THE ALLEGED RUSSIAN PLANS FOR THE INVASION OF AUSTRALIA, 1864

By Duncan MacCallum

A LEXANDRA, arriving in the second week of November, 1864, brought much important news from London in the mail that had left in September: the accounts of the Shakesperian Festival Committee at Stratford-on-Avon showed a deficiency of £5,000; there had been an unparalleled increase of brutal murders and other criminal offences; a frightful colliery explosion had occurred near North Shields, resulting in the death of eighteen persons; a fire had almost gutted the Haberdashers’ Hall in Gresham Street, causing damage of about £100,000; an earthquake shock had been distinctly felt in Cheshire; there had, in the week before the mail left, been a violent tempest, causing 47 ships to be wrecked; the Emperor of Abyssinia had kept the British Consul in irons because he delayed making a favourable reply to the Emperor's offer of marriage to Queen Victoria. But not the least interesting news to the colonists, in fact, what the Argus described as the most interesting news, was the revelation by The Times of what purported to be the great Russian project for the destruction of some of the Australian seaports. It appeared to the Argus that, for the past eight or nine months, the fate of the colony had hung by a thread. The story which The Times published, according to the Australasian, "with solemn authority," was that information had reached it "in a very authentic shape" that Russia fully expected the breaking out of war as a result of her correspondence in 1863 with the English and French governments on the subject of Poland.

Wishing to put her fleet to better use than that to which it had been put in the Crimean War (when it had been locked up in ports), Russia had noticed the tactics of the Confederates in the American Civil War, and had seen how much injury a very small force could inflict on a large and flourishing commerce. Even if the exploits of the Confederate ship, Alabama, were unusual, she thought that she might be able to strike a blow which would inflict a great discredit on English arms, and damage to her commerce.

The Australian gold colonies were tempting baits and perhaps easy triumphs. Sir Charles Darling wrote that "the importance of Pt. Phillip as a harbour whence the Russian Fleet might inflict serious injury upon the Australian trade [which he estimated at about £50 millions per annum] ... is obvious".

Russia was prepared, as The Times put it, to make a swoop even though she knew that her fleet might not long keep the seas against English and French forces. According to The Times, instructions had been issued to the Russian admirals on the American Californian coast, directing them to leave their ports to rendezvous and to
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be ready in the event of a war with England to bear down on the Australian colonies, first on Melbourne, then on Hobart, then on Adelaide, Sydney and New Zealand.

The circumstances in which Russia and England might have been at war in 1864 comprised, of course, the Polish Insurrection. The first article in the final act of the Treaty of Vienna had decreed Poland to be bound by its constitution to the Russian Empire and also contained an assurance on the part of the then Czar that the Poles should enjoy a National Representation and institutions of a liberal nature. Although the Emperor, Alexander II, had introduced a policy which Dr. Coleman has considered as showing enlightened self-interest, his rule did not appear congenial to many of the Poles, and partly as the result of the activity of some parts of the Emigration, consisting of those who had left Poland after 1830, partly as the result of the student activities and the Liberal movement within Poland and the outbreak of patriotic fervour in January, 1863, the Polish Central National Committee called the nation to arms. Insurrection had become general by February, 1863.

In view of the dispositions in the Treaty of Vienna, it seemed significant when Lord John Russell, the Foreign Secretary in Lord Palmerston's cabinet, had recognized the belligerent rights of the Poles. This seemed to be tantamount to a surrender of the principle of non-intervention. But the unhappy retreat of the English Government, in spite of the personal sympathy of Lord Palmerston for the Poles, is a matter of history. In view of the roles of France and Prussia, Lord Palmerston found himself obliged to see that effective action was impossible, a view that was not congenial to Queen Victoria and to the, at first, pacifist, and then anti-Polish attitude of the Thunderer, The Times—an attitude perhaps largely due to the conjunction of activities of Count Brunow, the Russian Ambassador at the Court of St. James, Baron Lionel Rothschild, who had contracted a Russian loan of fifteen million pounds, and Delane, the Editor of The Times, with whom Baron Lionel was on very close terms of friendship.

At any rate, the Australasian in October, 1864, reported the execution of Poland after months of lingering agonies: "... the bitter end has come. The final scenes are declared in August of one of the saddest tragedies of modern times." The Australian press were, so far as I have been able to ascertain, sympathetic to the Poles, aware of Russian expansionary tendencies and pessimistic about the European situation in 1864. In July, 1864, for instance, one paper had published its report from London in May. "The horizon darkens daily, a tempest is evidently at hand." The correspondent remarked that the English Government was draining the cup of humiliation to its bitterest dregs. He referred, for example, to the arrogance and rapacity of Prussia; to the duplicity and double-dealing of Russia; to the reserved and equivocal attitude of France; and to the clamours of the German democracy for the dismemberment of Denmark.

If the Polish debacle was regarded, then, as complete by November, 1864, there was much sympathy for bleeding Poland, and there was not any undue optimism as to the state of international relations. On the other hand, Australia was thousands
of miles from the seat of controversy. The main political matters agitating the Victorian people were the issues of Protection versus Free Trade, and the Land Question. This was the time of Ben Hall and his bushranging. A great deal of interest was being taken in the Molesworth divorce case involving Mr. Justice Molesworth, which, as the Melbourne Punch stated, revealed the "intense disgust of a highly moral public on being excluded from court while some highly immoral revelations were being made". The ramifications of the case in colonial society were profound, and the Argus was moved to hope that it would not be accepted by English newspapers as a true picture of Victorian domestic life. One of the burning colonial issues that directly impinged on the reception of this news from the outside world was the controversy as to whether transportation to Western Australia should be continued. This had, in fact, become a large colonial question. "Not a single mail ", wrote the Argus, "had gone to England during the last eleven months without some petition or remonstrance, official or private, against the sending of convicts to Western Australia. Men of all shades of political opinion, of all professions and callings, of all creeds and sects, have taken part in the most righteous indignation." The Argus argued that this pollution of Australia's soil should be opposed by every lawful means and that, if the British Government persisted in its decision to send convicts to Western Australia, the policy would inevitably lead to estrangement from "the land at present the object of our loyal affections and allegiance".

Before we can examine the reactions in the colony to the Russian news that was available publicly first from the London Times arriving in November, we must examine the source of the information and the process by which it reached officialdom. Searching in the light of recent events, I can find no information to suggest that when he heard of the alleged Russian designs on Australia, the Leader of the Opposition in the Victorian Parliament, Mr. O'Shannassy, wrote to the Foreign Minister of Czarist Russia to ask him if there was anything in the report; in fact, in the colonies the matter was handled very discreetly.

And this takes us back for a brief time to Russia and Poland.

Admiral Popov, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Station of the Russian Navy, had visited Melbourne and Sydney in early 1863 in the course of a cruise, part of which, at any rate, was designed to secure the friendship of the American Federal Government, that is, the Northern Government, and to prepare to attack British commerce in the event of war. The Admiral was a naval ship designer of note; he had become quite famous by his breaking of the British blockade at Petropauloski, and he was now attached to the staff of His Majesty Alexander II. The awareness of a threat to English power that might be implied in Russian expansion did not prevent Popov being welcomed enthusiastically in the colonies.

It was, of course, not the only experience of visiting Russian warships. At the beginning of 1862 the Russian eagle, in the case of Swetlana, had visited Melbourne without fluttering the dovecots. "Nothing had been cracked", wrote the Argus, "but jokes and bottles. The only artillery practice witnessed was the popping of champagne corks and our boarding parties had been received by the Admiral, not
with hot shot and cold steel, but bon-bons and cheroots.” The social qualities of the Russian gentleman and his peculiar capacity as a linguist were favourably noted by the Press, and in 1863 the Illustrated Melbourne Post described in detail Popov’s corvette, Bogatyr, even to mentioning the cooking arrangements and the hangings in the Admiral’s cabin. While the ship lay in Melbourne, Popov had thrown it—except for the magazine—open to public inspection and probably nearly 8,000 people took advantage of this. When the Admiral visited Sydney, a mistake was made in returning his salute, which was remedied the next morning by firing the appropriate twenty-one guns. The Governor of New South Wales, Sir John Young, apologized, forwarding the explanations of the Commander of Her Majesty’s Troops, which Popov was asked to return, as “owing to pressure of business copies have not been made”. Popov accepted the explanations as perfectly satisfactory.

The episode is an interesting example of the niceties and courtesies of service and international protocol. If looked at otherwise, it would seem ironical in view of the fact that Popov was the commander of the fleet which in certain eventualities was to attack some British possessions—probably Australian ports. According to Sir Charles Darling, who became Governor after Popov’s visit, it was well known that during Bogatyr’s visit the harbour of Port Phillip “was minutely surveyed by Russian officers, and I understand that a similar survey was made of Western Port”.

On board Bogatyr was a young Polish officer, whom I have called Zlyszuvski. It was, of course, entirely proper for a Pole to be in the Russian Navy, since Poles owed allegiance to the Czar. In Melbourne also was Severin Apolinair Rakowski.*

The resistance movement in Poland at the time of the Insurrection was controlled by the shadowy but influential Polish National Government, which preserved order, made laws, levied taxes, and commanded some support from the considerable number of Poles who had left their country after the unsuccessful rising of 1830. One of these was Rakowski, a count of noble family. I have not been able to verify all of the report of his career in Victorian Men of the Time, but it seems that after an adventurous escape after 1830 he went to England. Some years later he migrated to Victoria, where he was naturalized in August, 1854. He is supposed to have failed in a farming venture and then, after reverses in an importing business, he became employed as a bookkeeper and accountant. Rakowski died a natural death in July, 1887, and was buried as a member of the Church of England in the Melbourne General Cemetery.

Rakowski had interested himself in Polish Relief. “On behalf of the old Polish soldiers in Melbourne”, he had written a letter to the Argus in December, 1863, appealing for help for the National Government. “Men of Israel—ye are the bulk

* Since this address was delivered, Mr. L. K. Paszkowski, of Melbourne, who is investigating the history of Poles in Australia, has informed me that the name of this officer (whom I called X) as given in the Argus, October 15, 1863, p. 5, col. 3, is correct—Zbyszewski. Mr. Paszkowski has kindly translated extracts from Lepszy Kazimierz: DZIEJE FLOTY POLSKIEJ, Gdansk, 1947 (The History of the Polish Navy), in which Ladislaus Zbyszewski’s desertion is described. Under the assumed name of Felix Karp, he was appointed Organizer General of Polish National Naval Forces. The incident is also discussed in Pertek, Jerzy: POLACY NA SZLAKACH MORSKICH SWIATA, Gdansk, 1957 (Poles on the World Sea-Lanes).
of the Poles in Australia, ye are many and strong." This appeared with another letter addressed to "the Hebrew population in Australia, natives of Poland ", following a sympathetic editorial.23

In August, 1863, the Mayor of Melbourne convened a meeting in accordance with an influentially signed requisition to decide upon what the colonists could do to show their sympathy with Poland. More than 1,000 people filled St. George’s Hall.

One of the instigators of the meeting, Mr. Langlands, said he had heard many say these meetings were simply got up by Roman Catholics because the Poles as a nation were Catholic, but he was sure that there was no one present who shared in that opinion.24 Even had this been so, there was ample humanitarian reason for help and good work on behalf of the Poles. In fact, the membership of the committee and the speakers at the meeting suggest a wider non-sectarian interest, though the interest was not sustained in subsequent activity. It included Mr. Hull, a member of the Victorian Legislative Council, Edward Cohen, John Langlands and Charles Gavan Duffy. Dr. Cairns, the prominent Presbyterian minister, Dr. Embling, a medical practitioner, and the Reverend Mr. Rintel, the minister of the Jewish congregation in Melbourne, spoke, as well as Mr. Hull. A Pole who was present read a letter of encouragement he had received from Victor Hugo. A motion of sympathy was carried, and several subscriptions were reported as being received by the Treasurer, Mr. T. J. Sumner, who had apparently been elected Treasurer of this committee, later referred to as the "English committee".25

Some months later the Age wrote of this august committee, "nothing has been heard of its proceedings . . . Will any of its members say whether it be dead or alive? " This opinion was shared by Rakowski, and the Poles decided to form their own organization.26 Towards the end of November, a number of Polish gentlemen met at Danoker’s "Globe" Hotel, Swanston Street, Melbourne, to discuss ways in which they could demonstrate their practical sympathy with Poland, and, following broadly the organization of a corresponding committee at New York, they formed a committee to appeal for financial support and to work in conjunction with the "English committee", appointed in August. Rakowski did not preside nor at this stage was he a formal office-bearer, but he was asked as "agent for Poland" to address the meeting, and in fact he had nominated the Chairman.

He stated that already eleven volunteers had been sent home by subscriptions, and some money was collected at the meeting. By March, 1864, £59 was reported by Rakowski to have been sent to the Earl of Harrowby, the President of the Literary Association of the Friends of Poland, the Bank of Victoria making its contribution by granting the draft at par.27 It is hard to assess the support for the Fund, as the Committee’s figures do not identify the Poles and Polish Jews separately,* but the

* According to the Age (November 27, 1863) the Christian Poles in Victoria were very few, "but Poles of the Jewish persuasion are settled very numerously throughout all the Australias ". The Age appealed to Jews for support, but also argued that mankind in general had reason to be grateful to Poland. "As we cannot send from Australia a legion of fighting men, let us send at least the means of arming one, for arms are the things needful in this contest."

(footnote continued on page 48)
Victorian people were about this time also contributing generously to an Irish Relief Fund.28

The historian’s task is not made any easier by the probability that false names were assumed in this incident. At this meeting, someone remarked29 on the desirability of this so as to avoid compromising relatives at home in Poland, and in 1882 Rakowski regarded the publicity given to his role in the reporting of the Russian threat as having gravely prejudiced his own claim to family estates in Poland.30 He mentioned that a friend connected with the British Foreign Office had told him that there was not the slightest hope of his claims being recognized in view of this incident.

According to the despatch of the Governor of Victoria31 to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the news of the alleged Russian plans were received by the Colonial Treasurer, Mr. (later Sir George) Verdon, in July, 1864, from Mr. Rakowski, through Mr. T. J. Sumner. According to a statement which, because of its contents and the matter in common with the Colonial Treasurer’s memorandum, may be identified as that of Rakowski,32 in 1882, Rakowski obtained his information from a "nephew". I have called him Zlyszuvski. According to Rakowski’s statement, Lieutenant Zlyszuvski (let us call him X as a matter of historical humility) was held in high esteem by Popov and "enjoyed his confidence in an extraordinary degree".

Rakowski had met Popov in Melbourne. The Admiral invited him to be his guest during the whole term of his stay in Victoria, but Rakowski paid a short visit and remarked later that the Admiral had received him "with marked courtesy". Popov apparently went from Australia to the East, and Lieutenant X wrote to Rakowski from Shanghai on June 28, 1863, "On our arrival here we found war had broken out. I went to the Admiral and told him I would like to retire. He answered ‘You ought to be Captain and not Lieutenant’ and in two hours I was appointed Captain of the Amerika." The same night they sailed for Shanghai and Lieutenant X heard that the insurgents had made progress. "Feeling it was unbearable to wear

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Dr. F. B. Horner, Deputy Commonwealth Statistician in New South Wales, has provided the following figures. Unfortunately, the number of Poles is not shown separately in 1861. Some of the persons in "B" (compiled on basis of religion) will have also been counted in "A" (compiled on the basis of country of birth).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Richmond</th>
<th>Melbourne</th>
<th>Victoria</th>
<th>A Europe outside British Isles, France, Germany, or Austria</th>
<th>B 47 Jews</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1861</td>
<td>22 persons born in Europe outside British Isles, France, Germany, or Austria</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>6,938</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1871</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>491</td>
<td>6,206</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,486</td>
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The figure of 214 Poles in Victoria in 1871 compares with 6 in Tasmania; in South Australia, Western Australia (1870), Queensland and New South Wales the number of Poles is not recorded in either the 1861 or 1871 figures. When it is recalled that the total population was slightly over half a million in 1861 and slightly under three-quarters of a million ten years later, it will be clear that in these two census years there was in Victoria an extremely small proportion of the inhabitants which might have consisted of Poles.
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a Muscovite uniform while my countrymen were fighting against Russia I went at once to the Admiral and told him that an honourable Pole ought not to serve Russia while his country was bleeding and begged him to grant me my discharge. Noble-hearted Popoff (sic) heard my pleading with tears and thanked me for my sincerity but instead of acceding to my request he offered me further advancement. True, as a Muscovite he did not understand my duty to my country and inflicted fresh wounds on my heart."

In a very interesting article published in 1915, F. A. Golder, using the Arkiv Morskogo Ministerstva, Dielo, Kantseliarri Morskogo Ministerstva No. 991, Part 1, otherwise known as the A.M.M.D.K.M.M., the Archives of the Russian Ministry of Marines, noticed that General Adjutant Krabbe, who directed the Russian Navy, wrote to Popov, in April, 1863, of the critical situation in Europe and warned him to be ready at any moment to attack the enemy. This letter came to Popov’s hands, as Golder states (without reference to its journey), rather obliquely on July 20, while Gregg, one of the officers of the Russian Admiralty, notified him on June 3 that the news of declaration of war would be telegraphed to him to Omsk, whence a courier would take it to Tientsin by way of Pekin. It was in July, 1863, that Lieutenant X was ordered to go with his vessel to Japan, where, since Popov did not accompany him, he was Chief to the Station, and he received a despatch there addressed to Popov or the Senior Officer in Command.

These documents stated that the Western powers had taken a part of Poland and the Squadron should be made ready for fighting. It may be that this Krabbe despatch is the one Rakowski refers to in his account. X, according to Rakowski, decided that he could not fight against the supporting powers and he resealed the despatches, forwarded them to Popov and then deserted, sailing on an American steamer, leaving the next senior officer in command. He was then introduced to a Polish Jew, received money to carry him on, together with an outfit—and apparently wrote to his "uncle" in March, 1864, the letter reaching him in May. Rakowski said that he had no doubt that Lieutenant X forwarded this information to him in order that he might use it to place the colonial authorities on their guard, and, speaking eighteen years later, he said, "On receipt of my nephew’s letter, I consulted Mr. Sumner of Messrs. Grice Sumner and Company, who advised me to make any communication in the presence of Sir George, then Mr. Verdon, then the Treasurer of the Colony". It is possible that it was to this Lieutenant X that the Age, in a leading article on November 27, 1863, referred when it mentioned that the First Lieutenant of the Russian frigate, Bogaty, flung up his commission and favourable professional prospects to bear a hand in his country’s battle, and this might be settled by reference to the Russian Navy List when I am able to do this. According to the Marlborough & Donnelly Daily Advertiser, Captain X found his way to Europe and was heard of in Paris, and in November, 1864, was said to be in the service of Spain.

The memorandum of the Colonial Treasurer, enclosed in one of the despatches from the Governor to the Secretary of State, reveals that Mr. Verdon was told by Mr. Sumner that the agent of the Polish National Government, Mr. Rakowski, gave
him information affecting the safety of the colony. Rakowski showed Sumner papers from the Polish National Government, and Sumner appeared to be satisfied of the genuineness of the documents. One paper was not signed but sealed with a stamp said to be the Government's seal. One of these documents apparently was Rakowski's appointment as an agent, dated from Warsaw, February 12, sealed but not signed, and one was a letter from Palmero dated March 10, received on May 12, giving the news in regard to the likely outbreak of war and the plans for the Russian ships. Rakowski, in May or June, informed either Verdon or Sumner that his information was obtained from Polish spies employed in "Russian public offices", which could have been a deliberately vague description of an officer's service in a ship of the Russian Navy. Verdon met Rakowski at Sumner's office in Sumner's presence.39

Rakowski was sufficiently well known in Melbourne to render it, in the opinion of the Governor, Sir Charles Darling, impossible to regard his information as unfounded, although both at the time and according to his later recollections, which he admitted to be imperfect, Verdon, one of his advisers, was at first sceptical of the information.40 In his letters to the Governors of New South Wales, Tasmania, New Zealand, South Australia and Queensland, Sir Charles Darling referred to "a Polish gentleman for some years resident in Melbourne, who is sufficiently well known in the community to justify the belief that the communication he has made is not without foundation". Darling also wrote that "it was impossible to disregard this information as the projects attributed to Russia appeared to be both probable and feasible".41 The communication from Rakowski to Verdon may have been the more convincing because it was made through the eminently respectable Theodates John Sumner,42 a colonist of many years' standing, who had entered a partnership in a mercantile firm with Richard Grice, the ancestor of Sir Richard Grice, the member of the Council of the University of Melbourne. Sumner was sometime a Vice-President of the Melbourne Philharmonic Society, a President of the Port Phillip Farmers' Society, President of the Agricultural Society of Victoria, a Trustee of the Victorian Savings Bank—an established man with public responsibilities. We do not know why Rakowski confided in Sumner. Perhaps they were friends; they might have developed common interests from their farming activities. Sumner may have had some Polish blood. Certainly he was an active sympathizer of Poland. We have seen that at the meeting in August, 1863, he had been appointed Treasurer of the Committee which was referred to as the English Committee, although he had sent an apology for being unable to attend it. His donation of ten guineas was one of the earliest subscriptions.43 Sumner "said that certain communications had been made to him by Mr. Rakowski when acting as Treasurer to the Committee of the Polish Relief Fund". This clumsy syntax obscures the fact that Sumner, not Rakowski, was Treasurer.

If Rakowski was in life an Anglican, Sumner was a leading member of the Wesleyan body, so there cannot have been the bond of common religious worship.

The Governor almost immediately communicated with the Governors of the other colonies and the Military Commander, sent a letter to the Commodore in charge of the
Australian Station and sent confidential military and confidential despatches later in the month to the Colonial Office, enclosing these local communications. The Colonial Office received the confidential and confidential military despatches in September, just before the date on which The Times published its editorial. They were forwarded to the War Office, to the Admiralty and to the Foreign Office, but I am informed that there are in the obvious accessible places no notations or documents which suggest that the matter was followed up with the Embassy at St. Petersburg. By now, of course, the tension between England and Russia was over and there may have been no point in pursuing the exact facts very vigorously. The Governor of Victoria had thought that some communication such as Verdon had received would have been made to the United Kingdom Government, although he remarked that in Rakowski's view this would not have been so, that it would have been thought sufficient to warn the local authorities. Judging by his 1882 statement, Rakowski would himself have been most unwilling to have divulged the information publicly to The Times in a way which would have drawn attention to his own part in the revelations, and it may be interesting that The Times report did not reveal the process by which the information had been obtained, although in many other respects it bore very close resemblance to the Verdon memorandum enclosed in one of the despatches from Governor Darling to the Colonial Office. Perhaps in 1864 there might have appeared to be some tactical reason connected with the Polish-Russian dispute why this information should have been made publicly available to the English people by one connected with the Polish National Government, but it seems quite possible that the Poles would have shared Rakowski's fears of reprisals.

There was hardly any time between the arrival at the Colonial Office of the despatches of Sir Charles Darling, to which I have referred, and the publication of the news in The Times; certainly not enough, as we know, for them to be minuted by the various levels of Colonial Office officials. But we know the Prime Minister's personal interest, and it is not unreasonable, perhaps, to think that even if Palmerston himself did not hear about it quickly (and perhaps he told Delane over dinner) some comparatively junior officer might have appreciated its interest. But if he did, he would have had to act quickly for The Times to publish it the next day.

This perhaps might have been the more likely if the Colonial Office had shared The Times's desire to point the moral to the colony, but there is no evidence that it did, either in the particular notations on the incoming despatches or in the replies to them.

The Times angered the Argus by using the incident as a lesson. Referring to the colonial threats to consider separation if convicts continued to be sent to Western Australia, The Times pointed out that, while they were colonies, none could attack them without bringing upon themselves the whole power of England, but once they separated this would not be so. The Herald appreciated this argument, but the Argus pointed out, and both elements are to be found in subsequent colonial discussion, that the argument could be turned and, in fact, The Times had expected this. There was, of course, very little sustained active separatist feeling in the colonies, very little support for the view taken by Dr. Lang, which was, roughly, that the Australian colonies would be an unattractive target if they were separated.
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"The Times", wrote the Argus, "makes a most daring experiment upon the ignorance and stupidity of Australians when it professes to believe that our best security for the cupidity and violence of the European nations lies in our connexion with England. It is more than puerile even to suggest that any European power having the power to do us an injury would attack us if we were independent, simply for the sake of plunder or out of love of violence."

"... It is really too bad that we should be expected to take charge of British criminals for no better reason than this, that we might otherwise possibly receive worse injury from some other sort of people... It is in virtue of our character as British colonists that we seek protection from both the epauletted warriors of Europe and the trained felony of England."

This raised two issues. Some, such as Lord Grey, conceived the colonial relationship, insofar as he nailed it down to close calculation, as protection on the part of the Mother Country and obedience on the part of the colonies. Others, such as John Robert Godley and Robert Lowe, believed that the involvement of the colony in the consequences of the Mother Country's foreign policy provided the main—in the case of Godley, the only—reason for the Mother Country's assuming the responsibility of protection.

If England could provide the protection in this case, the crude argument, which ignored trade and sentiment alike, sometimes went, why need the colonies be concerned about the Russians; if not, why should we obediently take British convicts in gratitude? During the period, Colonial and Imperial statesmen alike were gradually feeling their way into a different colonial relationship. As the colonies assumed a greater degree of self-government, obedience seemed less likely in fiscal policy and elsewhere, and the obligations of self-government included self-defence and self-reliance. As the colonists grew aware of both the attempts by Britain in the 'fifties and 'sixties to reduce military expenditure, and of the views of the anti-imperialists and the Manchester School, they were wondering what was the content of the colonial relationship. Given responsible government, given English control over foreign policy, was this imperial relationship meaningful if it were defined in terms of being protected, or if not so defined, did the advantages of being defended outweigh other factors?

In this case, the question was whether the naval ships which were still almost all an Imperial responsibility could have intercepted or defeated any attempts at attack, and if the enemy reached the coast, whether Imperial troops and volunteers could repulse them.

By the eighteen sixties, the Australian colonies had responsibility for erecting their own fortifications. Attempts were made, however, carefully to preserve to the Imperial authorities command of troops as also the power to make peace or war, and the disposition of the Queen's ships.

Victoria led the other Australian colonies, and, in fact, most British colonies, in her willingness to make military contributions. But the absence of a clear and present danger for very long, as well as the preoccupation with internal political and
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economic growth, the absence of a peace-time military tradition, the existence in long-run perspective of a shortage of labour in the colony, all told against a state of effective preparation, and, whether the colonists were willing to admit it or not, they relied fundamentally on the long arm of British sea power. Perhaps sometimes there were misgivings as to the value of fortifications, and differences of opinion on technical matters which reinforced the factors making for inertia. Almost whenever the possible danger was discussed, it was the quick raiding and plundering expedition that was feared, rather than the sustained occupation.

Her Majesty's ships under Commodore Wiseman included *Esk, Harrier, Miranda* and *Curacoa*, not mustering more than seventy or eighty guns, and sometimes occupied in New Zealand and patrolling in the Pacific, against a total of eleven ships with 217 guns in all, mentioned in the Verdon memorandum. Commodore Wiseman proposed that his squadron be reinforced if their Lordships of the Admiralty considered the information reliable. His comments were not over-sanguine: "With the present very small force under my command . . . I could do little but endeavour to meet and cripple the enemy’s squadrons before they could reach Port Phillip."54

The Governor, writing to Wiseman, had not been over-confident of what would happen if the ships reached the coast: "... we are absolutely without the means of preventing a hostile Naval Force from occupying Pt. Phillip and from shelling Melbourne."55

The Victorian Government's vessel, H.M.C.V. *Victoria*, which carried out survey work and served in New Zealand, was not a very significant addition to the British sea force, but she did illustrate a most important tendency in colonial defence, being the rudiments of a colonial navy. This little navy stimulated the discussion in Whitehall which preceded the drafting and enactment of the Colonial Naval Defence Act of 1865, which attempted to provide the basis for colonial navies.56

The basic problem was twofold: to stimulate the growth of colonial self-reliance and to transfer some of the cost from the Imperial to the Colonial Exchequers and yet to maintain the Crown’s control of the sea forces. Their Lordships argued with an impressive literary exactness as well as with dignified humour that a naval ship was an "erratic body". When and where the naval force should be employed to protect the colonies must depend on circumstances and must be left to the unfettered discretion of the naval commanders. The very naturalness of the wish of the colonies to maintain ships near them was appreciated by the Commissioners but regarded as a complication. The difficulties of the colonial navy within the Imperial connexion seemed to be the influence of a very democratic legislature, and destruction of an imperial link, the implication on the other hand of a desire for a voice in general policy. There were legal problems such as the absence of Imperial legislation authorizing the Royal assent to colonial legislation, the status in international law, the difficulties if "the half-civilized governments of South America" or "even our kindred in North America" asked for reciprocal recognition. The 1865 Act does not seem to have been very successful. In the eighteen eighties the cost of the Australian Commands
was shared, and after federation, in an age when the bonds of empire were looser but still there, the dominion created its own navy.

In 1864 there were still, as there were to be for six more years, some of Her Majesty's land forces in Australia. By this time a system of joint colonial and Imperial contribution was being evolved. The New Zealand campaign, which, with Canadian fiscal protection and the South African problem, was to add weight to thought in England which was opposed to garrisons abroad, had, however, depleted these troops and there was reliance on the local Volunteer Force for guard duties.

The first Volunteer Movement, which flourished at the time of the Crimean War, languished with peace, and the second Volunteer Movement of the eighteen sixties followed the English movement and reflected the concern over relations with the French. It arose spontaneously and was accepted and supported by Government with varying vigour. In the Volunteer Movement is the origin of the modern Australian Army. Its story reflects many of the facets of colonial life. The Governor-General rightly defended the movement against the charge of playing soldiers, but the activity of the Volunteers had to confront the lack of preparation in fortification, and scarcity of equipment, and parsimonious financial support, in fact, most of the factors affecting Australian defence generally.

The administration of the Volunteers and the discussions over the role of the Governor vis-à-vis his responsible advisers and the officer commanding these forces show again the desire on the part of the imperial authorities to encourage colonial effort on the one hand and to preserve one of the prerogative powers of the Crown on the other, and also show colonial sensitivity over questions of control, especially where the colony contributed to the cost for supplying the men.

There would be little point in discussing very fully the extent of preparedness for the invasion which did not take place. The Commodore's inspection of fortifications was brought forward and there were signs of activity among the various colonial governments, though it should be remembered that colonial officials already knew the Polish imbroglio was no longer active, however depressing was the general international scene.

The question remains against what was the activity directed? I have not yet been able to pursue some inquiries concerning Lieutenant X and Rakowski that would bear on the authenticity of their story, but this story seems quite consistent with Russian activity and policy. If the Governor was right about Bogatyr and the Argus was right about the spying of a Russian count in Australia after the Crimean War, these do not make it less likely. Joyneville mentions the Russian plan very briefly in his biography of Alexander II. One might find confirmation if one could examine the basis of the material of Golder's work. Golder, who is now dead, was concerned with Russia and the American civil war, and his treatment of Russian archival material does not explicitly mention Australian ports; but there is the instruction from Grand Duke Constantine, in charge of the Russian Admiralty, to Popov to use his stronger ships to destroy the enemy's commerce in the event of war; there is the concern lest the Russian fleet be blockaded in port; the concern that
proper advantage be taken of a diplomatic situation between Russia and the Federal Government. We know the reaction of the United Kingdom Government to the plans for attacking British commerce. We know of the ignorance of these plans on the part of Brunow, the Russian Ambassador in London, and his concern when he discovered them. We know that the Russian Foreign Minister, Gortchokov, became opposed to the scheme and was resisted by its defender, General Adjutant Krabbe, who argued that England would not fight if her commerce was in danger, and that a few Russian guns in the ocean would have more influence on England than a much larger number in Sebastopol. We know that Alexander II attached considerable importance to the American aspect of the cruise.*

The alleged plans do not seem inconsistent with an idea which might be favoured by the Muscovite of a sharp, vivid, exciting attack, and a demoralizing one, on the opposing empire, through its wool and its gold colonies isolated in the Antipodes. Whatever the Czarist Archives contain, the incident does show the involvement of the Antipodes in the affairs of Europe, the interest of Russia in the Pacific, the concern in Australia at oppression. The revelation came in a manner that is not unworthy of Buchan or Oppenheim, but that is now, alas, part of our common daily experience. There is some interest in the integrity of the characters—in Rakowski risking such security as he had in the present and such expectations as he had in the future, to help Poland and to pass on the information in a loyalty to his country, which he had left three decades earlier; in Lieutenant Zlyszuvski and Popov in their mutual respect and friendship which emerges in spite of the roles of antagonism for which their countries' situations cast them. There is some interest in this for a world in which we seek the meaning of treason and in which we seek to preserve in mass society the dignity of human relationships.

* There is also the statement by Verdon in 1882 (although he admitted his recollections might not be exact) that an officer of the British Admiralty had told him that at about the time Verdon mentioned, "the Russian squadron had suddenly left New York without taking leave of their friends on board the English ship with whom they had been on friendly terms up to that time, or announcing the object of their departure or whither they were going". Age, 30th March, 1882. It is not certain that this was the squadron to which the raid had been entrusted.

In his communication to Wiseman, Darling referred to a similar report of the slipping away of Russian ships from Japan, but the Verdon memorandum mentioned only one ship from Japan which was to attack Australia. There is a rough correspondence in the names of ships mentioned by Golder and Verdon, allowing for different spellings and errors of transcription.

**NOTES**

I must acknowledge the help of Miss Hazel King, Mr. A. G. L. Shaw and Mr. K. J. Cable in making searches and extracts at my request from documents in the Victorian Archives and in the Public Record Office, and that of the Public Librarian in Melbourne in sending photostat copies of newspaper extracts. I have benefited greatly from Count Poninski's knowledge of his native land and his comments upon some of the nuances of contemporary Polish conduct. The debt of anyone who undertakes research in Australian history to the staff of the Mitchell Library is well known. I acknowledge the indefatigable patience of Miss McDonald and her colleagues. In the Library of the Parliament of New South Wales are some House of Commons papers which are not available elsewhere in Sydney, and I thank the Parliamentary Librarian and his staff for their hospitality. I should also like to mention the work done in checking and verifying references and making searches at my request and under my direction by Mrs. Daniel and Miss Fisher.
RUSSIAN PLANS FOR INVASION OF AUSTRALIA, 1864

1. Argus, 16th November, 1864, p. 4, cols. 4, 5; p. 5, cols. 6, 7. Still, in New South Wales the Sydney Morning Herald (21st November, 1864, p. 4, col. 3) complained that there was popular apathy in regard to the news.

2. The Times, 17th September, 1863, p. 8, cols. 2, 3.

3. Australasian, 18th November, 1864, p. 12, col. 1.


9. "Nothing is more certain than that the almost contemptuous indifference now exhibited about the growth of the Moscow Empire is a still greater error than the panic on the same subject which 20 years ago pervaded Europe", Argus, 7th July, 1864, p. 4, col. 5.

10. Argus supplement, 14th July, 1864, p. 1, col. 1.


14. Cf. the Leader of the Opposition in the Federal Parliament, the Rt. Hon. H. V. Evatt, in his account of his actions following the Petrov deflection and disclosures (Commonwealth Parl. Debates, H. of R., 10th October, 1955, p. 1665). "...I communicated with His Excellency the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union...I pointed out that the Soviet Government or its officials were undoubtedly in a position to reveal the truth as to the genuineness of the Petrov documents..." Only a naive historian could have been surprised that the reply informed Dr. Evatt that the documents "can only be falsifications".

15. Cf. the reply of the Attorney-General to questions in the Legislative Assembly of South Australia (11th November, 1864, retd. S.M.H., 19th November, 1864, p. 5, col. 6.)

16. Except that in this case, as later happened to Bogatyr, the Russian salute could not be returned. This stimulated interest in the state of the Victorian defences, e.g. Mr. Hull, Vic. L.C., 21st January, 1862, reported Argus, 22nd January, 1862, p. 5, col. 7, Mr. Loader, Vic. L.A., 21st January, 1862, reported Argus, 22nd January, 1862, p. 6, col. 2, Vic. L.A., 22nd, 23rd, 28th January, reported Argus, 23rd January, p. 6, cols. 1, 2, 3, 24th January, p. 6, col. 1, 29th January, 1862, p. 6, col. 1, and editorial, Argus, 28th January, 1862, p. 4, cols. 4, 5.

17. Argus, 20th January, 1862, p. 4, col. 4, the Argus (24th November, 1864, p. 6, col. 7) and the South Australian Register reported the observations in Australia, after the Crimean War, of an illustrious Russian Count who "had not travelled with his eyes shut".

18. 7th March, 1863, p. 5, col. 1; 14th March, 1863, p. 3, col. 2.


22. See Dr. Coleman in Cambridge History of Poland, chs. 14 (A) and 16; according to the Chief Librarian, the Public Library of Victoria, the Victorian Colonial Secretary's records show he was naturalized on 23rd August, 1854; see also the Register of Deaths, Government Statist, Melbourne.

23. Argus, 3rd December, 1863, p. 6, col. 5; the Pope's attitude of hostility to Russian conduct in Poland is shown in the Encyclical Letter of 30th July, 1864, printed in The Times, 23rd September, 1864, p. 6, cols. 5, 6.


27. Age, 26th March, 1864. Mr. Paszkowski has drawn my attention to the "First List of Subscribers" advertised in the Argus, 23rd January, 1864, p. 7, col. 4.


29. Mr. Warszawski, Age, 24th November, 1863.

30. Age, 30th March, 1882.
Darling to Cardwell, Confidential Military, 25th July, 1864, op. cit.

Age, 30th March, 1882. Statements from Verdon and from a person identifiable as Rakowski were published as reminiscences on the occasion of another Russian scare after Admiral Aslanbegov’s visit in 1882, which I hope to discuss in another article. Verdon’s memorandum of 1864 was sent to the Governor of Victoria.


Age, 30th March, 1882.

Ibid.

Age, 27th November, 1863: cf. also Argus, 15th October, 1863, p. 5, col. 1, which gives the naval officer his correct name.


Verdon’s Memorandum is enclosure I in Darling to Cardwell, Confidential Military, 25th July, 1864, op. cit.

Age, 30th March, 1882. According to Verdon’s memorandum, on 1st July, 1864, it is not stated when Rakowski first spoke to Sumner of the Russian Plan. According to Darling (Darling to Cardwell, Confidential Military, 25th July, 1864, op. cit.) Rakowski may have received his news by mail which arrived on 12th June, 1864. It appears from Verdon’s memorandum that he did not reveal his information sooner because he had been instructed not to alarm the colony, and because until the Entente Cordiale was restored he believed it possible that England would not take part in a war concerning Schleswig Holstein or Italy. However, the April mail arriving in Melbourne on 12th June, 1864, reported that England and France were arming against Prussia and Austria (Argus, supplement, 13th June, 1864, p. 1, col. 1).

Age, 30th March, 1882.

Darling to Governors of New South Wales, Tasmania, New South Australia, Queensland, 6th July, 1864, Circular, Confidential, Enc. 3 in Darling to Cardwell, Confidential Military, 25th July, 1864, op. cit.; Darling to Wiseman, 6th July, 1864, op. cit.


Age, 11th August, 1863.

Darling to Wiseman, 6th July, 1864, op. cit. Sir John Young, too, communicated direct with Commodore Wiseman, and also with the Colonial Secretary for N.S.W. "for the careful and secret consideration of himself and his colleagues"; Young to Wiseman, 20th July, 1864 (in Government House Miscellaneous Correspondence, vol. 2, 1861-1869, p. 155). The Governor warned the Commodore to avoid reference to the confidential despatch in his report, which might have to be tabled in Parliament. I have been unable either to find the correspondence between the Governor and the Colonial Secretary or Wiseman’s immediate reply, though his report, made later, is available.

On 16th September, 1864, the Colonial Office received Darling’s Confidential Military Despatch of 25th July, and the Admiralty received Wiseman’s despatch of 21st July.

Wiseman to Secretary of the Admiralty, 21st July, 1864 (F.O. 15/1868, Admiral’s Despatches—Australia, 1864) and C.O. to F.O. (n.d.) sending on Despatch Confidential Military, 25th July, 1864. The Colonial Office did not forward the despatch from Darling until after 17th September, when The Times published the news, and the minute of the Parliamentary Under-Secretary for the Colonies was dated 17th September. Nor did the Permanent Under-Secretary minute it until 17th September. The Governor of Victoria did not send Commodore Wiseman the whole of the Verdon memorandum, but The Times material could have been composed from the portion sent. Mr. K. J. Cable has searched the despatches to the Ambassador at St. Petersburg from September, 1864, to February, 1865 (F.O. 65/656), the Ambassador’s reports to the F.O. and the telegrams.

Rakowski stated later that a solemn assurance was given him by Verdon that the strictest secrecy should be observed. "Faith was kept in Victoria, but the matter having been communicated to the Foreign Office (sic) the facts were speedily published in the London Times" (Age, 30th March, 1882). Since this paper was delivered The Times has written to me, "The information reached us from Australia. There is no record of any correspondence with Rakowski". I am indebted to Miss Marjorie Jacobs for the suggestion that the news may have emanated from private letters to persons in London interested in the colonies: The Times may have received the news from one of a group who were soon to form the Royal Colonial Institute.

Argus, editorial, 14th November, 1864, p. 4, col. 7, p. 8, col. 1.

Select Committee in Colonial Military Expenditure, Report and Evidence, etc.; 423 H. of C. Papers, Reports from Committees, vol. XIII, 1861, Grey, Qn. 2531, 9th May, 1861; Godley, Qn. 2133, 2nd May, 1867; Lowe did not think this constituted any claim the advantage to the colony outweighed the disadvantages (Qns. 3335, 3339, 27th May, 1861).

Argus, 25th November, 1864, p. 4, col. 7.
The development of thought on the colonial navy can be seen in Osborne to Merivale, 24th June, 1860 (in Despatches from the Governor of N.S.W., vol. 80, 1858-1860, pp. 1089, 1090, 1120) and in C.O. Minutes (in Despatches from the Governor of N.S.W. Enclosures, P.R.O. Transcripts, 1860, pp. 1769, 1770, 1797 et seq.).

See Report of Select Committee, op. cit. Evidence of Elliot, Assistant Under-Secretary for Colonies, 18th April, 1861, Qn. 166, and also the figures in the Military Forces (Colonies), Return to an Address of the House of Commons, ordered to be printed 25th July, 1859, H. of C. Papers, Accounts and Papers, vol. XVIII, 1859, 114.

Argus, 12th November, 1864, p. 5, col. 2.

Wiseman to Darling, 20th July, 1864, with Darling to Cardwell, Confidential, 25th July, 1864, op. cit. Sir John Burgoyne, Inspector General of Fortifications, disagreed with an assumption he found in a report made by Captain Scratchley that “there would always be a squadron on the Australian Station of sufficient strength and in sufficient time to prevent any attack by an enemy of any moderate force”. Burgoyne did not think it “at all improbable that an enemy of powerful Maritime means might think it worthwhile to send out a large Squadron capable of landing 10,000 men or more to the Indian and Australian seas for specific or general aggressive operations”; and that even “with a general Naval superiority, he might not be able to have a command in any such sea for weeks, if not months together”. He referred to projects of the French Marine authorities “expressly adapted to such a course of proceedings”. Burgoyne, therefore, argued that preparations on shore were essential (sub. Enc. in Elliot to Secretary of the Admiralty, 31st October, 1864, Ad. 1/5990).

Darling to Wiseman, 6th July, 1864, op. cit.

The development of thought on the colonial navy can be seen in Osborne to Merivale, 24th January, 1857, Enc. in Stanley to Denison, 6, 11th March, 1858 (repr. N.S.W.L.A. V. & P., 1859-1860, vol. 2, pp. 642 et seq.), Barkly to Newcastle, 55, 11th June, 1860 (Despatches from the Governor of Victoria, 1860, p. 4648 et seq.) and the minutes on it. (Transcripts Missing Despatches from the Governor of Victoria, 1860, p. 2179); Letter from Admiralty, 18th July, 1860, in Lewis to Denison, Circular, 10th August, 1860 (in N.S.W. Col. Sec. In Letters, Box 77): Admiralty to Colonial Office, 1st October, 1860, enc. in Fortescue to Barkly, 76, 14th December, 1860 (Despatches to Governor of Victoria, 1860, p. 3268); Admiralty to Colonial Office (in Box 77, op. cit.); Denison to Newcastle, 116, 10th December, 1860, and Young to Newcastle, 9, 18th April, 1861 (Despatches from the Governor of N.S.W., 1860 and 1861-1863); Admiralty to Colonial Office, 26th December, 1861 (C.O. 309/58): Minutes on Admiralty to Colonial Office, 6th February, 1862 (C.O. 309/62): Minutes on Bowen to Cardwell, Confidential, 25th July, 1864, and Darling to Cardwell, 66, 15th July, 1864 (C.O. 309/67).

Sir W. Denison’s note on memorandum from Major Wingate (in N.S.W. Col. Sec. In Letters, Box 50).

Cf., e.g., Newcastle to Young, Circular, 6th April, 1863 (Despatches to Governor of N.S.W., 1863, p. 1034); Minute of Young for N.S.W. Executive Council (Government House Miscellaneous Correspondence, vol. 2, 1861-1869, p. 123); N.S.W. Executive Council Minute 64/2 (in N.S.W. Col. Sec. In Letters, Box 50), Young to Newcastle, 11, 30th January, 1864, Young to Cardwell, 56, 14th July, 1865, Young to Cardwell, Confidential, 21st July, 1865 (Despatches from the Governor of N.S.W., 1864-1866, pp. 16, 99-104, 111-113), Young to Cowper, 17th July, 1865, Cardwell to Young, 74, 23rd October, 1865 (in Box 50, op. cit.) in the Mitchell Library. This affected the mode of appointments and the channel of communication.

See, e.g., Mr. Hull’s speech, Victorian Parl. Debates, vol. XI, L.C., 6th December, 1864, p. 39. In the Confidential Military despatch of 25th July, Darling wrote that “the English May news appeared on the whole to make war seem less probable between Great Britain and Russia” than had the earlier news. Wiseman delayed answering Darling’s letter of 6th July, but his despatches from the Admiralty did not mention the subject and he presumed that their Lordships did “not anticipate the probability of such an event occurring” (Wiseman to Darling, 20th July, 1864, with Darling to Cardwell, Confidential, 25th July, 1864, C.O. 309/67).