

Imagination, Power and Freedom

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When Plato banned the poets from his ideal Republic he perhaps initiated the now long-standing antagonism between philosophy and literature, between reason and the imagination, and between truth and meaning. Yet, as Michele Le Doeuff has observed, when one reads philosophy one encounters ‘statues that breathe the scent of roses, ... clocks, horses, donkeys and even a lion ... scenes of sea and storm, forests and trees ...’.¹ Plato himself made extensive use of metaphors, images and imaginary scenes —amongst the more famous, that of the cave dwellers who mistake the shadows on the wall for reality. Nor is this reliance on stories peculiar to the Ancients. Contemporary philosophy tells us stories about what it might be like to be a bat, asks us to choose fair social arrangements whilst imagining ourselves behind a veil of ignorance, and engages in thought experiments which place Brown’s brain in Smith’s body and then asks: who have we got here, Smith or Brown?

Why do philosophers, whose purported specialist tool of trade is reason, engage in these ‘flights of the imagination’? One explanation is that thought experiments, imagining things otherwise, allow us to draw out and test the reliability of our intuitions about, for example, justice or personal identity. Such stories allow us to explore if, and if so how, our intuitions might shift if we imaginatively alter some of the familiar conditions. This is the likely reasoning behind Frank Jackson’s thought experiment about Mary and her black-and-white life. If you find physicalism a plausible theory about the world then what would you say in

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response to Jackson's imaginary story?

Mary is confined to a black-and-white room, is educated through black-and-white books and through lectures relayed on black-and-white television. In this way she learns everything there is to know about the physical nature of the world.... If physicalism is true, she knows all there is to know. For to suppose otherwise is to suppose that there is more to know than every physical fact, and that is just what physicalism denies.... It seems, however, that Mary does not know all there is to know. For when she is let out of the black-and-white room ... she will learn what it is like to see something red, say. This is rightly described as learning—she will not say 'ho hum'. Hence, physicalism is false.²

This thought experiment does not work for me. I find it difficult even to get to the stage of testing my intuitions about physicalism. Instead I find myself wondering if this imaginary Mary has a body similar to those of women in the actual world, most of whom frequently, monthly in fact, experience the colour red. Indeed, I find myself wondering if Mary is a disembodied being—a pure 'intellect'. Perhaps my failure to put the story to work in the context of the theory of physicalism indicates my unsuitability to pursue philosophy—at least of this kind—since I am clearly 'missing the point'. But the point I wish to make is that the ways in which philosophers imagine things like justice and personal identity and, more generally, the way the world 'is' *do* matter quite a lot. Moreover, the way in which such topics are imagined typically involve the tendency to fail to note the *specificity of embodiment*, that is, that the human body is always male or female, racially marked, and so on. The validity,³ or otherwise, of such imaginative ways of thinking does not interest me so much as do the effects of such thinking on actually existing people. *Whose* imagination is being exercised, and about *whom*, seem to me to be very important questions. They draw attention to the fact that the imagination is always embodied and so always situated—it is always the imagination of this or that particular philosopher, or of this or that particular group of philosophers. Indeed, the introduction of this or that 'story' in a philosophical debate often

functions as a 'badging' signal. It can act to identify a philosopher as a member of a particular school of thought.

I am not, of course, criticising anyone's prerogative to exercise the imagination. As I will argue shortly, to imagine is essential to what it is to be human—to exist as an embodied being in a human world means to exist as more than a mind or intellect. What concerns me here is the tendency within philosophy to fail to note the central role the imagination plays in philosophical theories about the world and the effects that follow from this central, though unacknowledged, role. With few exceptions, philosophers tend to view the imagination as an inferior faculty that is most frequently associated with error or with the absence of knowledge.⁴ As such, it is deemed to be unworthy of a close and careful analysis.

One exception is Eva Brann's magisterial study of the imagination. Brann shows that in spite of the fact that the imagination 'functions as the interface of world and mind', acting as 'a pivot between sense and intellect', it nevertheless remains 'the missing mystery of philosophy'.⁵ This 'mysterious' absence of any sustained analysis of the imagination gives it extraordinary power precisely because its constitutive role in our knowledge about the world goes largely unnoticed. This is, perhaps, relatively harmless in the case of Jackson's Mary. But when we turn to the uses of the imagination in political life and theory, the problem of failing to acknowledge the powers of the imagination can be sobering. As Brann rightly points out, '... the imagination of citizens is ... the deepest force of political life. Certainly its pathology, its excesses, and deficiencies, are responsible for those publicly orchestrated enormities, from the Right or the Left, that have turned history into a theater of tragedies'.⁶

In my previous research I have written about the way in which a founding story in political philosophy, namely, social contract theory, has functioned historically to constitute a form of sociability and citizenship that excluded women (and others, for example, peoples judged to be 'inferior races'). Moreover, I have argued that such stories have played a large role in the constitution of what, along with others, I have called the 'social imaginary'.⁷

I understand this phrase to include those images, symbols, metaphors and narratives that help structure forms of identity, and belonging, social meaning and value, and which, because they appeal to the imaginative faculty, attract strong affective investments. Cornelius Castoriadis dramatically draws attention to the importance of the imagination for the very existence of human societies. He writes:

Hegel has said that man is a sick animal. In truth, man is a mad animal, totally unfit for life, a species which would have disappeared as soon as it emerged, if it had not proven itself capable, at the collective level, of another creation: society in the strict sense, that is, institutions embodying social imaginary significations.⁸

These diverse significations will, of course, vary from culture to culture and even within a single culture, but they are essential and permanent elements in the creation, maintenance and revision of the meanings through which every culture makes sense of itself and offers justification for the variable status of its members. The differential status of the members of any given society will also affect the social distribution of agency, including the power to revise the social values that give order and meaning to life—whether these are religious, cultural or moral values. So my claim is that the social imaginary significantly contributes to the social harms and benefits experienced by those whose subjectivities and behaviours are shaped by it.

Unlike some Marxist or neo-Marxist approaches I do not identify these imaginaries (for they are plural) with ideology (or false consciousness). Such a claim may be taken to imply that a 'true' or 'non-imaginative' consciousness is attainable. My view is that truth is simply the wrong register in which to attempt to understand the generation of the kind of meaningful behaviour that is vital to all forms of sociability. Imagination is wrongly conceived as truth's contrary. Rather, it should be acknowledged that sociability itself depends on the power of the imagination to bind together individuals, both temporally and affectively. As Benedict Anderson, in much-quoted lines, holds: 'all communities larger than primordial villages (and perhaps even these) are

imagined. Communities are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined'.⁹ Two of the most common ways of imagining 'community' are through religious or political stories; and these two story lines are never easily separated. In the West, from at least the seventeenth century, a central story about the legitimacy, or otherwise, of extant distributions of power and freedom has been contractarianism. In some ways, social contract theory may be seen to mark a break from theologically organised societies to political, or secular, societies; from societies based in fixed 'status' to those based in free 'contract'. It would take a book, rather than a lecture, to do justice to the complexity of social contract theory. All I can offer here is a very brief sketch of the barest outlines of its development and then argue for the effects that I take it to have had in the past, and to continue to have, in the present.

The core of modern social contract theory is associated with Thomas Hobbes and John Locke in the seventeenth century, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau in the eighteenth century. The basic idea is that human life without political order would be barbaric, or, in Hobbes' famous words: life in the state of nature would be 'solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short'. Each 'man' (as the philosophers say) cannot enjoy his right to do whatever he can, and to retain possession of his goods, when every other 'man' bears the same right. Thus, men will need to come together to agree upon certain binding rules of conduct if each is to enjoy his life and convert his vulnerable possessions into property. The right of one man to do all he can must be limited by respect for the rights of others. Political society is thus born from fear (of other men's violence and acquisitiveness) and from the desire for peace and security.

In spite of the colourful stories that Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau provide of 'natural' man and pre-political life, contemporary political theorists insist that these stories about life in the state of nature are mere hypotheses or useful fictions. The story of social contract should be understood as another 'just so' or 'as if' thought experiment. Contemporary political philosophers

typically claim that social contract theory is really about the grounds on which one can justify present political authority, including an account of the rights and obligations of the rulers and the ruled. This interpretation of social contract theory rejects the idea that an historical contract ever took place. Furthermore, when Immanuel Kant pronounced that the notion of social contract is 'an idea of reason', the role played by the imagination of the previous social contract philosophers is obscured. Social contract theory now is seen as a device of reason, not a speculative tale. Consistent with at least the early approach of John Rawls, social contract theory comes to be recast as an instance of rational actor theory.¹⁰ In order to discover whether present political authority and social institutions are justified, we need to ask: 'would a rational, self-interested actor consent to these arrangements'?

There are a number of problems with this reinterpretation of social contract theory. For a start it encourages us to lose sight of the historical context in which modern social contract theory arose and the specificity of the debates it engendered. Losing sight of this history runs the risk of failing to understand adequately the puzzles which that context and those debates have bequeathed to the present. At the end of the paper I will attempt to unravel this dubious bequest in relation to twentieth-century conceptions of universal human rights. To reiterate an earlier point, the re-articulation of social contract theory as a species of rational actor theory obscures the historical questions: *who* was revising the dominant social imaginary and for *whom*? For example, Locke's disagreement with Sir Robert Filmer, concerning the validity of patriarchal right, was not concerned with the right of men over women but with the right of fathers over sons. On Filmer's view, the right of monarchs over their subjects, like the rights of fathers over their sons, had been passed down from Adam since creation. The challenge presented by the idea of man's natural right to liberty was, first and foremost, a challenge to some men's authority over other men. As Carole Pateman has so ably shown, modern social contract theory announces a new form of sociability: 'fraternal patriarchy'.¹¹ The 'fathers' were defeated and the new

social order is a fraternal pact, based in convention and consent. This is not to say that the social contract theorists were uninterested in the question of what should be the proper relation between women and men. Whilst men become brothers in civil society, woman's relation to civil society was to be mediated through her father/husband as head of the household. Social contract theorists were not in the business of challenging male authority in all its forms. Nor, if we take humanity to include women, were they concerned with the promotion of human equality. The transition to a 'revolutionary' modernity was not to be revolutionary for women. To show the strictly limited nature of this challenge to authority allow me to consider some of Rousseau's comments from *The Social Contract*:

Since no man has a natural authority over his fellow, and force creates no right, we must conclude that *conventions* form the basis of all legitimate authority among men.¹²

To renounce liberty is to renounce being a man, to surrender the *rights of humanity* and even its duties. For him who renounces everything no indemnity is possible. Such a renunciation is incompatible with man's nature; *to remove all liberty from his will is to remove all morality from his acts*. Finally, it is an *empty and contradictory convention* that sets up, on the one side, absolute authority, and, on the other, unlimited obedience.¹³

One may be forgiven for thinking that when Rousseau uses 'man' and 'men', he is doing so in the generic or inclusive sense. Certainly, his use of 'humanity' in the phrase 'the rights of humanity' would encourage the assumption that he means 'humankind' when he writes 'man'. But this assumption is false. 'Man' and 'men' in these passages were not, unfortunately, intended to include 'woman' or 'women'. While authority among men is deemed conventional, authority between men and women, according to Rousseau, is natural and, moreover, 'rational'. But Rousseau does not argue for women's subordination in his political treatise, *The Social Contract*. He writes an additional text, an imaginative novel, in fact, entitled *Emile, or On Education*. Consider the following quotations from *Emile*:

When woman complains of the unjust inequality which man has imposed on her, she is wrong; this inequality is *not a human institution*, or at least it is not the work of prejudice but of reason: that one of the sexes to whom nature has entrusted the children must answer for them to the other.¹⁴

It is presumably this fact of the natural procreative difference between the sexes that dictates the ‘severe restraint’ that must be imposed on the liberty of girls and women:

[O]ne must impose restraint on them from the start, so that it will never be a hardship for them, so as to master all their fantasies and make them *submit to the wills of other people* This habitual restraint results in a docility in women which they need all their lives, since *they will always be in subjection* to a man or to men’s judgements, and will never be allowed to set themselves above these judgements.¹⁵

Regardless of what contemporary political philosophers claim about the meaning of social contract, these two sets of quotations from Rousseau highlight a paradox in the history of social contract theory—a paradox that, as I will show, remains with us today. This paradox was noted and exploited by Mary Wollstonecraft, among others. On the one hand, we have the claim that ‘to renounce liberty’ is to surrender the rights and duties of humanity. On the other hand, we have the necessity of women’s submission to men. On the one hand, we have the claim that without liberty of will, morality is absent. On the other hand, women must ‘submit to the wills of other people’. On the one hand, we have the claim that it is ‘an empty and contradictory convention that sets up, on the one side, absolute authority, and, on the other, unlimited obedience’. On the other hand, we have the view that women must obey and should never be allowed to set themselves above men’s authority.

These two sets of quotations exemplify a paradox in the traditional conception of humanity. At base, the problem is the very fact of sexual difference, that is, the fact that human life is double: man *and* woman. Yet one half of humanity, man, has had by far the major say in how and why this fact should be made

socially, ethically, and politically meaningful. It is mostly one kind of body, one kind of imagination, one set of affective investments, which have framed the terms through which 'humanity' is grasped. The result is plain: 'man' comes to coincide with 'humanity' and 'woman' comes to occupy a precarious position in relation to 'humanity'. As Wollstonecraft put it, woman is made into 'a fanciful kind of *half-being*'.¹⁶ She is both 'man', that is, part of humanity, and 'not-man', that is, not entitled to all the rights of humanity. One might say, to echo Aristotle, that woman is non-normatively human. (Aristotle, infamously, claimed that woman is a de-formed male.) But surely this phrase 'non-normatively human' gives the game away? In a bizarre reversal of the nature-norm distinction, what has been taken to be the way woman 'should be' renders her a non-normative human being.

Rousseau's *Social Contract* criticises an important element in his contemporary social imaginary, namely, the supposed natural authority of fathers over sons. His detractors respond that paternal authority is not a political convention; it is underwritten by Judeo-Christian theology. But, as I have shown, Rousseau does not question the conventions, or norms, governing male-female relations. What he tries to do is to derive a norm of social organization from a natural fact, namely, that the facts of human reproduction give rise to women's subordination to man. This move is familiar but invalid. The essential underdetermination of human being—what Castoriadis has called our 'madness', our 'unfitness' for life—bars the legitimacy of any direct inference from the natural to the normative. Or, in David Hume's famous phrase, from the 'is' to the 'ought'. We have instincts—certainly—but these are always affected by the material conditions under which they are expressed. Moreover, the expression of a human instinct or natural predisposition is always filtered through the social imaginaries that precede us. I have suggested that eighteenth-century debates about 'the woman question' may be framed as a debate about the relation between nature and norms. It may also be read as a battle over social imaginary significations. A question of great interest to me, to which I will turn shortly,

concerns how one should understand the relation between the normative and the imaginary. Re-reading the works of eighteenth-century writers who argued for women's human rights, with this question in mind, is instructive. They can be seen to be battling with dominant interpretations of nature and convention, on one front, and with the larger social narratives, or imaginaries, that support these conventions, for example religion, on the other.

Until relatively recently there was little knowledge about the intensity and frequency with which seventeenth- and eighteenth-century political theorists and activists—both male and female—debated what should be the proper rights and duties of men and women in social, economic and political life in the West. Thanks to the work of several feminist historians, such as Joan Scott, Joan Landes, Dorinda Outram, and many others, the details of these debates are now accessible to the non-specialist.¹⁷ It is important to realise that women (and some men) were arguing for a reinterpretation of woman's nature and rights at precisely the same time that men's own self-understandings were radically shifting. As Carole Pateman has shown, the long revolution against patriarchal power, as far as the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century social contract theorists were concerned, ended in the defeat of the fathers by the sons: long live 'liberty, equality and *fraternity*'. But, as Wollstonecraft argued, the revolution in the 'rights of man' was incomplete because it failed to champion *human* rights, which necessarily must include women. Wollstonecraft dedicated her 1792 *Vindication of the Rights of Woman* to Charles Talleyrand, an influential force in the French Constituent Assembly, especially entrusted with the task of advising on public education in the new Republic. Among her appeals to Talleyrand is the following:

[I]f women are to be excluded, without having a voice, from a participation of the natural rights of mankind, prove first, to ward off the charge of injustice and inconsistency, that they want reason—else this flaw in your NEW CONSTITUTION will ever shew that man must, in some shape, act like a tyrant, and tyranny, in whatever part of society it rears its brazen front, will ever undermine morality.¹⁸

History provides many examples of women's claims that human rights, if they exist at all, must be rights able to be enjoyed by both men and women. Olympe de Gouges, an activist and theorist during the French Revolution, went so far as to draw up her own 'Declaration of the Rights of Woman and Citizen' (1791), the articles of which engage, point for point, the seventeen articles of the 1789 'Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen'. The latter 'Declaration'—an important touchstone for contemporary human rights discourses—is notable for the way its very title weds 'nature' and 'politics'. 'Man'—a 'natural' category—asserts his natural right to the freedom to decide the parameters of his social and political existence as 'citizen'. De Gouges' 'Declaration' is interesting for the way it stresses that the terms 'man', 'citizen' or 'all' cannot be assumed to include women. Instead, where the 'Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen' reads 'all citizens' de Gouges wrote 'all female and male citizens'. She also introduced rights specific to female embodiment, for example, a woman's right to name the father of her child.¹⁹ The issue of women's rights was strenuously debated in France in the years immediately after de Gouges' Declaration. After the banning of women's clubs and societies in 1793, representatives of the new Republic made clear their opposition to women's rights. Chaumette, for example, rejected women's petition for citizenship in the following terms:

Since when is it permitted to give up one's sex? Since when is it decent to see women abandoning the pious cares of their households, the cribs of their children, to come to public places, to harangues in the galleries, at the bar of the Senate? Is it to men that nature confided domestic cares? Has she given us breasts to feed our children?²⁰

Chaumette's line of reasoning is familiarly Rousseauian: in the case of man, nature guarantees rights and liberty; in the case of woman, nature dictates duty and subordination.

De Gouges' 'Declaration' failed to influence the formation of the new French Republic just as Wollstonecraft's *Vindication of the Rights of Woman* failed to find much support in eighteenth-

century English political circles. Women like Wollstonecraft and de Gouges did not significantly influence Enlightenment reinterpretations of what should count as a just or legitimate polity. It was not that women were incapable of imagining different ways of organising social and political life. It was rather that their imaginings were not influential, at least in their own times, in debates about the role of Government in determining the scope of natural and conventional authority. The result is that the unfinished business of the Enlightenment still haunts political philosophy today.

The influence of these past interpretations of who we are, and what should be our modes of governance, remain with us today. The ways in which a community governs and imagines itself become embedded, over time, in institutions and normative ways of behaving. It is this longevity and resilience of the layers to our social institutions that call for analysis. Such analysis requires us to take seriously the ways in which the power of the imagination—both individual and collective—is constitutive of human sociability, as such. Failure to acknowledge the history of the struggle over *whose* imagination, *whose* innovations, *whose* challenges to convention, have had the force to shift the way we imagine our political communities, results in the continuing exclusion of women from political society.

In order to flesh out this latter point a little, allow me to consider the United Nations 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.²¹ Even a cursory glance at this Declaration illustrates its structural similarities to the philosophies of social contract. The preamble to the Declaration states ‘... the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women ...’. This would have to count as progress!

But now consider the following Articles:

Article 1. All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of *brotherhood*.

Article 12. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with *his* privacy, family, home, or correspondence, nor to attacks upon *his* honour and reputation.

Article 18. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion; this right includes freedom to change *his* religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest *his* religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship, and observance.'

Let me, very briefly, note three things about these articles:

- (i) the reassertion of fraternity—or brotherhood—in the context of both freedom and equality, in Article 1.
- (ii) the male head of household assumption coupled with the privacy of the family and home, in Article 12, conflicts with women's rights to autonomy. Indeed, the family and the home have been shown to be key sites where women are often denied their rights.
- (iii) the guarantee of freedom of religion and religious practice, will conflict, in a very large number of cases, with women's rights—whether it be the right to non-interference, the right to divorce, or the right to equal treatment—all of which rights are guaranteed to every person elsewhere in the Declaration.

These are just some of the more obvious examples of the repetition of the structural failure of social contract theory to guarantee woman's enjoyment of the rights that should be hers by virtue of her humanity. The very idea of human rights, in the case of women, is so tied up with the history of the ways in which 'humanity' has been paradoxically conceived, as to render it totally problematic. The particular paradox that I have focussed on here concerns 'humanity' as it has been conceived in the West. Two factors, however, make this problem broader than Western thought and practices. First, the near universal reach of the United Nations Declaration means its influence is global. For very many women, worldwide, the familiar problem of their invisibility within the home makes it difficult to see how they may gain access to their rights as presently conceived. Second, comparative studies in

religion show that the paradoxical status of women as human but not-quite-human is a common feature of many religions, not just Judeo-Christian, (or, at least, dominant interpretations of religion).

In 1979 a treaty against sex discrimination which specified particular women's rights, entitled the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), attempted to ameliorate some of the problems with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.²² CEDAW today holds the dubious distinction of attracting the greatest number of reservations of any UN legal instrument. Almost all of the reservations concern perceived threats to the autonomy of religion and cultural traditions. If there is anything universal about the human rights of women, it is this: the very idea of women's human rights is seen a threat to order, culture, and civilization.

But the normatively interesting feature of the internationalisation of these debates and struggles, in the context of women's rights, is the way they reveal the sheer diversity of social imaginaries and norms concerning marriage, reproduction, divorce, property inheritance, and so on. Furthermore, women worldwide are increasingly challenging the dominance of masculinist imaginaries within their own cultural contexts and are articulating their own counter-imaginaries. Now, before one can even hope to understand the institutions and the norms that govern relations between the sexes in any given society, one must first gain some understanding of the broader social imaginaries through which these norms and institutions justify their authority. The pretensions of human rights to be universal, again, confronts the particular, the embodied, the affective, in short, the imaginary social significations that enable human life to exist as this or that particular collective life. As Michael Ignatieff rightly observes: '... it is not the naked body we share in common, but the astoundingly different ways in which we decorate, adorn, perfume, and costume our bodies in order to proclaim our identities as men, women, members of this tribe or that community'.²³

The increasing engagement of all world cultures with different others is not—as recent events clearly show—all 'good news'.

However, it is not all ‘bad news’ either. The global nature of human rights debates brings many and diverse actors together to deliberate, disagree, exchange ideas, and make the unfamiliar a little more familiar. Such engagement challenges another element of social contract philosophy, namely, the notion that each State stands in relation to every other as does each man to other men in the state of nature: that is, as natural enemies. In so far as human rights aspire to stand above States, they encourage at least three edifying effects:

- (i) Engagement with and knowledge about diverse cultures both makes visible and acts to contextualise the multiplicity of social imaginaries—the multiple ways in which we make ourselves human. For women, this international context provides a new space in which women’s counter-imaginaries gain a more enduring publicity. A growing international women’s ‘public’ is one promising feature of the internationalisation of human rights.
- (ii) To the degree that any given culture’s imaginaries are able to be understood, it becomes possible, also, to make sense of local normative behaviour, however ‘bizarre’ or ‘objectionable’ that behaviour may seem to an ‘outsider’.
- (iii) If the claim about the permanence and the ubiquity of social imaginaries is correct then our freedom in relation to them lies in trying to understand how imagining them otherwise could result in more inclusive forms of sociability with greater opportunities for all to develop and express their capacities. If the idea, the vision, of human rights is to be useful to those whose freedoms are trammelled, then human rights must be kept open to local re-interpretation, adaptation and application, in short, transformation.

The universal reach and scope of Human Rights may be one of the strongest provocations and supports available to women worldwide to express their freedom to participate in the reimagining and reinvention of the various traditions and values of their cultures. If human rights are to come to accommodate women’s rights then women’s quintessentially human capacity

for vision and imagination will need to be recognised by the various communities and nations to which they belong, including the international human rights community.

Notes

- 1 M. Le Doeuff, *The Philosophical Imaginary*, London, 2002, p.1.
- 2 F. Jackson, 'What Mary Didn't Know', in *The Nature of Consciousness*, eds N. Block, O. Flanagan and G. Guzeldere, Massachussets, 1997. David Lodge, in his novel *Thinks*, has a lot of fun with Jackson's Mary.
- 3 K. Wilkes is interested in the question of the validity of thought experiments. She claims: '... although we can in a sense imagine all sorts of things—anything, in fact, that is not a logical impossibility—this kind of imaginability does not validate thought experiments built up upon it'. *Real People, Personal Identity without Thought Experiments*, Oxford, 1988, p.21.
- 4 Indeed, Jackson, in the paper cited above, notes: 'Imagination is a faculty that those who *lack* knowledge need to fall back on'.
- 5 Eva Brann, *The World of the Imagination: Sum and Substance*, Maryland, 1991, pp.3,6. For another exception, see Mary Warnock, *Imagination and Time*, Oxford, 1994. Two figures in the history of philosophy also deserving special mention as exceptions to the rule are David Hume and Benedict Spinoza.
- 6 Brann, p.711.
- 7 See *Imaginary Bodies: Ethics, Power and Corporeality*, London, 1996.
- 8 C. Castoriadis in G. Robinson and J. Rundell, *Rethinking Imagination: Culture and Creativity*, London and New York, 1994, p.148.
- 9 B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, London, 1991, p.6.
- 10 This claim is confined to Rawls's early work, particularly *A Theory of Justice*, Cambridge, Mass., 1971.
- 11 C. Pateman, *The Sexual Contract*, Oxford, 1988.
- 12 J.-J. Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, Harmondsworth, 1975, p.53.
- 13 *The Social Contract*, p.55.
- 14 J.-J. Rousseau, *Emile, or On Education*, trans. A. Bloom, New York, 1979, p.361.
- 15 *Emile, or On Education*, p.370.
- 16 *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman*, Harmondsworth, 1978, p.39.
- 17 Joan W. Scott, *Only Paradoxes to Offer: French Feminisms and the Rights of Man*, Harvard, 1997; Joan Landes, *Women and the Public Sphere in the Age of the French Revolution*, Cornell, 1988; Dorinda Outram, *The Body and the French Revolution: Sex, Class and Political Culture*, Yale, 1989.

- 18 Wollstonecraft, *Vindication*, p.5.
- 19 For a full account of de Gouges' inventiveness in her 'Declaration', see J. W. Scott, *Only Paradoxes to Offer*, Chapter 2.
- 20 Quoted in Scott, p.48.
- 21 For the full text of the 'Declaration', see <http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html>.
- 22 For the full text of 'CEDAW', see <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/cedaw.htm>.
- 23 M. Ignatieff, *The Rights Revolution*, London, 2001, p.41.