54. J.F. Richards, *Mughal Administration*, pp. 157-8.