To the Halls of Europe: Theodore Roosevelt’s African Jaunt and the Campaign to Save Nature by Killing It

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Exactly what should one do at the end of a term as American president? Some of Theodore Roosevelt’s predecessors retired exhausted, or travelled around the world, others died almost immediately. More recently, ex-presidents have licked their wounds and become reclusive, others have thought about their legacy and their presidential libraries. For Roosevelt, it was a strenuous hunting jaunt to Africa that was on his mind. On March 23 of 1909, TR and son Kermit bordered a steamer of the Hamburg Line in New York, bound via Naples, for Mombasa, British East Africa, arriving there April 21. In the ten months that followed, father and son mixed with Maasai tribesmen and pious missionaries, haughty British officials and hunters full of derring-do. They traipsed from Kenya into Uganda, then to a small exclave of the Belgian Congo, and on to Southern Sudan. They returned via the mystical Nile to the larger world of non-stop publicity, greeted by a throng of journalists and photographers at Khartoum on March 14, 1910. Emerging back from what Roosevelt called ‘savagery’ or ‘wilderness’ into ‘civilisation’, it was time to take count. TR’s party had collected eleven thousand specimens great and small. Among the several hundred large game animals killed were elephants, hippos, rhinos, leopards, lions and the like. Father and son alone had shot 305 animals. These were skinned and sent back with their skeletons to museums in the United States for stuffing, mounting and exhibiting, though Roosevelt kept some animal parts for trophies at his Sagamore Hill residence. The total take from British East Africa alone was over 4000 mammals (Associated Press Daily Mail 2011).

How could such a man be a conservationist? The question arises acutely since conservation was a major theme in Roosevelt’s presidency, but conservation in the first decade of the twentieth century did not in the United States mean preservation alone (or even mainly). It meant efficient use of resources in the interests of both national strength (national efficiency) and long term ‘habitability’ for humans (the term sustainable was not used but the idea was similar) (see Hays 1959; Tyrrell 2012). In seeming contradiction, conservation also included protection of scenic beauty, and preservation of natural wonders and wildlife species from extinction. The ex-President contained all of these contradictory strands in his forceful personality. Though he never thought systematically about them, he believed the conflicts between preservation and conservation could be resolved with good sense and wise judgment by a patrician elite. In a sense, Africa exaggerated these tensions but also gave Roosevelt a way to discharge them by seeking to take the cause of scientific investigation and collection of knowledge about wild animals to its newest frontier of imperial Europe. In Africa, Roosevelt could also play at empire. The years after 1890 had seen an Anglo-American rapprochement in diplomacy, and the rise of racialist thought that emphasised the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon peoples. Africa was the site of much of the great imperial rivalry among the European powers and, in Africa, Roosevelt could dramatise his own view of empire as paternalistic rule by wise, forceful men, and, perhaps more surprisingly, make a case for the settler society model derived from his own frontier experience, which he believed was being re-enacted across the world by English-speaking peoples.
Africa also meant the certainty of attracting media publicity as an ex-President. As throughout his presidency, Roosevelt believed press publicity was the key to getting his messages across, and he understood the value of the Washington press corps. This was the era of mass circulation ‘yellow’ journalism and the ‘muckraking’ periodicals that exposed corruption in government and crusaded for ‘reform’ of social and economic structures. Roosevelt cultivated personal relations with press reporters and newspaper barons. He briefed journalists regularly and became the first president to exploit mass media, including the use of extensive photo opportunities that would symbolise his political and personal agenda (Ponder 1985; Dalton 2002; Rice 1996; Roosevelt, Autobiography 401).

Africa presented him with excellent opportunities, I shall argue, for both publicity and for advancing the questions of conservation and empire that were central to his thinking.

The contradiction of hunting and conservation must be seen in these contexts. Roosevelt and his party went in the name of scientific discovery, and hence conservation, for to know was the prelude to the urge to preserve. In African Game Trails (1910), Roosevelt’s engrossing account of the trip, ‘conservation’ is not mentioned, but ‘natural history’ is, and Roosevelt was known as a great lover of nature, of the field then called natural history, and of wildlife.¹

He wished to experience the wild, just as he had in his youth as a rancher in the Dakota Territory in the mid-1880s. He had carefully cultivated there a public image as a hunter, and wished once more to be close to elemental nature in all its bloodthirsty detail. And he wished to be seen studying nature – as Roosevelt the intrepid scientist-explorer. His book and magazine articles, for which Scribner’s offered him a handsome advance of 25,000 dollars, reflected upon the issue of adaptation to natural surroundings, and intimated that the campaign of slaughter served the study of the natural world and biological evolution, a theme which squared well with the lecture on ‘Biological Analogies in History’ that he delivered in Oxford after his safari had ended. (Roosevelt, African Game 497; Thompson 2010; McCalman 2006).

Despite the enormous numbers of animals killed, there was little criticism at home. Sometimes the (few) critics were predictable. An old enemy, General Nelson Miles, remarked in 1909 that a man who shot elephants, zebras and wildebeest ‘must have a depraved mind’ (qtd. in Dalton 2002: 349). Miles pointed out that ‘England recently passed a law setting apart a large tract of land in Africa for reservation purposes and for the protection of just such animals as elephants, zebras, antelopes and ostriches, which live in that region, and it is a pity a man should find enjoyment in shooting such animals’ (New York Sun 1909).

Most American commentators, however, treated the ex-President’s exploits with adulation, and the isolated charges of bloodlust and exhibitionism raised hackles among the ex-President’s adoring friends and supporters, such as naturalist and Bronx Zoo Director William T. Hornaday. Hornaday claimed that the ethics of TR’s hunting were not in any way ‘assailable’. To ‘condemn the Colonel’s work in Africa [was] to condemn the museum idea so far as it relates to zoological forms’. The African venture was all done ‘in the interests of zoology and devoted wholly to science’ (1913: 6).
For Roosevelt, it was always important to have a record of the natural world and its creatures. From his friend Hornaday he had learned in the 1890s that animal species in danger of extinction could be bred in captivity and released. National parks and wildlife refuges that he created from 1901 to 1909 were partly designed with this aim in mind (Brinkley 2009: 231, 276, 624-30). Africa, however, presented a different prospect, since the grip of the imperial powers at the local level was both contested by African native tribes, and by intra-European rivalries. Consequently, there was anxiousness about the possibilities for conservation in Roosevelt’s urge to preserve in museums the stuffed form of every variant of every African species. Museums were de facto instruments of European scientific superiority, showing the achievements of western science and civilisation, but also were potentially beneficial by instructing the visiting public on the diversity of natural species and their condition in the wild. By supporting the process of specimen collection in his spectacular way, rather than relying only on European habitat protection initiatives in Africa (such as game parks) that seemed a long way from fruition, Roosevelt affirmed the value of European imperialism as the only hope for saving wild animals, since only the education of the home public could ultimately achieve this goal by creating a pro-conservation ethic on a global scale. In the meantime, specimens would provide an insurance policy of memorialisation for those species ‘lingering toward extinction’ and expose the follies of the human race that allowed such total extermination (Roosevelt, African Game Trails 412; Bennett 1995: 59-88).

Science and the anxieties of conservation alone were not enough, however. Roosevelt was a vigorous exponent of American nationalism and the exertion of American power abroad. Hornaday defended the episode in terms of a vigorous nationalism, an assertion of the American nation on the world stage. It was nationalistic in the way it highlighted the retirement of a president already admired in Europe for putting the United States on the world stage. But it was more than that. In Hornaday’s opinion, the slaughter was a price that had to be paid for national pride. These specimens were needed for ‘this great progressive, and wealthy Nation’ that the United States had become, and because
America’s national museum had been scandalously under-funded and handicapped. Its
collection was unrepresentative of so many species, some of them endangered. Roosevelt
would fill the void (Hornaday 1913: 6).

In the name of science and nation, yes, but the trip had to be chastened by calculation and
restraint, as Roosevelt’s own account put it in the case of the white rhinoceros. ‘Too little
is known of these northern square-mouthed rhino’, he reported. Lest they be on the verge
of extinction, ‘we were not willing to kill any merely for trophies; while, on the other
hand, we deemed it really important to get good groups for the National Museum in
Washington and the American Museum in New York, and a head for the National
Collection of Heads and Horns which was started by Mr. Hornaday’ (African Game Trails
412). Roosevelt solicited others such as Warrington Dawson of United Press International
to provide such ex post facto justifications for the practices of the hunt, and fed Dawson
his lines. The shooting of lions Roosevelt justified in view of their vermin-like status in
the vicinity of settlements. For other slaughter, he argued for the importance not only of
getting representative figures, but also of obtaining sub-species and individual creatures
deviating from the norm, such as ‘large’ animals or ‘freak’ examples with genetic defects
(Fl. Writings, and Roosevelt 12, 13).

Uncomfortable as he was about the apparent contradiction between such comprehensive
hunting and the goals of conservation, Roosevelt and his apologists found resolution in the
assumption of the survival of the fittest. Killing for science, stated Hornaday, was ‘no
more cruel or wasteful of life than the forces of nature herself’ (Hornaday 6). After all, just
one lion killed 104 zebras, gazelle and other mammals a year, on average. This was the
way of nature, Hornaday opined. Species would die off anyway – humans could justifiably
take for science because of this cycle of life and death. In a sense, killing species could
conserv e them forever, whereas neither the animal world nor ‘savage’ peoples had any
such foresight or plan. Hunting would help preserve the memory and knowledge of the
northern square-mouthed rhino in the event of its demise.

In hunting for science, Roosevelt justified the process in terms of the Progressive Era’s
efficient conservation practice. The expedition was a morally upright use of resources that
dispelled any idea of hapless waste. ‘We only shot for meat, or for Museum specimens –
all the Museum specimens being used for food too’ (Roosevelt, African Game Trails 409).
The father and son were ‘in a wild, uninhabited [sic] country, and for meat we depended
entirely on our rifles; nor was there any difficulty in obtaining all we needed’. Mostly, the
abundance of game justified the take as harmless: ‘The naturalists were as busy as they
well could be’. Roosevelt found that, ‘except when we were after rhinoceros, it was not
necessary to hunt for more than half a day or thereabouts’. There was simply too much
game to worry about extinctions in most cases, yet the desire to prevent waste remained a
consideration in Roosevelt’s re-telling. We know that Chicago’s packing industry was said
to leave nothing of the pig but the squeal. A similar point could be made of the hunt.
Sagamore Hill has a wastepaper basket made from the hollowed foot of an elephant, and
an inkwell crafted from part of a rhino (Daily Mail 2011: 5).
But the event was neither simply a scientific expedition alone, nor an episode in efficiency conservation. It represented on one level Roosevelt’s masculinist strivings for an encounter with the wilderness. Manliness is not incompatible with leadership and policy considerations, however. For this reason, Roosevelt’s ‘Pleistocene vacation’, as Gail Bederman terms it (1995: 213) should be seen in context. It was preceded by a concerted campaign for North American conservation, and succeeded by three months touring and lecturing the European powers on their duties and responsibilities for the uplift of the less fortunate people of the world. (He arrived back in New York on June 18, 1910). The African visit testified to both of these themes, and to the third that underlay all of Roosevelt’s achievements, his media manipulation (Dalton 242; Ponder 4; Rice 404-16; Roosevelt, Autobiography 401). And the African trip was a media event above all, carefully calculated to enhance Roosevelt’s reputation and to draw attention to his interlocking causes, conservation and imperial power.

At first glance, Roosevelt seemed to be shunning the media whirlwind that accompanied him during his presidency. The deal with Scribner’s prompted him to ban press photographers that might steal his thunder. (Son Kermit served as the official picture-taker). Nor were reporters to accompany him in Africa, though some did on the ship to Mombasa (he could hardly stop them from joining the boat!). It was a masterstroke to go incommunicado in this way, and one wonders how genuine that urge was, since the ban merely enhanced curiosity, and photographs and news leaked out. The masterstroke did not escape his press secretary William Loeb, who calculated for Roosevelt exactly how effective the impact of denying press access was. Back in the United States, the press and public followed the tour as avidly as it could. Though Roosevelt ostensibly spurned publicity, intrepid reporters hung about, sneaking into meetings; letters reached the outside world via Maasai runners, and information flowed across to Europe and the Atlantic. In truth, the event became a media circus. So much so that he relented for a while, allowing
Warrington Dawson special access until leaving the Nairobi region to head west toward Uganda (Dawson to Roosevelt, 14 October 1909: box 7).

The media accompaniment to this trip was, indeed, well-nigh unprecedented in its multifarious variety and ingenuity. TR met Americans everywhere, and they obliged newsmen with pictures and stories for the home audience. Upon completion of his own hunt, an old Harvard classmate Dr Ramon Guiteras, met the ex-President in Mombasa and took back information, giving readers on the San Francisco Call and the New York Herald a run down on what TR would be doing (San Francisco Call 22 August 1909: 6). Film footage was taken, too. The officially sanctioned Yorkshireman Cherry Kearton provided so much that it amounted almost to an anthropological coverage (Hasegawa 2010: np). Kearton strove for the (unattainable) goal of authenticity, and therefore refused to stage hunting events by day that in real life only would occur by night. Lions were shot at night, not in daylight, and hence in terms of the technology of the time did not present a feasible spectacle. Such inhibitions did not hold back commercial interests, however. Resourceful entrepreneur William Selig released a highly successful fake, Hunting Big Game in Africa (1909), filmed at the Selig Company’s own property in California with an actor playing Roosevelt. In all, the Africa jaunt was surely one of the best-covered and documented hunts in history. But not until Roosevelt returned and published African Game Trails did the full extent of his activities become clear through the many photos that the expedition leaders themselves had taken.

News stories often gave the impression of a wilderness warrior, a backwoodsman sometimes alone with his son and the elements. These items backed the claim in the book of a ‘wild’ and ‘uninhabited’ place with which he did battle. But Maasai tribesmen were all about, with dozens of porters to carry the president across even the slightest of streams, in pith helmet and full Bwana style. Moreover, at least two other major European hunting expeditions were going on in the same area. This was the era in which, as John MacKenzie and others have argued, the safari as tourist experience was being created, facilitated by construction of the railway from Mombasa (1896) that from 1899 made the sleepy crossroads settlement at Nairobi the launching pad for European excursions. Roosevelt re-enacted that story, though with a twist (MacKenzie 1989). Just as in Roosevelt’s narrative, the official filming of the trip followed the story of advancing modernisation under British rule contrasted with the tribalism inherent in the culture of the indigenous. It contrasted the progress of the railway journey across the African plain with the ethnographic presentation of the tribal rituals of the Maasai and Kikuyu, wrongly labelled in the film as Zulu (Kearton 1910). However, the indigenous people are very much depicted as human beings capable of progress, under forceful, paternalistic European leadership supplying the technology of rail.

Roosevelt’s visit to Africa was not by any means an effort to escape to the wilderness, but rather reflected a real ambivalence toward that theme in American history. His time in British East Africa was peppered with return visits to Nairobi to meet ‘society’ and deliver speeches. At night by the campfire, Dawson reported, Roosevelt seemed less than satiated by wilderness alone. The world of the wild and of politics and intellectual life he held in an elaborate juggling act. The pull of the latter reflected his desire to use the trip to comment on Europe and its imperial outreach, and arguably this impulse was more important than the hunting itself. In particular he wished to identify with British imperialism’s rule, but all European empires he praised for their work of ‘uplift’ in Africa (‘Atmosphere and Theodore Roosevelt’: box 35).
The journey was scheduled to end in Egypt, after a trip through the Sudan, where the ex-President toured the scenes so recently contested between the forces of the millenarian Islamic leader, Muhammad Ahmad (the self-proclaimed ‘Mahdi’) and the British under Lord Charles George Gordon, who died at the siege of Khartoum in 1885. Lord Kitchener had, as Roosevelt reminds us in the book, relieved Khartoum from Islamic control and avenged the death of Gordon only in 1896. The bloody conquest of Africa was close in time, and Roosevelt identified the extension of British rule with the recent American subjugation of the Philippines. In this and in many other ways, Roosevelt’s visit was inseparable in strategy and impact from events back home and his subsequent visit to Europe to receive the approval of European empires.

Whether intended or not, the trip cast Roosevelt as a world leader doing a lap of honour. He was going to Europe to receive at last the Nobel Prize won in 1906. But it was more valuable to his purposes to go to Africa first. The African prelude itself made TR an actor in an imperial drama. The episode enabled Roosevelt to align himself with the conservation and social ethic of imperial hunters. John Mackenzie has documented how, in Africa and Asia, British imperial hunting lay behind the creation of the first forest and game reserves, and Roosevelt sympathised with these efforts. Kruger National Park had its origins in one such reserve established in 1896. When the Society for the Preservation of the Wild Fauna of the Empire was established in London in 1903, Roosevelt became a member and he wrote for its Journal commending its conservation as part of a global movement (Roosevelt, Journal of the Society 1907: 4; 1908: 8; Gissibi 2006: 132; MacKenzie 1989: 81; 202; 321).

The hunt drew attention to Roosevelt’s identification with this form of conservation that sought to preserve wild game for the selective use of wise white hunters, at the expense of indigenous use. Roosevelt was accompanied on early parts of the hunting tour by the famed English hunter Frederick Selous, who had visited him in the White House and who interested him years before in the conservation of African animals, an expansion of the President’s concern for the saving the American bison, a species that had come so close to extinction in the United States in the 1890s. While the ‘saving’ of the bison from extinction was initially an American issue, Roosevelt and key advisors had come already to believe that conservation of threatened species was a global issue. This was shown in the parallel European movement for such preservation, illustrated in the foundation of the Wild Fauna protection organisation and the 1900 treaty on the same subject negotiated between seven European powers. But the latter had only been partially implemented, and Roosevelt wished to tap into this global concern over species extinction, and he did so through several initiatives in the later part of his presidency. The African trip extended his growing preoccupation with the global. Roosevelt’s international conservation agenda had already included the holding of a North American Conservation Conference in February 1909, at which Hornaday spoke to Mexican, Canadian and U.S. delegates on the transnational destruction of wildlife (Washington Herald 1909: 9; Washington Post 1909: 1; North American Conservation Congress: box 533).

When in Africa Roosevelt could not help but reflect, through the Euro-American world’s quest for national efficiency, upon civilisation’s onset in that ‘dark’ continent. As already noted, Roosevelt did not see utilitarian conservation and preservationist conservation as polar opposites. Through strenuous application of the principle of ‘civilisation’ throughout the world, the two would be resolved. At the Guildhall address in London he reflected on the experience, referring to ‘the spread of civilization over the world’s waste spaces’,
thereby linking conservation, empire, and efficiency and occluding indigenous occupation. He repeatedly praised the work of British Empire officials. ‘British Rule in Africa’ was the title of the Guildhall address – these Anglo-Saxon cousins were engaged in the task of ‘subduing the savagery of wild men and wild nature’. The New York Times called it a ‘world-stirring address’ (1910: np).

This was not the usual European imperialism centred on rulers and subjects alone, however. Especially, it endorsed empire with a settler inflection in mind. Roosevelt used the hunt as an opportunity to identify himself with civilisation’s expansion by marking out the spaces of an imperial version of conservation that was settler based. The American experience of settler expansion through the small-scale yeoman farmer was something that Roosevelt strongly cultivated at home, as shown in such histories as his four-volume The Winning of the West (1889-96). This tradition he sought to reinvigorate as the nation became more urban. The global spread of Anglo-Saxon civilisation with Britain and the United States in partnership enabled him to identify American traditions with transnational racial strivings for empire. The Winning of the West itself had opened with a chapter on the ‘Spread of the English-Speaking Peoples’ (Morris, The Rise 2001: 394). The change in inflection by 1909 was only to shift the terminology and concept to the ‘expansion’ of the ‘English-Speaking People’. This term had become identified with American imperialism in the Caribbean and the Pacific. The theme was the backdrop to his key speech in British East Africa, delivered August 3, 1909 in Nairobi. Announcing ‘I am ever an expansionist’, he told the white colonial ruling class: ‘During the last three centuries the greatest and most important feature in the history of the human race has been the remarkable spread of the English-speaking peoples over the waste places of the earth’. British East Africa was one such place (Roosevelt, The Truth 1909: 2).

In the symbolic character and practical, demonstrative and theatrical nature of the trip, he brought the two topics of hunting and empire together with the racial foundations of his thought in the travail of the Anglo-Saxon settler in the far corners of the earth. He praised imperial hunters and thought game laws should favour the interests of the ‘settlers’ (Roosevelt, African Game Trails 12), meaning the white Afrikaners, British Kenyans and Australians with whom he hunted, not ‘well-meaning persons’ who ‘apparently think’ that ‘man could continue to exist’ if ‘all wild animals were allowed’ to roam ‘unchecked’. The latter stance was incompatible with ‘civilisation’. Roosevelt’s account of the hunt was justified in terms of game management in the interests of settler society, not preservation. He held in high esteem a racial and imperial supervision of hunting and ‘the happy mean which is healthy and rational’ between the extremes of preservation and slaughter (African Game Trails 11-12). As with his domestic conservation policy, he did not adhere to a management strategy based on either scientific expertise or democratic principles, but identified with a social elite, in this case of manly hunters. In the interests of the same civilising values, however, he supported (gentlemanly) fair play, agreeing that ‘Game butchery is as objectionable as any other form of wanton cruelty or barbarity’ (African Game Trails 11-12).

It was not only masculinist hunting that Roosevelt endorsed as a settler value. The very first photograph of him to reach the American public was taken at Kijabe, British East Africa, on the edge of the great Rift Valley (see Roosevelt, Address 1909), at the Africa Inland Mission. The Presbyterian William Hurlburt of Pennsylvania, who appears in the photo, led this outpost. TR had communicated with Hurlburt to get maps of the area before he departed from Washington, and he heaped praise upon the missionaries in return. Like
other visiting American politicians of the time, he used missionaries to mark out a space for American cultural endeavour abroad (Berea Citizen 1909: 7; San Francisco Call 1909: 6). Missionary work was to be inter-denominational, non-doctrinaire, and practical (Roosevelt, African Game Trails 432): ‘I earnestly wish you well in your work; all missionaries who do honest, practical work, whatever their creed, are entitled to the heartiest sympathy and support and it will be a particular pleasure to me when I go back to my own country, to report what is being accomplished by this Interdenominational Mission’ (Address 1909: np). Medical work was especially praised; at the Sobat Mission further north he endorsed ‘the faithful work they are doing’ in medicine ‘under such great difficulties and with such cheerfulness and courage’.

The missionary theme also tied in with the settler theme. Roosevelt was emphatic that missionaries must serve the white settlers as equally deserving of spiritual attention. He expressed sentiments on the need for country churches for these scattered farmers very similar to those that he advocated for the United States in his response to the Commission on Country Life at home (Address 1909: np). Roosevelt argued that not all of British East Africa was suitable for the white man, but the higher elevations should be reserved for this purpose (African Game Trails 1910: 31). In effect, the wilderness would have carved out of it park like areas as demonstrations of the settler society model. These would have to be defended against wild beasts, and wild natives. In his paean to British imperialism in East Africa, he saw the establishment of viable white settlements in the highlands as part of chain of settler societies that would extend Anglo-Saxon society globally. Settlement societies should grow to provide leadership for the British empire, and he saw the prospects in Africa as an important part of this process, with a possible duplication of conditions on the American frontier of thirty years before (The Truth 1909: 1, 2; African Game Trails 1910: 31-5).

TR emerged from Africa to pronounce upon the relationship of the colonised and their conquerors, and, in effect, the entire fate of empires. He proffered advice on how the European empires could learn from the Americans in their own empire. In Khartoum on March 3, 1910 he called upon the British to continue their good rule without relaxing their hold, much to the chagrin of the local people of the Sudan. Britain’s success resembled his own in the Panama case, he believed. In Cairo, he chastised radical Islam for not realising the essential goodness of the British tutelage – and condemned the assassination of Boutrus Pasha by those radicals. He opined that independence was a work not of years ‘but of generations’ (Morris 2010: 38). His comments mortified ever-pragmatic British officials and newspapermen as the work of a bull in a China shop. But in the United States, these forays won him acclaim. Eight hundred men attending a fund-raising banquet for the Layman’s Missionary Movement in San Francisco endorsed his speech at
Khartoum and cabled him at Asswan stating that they ‘count largely upon your cooperation in enlisting the church for the evangelization of Africa and of the world’ (Los Angeles Herald 1910: 16). The African trip had religious and moral as well as scientific, cultural and political significance.

Then on to Europe. Clearly, Roosevelt’s European and African adventure was more than a holiday; more than a journey back to nature; more than a striving to reincarnate frontier masculinity (Bederman 1995: 211-15). It was a calculated move to draw attention to him, and to his causes through a highly newsworthy series of events that dragged on for almost a year. The causes that he advanced included the need for conservation, but settler conservation in the interests of the nation, and asserted the trajectory of history towards an American hegemony of the Euro-American imperial world.

NOTES

1 ‘Conservation’ as a concept was used by George Grinnell of Forest and Stream as early as 1884. See Benson, p. 20.
2 For Roosevelt as frontiersman and nature lover, see Brinkley 794-95. Brinkley’s study ends with the swearing in of Roosevelt’s successor. The African trip is only fleetingly treated. For manliness, see Bederman, 207-13.
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