The International Journal of Education: Comparative Perspectives
THE INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION JOURNAL: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES

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Business correspondence, including orders and remittances relating to subscriptions, back numbers, offprints and advertisements, should be addressed to Valery Jackson, Curtin Business School, Curtin University of Technology, PO Box U1987, Perth WA 6845, Australia (valery.jackson@cbs.curtin.edu.au)

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It may be argued that the Australia and New Zealand Comparative Education Society considers itself a fragmented community of scholars. This community utilises various research approaches to study educational phenomena that attempt to highlight patterns, trends, differences, or dissonance. A separation of ‘cohorts’ ensures both the viability of investigative research techniques and currency of key issues (e.g. globalisation, international education development, multiculturalism), and differing approaches add new dimensions to our fields of study. These are scholars who make their mark beyond the academy; those who actively find causes in the field or who become policy-making practitioners outside the walls of the university.

In this issue, several academic scholars or practitioners are featured by papers that reflect their current research. Hilary Tolley examines whether basic education in the Pacific is considered more a global rather than local desire. Beverley Hall explores how the globalisation of English has impacted young children in Viet Nam. Rose Amazan investigates the brain-drain effect of highly skilled Ethiopians leaving their country. Kiprono Lang’at discusses how neo-colonialism has helped promote ‘peace’ and sovereign recognition in Kenya, yet done little to raise hopes for improving the value of education and its development. Brian Denman, Marie Loller, and Rebecca Spence share their insights and investigation on the establishment of a new university for Israeli-Arabs in a predominantly Israeli-Jewish society. Elizabeth Cassity concludes with her research, which considers AusAID as a multilateral donor agency and how it attempts to effect aid policy within the Asia Pacific region.

All scholars utilise their own investigative approaches and their corporate scholarship provides an element of pragmatism in producing productive and synergistic dialogue among scholars and practitioners alike. It is hoped that, among its other outcomes, this dialogue may lead to creative ideas in professionalising our fields of study (comparative and international education), which have often been perceived as ill-defined.

**Brian Denman**  
Editor-in-Chief
More effective aid policy?

AusAID and the global development agenda

Elizabeth A. Cassity
University of Sydney
e.cassity@edfac.usyd.edu.au

A first glance at almost any policy document generated by a bilateral or multilateral donor agency reveals a familiar rhetoric of participation, partnership, community, good governance, growth and strong democracy as key ingredients for a successful development program. While some critics of this rhetoric argue that this is merely a recasting of old aid agendas, others confirm that recent rethinking of aid policies and agendas are sincere efforts to address poverty reduction and ensure aid effectiveness. Education has been proposed as an indispensable element to achieving the aforementioned goals of development policy rhetoric, not least in the Eight UN Millennium Development Goals. This paper examines the role of the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) in the current global development environment, with particular focus on education policy in the Asia Pacific region. How does AusAID’s education policy align with international goals for poverty reduction and sustainable development? How does AusAID coordinate its education policy priorities with other development agencies and recipient governments? To enable an exploration of these questions, this paper provides a comparative analysis of AusAID’s approach to its educational development programs in Papua New Guinea and Cambodia.

[Keywords: bilateral aid, educational development, aid effectiveness]

INTRODUCTION

Glancing at almost any policy document generated by a bilateral or multilateral donor agency reveals a familiar rhetoric of participation, partnership, community, good governance, growth and strong democracy as key ingredients for a successful development program. While some critics of this rhetoric argue that this is merely a recasting of old aid agendas, others confirm that recent rethinking of aid policies and agendas are sincere efforts to address poverty reduction and ensure aid effectiveness. Education has been proposed as an indispensable element to achieving the aforementioned goals of development policy rhetoric, not least in the Eight United Nation (UN) Millennium Development Goals.

This paper has been conceived from an initial literature review and policy evidence collected for an Australian Research Council Linkage Project grant between the University of Sydney and the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID). The research examines the design, delivery and impact of Australian aid in the Asia Pacific region and is premised on recent responses to poverty reduction, economic growth and regional stability as critical issues in the construction of aid programs. How education contributes to these responses is important. Aid effectiveness and getting better results from educational systems in low-income countries are two important policy issues.
Many academics, researchers and practitioners have heralded good policies as indispensable elements in making donor countries’ aid dollars more effective. Although development has been a central realm for a number of researchers and practitioners in international and comparative education, there has been little discussion as to how this new aid rhetoric is applied in a bilateral donor-recipient context. Many studies underscore the fact that bilateral relations tend to develop in a more pragmatic manner that focuses on negotiations between nation-states. Certainly, recent international focus on the issues of security, terrorism, and international crime, has influenced the focus of many bilateral programs’ agendas. Alongside this argument has been recent discourse about partnership and donor harmonisation, as well as the impact of global agendas generated by the international community, notably the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), Education For All (EFA), and the World Bank’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) process. International declarations such as the Rome Declaration on Harmonization (2003) and the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) have also given shape to current donor agendas.

Education is central to many bilateral policies. Aid to education has contributed to raising literacy rates, increasing school enrolments, and has improved girls’ participation in schools. While this paper does not focus explicitly on these indicators, an examination of data sets from UNICEF and the World Bank provides evidence of improvements in the educational outcomes of many developing countries in the past three decades. There have been numerous shifts in the rationale for funding aid programs to education since World War II (WWII) and the advent of international thinking about development. The current rhetoric has placed many aid agencies — both bilateral and multilateral — backing ‘sector-wide approaches’. This has had the most explicit realisation in the World Bank’s PRSP process, and has been embraced by government and non-government organisations alike with the new commitment to donor harmonisation and coordination, emphasised in the Eighth MDG, ‘Develop a Global Partnership for Development’.

For AusAID, coordination and partnership means focusing on ‘whole of government’ and sector-wide approaches, as well as participating in donor coordination committees at the country level. The coordination approach also firmly places AusAID as a lead donor in some countries, like Papua New Guinea, from one that has seen it recently withdraw its aid to education programs in countries like Cambodia. AusAID is reconsidering the process of educational planning and policy development, as evidenced by major expansion and reorganisation within the agency itself. However, with the lessons learned from so many aid agendas in the past, experience suggests that local context and variations in the design and delivery of country aid programs are seemingly having increased impact on the conceptualisation of aid.

The project has only recently commenced and the intent of this paper is to review and examine donor trends internationally and in Australia. This paper reviews debates about foreign aid, and specifically, bilateral aid. Focus on the effectiveness of aid is prominent in both AusAID and international agencies. Education has been an element of international development plans since the post-WWII era, but ideas on what education is and how it contributes to growth have shifted to the centre of many current policy debates. AusAID’s policy has shifted conceptually, and policy discourse over the last 10 years is convincingly coupled with international rhetoric. This paper examines some of those recent shifts in AusAID’s education policy then explores its approach to two country programs: Papua New Guinea and Cambodia. This paper concludes by reconnecting fundamental debates on global aid policy to AusAID’s education development agenda.
**CURRENT DEBATES ABOUT THE GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT AGENDA**

Debates about donor aid and its ability to impact educational development have intensified in recent decades. Concepts and rhetoric carry considerable power in shaping the way that aid policies are designed and implemented. Cornwall and Brock ask if particular keywords carry cultural and political values of the time, and what these keywords do for development policy (Cornwall and Brock, 2006, p.44). For example, the mission statement ‘For a World Free of Poverty’ is shared by the World Bank, ActionAid, and War on Want — three organisations with radically different views on development policy (Cornwall and Brock, p.47). How does international rhetoric about participation, donor coordination and partnership, aid effectiveness, and good governance translate to policy? This section gives an in depth examination of research and rhetoric — often conflicting — that frames the current development paradigm.

Participation is a key operational term in the idea of development partnerships. A sense of action or demand remains implicit in ideas about participation. In current usage, participation can mean simply recognising and acting on one’s interconnection with a larger society through a set of philosophical ideals (Patton, 2005, p.252). Participation can also be an ambiguous term used as a means to gain political agency, maintain rule, neutralise political opposition, and tax the poorest, in other words engaging communities in sharing the costs (Cornwall and Brock, 2006). Importantly, lack of participation can imply the lack of resources to participate in a global society, where social exclusion is based on the inability to participate in the economy and democratic processes (Patton, 2005, pp.253–254). Thinking about participation in this way has important implications for poverty. In terms of policy rhetoric, ‘participation’ is a key working term in the World Bank’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) — plans for assistance to low-income countries. Guiding principles for PRSPs are that they are country-driven, long-term, sectoral, and are a partnership involving civil society, the private sector and donor agencies.

Participation is integral to partnership. The notion of partnership is a transformation that has dominated the literature on aid in the past 10 years. The important question to ask is, have a wide range of stakeholders and participants been able to contribute to aid programming and delivery? PRSPs were developed with the idea to include a wider range of stakeholders, and particularly the voices of the poor (Narayan, 2000). Policymakers and researchers consistently attempt to identify ‘best practice’ models, yet these models emerge from the ‘particular’ and are unquestionably adapted to the ‘universal’. Freeman and Faure (2003) found that relevance of external support to local needs should be emphasised and tailored, while sector-wide approaches do not improve partnerships if they are implemented as a blueprint. Aid effectiveness is contingent upon policy regimes of recipient countries (McGillivray, 2005; Rose and Greeley, 2006). Nearly all of the foreign aid literature of the last 10 years across disciplines mentions that context and complexity are important; a purpose of the World Bank’s PRSPs is an attempt to take context and local conditions into consideration when forming policy. However, recent qualitative research on the effects of PRSPs suggests that they are creating different forms of power structures, and voices of the poor are still not being considered in any process other than rhetoric (Chambers and Pettit, 2004; Higgins and Rwanyange, 2005; Kakande, 2004). In this debate, Stromquist (2007, p.273) recognises the positive legacy of engaging civil society in education through global initiatives like EFA, but crucially recognises the continued lack of leverage that NGOs and civic organisations have on education policy.

King (2006) writes that for all the rhetoric about country ownership and autonomy, aid dependency may actually have increased. There is also scepticism about foreign aid in the new cooperative context (Knack, 2004). On the one hand, PRSPs are perceived as an enabling factor
that includes voices of the poor and civil society in order to frame effective development agendas. On the other hand, PRSPs have been criticised as yet another exogenous tool to shape national policies that are tightly coupled with donor countries’ aid agendas. Added to this is critique that PRSPs have, in fact, continued to marginalise the poor and local civil society organisations because of an administrative structure that does not encompass these sections of society.

Recent literature on donor coordination represents a range of perspectives. As much as donor coordination has been hailed by some scholars as a solution to solving aid flow volatility and resolving equity issues (McGillivray, 2005), it has been vehemently described by other scholars as being another ‘aid cartel’ by promoting Northern-developed policy frameworks (Guttal, 2006). Numerous authors suggest the power of the international community has the potential to displace fundamental recipient issues (Hinton, 2004; Kakande, 2004), while other contingents suggest that aid gets into the hands of corrupt officials, benefiting neither poor recipients nor donor taxpayers (Easterly, 2006; Hughes, 2004, 2003).

Good governance is also a concept central to donor agendas. What do aid agencies mean by ‘good governance’? How is it measured? How can it encourage participation? Foucault’s (1991) concept of ‘governmentality’ sought to capture the complexities of multiple sites of government. Governance has most recently characterised the range of political actors involved in a structure, the state being only one of these actors. Governance refers to the outcome of these interactions and dependencies — politics increasingly involves exchanges and relations among a range of public, private and voluntary organisations, without clear sovereign authority (Rose in Bennett, 2005, p.153). Good governance, while including the state, also takes into account various organisations that contribute to global policy development, most notably multilateral, bilateral, and non-government organisations (Chabbott, 2003; Jones, 2006, 2005; Mundy, 2007).

Research emerging on so-called ‘fragile states’ highlights intersections between aid effectiveness, good governance, and developing education policies. The complex relationships between education, equality and state fragility need to be examined in context and especially in relation to bilateral and multilateral interventions (Kirk, 2007, p.196). These approaches require addressing governance issues for education policy and planning. Fragile states are those unable or unwilling to provide basic services, including education, to the majority of their citizens (Rose and Greeley, 2006, p.4). They also lack the capacity to implement pro-poor policies, and are prone to violent conflict. Insecurity and poor governance characterise fragile states, and focus on aid interventions is through good governance — strengthening the willingness and capacity of elected officials, state institutions, and employees to improve size and distribution of social welfare (Rose and Greeley, 2006, p.28). Good governance, then, is an important element in developing effective education systems through the policy of capacity building.

An issue that is often presented in the literature is the idea of power, specifically how it affects decision-making between donor and recipient. Robb (2004) makes the general observation that aid agency patterns of behaviour are changing with aid becoming untied, country offices being decentralised, and aid agencies becoming more critical of their programs. Alesina and Dollar (2000) suggest bilateral aid is given for political and strategic reasons of the donors — as much as for economic and policy reasons of the recipients. Chauvet and Collier (2005b), on the other hand, suggest that aid can expose governments to new ideas, and that reform should not be the only means of influencing policy and institutions. In fact, increasing the resource base of reform-minded governments can assist with good governance (Tavares, 2003). This lack of operationalisation and limited planning are considerable when reflecting on earlier studies by
economists Knack (2004) and Chauvet and Collier (2006, 2005a) who found that donor aid did not have a causal connection to democracy and good governance.

Several scholars have suggested that aid effectiveness in promoting growth is contingent on policy regimes in recipient countries (Burnside and Dollar, 2001; McGillivray, 2005). King (2006) and King and McGrath (2004) have produced important recent work on knowledge for development and the role of power in knowledge dissemination. Political influence, accountability, and donor decisions similarly impact policy formation (Chauvet and Collier, 2005b; Hinton and Groves, 2006; Makuwira, 2006). Many scholars have noted the increased policy focus on education as a result of recent compacts to harmonise donor initiatives. Mundy (2007, p.16) suggests that the involvement and coordination of the international community has had the effect on bilateral donors of moving towards collective action through experimenting with pooled funding, direct budgetary support, and funding of recurrent costs of primary levels of education. Mundy (2007, p.25) found that the focus on long-term funding and donor coordination was a positive move to promote the funding of education as a basic social right. Global agendas like EFA have organised the global public around the right to education as a commitment to redistributive justice (Mundy, 2007, p.25).

However, a key tension exists in conceptualising and operationalising global education policies. For example, while the Papua New Guinea Department of Education National Plan, 2005–2014, outlined a comprehensive and theoretically equitable plan to improve quality of and increase access to education, it also recognised the Department’s challenges of harnessing the organisational capacity to implement education reforms (Papua New Guinea Department of Education, 2004, p.26). These policy challenges are not exclusive to Papua New Guinea and this tension outlines the complexities of providing education that is both a human right and an end in itself, as well as a means to achieving economic sustainability. Herein lies the gap between policy rhetoric and implementation. Planning, resource allocation and absorptive capacity of recipients are issues that should be considered in a donor agenda. The following section examines some recent shifts in AusAID’s education policy and its focus on aid effectiveness.

**AUSAID, EDUCATION AND AID EFFECTIVENESS**

Global agendas about development and the keywords that convey ideas are central to many policy documents. Australian aid priorities have ranged from the explicitly political and security-focused, to those of education and basic needs. How does AusAID’s education policy align with international goals for poverty reduction and sustainable development? In addressing this question, current AusAID policy indicates a general preference for a sector-wide approach in education. Sector-wide approaches, particularly in health and education, are “…better aligned with partner government systems, and adopt more responsive and flexible approaches” (AusAID, 2006, p.4). Similarly, AusAID has developed “new and sensible sectoral approaches to education” in the Pacific, also to be adapted in the Philippines, Indonesia, and PNG (AusAID, 2006, p.52). Furthermore, AusAID’s two education policies published over the past 11 years indicate a priority of funding education that leads to economic growth and sustainable development. This section examines these issues as they apply to AusAID between 1996 and 2007.

The *Simons Report* (1997) was a review of Australia’s overseas aid priorities, objectives and focus for its bilateral aid program. The report reiterated that the aid program was sound and that the program should remain geographically focused in East Asia and the Pacific (AusAID, 1997). The Report emphasised that, overall, policy imperatives should be a combination of humanitarian, foreign policy focused, and commercial outcomes (AusAID, 1997). For the agency itself, skills
development and decentralisation of AusAID management was a key recommendation of the Simons Committee (Cassity, 2008, p.10). The title itself — *One Clear Objective. Poverty Reduction through Sustainable Development* — signifies a shift in aid donor philosophy exemplified in numerous UN conferences in the 1990s. These include the World Conference on Education for All in 1990, the UN Conference on the Environment and Development in 1992 (also known as the Earth Summit) which established the UN Commission on Sustainable Development, and the Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995 leading to action plans focusing on the social, economic and political empowerment of women. Poverty reduction, sustainable development, good governance, economic growth and participation are guiding principles in the *Simons Report*, and suggest a new direction in aid strategy.

Sustainable development and economic growth as a means to reduce poverty, underpinned AusAID’s first education policy statement released in August 1996. By assessing individual countries’ needs, a comprehensive education sector plan was designed as a pathway to assisting with a country’s human resource development. This, among other things, emphasises the policy rationale that education is a basic building block in alleviating poverty *through* impact of economic growth and the development of quality human capital (AusAID, 1996). AusAID’s funding priorities to achieve these policy goals included basic education, vocational and technical education, higher education (Overseas Development Scholarships), institutional strengthening, and distance education (AusAID, 1996). AusAID notes that assessment of the global situation influenced its approach in funding education programs that recognise the gender gap, rural inequalities, high dropout rates, the need for relevance of curriculum content, and inefficiencies of school systems (AusAID, 1996, pp.5–6). Finally, the policy affirms its commitment to basic education as a direct result of increased bilateral and multilateral funding of basic education following imperatives from the World Conference on Education for All in 1990 (AusAID, 1996, p.7).

In a 19 June 1998 Speech to Parliament, The Hon Kathy Sullivan MP, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, outlined five sectoral priorities vital to Australia’s aid program in reducing poverty and encouraging sustainable development: health, education, agriculture and rural development, infrastructure and good governance (Sullivan, 1998). She also signalled countries overcoming poverty as the key reason for giving aid. This point is again taken up in the policy paper *Reducing poverty: The central integrating factor of Australia’s aid program* (AusAID, 2001). Education is again recognised as one of five priority sectors. It is important from a perspective of building human capital, encouraging gender equity, and contributing to economic growth for the poor (AusAID, 2001). While the paper does not specify how education will reduce poverty (addressed in the 1996 education policy statement), it emphasises the integral nature of the education sector for Australia’s aid program in reducing poverty.

The 2006 *White Paper* reaffirmed sustainable development and economic growth as central policy objectives, and embraced some new terms. Indeed, more considered text is devoted to elaborating upon how participation will happen, why it is important to encourage good governance, why poverty is a challenge in the region, and how local AusAID offices need to have authority devolved to them. This is a shift, and a substantial one at that. The focus is on promoting growth and stability, so the ever-present words of economists are brought to the fore. Growth is important for poverty reduction; stability is important for effective aid.

This recent review of Australia’s aid program recommends more aid to Asia and the Pacific, Australia’s traditional areas of focus, but with increased attention paid to the efficacy of aid. In fact, the report recommends the establishment of an Office of Development Effectiveness to
evaluate quality of aid projects (AusAID, 2006). Regional security and Australia’s political role in the region continue to be central themes, and the unifying objective of the program remains the same: “To advance Australia’s national interest by assisting developing countries to reduce poverty and achieve sustainable development” (AusAID, 2006, p.8). Arguably, the goals designed in the Colombo Plan over 50 years ago — that technological, economic and cultural advancement through donor aid was an antidote to the instability in the Asia Pacific region — remain important in current AusAID rhetoric (Cassity, In Press, p.10).

AusAID notes it has long pursued key interests in cooperation with the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, and that these donor partnerships should continue (AusAID, 2006, p.xiv). Excessive fragmentation of donor effort reduces aid effectiveness (AusAID, 2006, p.66). Furthermore, 20 per cent of Australia’s aid goes to multilateral partners, notably the World Bank and Asian Development Bank because of “their financial weight, policy dialogue role and convening power” (AusAID, 2006, p.67).

AusAID’s most recent education policy statement was released in May 2007 and is fundamentally linked to the 2006 White Paper through the theme, ‘Investing in People’. At the outset it highlights two priorities: the first, “to improve functioning of national education systems to enable more girls and boys to complete primary school and progress to higher levels of education”; and the second, “to improve relevance and quality, including vocational and technical education, for students to acquire knowledge and skills necessary for life and productive employment” (AusAID, 2007a, pp.1–2). Although AusAID does not wholeheartedly embrace all the MDGs, ensuring universal primary education (MDG 2) and working towards gender parity (MDG 3) are mentioned as international benchmarks (AusAID, 2007a, p.7). This education policy statement is by far the most detailed published by AusAID. Education continues to be framed as a foundation for economic growth and self-reliance. Themes expanded upon in previous statements, such as improving access and equality, as well as supporting education that develops skills for productive employment, continue as central concepts. Added to these is security, with the recognition that lack of education may contribute to instability and violence.

As with past statements, the framework of the policy is to reduce poverty and achieve sustainable development. AusAID states it will do the aforementioned by improving education systems’ governance, strengthening service delivery, improving vocational and technical education, supporting Islamic education, and improving English language skills (AusAID, 2007a, p.3). This statement also makes explicit links to global discourse about aid effectiveness. For education, this means strengthening performance (sector analysis, reporting, sector programs, and policy coherence), combating corruption, enhancing regional engagement and strengthening partnerships (dialogue, harmonisation, and whole-of-government approaches) (AusAID, 2007a, pp.32–34) — all concepts linked to statements of multilateral and bilateral development agencies. The statement also makes implicit connections to international dialogue surrounding education in fragile states and in emergencies, as well as recognising the importance of NGOs and community organisations in development. In the following section, this paper explores this shift to strengthening performance through sector analysis and strengthening partnerships through dialogue and donor harmonisation.

PAPUA NEW GUINEA AND CAMBODIA IN COMPARATIVE CONTEXT

Donor harmonisation and coordination are concepts that are emphasised, at least on paper, in the policy documents of AusAID and other international organisations in managing aid activities in country programs. Space does not allow for an exhaustive analysis of international organisations’ policy, so the World Bank and UNESCO are used for comparison with AusAID. As mentioned
previously, AusAID’s involvement in education is different in each country. This section examines AusAID’s education approaches through the concept of donor harmonisation in Papua New Guinea and Cambodia.

An important consideration is how AusAID coordinates its education policy priorities with other development agencies and recipient governments. In Papua New Guinea, donor coordination has experienced challenges, to date, even though it is one of the largest recipients of Australian aid. In Cambodia, on the other hand, AusAID has withdrawn its support in education (other than Overseas Development Scholarships) and health under a coordinated donor strategy. AusAID writes that its contribution is most efficient in rural development and governance in Cambodia (AusAID, 2003a). AusAID’s withdrawal from educational development in Cambodia highlights an agency perception that aid is most effective in agriculture and governance. Cambodia receives education aid from no less than 14 large multilateral and bilateral agencies (not including NGOs and community organisations). The rationale follows that Australian aid focused in other sectors is more effective.

**Papua New Guinea**

Since independence in 1975, Papua New Guinea has consistently been one of the largest recipients of Australian aid. As an extraordinarily diverse and politically decentralised country, Papua New Guinea has presented numerous challenges to donor agendas. Until 1982, Australia accounted for 95 per cent of foreign grants, however, 80 per cent of Papua New Guinea’s donor aid still came from Australia in 1987–88. The Government of Papua New Guinea invited the World Bank to establish a Consultative Group in May 1988 and this stimulated expansion of Papua New Guinea’s aid sources. In spite of this aid expansion, Australia accounts for 72 per cent of Papua New Guinea’s bilateral aid in 2003 (AusAID, 2003b, p.30). AusAID continues to be the largest donor followed by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the European Union (EU), and New Zealand (NZAID); the Asian Development Bank, World Bank, and UN are key multilateral agencies.

The general background of economic and social development in PNG from independence in 1975 through the 1990s included several issues considered by bilateral and multilateral aid agencies. Papua New Guinea was perceived to have a weak institutional environment with poor control of government spending and a serious law and order problem (AusAID, 2003b, p.viii). There was a dual economy (formal mining sector and large informal sector) combined with a series of external shocks, mineral boom, and structural adjustment in the 1990s that made for uncertain economic growth (World Bank, 2000). Social indicators were reported to be either low (World Bank, 2000) or improving marginally (AusAID, 2003b).

UNESCO’s EFA 2000 Assessment of Papua New Guinea focused on the country’s progress towards EFA goals in the 1990s. In 1995, the Ministry of Education included four national EFA objectives in its education policy: the education system should meet the needs of Papua New Guinea people; to provide basic schooling for all; to help people understand changes in society through non-formal education and literacy campaigns; and, to identify manpower development needs in public and private sectors (UNESCO, 2000). UNESCO recommended that the achievement of these goals meant that donor and Government attention needed to focus on policies and effective legislation, capacity building, coordinated planning and implementation, efficient staff deployment and community involvement (UNESCO, 2000). Education access has improved but quality and equity are concerns: education status of workforce and general population is low; there are low gross enrolments, especially female enrolments; there are high
attrition rates; and, 40 per cent of PNG’s population over 14 years old (including 49% women) have never attended school (World Bank, 2005a, pp.10–11).

A 2003 report on the contribution of Australian aid to Papua New Guinea’s development between 1975 and 2000 is framed as part of AusAID’s focus on improved learning and accountability, and a general strengthening of AusAID’s policy research and analysis capacity. Education has consistently accounted for at least 25 per cent of the Australian aid budget, and the report notes a number of achievements in the sector (AusAID, 2003b, pp.34–35), although there are ongoing issues with quality, equity, and retention and progression rates, as well as lack of access to secondary school. Governance became a priority in 1997 following the recommendations of the Simons Review; and, education’s links to promoting good governance and poverty reduction were emphasised in subsequent policy papers (AusAID, 2000; AusAID, 2001). Since the early 1990s, there have been a number of shifts in AusAID’s funding strategy to Papua New Guinea.

AusAID works with the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank in Papua New Guinea through donor coordination. The World Bank’s lending policies in Papua New Guinea were not always well received. The World Bank funded education projects starting in the early 1980s (Bray, 1984). An evaluation by the World Bank in 2000 was a frank assessment of how its intervention in Papua New Guinea had gone wrong, though it asserted it had productively contributed to the education sector. The relationship between the Papua New Guinea Government and the World Bank became strained due to disagreement about loan conditions. Analysis was that there has been lack of consistent commitment to reform, lack of consensus, and reversal or partial implementation of reforms on parts of both donors and recipients (World Bank, 2000). The report suggested donor coordination was a feature to be improved upon.

An Interim Note in place of a formal Country Assistance Strategy was published by the World Bank in 2005, and conveyed that relations between the Bank and the Papua New Guinea Government had gone from bad to worse. Political instability was interfering with sustained dialogue for reform. The World Bank suspended disbursements in 2003 on a project for legal non-compliance from the Government. The Asian Development Bank deferred release of loan because of governance concerns. The World Bank recommended a reconsideration of its business model in light of these complexities (World Bank, 2005a). As a result, a formal joint cooperation strategy between AusAID, the World Bank, and Asian Development Bank was initiated for the agencies to work with Government on economic and public sector performance, human development and infrastructure.

Through an Enhanced Cooperation Program (ECP) with the Government of Papua New Guinea, Australia has altered the aid paradigm to a ‘whole-of-government’ approach with a key objective of capacity building and strengthening institutions (AusAID, 2007c; World Bank, 2005a). The ECP is aligned with both AusAID’s 2006 White Paper and its 2007 Education Policy. The PNG–Australia Development Cooperation Strategy 2006–2010 (2007c) recommends improved donor coordination to reduce the administrative burdens on the Papua New Guinea Government. It is also suggested that improved donor coordination will improve aid efficiency (AusAID, 2006, p.30). Despite rhetoric emphasising the need for better donor coordination in earlier policy documents from the World Bank, AusAID, and UNESCO, it is apparent that this has yet to meet with success in Papua New Guinea.

Margaret Thomas (2006), the Minister Counsellor for AusAID at the Australian High Commission in Port Moresby, recently outlined the role of donors in Papua New Guinea’s development. Again, key words commonly used in describing elements of a global development agenda are used to frame Thomas’ discussion. She emphasises the importance of partnership,
especially in terms of donors assisting with capacity building to strengthen institutions and organisations (Thomas, 2006, p.4). Thomas’ discussion of engaging civil society notes global donor commitment to participation, as well as good governance through policy dialogue that also links up with international discourse. She also signals AusAID’s intent to engage in donor harmonisation as a means to reduce transaction costs and management demands on Papua New Guinea (Thomas, 2006, p.6). While Thomas’ paper does not explicitly address the education sector, overall donor policy is made clear from an AusAID perspective. In qualifying these statements, it must be emphasised that rhetoric may or may not be removed from the reality of aid in Papua New Guinea.

Cambodia

Cambodia is a decade-old post-conflict country that experienced a transition to multi-party democracy in 1993–94. Cambodia is also classified as a Least Developed Country (LDC), and is one of the poorest countries in the world. Given this background, the Government of Cambodia has localised and created its own version of the Millennium Development Goals called the Cambodian Millennium Development Goals (CMDGs). In addition to the Eight MDGs that have been ratified by the international community, Cambodia has added a Ninth Goal: De-mining, UXO and Victim Assistance. Unexploded ordnance (UXO) and mine contamination continue to constrain Cambodia’s development process.

Given Cambodia’s background as a country that, after decades of conflict, has achieved a level of stability and peace, numerous aid donors have contributed to the country’s development. However, recent evaluations have suggested that uncoordinated and donor-led aid has slowed or even undermined the evolution of good governance. Since the last Country Assistance Strategy was written in 2000, three lessons have been learned: first, the need to focus on governance throughout the country program; second, to improve donor coordination and partnerships; and third, to focus on the relationships between inputs, activities, progress indicators, and outcomes (World Bank, 2005b).

From an international perspective, Cambodia has been the focus of numerous donor coordination efforts. The World Bank, Asian Development Bank, DFID (UK), and UN worked together to follow a joint country strategy formulation process leading to less duplication and fewer gaps, reduced transaction costs for Government partners, and coherence of message from four main donors (and donor community) to Government (World Bank, 2005b) as specified in the Rome Declaration on Harmonization.

In 2002, the World Bank prepared a short review of educational progress and challenges in Cambodia. It noted that enrolments were growing, administration was improving, and schools had been rehabilitated, but there were also substantial challenges in the financing and management of education for free, universal access (World Bank, 2002). The World Bank concluded that the Cambodian Government continued to under-spend in education and there was a heavy burden on families and communities for financing education, as well as a lack of meaningful civil service reform (World Bank, 2002).

In 2005, the World Bank followed up its work with a review on Cambodia’s progress towards reaching quality basic education for all. Enrolments in primary schools had increased, but significant gender inequalities remain. There were ongoing education reform issues including a bottleneck at the upper primary level, direct and indirect household costs presenting barriers to families, and late school entry that negatively impacts primary school completion (World Bank,
More effective aid policy

2005d). As a strategy to focus aid on improving educational outcomes, the Bank is supporting an education sector wide approach with UNESCO as the lead donor facilitator (World Bank, 2005b).

In 2006, the donor group in Cambodia formally endorsed the country’s Education Strategic Plan 2006–2010. This included an enormous number of donors. Those countries and agencies endorsing and contributing to the development of Cambodia’s education sector plan include Belgium, the European Commission, Japan (JICA), Education Partnership (NGO), Sweden (SIDA), the United Kingdom (DFID), UNICEF, UNESCO, UNFPA, the World Bank, the World Food Program, Asian Development Bank, France, and USAID. Despite the large numbers of donors in Cambodia, and the fact that Cambodia is located in one of Australia’s primary aid-giving regions, AusAID is no longer a donor partner in educational development in Cambodia.

AusAID’s current education commitment to Cambodia is providing Australian Development Scholarships for students intending to study in Australia. Only 25 education projects have been funded in Cambodia since 1992, and the last bilateral education development project in the country was completed in 2005 (AusAID, 2006). AusAID funded various projects towards education in Cambodia from the early 1990s until 2005. These include the University of Phnom Penh English and Education Project to support the teaching and administration of a four-year Bachelor of Education in Teaching English as a Foreign Language (1993–1997); the Cambodia–Australia National Examinations Project; and, an adult literacy and vocational education project (1996) administered by CARE International.

The specific rationale for AusAID’s withdrawal of support from education development in Cambodia is stated in its Australia–Cambodia Development Cooperation Strategy 2003–2006, “The aim is for Australian aid to be targeted where it can make a difference. Assistance to health and education will be phased out” (AusAID, 2003a, p.1). AusAID writes that other donors are providing considerable support in the sectors of education and health with the argument that Australia’s “limited aid resources” (AusAID, 2003a, p.1) will have better impact in other sectors. In this sense, the extent of donor coordination in Cambodia has served to make AusAID highly selective in its donor strategies. Its in-country focus is currently on increasing productivity and incomes of the rural poor, reducing vulnerability of the poor, and strengthening the rule of law (AusAID, 2007a; 2003a), signifying a shift from its post-conflict humanitarian assistance and reconstruction support in the 1990s. Whether or not funding education in Cambodia is indeed an issue of “limited aid resources” with potential for better impact in other sectors, the point is that donor coordination could well play a role in sector selectivity.

CONCLUSIONS

This paper has provided a literature review of global donor trends and the development agenda, and an initial policy analysis of AusAID’s education program. It has reviewed important policy papers from AusAID, the World Bank, and UNESCO, in order to examine the meta-narrative of shifts in global aid policy. This was done specifically to examine the extent to which AusAID has aligned itself with international aid trends. Exploring policy debates at an international level enables an examination of the level of diffusion of rhetoric and ideals in donor agendas. Viewed in this way, AusAID’s policy prerogatives that focus on donor coordination and harmonisation, good governance, capacity building, participation, partnerships and educational reform are substantially influenced by global dialogue.

In the spirit of donor harmonisation and increased aid effectiveness, AusAID has designed different educational interventions in Papua New Guinea and Cambodia. Given its colonial and donor linkages with Papua New Guinea, AusAID has remained the primary donor in the country,
and because of its extensive knowledge, is recognised as a lead donor in the coordination of aid activities. AusAID has withdrawn support from education development in Cambodia in order to focus more efficiently on other sectors in the country.

A difficult aspect of measuring policy impacts on aid effectiveness seems to be entrenched in the very complexity of the aid process itself. In this sense, identifying the exact input(s) that can contribute to improved educational outcomes is difficult because the very nature of context and community make reliable conclusions challenging. Over two decades ago, Bray (1984) studied decentralisation in Papua New Guinea’s education system. Noting the various shifts in philosophy on the rationale for decentralisation in development settings, Bray suggested it was difficult to trace the causality of decentralisation on improved outcomes in education systems. Improved outcomes could be the result of numerous other factors, decentralisation being only one of these factors.

Education arguably contributes to the implied benefits of enabling communities, encouraging good governance, and developing civil society. Some scholars are now making explicit ties to the expansion of secondary education and the development of good governance (Chauvet and Collie, 2005a), while others emphasise that secondary education can provide capabilities for students hoping to achieve personal and social freedom (Sen, 1999; Walker, 2006). Presumably, if secondary education systems are well planned citizens are endowed with critical thinking skills and schooling literacy that result from quality education beyond the primary years. This statement alone implies the need to engage seriously in planning about educational expansion and aid efficiency.

In 2001, Anthony Siaguru published a collection of his In-House columns written for Papua New Guinea’s Post-Courier daily newspaper. His commentary includes observations on how to make institutions work in Papua New Guinea. He has been remembered as a keen observer of Papua New Guinea society and politics. A few of his columns address educational issues in Papua New Guinea. One column critiques the national government’s lack of empathy for the work of teachers by not increasing salaries (Siaguru, 2000, October 6). The other considers the kind of curriculum and values that could contribute to helping students become good citizens (Siaguru, 2000, December 15). The point of mentioning Siaguru’s commentary on education in Papua New Guinea is to highlight context. Both the work of teachers and relevant curriculum can be viewed as recipient prerogatives, but how these values align with donor policies could present a point of contention.

While this may lend a spurious sense to the work of development agencies in their attempts to encourage sustainable, long-term development, it also gives credence to the fact that context may be one of the key indicators for aid success. In all of this, local actors continue to be crucial in any aid project or program implementation and success. Notably, states are not passive actors. Interpretation of aid policies is no doubt affected by local conditions and the ability or inability of local and civic institutions to enact those policies. Resources and political will are common factors in lack of policy collusion, while good governance and levels of community participation may be exogenously determined factors based on pragmatic outcomes of bilateral aid programs.

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The rise of basic education: A local issue or a construct of the global agenda?

A review of education priorities of key donors in the Pacific region

Hilary C. Tolley
University of Auckland
tolley@ihug.co.nz

With ‘basic education’ now firmly a part of the current development discourse, this paper discusses how a selection of donors in Pacific education relate to this notion in terms of shifts in their development policy, their financial commitment and their underlying political agenda. With Levesque’s (2001) notion of “perception gaps” in mind, discussion about the direction in which these priorities, objectives and obligations are pushing education development are considered and attention is drawn to the need for a loud local voice with increasing donor convergence.

[Key words: basic education, Pacific region, development, NZAID]

INTRODUCTION

This paper explores global development trends in relation to the rise of education as a development tool in the fight against poverty and how donors in the Pacific are currently translating these trends. In understanding some of the underlying desires, objectives and obligations of the donors, and by drawing attention to where current policy shifts might lead in the future, it hopes to promote greater awareness within the Pacific that increasing donor convergence comes with a need for a louder local voice.

GLOBAL TRENDS

The rise of education as a development issue is well documented in the literature. From its scant international support following the end of World War II, to being dominated, especially since the late 1980s, by the discourse of structural adjustment policies (SAPs) and ‘human capital development’. Amid a plethora of international conferences, the early 1990s became a watershed and saw a series of shifts in perceptions over the definition of development. These shifts, which included profound changes in understanding of the relationship between education and development and around the relationship between aid and development, resulted in a general “education for development” regime (Coxon and Tolley, 2003). It was recognised that if aid was to result in development, certain preconditions were needed. This realisation led to both a flood and a convergence of donor objectives. By the mid-to-late ’90s, a distinct shift towards poverty-


2 Institutional strengthening, capacity building, good governance, strengthening democracy and civil society, human resource development (HRD), local ownership, gender equality, and sustainability
focused strategies had become evident with education central to this new ‘pro-poor’ approach. Although the consensus that poverty reduction and education were critical in achieving this new global development agenda, critics argued that the approach might be more one of stabilising the political, economic and social conditions of poor populations rather than any benevolent change of heart (Ilon, 1996) — or, “adjustment with a human face” (Cornia et al., 1987, cited in Robertson, Novelli, Dale, Tikly et al., 2007 p.55).

In education, clear shifts in financial and technical assistance towards support of basic education as a universal human right and an international concern, became evident (Buchert, 1995). The concept of Education for All (EFA) and subsequent development of, and international participation in, the EFA Targets and the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) raised the notion that greater support for ‘basic education’ was needed. It also reduced the ideological differences between the major groups of multilateral and bilateral agencies to the point where they came closer together (Robertson, Novelli, Dale, Tikly et al., 2007). Education, in particular the universal right to primary education and the provision of publicly funded basic education, emerged as one of the key pillars of the global development model, uncontested by all factions — perhaps because it satisfies those consumed with a focus on equity and human rights as well as those who view development more as a conceptualisation of productivity (Mundy, 2006).

By the close of the century, education had not only become thoroughly embedded in the anti-poverty development approach, it had also helped to create unprecedented interest among international donors in mechanisms to harmonise their initiatives around a common framework of priorities and targets. Among the mechanisms responsible for embedding the new global development policy agenda have been the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs)3, which lie at the heart of World Bank/IMF anti-poverty initiatives, and the Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp)4 generally supported by the EU, DFID, New Zealand, ADB, and increasingly, Australia. Within both frameworks, selective measures can be targeted at specific countries and populations to help the poor adjust to a changing international economic order (Robertson, Novelli, Dale, Tikly et al., 2007). Through extensive country assessments, governments develop ‘credible’ education strategies detailing priorities and subsequently develop an appropriate action plan. Donors and recipients then decide together how best to allocate the available funding and resources according to the plan. Many see SWAp as a precursor rather than an alternative to PRSPs and in some ‘post-SWAp’ countries, similarly conceived direct budgetary support is being developed. As Mundy (2006) suggests, experimentation with pooled funding or direct budgetary support and recurrent funding support suggest that universal basic education is steadily being recognised by rich countries as a global public good in need of collective rather than unilateral action (p.38).

3 The PRSP initiative requires recipient governments to develop a national development plan focusing on growth and poverty reduction, formally integrating social policy with plans for macro-economic stability, liberalisation and debt repayments within a medium-term expenditure framework (MTEF) (Mundy 2006). Using participatory methodology a PRSP requires governments to fully identify the incidence and causes of poverty and develop a national program of targeting expenditure on measures to reduce it. Ideally this approach should encourage national ‘ownership’ of development planning and accountability; critics argue that this approach can lead to forced consensus — or no consensus — to adopt contextually inappropriate initiatives which favour stability and liberalisation over social development. It is also argued, however, that the PRSP process has had the specific effect of bringing about much tighter integration of educational development planning into development expenditure planning, often favouring the reallocation of resources towards primary or basic education (Mundy 2006).

4 The central aim of a SWAp is to create a single repository (a ‘pool’ or ‘basket’) into which donors place funds in support of a particular national policy program. The local stakeholders are responsible for using the funds in previously identified priority areas within the sector strategy, and for monitoring predetermined outcomes. Audits monitoring and evaluation are centrally managed and one set of common reports can then be issued to all stakeholders (King and McGrath, 2002; Ward, 2002).
The events of September 11 2001 radically altered the geo-political and geo-strategic activities of the dominant Western powers and from the point of view of development aid, three main issues have emerged (Robertson, Novelli, Dale, Tikly et al., 2007). The first relates to the definition of what constitutes official development assistance (ODA). Recently, and for the first time, the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC), which controls and regulates the definition, has allowed the aid budget to include certain military and security funding. Secondly, some nations — most notably the United States — have increased concern for the need to be identified contributing in the humanitarian and development field. This individualism, as noted in the high profile Millennium Challenge Account, which bypasses other multilateral organisations performing similar activities, endangers other nations’ willingness to pool funds in multilateral institutions or funding mechanisms (ibid.). Thirdly, there has been a variety of responses to the threat of terrorism and conflict influenced by different underlying understandings of the causes of conflict and insecurity and thus in determining appropriate interventions, whether it be winning hearts and minds, a structural inequality approach or applying sanctions on rogue states or players (ibid.).

PACIFIC TRENDS

Education developments among donors in the Pacific have reflected international trends. During the decolonising era of the 1960s and ‘70s development and educational aid programs were primarily directed towards localisation and the promotion of self-reliance (Baba, 1987; Coxon and Baba, 2003). The educational approach applied to both decolonising administrations and newly independent states was two-fold: to assist in the provision of qualified indigenous personnel to staff public service, and facilitate the development of a workforce with the ‘modern’ skills and attitudes deemed necessary for economic development. Based on the continuation of the formal western model, central to both was the need for more senior secondary and vocational schooling and the development of tertiary education. To assist the 11 countries formerly under their administration, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand were instrumental in establishing the University of the South Pacific (USP) in 1968 (Coxon 2003).

Localisation remained the major thrust in education development for the Pacific Islands region throughout the 1980s (the lower levels of education at national level, and higher education at regional level). Into the 1990s education development in the Pacific came under increased scrutiny from the international funding institutions (IFIs) and the findings and recommendations of the education sector studies undertaken in the island states strongly reflected the ‘global blueprint’. As a result, the aid programs of Australia and New Zealand underwent significant shifts in policy and procedures, many of which affected their bilateral relationships with the Pacific states. Australia’s policies, in particular, shifted from explicitly providing maximum benefits to Pacific peoples and supporting self-reliance, to emphasising the need for Australian aid to work for Australian economic interests. Thus, Australian support for the regional higher education institutions shifted towards the export of Australian educational services through tightened contracting conditions stipulating the use of Australian education institutions to deliver aid expertise and provide places for overseas scholarship students (Baba, 1987, 1989). Together these recommendations ensured a very high level of ‘boomerang aid’ in which a large proportion of the Australian aid dollar remained in the Australian economy (Coxon and Tolley, 2003). In 1997, the Simons Review led to significant changes in the priorities and administration of

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5 In May 1997 the Report of the Committee to Review Australia's Overseas Aid Program was submitted to the Minister for Foreign Affairs by the Chairman of the Committee, Mr. Paul Simons. The report, entitled One Clear
AusAID from which emerged a central and strong anti-poverty focus centred on five priority areas: education, health, governance, rural development and infrastructure.

Similarly, early New Zealand Overseas Development Assistance (NZODA) strategies more directly pursued export markets, and encouraged Pacific Island governments to emulate New Zealand by deregulating their economies (Coxon and Baba, 2003). New Zealand also established an educational services export industry and aid, trade and foreign policy became inextricably linked — clearly demonstrated by the move of the aid program into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Coxon 1996). In accordance with the global emphasis on targeting and monitoring aid in the interests of accountability, efficiency and cost effectiveness, NZODA’s education policy paper (MFAT, 1993) recommended that greater emphasis be placed on management and capacity building in education policy and planning; the identification of HRD needs; the development of information systems to monitor and evaluate expenditure on education and training according to HRD needs; and to increased education investment by the private sector. There was little focus on quality — that is, the processes and structures of learning were downplayed in favour of education as a delivery system (Coxon and Tolley, 2003).

**Australian Aid: into the 21st Century**

Despite Australia’s shift in focus towards poverty alleviation, the overriding objective of Australia’s aid program remains “to advance Australia’s national interest by assisting developing countries to reduce poverty and achieve sustainable development” (AusAID, 1997). In the latest White Paper, *Australian Aid: Promoting Growth and Stability*, which governs policy until 2019, the central mission statement is only slightly reworded, and now reads: “To assist developing countries to reduce poverty and achieve sustainable development, in line with Australia’s national interest” (AusAID, 2006). To achieve sustainable economic growth as the solution to poverty, strong emphasis is placed on ensuring “secure and stable environments; improving governance and the investment climate, including property rights; opening up to trade; and [participation of the poor] through health, education and market access” (Downer, 2005).

Since 2001, and the rise of the post 9/11 security-centred development agenda, Australia’s aid policy has become increasingly interventionist in its quest for “… functioning and effective states” … [and] promoting regional stability …” (AusAID, 2006, p.34) as shown by a recent rapid rise in funding for governance projects (including law and justice programs). In the period between 1999 and 2005 AusAID’s governance spending has increased from 15 to 36 per cent while education and infrastructure funding dropped from 18 to 14 per cent and from 15 to 7 per cent, respectively (O’Connor *et al*., 2006). Although there has been a drop in official ‘tied’ aid, the shift from conditional assistance to a combination of military intervention, law and order securitisation and good governance signals an important new phase — security and governance are now closely linked (law and justice take 47% of the governance budget) and often involve the deployment of staff and resources from Australian government departments such as Treasury, Finance, Customs, Defence and the Federal Police (O’Connor *et al*., 2006). While Australian aid might have been seen previously as a conduit for social and economic intervention, critics argue that it has increasingly become a means of direct political interference; a process with the potential to widen the gulf between donor interests and recipient needs. One example of this can be seen in Australia’s controversial view that land registry is critical to economic growth in Solomon Islands (ibid.).

*Objective: Poverty Reduction Through Sustainable Development*, was the most comprehensive examination of the program since the Jackson Report of 1984 and made a total of 79 recommendations.
More effective aid policy

Australia’s support for the Millennium Development Goals makes only a rhetorical appearance in government policy, although some support for them can be read implicitly in the sections on social investment and support for water and environmental programs. However, they play little part in planning, measuring or reporting on how Australia’s support is contributing to sustainable poverty reduction in the region.

In terms of educational support in recent years, Australia’s focus on basic education resulted in 31 per cent of the education budget being tagged for this area in 2002/3 with the main focus in the region being on education sector programs, training, institutional strengthening, in addition to its scholarships scheme. However, the 2006 White paper declares a “significant scaling up of Australia’s investment in the creation of functioning and inclusive national education systems” that could amount to tripling their support by 2010 (AusAID, 2006, p.53). In line with the Paris Declaration (OECD, 2005), there is evidence of an increased willingness on the part of Australia to support regional multi-donor sector programs, contribute combined budget support, and a general movement away from stand-alone projects, as witnessed in AusAID providing assistance to Government of PNG to develop a sector-wide approach (SWAp) in the health sector in association with the EU, World Bank and ADB.

Although there had been an earlier general decrease in the Australian Development Scholarship program in favour of funding ‘basic education’ (Tolley, 2003), a major new Australian Scholarship scheme (A$1.4b over five years) is to be introduced, aimed at doubling the number of Australian education awards in the Asia Pacific region to 19,000 (AusAID, 2006). This program is expected to include a new type of scholarship, Australian Leadership Awards, which, similar to the Colombo Plan of old, will assist future leaders in partner countries to develop and maintain links with Australia, as well as support for the establishment of a new Asia Pacific Technical College.

Contemporary New Zealand Aid

A significant change occurred in New Zealand’s approach to ODA in July 2002 with the announcement of the establishment of New Zealand Aid and International Development (NZAID), a semi-autonomous division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade with a single clear mission: to alleviate poverty. Up to this point New Zealand’s aid agenda had become inextricably linked with trade and foreign policy and had no specific education policy document with an explicit development focus. Support had been significantly tertiary-biased, offered largely in the form of overseas scholarships. In 2000 just 1.7 per cent of the aid budget was spent on areas of ‘basic education’ (despite 40% being allocated to education), and mainly concentrated on technical assistance in areas of teacher training, educational assessment and support for curriculum development, materials production, and in-service teacher development. The establishment of NZAID therefore provided an important opportunity to re-examine many of the country’s fundamental approaches to aid and development.

In line with global development trends, NZAID’s 2002 policy statement reflected the agency’s new long-term commitment to the alleviation of poverty and the associated roles of achieving the MDGs and EFA goals across the Pacific region. As such, basic education became a prominent

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6 The Paris Declaration, committed to by over 100 countries, aims to continue to increase efforts in harmonisation, alignment and managing aid with a set of monitorable actions and indicators (OECD 2005)

7 The college is expected to focus initially on occupations in the automotive, electrical, health and community services, manufacturing, hospitality and tourism, and construction fields (AusAID 2006)
focus in NZAID’s 2003 Education Policy. Aid delivery systems also came under scrutiny in the development of the policy (NZAID, 2002a, 2002b) with a Sector-Wide Approach being clearly favoured in the document: “There will be increasing emphasis on support that is focussed on process and outcomes, and moves partner countries and donors towards sector-wide approaches to cohesive education development” (NZAID, 2003b, para 43). Since 2004, these shifts have become evident through New Zealand’s contribution to the Pacific Regional Initiative for the Delivery of basic Education (PRIDE) project; its spearheading of the Solomon Islands Education Sector Investment Reform Project (ESIRP); its assistance (US$3.8m grant) in the implementation of the Tonga Education Support Project (TESP), a supplement to the concessionary loan (US$1m) provided by the World Bank; and its involvement in the Post Conflict Emergency Rehabilitation Project (PCERP), jointly funded by ADB, AusAID, and NZAID. The DAC review in 2005 noted the country’s commitment to improving the focus of its assistance through “bigger, fewer, deeper and longer engagements with bilateral and multilateral partners” (DAC 2005, cited in Reality of Aid, 2006, p.313).

NZAID is keen to encourage donor harmonisation and has built up strong relationships with AusAID and the EU, in particular. These collaborations exist predominantly in areas of program administration; cooperation at policy, program and sector level planning; and coordinated representation in high-level meetings. In addition, collaboration in funding and management of Pacific Regional Organisations is an area of interest and engagement among these agencies. For example, New Zealand has recently entered into a tripartite funding arrangement with Australia and the University of the South Pacific (USP), as well as with the EU, through USP, on the PRIDE project. In the Cook Islands and Niue, AusAID’s funding for development is channelled through and managed by NZAID and in Tuvalu, AusAID and NZAID operate from a single office, which facilitates stronger links between the donor programs and cuts overheads. There is also a joint NZAID/AusAID education program underway in Kiribati utilising a sector-wide approach for the co-funding of basic education in the country. Support is provided through government systems under the Kiribati National Development strategy with opportunities for other donors to contribute to the assistance program.

New Zealand has a distinct humanitarian flavour to its aid policy in the Pacific and, unlike Australia, has not countenanced a strong emphasis on security and terrorism, although it acknowledges the vulnerability of some nations being perceived as potential weak security links. Instead, it places importance on assisting countries to develop a culture of respecting human rights and recognises the importance of preventing conflict by addressing the root causes — addressing human rights and gender issues, tackling poverty as a cause of conflict, developing local capacities for conflict resolution, supporting process of disarmament and assisting governments and communities with post-conflict reconstruction (Reality of Aid, 2006).

The European Union and Pacific Island Forum

The European Union is the largest regional donor in the Pacific and an important influence on educational development in the region. The Pacific Islands Forum, comprising 16 independent and self-governing states in the Pacific8, is the conduit for €29m, the European Commission’s European Development Fund allocation to the Pacific under the 9th EDF (2002–2007).

In 2002 a new framework of objectives and priorities was launched which included new measures for education and training. Three key priorities for EC support were identified: basic education,
primary education and teacher training; work-related training; and higher education, especially at regional level. Under the Cotonou Agreement, African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries are obliged to produce Country Support Strategies which reflect the EU development approach and the country’s analysis of how to achieve it, in a similar manner to the PRSPs (Hilditch, 2002). The main objective of the 9th EDF was to eradicate poverty in the region by 2020 and regional leaders highlighted human resource development (HRD) and regional economic development as two focal areas for funding (Government of Fiji, 2001; Tavola, 2001). In 2001, €8m was assigned to support the HRD component and has been used to co-fund the Pacific Regional Initiative for the Delivery of basic Education (PRIDE) with NZAID.

At the initial Pacific Forum Education Ministers Meeting (PFEddMM) in 2001, it was agreed that a basic education plan be drawn up based on the EFA/MDG goals and in line with the aforementioned EC strategy, as the basis for a new regional education program. The Forum Basic Education Action Plan (FBEAP) was subsequently produced (PIFS, 2001). This formed the basis for the development of the regional PRIDE initiative, which focuses on the development of coherent national education policies in all Pacific States. At the second PFEdMM in 2002, NZAID spearheaded suggestions that the region move away from an individual project approach and adopt a Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp) as the mechanism for educational support and donor collaboration. This mechanism has been supported, most notably in the education and health sectors, in the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Kiribati and Samoa, and is in contrast to the limited interest within the Pacific Forum nations in adopting a PRSP approach, although certain countries are known to be working in this direction.

**Fast Track Initiative and Education for All (FTI–EFA)**

There is a further major, internationally driven, planning exercise influencing the education sector in the Pacific that emanates from UNESCO’s mandate for monitoring progress and overall coordination of the EFA goals. Although UNESCO’s initial direct action involved assisting in the production of EFA country assessments and the development of subsequent plans of action, the raised profile of education through the EFA goals and MDGs has attracted support of several new players to the field of educational aid. Most notable is the unprecedented role that international non-government organisation (INGO) coalitions have taken on — that of leaders, advocates, EFA policy activists, and monitors of global EFA goals (Mundy, 2006). By 2000, most of the Pacific nations had carried out national EFA assessments, which formed the basis for the FBEAP in 2001. In 2002 the EFA Fast Track Initiative (FTI) was spearheaded by the World Bank with the aim of increasing the number of countries on-track towards achieving the MDG of universal primary education by 2015 (World Bank, 2004).

Although purportedly a "global partnership between donors and developing countries … which includes all major donors for education" (World Bank, 2005, p.1), funding for the FTI–EFA did not reach the anticipated levels and the initiative was reconceptualised as a facility that gives recognition to “sound” country plans. Such plans must include a primary education component and sector financing consistent with the FTI Indicative Framework (20% of budget and 50% of that on primary education) (World Bank, 2004); have access to predictable aid; and be able to manage large programs of sector-wide funding from multiple sources (Mundy, 2006). To access the support, low-income countries must have a PRSP or equivalent transitional strategy, which includes a credible education plan. This link to the PRSP has made FTI–EFA vulnerable to the same kind of criticisms; for example, issues of local preference, the speed of implementing policy changes, and limiting national policy to MDG goals (for more extensive discussion see Robertson, Novelli, Dale, Tikley et al., 2007: pp.93–97).
In 2006 a proposal was made by the World Bank to Ministers at the PFEdMM for the introduction of the FTI–EFA initiative in the Pacific (PIFS, 2006). It was proposed that the PRIDE Project be the vehicle to facilitate the participation of Pacific Island countries in the Fast Track Initiative. However, in its submission, the Bank stressed that it would not be financing PRIDE, but instead would add value to PRIDE’s activities through its technical assistance in strategic and financial planning, and monitoring and evaluation. Thus, rather than duplicate current initiatives in the region, it would enhance them (ibid). Ministers endorsed the World Bank’s proposals to carry out an exploratory investigation in this regard (PIFS, 2006).

To conclude this section of the paper, it is acknowledged that the agencies discussed above are by no means the only actors in the education aid forum in the Pacific. They are, however, probably the most influential in the region at this time. Other players include the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and Japan’s bilateral aid agency, JICA. The ADB currently has few educational loans in the region (apart from one in Samoa) although it does provide some grant funding. In general, JICA tends to bypass government channels and funds schools directly, largely on a self-help basis and often in infrastructural assistance, although this approach is showing signs of change (Tolley, 2003).

DISCUSSION

The analysis of the priorities and activities of key education donors in the Pacific indicates that most educational aid is provided through bilateral rather than multilateral channels and in the form of grants rather than loans. Since 2000, there has been clear convergence among donors both in their objectives and delivery models. They have generally conformed to the widely legitimised international consensus that supporting the delivery of basic and universal primary education (UPE) is a ‘pro-poor’ global good, more worthy of unified support than the elitist top-heavy support for higher education of earlier eras. Also, in sharp contrast to previous approaches, there are palpable indications that donors are now prepared to assume some of the long-term recurrent costs in education, as evidenced by their support for channeling funds through sectoral budgetary support mechanisms such as the Solomon Islands Education SWAp. However, it remains unclear how much and for how long such support will be forthcoming and there is limited, if any, evidence that these methods are, or will, substantially reduce issues of poverty in the Pacific. As Mundy (2006) points out, education is the key sector in which donors tend to experiment with historically novel efforts at donor coordination and resource pooling; a fact that is rarely realised (p.36).

It is clear that the main donors are increasingly choosing to focus their involvement on the negotiation of sector policies and strategies, rather than channelling their development assistance at more grassroots support (as Japan’s bilateral approach tends to be). These new mechanisms for aid delivery are aimed at eliminating poverty by changing the way recipient governments govern (Levesque, 2001), rhetorically known as the ‘good governance agenda’. Through this approach, donors can influence the way resources are allocated rather than relying on invoking more direct popular support. Basic education and UPE are now clearly embedded in this agenda. It is a core feature of ‘good global development’ and embraces all development camps: human rights, community participation, economic growth, human capital, and productive investment. Such dedication to the global goals and global good is also politically useful — not only does it crucially indicate to donor-country electorates their government’s humanitarian dedication to

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9 It is acknowledged that the ADB is providing educational loans to Samoa.
reducing global poverty, it also serves to increase the agency’s accountability both at home, and internationally.

Compliance to attesting attainment of the global education goals across the region is forefront in the majority of donors’ policies and one might be forgiven for assuming that this is the overriding education ‘problem’ faced by all Pacific Island countries. This is not the case. In countries such as Fiji and Samoa it is felt that many of the statutory goals have already been achieved and an over-concentration on the MDG/EFA goals risks narrowing nations’ educational scope and undermining other activities of the State in areas such as training and technological development. As one senior government official explained10, some countries are committed to their own education targets and have little enthusiasm for the global goals. Instead, the government pays lip-service to them, purely to ‘stay in the game’ and remain in the donor agencies’ favour, while at the same time resenting the energy and resources that have had to be expended in continuing the façade. This is particularly the case in nations with small populations and very limited staff resources.

With self-interest an acknowledged priority of some donors (e.g. AusAID) it is not surprising that recipients in the Pacific have found it difficult to reconcile self-interest and ‘humanitarian’, morally motivated aid11, although AusAID would assert that moral and self-interested objectives can be compatible in a donor-recipient relationship. From Levesque’s (2001) work in Pakistan it is clear that when donor self-interest is perceived by recipient to be the principal motivation, it tends to produce a negative climate, characterised by resistance to donor priorities, resentment at any form of external interference in local affairs and cynicism among government officials. In terms of the Pacific, some regard the high levels of aid currently being delivered by Australia to the Melanesian islands group (the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea) more a result of Australia’s preoccupation with regional security than for genuine humanitarian reasons and reducing poverty (Brewer, 2002). However, although this preoccupation has resulted in increased military and security measures, it also appears that AusAID has interpreted the relationship between security and poverty more broadly than the idea that poverty may act as a catalyst to security, and makes attempt to address the relationship between terrorism and social exclusion, marginalisation and inequality (Robertson, Novelli, Dale, Tikley et al., 2007). Moreover, the crucial role of education in this area must not be overlooked, especially in areas of promoting positive social integration, citizenship and human rights; assessing the effects of conflict on education and providing avenues of return to education for those affected; access to adult education; and reducing educational inequalities.

Within the Pacific the following assumptions are gaining momentum: donor activity is more effective when (1) it is coordinated and harmonised to reduce unproductive transaction and reporting costs, and is achieving greater integration of funding agency and government effort; (2) it is aimed at putting more control and leadership into the hands of recipient governments and is more in-line with their ‘credible’ strategic plans; and (3) when it is strengthening government management systems (Ward, 2003). However, for such approaches to become ‘country-driven’, donors need to be mindful of the level of capacity building that will be required for effective

10 Personal communication at the 2003 Pacific Regional Education Conference: Rethinking Educational Aid, Nadi, Fiji, October 20-22
11 This attitude was noticeable towards AusAID, and to a lesser extent towards NZAID, in the early stages of the 2003 Pacific Regional Educational Conference (PREC) in Fiji. Strong disapproval of and disillusionment with the involvement of highly paid, contextually insensitive, expatriate consultants has been highlighted by Nabobo (2000) who made strong calls for more locally driven self-development; sentiments that were clearly reiterated at the latest Conference (Sanga, 2003)
planning, prioritising and implementing programs. In some Pacific countries there is clearly an institutional need for external technical assistance, training and support\textsuperscript{12} to produce a national education strategy. However, this is not universal across the region; Samoa, for example, already has adequate and functional plans in place. Thus, the donors, especially through mechanisms such as the PRIDE project, must be wary of over-steering the process and imposing external criteria on internal processes while ignoring the local context. As Levesque (2001) points out, ignorance of local conditions and insufficient regard or use of local expertise can result in the detrimental development of so-called ‘perception gaps’.

SWAps are seen as precursors to macro budget support mechanisms through which donors are suspected of becoming increasingly involved in the internal functioning of the State in a manner that could be construed as ‘neo-colonialism’ (Baba, 1999)\textsuperscript{13}. SWAps and the introduction of the FTI–EFA initiative, in association with PRIDE with its mandate to prepare “credible” strategic plans (NZAID, 2003), could be seen as the beginning of Pacific PRSPs. From the literature, it is becoming clear that the panacea of the international donor community is for every aid-receiving country to develop a PRSP as a precondition for further lending and grant assistance (Ward, 2003). The PRSP, anticipated to be a reflection of individuality and national ownership, is however, also expected to conform to the methodology laid out in the thousand-page instruction booklet produced by the World Bank, and is based on the assumption that political change is a prerequisite for the elimination of poverty (Levesque, 2001). However, the continued use of conditionality and incentives may reduce the worth of such good intentions, especially when applied with the expressed intention of achieving one aim over another. Although no PRSP has yet been produced within the Pacific, countries should be vigilant of the experience of others who have already been through the process. They should also be aware of the concerns raised over the appropriateness of such an approach for small island states, together with the controversy that surrounds the actual levels of civil society participation and government involvement in their production and the model of development being encouraged. As Levesque (2001, pp.346–7) states, “There is limited evidence that politically prioritised development aid influences recipient government policy and significantly reduces poverty ... the assumed ‘trickle down development effect’ where ‘better government’ leads to more equitable resource allocation for the poor and improved social sector delivery has yet to be demonstrated [in Pakistan]”.

The title of this paper asks whether developing countries are losing sight of their local desires and obligations under international pressures to conform to a standardised global model. The message it hopes to portray is that with an awareness of where perception gaps might occur — for example, in the use of benevolent rhetorical language to hide political intent, the mismatch between local conditions and aspirations and global aims, and the real level of external involvement the new financial models demand — Pacific countries, in particular, can manoeuvre a strong and effective pathway through the current development maze with a loud and informed local voice.

\textsuperscript{12} A lack of capacity in these areas was recognised by the ESIRP Mid Term Review Panel in the Solomon Islands

\textsuperscript{13} For comment on the numerous conditions attached to the ADB public sector reform loan to Samoa, see Tolley (2003).
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Globalisation of English language programs for young children in Viet Nam

Beverley Hall
Macquarie University
brhall@adam.com.au

The specific purpose of education is to prepare children so that they are able to maximise their potential and participate in the society or community around them. In order for many Third World nations to access information technology, the provision of language programs, particularly English, has become necessary. However, in the implementation of these programs, the influence of the globalisation of English in a different cultural context becomes a crucial concern particularly in relation to curriculum design. In preparing children from a young age to be in a position to gain access to the information technology, perceived as necessary for the country's development, an awareness of the possible but unintended social and cultural outcomes is important.

Research in second foreign language (referred to in this paper as ‘second’ language) teaching methodology and curriculum development has been limited in the area of early childhood education. As a result, this paper is an account of an investigation into two second language teaching methodologies (direct and indirect) applicable for young children in Viet Nam. The development of these programs is discussed from two perspectives. One involved a comparative study into English language programs at the pre-school level, using the target language (direct) as a means of instruction and the vernacular (indirect) to teach the target language. The other perspective incorporated a brief comparative analysis of native versus non-native target language teachers. This involved four bilingual Vietnamese teachers and four groups of Vietnamese children in two economically diverse early childhood centres, while the second study involved a native English speaker in each of the same centres but with a different group of children.

This research was carried out in the context of a descriptive analysis using a hybrid research methodology involving predominantly participant observation — a research process recommended for studies involving young children. The results that emerged led to the development of a basic structure for age-appropriate programs for use in Vietnamese cultural contexts.

[Key words: early childhood education, globalisation, Vietnamese education]

INTRODUCTION

Research at the early childhood level has tended to concentrate on the intellectual, psychological or physical aspects of development, while research in methodology and curriculum — particularly in second language programs — has been limited in the case of young children (Paulston, 1992). Research in second language acquisition has tended to concentrate on the school age child. This paper explores the research carried out in a pilot program in Viet Nam. The Ministry of Education and Training in Viet Nam was interested in establishing the viability of English language programs for possible introduction at the pre-school level. Consequently, two centres were
selected based on convenience to carry out this research with a comparison made between two
different socio-economic areas. The Ministry was concerned that children in low socio-economic
areas would not become further disadvantaged because of English language programs being
introduced. The ultimate aim was to develop fluency in English language knowledge as early as
possible as part of a preparation process in gaining access to information technology.

This research was a comparative study of two language-teaching methodologies (*direct* and
*indirect*) at the early childhood level. However, some early childhood studies have researched
English language acquisition of young Vietnamese children in Australia (Clarke, 1996). Several
studies by Vietnamese researchers had been undertaken but these had involved using a curriculum
designed for primary school aged children. This was the first time a foreign researcher was
permitted to carry out a study in early childhood education centres in Viet Nam.

The programs were developed from two different perspectives. One involved an English language
introduction to pre-school children aged from four to five years incorporating several teaching
methods and curricula. Although children attend early childhood centres in Viet Nam until age
six, the curriculum introduced after age five begins to incorporate reading and writing skills. The
choice of the age group selected was to develop programs involving oral and aural skills leading
to a more communicative approach. The second perspective involved developing a Vietnamese
language program for the children of the 53 minority groups who do not speak Vietnamese. The
basic concepts and approach of the English language program in respect to Vietnamese as a
second language and mother tongue maintenance influenced the early childhood programs being
established for the 53 other language communities.

Within these perspectives, an overview of the socio-cultural and institutional influences that have
impacted on the development of second language programs at the early childhood level are
explored in this paper. As a result, the curriculum, language teaching methodology and classroom
procedures are developed within the Vietnamese context.

There is limited and variable provision of second language teaching programs in Third World
countries due to the lack of financial and community support (Brannelly, 2009; de Grauwe, 2008).
Many attempts are based on borrowing or adapting from the so-called ‘Western’ cultures, which
require considerable resources and are more suited to affluent communities (Bennett, 1993). These
programs are often culturally alien and do not consider the needs and resources of the local
community. In the pursuit of electronic knowledge and to compete globally, one or more of the
major international languages such as English, is seen as essential for improving the overall
economic situation. However, ‘assimilation’, whether within a country or internationally,
devalues all other cultural and linguistic forms by establishing the dominant group, locally or
globally as ‘superior’. Therefore, all programs need to incorporate ways of acknowledging and
building on the local culture when introducing a second language.

Preparing children from a young age to be in a position to gain from information technology,
requires an awareness of the social and cultural outcomes. This awareness becomes, not only
important in the language teaching process, but in the imposition of education practices and
structures more relevant for affluent nations and situations. Bennett (1993, p.109) emphasised the
necessity for “early childhood agents from Western or international agencies, practising in
developing countries … to be aware of cultural implications of their values and objectives”.
Bennett not only questions the attitudes of “engaging in early childhood intervention within
different cultures and social milieux”, but the need to have a knowledge of local ‘child-rearing
practices’ and cultural values. Bennett (1993, p.109) further suggests that “instead of importing
expensive, professional pre-school models”, supporting local parents would be more effective in
the provision of early childhood education.
BACKGROUND RESEARCH

In this situation Phillipson (1991, p.40) claims that the theories on which second language acquisition is based, “falsify social reality and serve to maintain and perpetuate the hegemony, linguistic and social, of the dominant group”, whether at a local or global level. At the core of this hegemonic practice is the internalisation of the legitimacy of the devaluing of other cultures, languages and classes within both the dominant and dominated groups. Consequently, Phillipson (1988, p.351) concludes, “linguistic imperialism has to do with more than language”.

The western system of knowledge and the process of obtaining it has not only been imposed, but has been accepted as the most viable direction in which to pursue social development, regardless of the values or limited contextual suitability. This process devalues the achievements, particularly educationally, of non-western peoples. In regard to Viet Nam, an education system has been in operation for well over a thousand years with the first schools being established in the 11th Century and the first university as early as 1011.

Aikman (1996, p.159) emphasises that “globalisation represents cultural homogenisation” and through education this is being affected as a means of ‘re-colonisation’. This is further seen as a conquest frequently achieved through the ‘dominant’ languages taking on a global perspective with the resultant dependence economically and scientifically. Cummins (1993) and Muhlhausler (1994) see English language teaching programs regionally and globally as being aligned with ‘modernisation’. In turn, this alignment is seen as an economic commodity designed to impose ‘western’ models of education and language teaching methods. Mother tongue or bilingual language learning in these situations is still regarded as part of a transition process to the dominant language, in this case English. Communication technology, overwhelmingly in English, is accelerating the globalisation process linguistically.

Viet Nam is concerned about the influence of western culture on Vietnamese traditions and language through the English language curriculum. The Research Centre for Early Childhood Education (RCECE) in Viet Nam expressed this concern before the study began. However, by developing an understanding of the cultural and educational traditions, as well as by working in collaboration with local colleagues, programs in English can be designed within a Vietnamese cultural context. The Vietnamese, similarly to many other Third World peoples, are particularly anxious to acquire international languages, especially English (RCECE). Many teachers and researchers in Viet Nam feel that gaining proficiency in the introduced language, with minimum linguistic difficulties, may be achieved by introducing it at a young age. Tabors and Snow (1994, p.105) verify, “the process of acquiring two languages from a very early age is now seen to have cognitive as well as social benefits”. Ellis (1994, p.490) summarised studies carried out over a long term as revealing that younger children “achieve higher levels of proficiency than those who begin in later life” and this is significant with pronunciation. Schachter (1997, p.12) points out that “the developmental paths of L1 and L2” are similar with young children.

Cajkler and Addelman (1992, p.23) feel that the influencing factors on language learning, are related to “size and ability of the class, the aim of the lesson, size and shape of the room, mood of the class”, in addition to the time of day the lessons are arranged. Many Third World countries may not be in a position to consider all these factors in providing second language teaching programs.

EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUCATION IN VIET NAM

Prior to 1945, there was no pre-school education in Viet Nam, even under the French Occupation. However, immediately after the August Revolution in 1945 the Ministry for Social Maintenance
brought in the Act of Child Protection, Orphanages and Kindergartens. It was decreed that
“kindergartens will admit children under seven years old and will be organised according to
conditions stipulated by the Ministry of Education” (Pham Minh Hac 1991, p.39). Despite many
difficulties from this point on, pre-school education was officially developed. The influencing
factors contributing to this official recognition by the new government was a commitment to the
care, “protection and education of children from the beginning; the legal affirmation of the
equality of men and women … the encouragement of women’s participation in social activities
and production” (Pham Minh Hac 1991, p.39). Since 1987, all early childhood education came
under the Ministry of Education and Training (MOET) including the establishment of crèches,
kindergartens and childcare along with the development of curriculum guidelines.

Over the past decade there has emerged a variety of early childhood centres, ranging from full day
for 10 hours a day, six days a week with meals provided, to others based on shifts or seasonally.
Children are placed with the same age group and the children’s ages are given in months as the
Vietnamese consider a child is already one-year-old at birth. There are non-formal programs, such
as family day care and abridged kindergarten programs, in areas where full attendance is not
possible. Early childhood education facilities are generally financed and operated by the local
communities and the state, while in the mountain areas there is a lack of facilities due to
remoteness and seasonal weather difficulties. With 80 per cent of children living in rural and
remote areas, the problems of providing early childhood services are overwhelming major
challenges. In addition there are 54 Nations in Viet Nam, with the largest, the Viet Kinh,
constituting 86 per cent of the population and speaking Vietnamese. The 53 other Nations have
their own distinct languages and cultures with 50 per cent of these having no written form, only
an oral language tradition. About 95 per cent of the peoples of Viet Nam are Indigenous,
including the Viet Kinh. Consequently, developing education programs in these other languages is
also a major challenge. However, the government is committed to protecting the basic rights of
these peoples and gives up to an 80 per cent subsidy to some villages to protect the cultural and
spiritual traditions. Although 80 per cent of the population in Viet Nam is Buddhist, there are
some groups still practising traditional beliefs. Viet Nam was the second country in the world to
This commitment to education extends to the Ministry of Education and Training having a
research department for all levels within the department (this is over and above University
education research). A strong underlying influence based on the philosophy of Confucianism and
tradition is that “a happy and virtuous family must make the child surpass the father in education
and talent” (Le 1995, p.8). Therefore, the Viet Nam culture places emphasis on the importance of
early childhood education, seeing this as providing a strong foundation for gaining primary
education for all.

Kindergartens (Mau Giao) in urban Viet Nam can range from 500 to well over 1000 children and
the children attend from age three to six usually for the whole day. Childcare centres (Mam Non)
cater for children from six months to six years, but are otherwise the same as kindergartens in
program content and numbers attending. Children three months to three years are in Nursery
Schools (Nhe Tre) and are grouped in classes for 3 to 12 months, 13 to 24 months and 25 to 36
months. In the rural areas childcare and kindergarten centres can be 20 to several hundred, but
varying considerably in standard of facilities and resources. Nevertheless, the program followed is
the same throughout the country. Class sizes with three to six year olds can average 60 to 70
children with two trained teachers and two untrained assistants, and for children under three it is
usually one trained teacher to six children with an assistant. The class is generally divided in half
to rotate classes on a very tight timetable. Even though class sizes are considered large from a
western perspective, the children generally remain attentive as the discipline is based on
community respect for teachers and education coupled with family honour.
Therefore, in developing a program that is contextually based and applicable to young children, these factors discussed above are important considerations. The facilities, the size of the classes involved, and the resources available, will influence the practical implementation of an English language component of the curriculum at this level. Another consideration was that parents usually pay for early childhood education and extra for music, dance, drama, art and craft, and second language lessons including English. The involvement of the children in this research meant that the groups had to be consistent and be able to pay the $1 a month extra to attend the lessons.

THE RESEARCH PROJECT

In carrying out this research, a mixed paradigm ethnographic approach was incorporated in which participant observation was predominantly used. Participant observation is considered most applicable to studies involving young children (Berk, 1991; Bredekamp and Rosegrant, 1992; Blenkin and Kelly, 1992). Throughout the study, two Vietnamese researchers from the RCECE assisted with the project. The methods of data collection involved recording all lessons on audio tape, and by video of at least two lessons per week of each group, and keeping diaries and logs. In addition, questionnaires were distributed to all parents of the children involved at the start and on completion of the study. Another questionnaire was distributed to all the qualified teaching staff in each centre who were involved with the children participating in this study. This was followed by interviews with the parents and staff. Assessment of young children needs to incorporate “the learning process as a whole rather than the end product” (Blenkin and Kelly 1992, p.126). Consequently, multiple assessment procedures were used rather than just tests alone (Shohamy, 1997). The tests, four in all, were taken over a period of six months, and involved each individual child to identify objects from resources used in the lessons and to follow simple tasks in English. This form of testing was based on recommendations by Foster (1990) in assessing young children, and the researcher’s 35 years of experience working in the early childhood field.

The English language program involved in this study was researched and piloted in two urban centres, and developed a curriculum drawn up and based on the Vietnamese language program. The development of the pre-school English language curriculum involved action research over several months before implementing the research study. The thematic approach was considered the most appropriate, which is based on the “children’s development from the familiar (self, home, school) to the outside world” (Reilly and Ward 1997, p.11). Reilly and Ward (1997, p.13) recommended that it is a “good idea to link what you are teaching to what the children are learning in their pre-school classes in their own language” and that English is seen as “a means of communication”.

The children in this study came from two mainstream early childhood centres in Hanoi and were four to five years of age with parents willing to pay for the extra curricula activities. The two classes were divided in half. One group in each centre was taught using the ‘direct’ or target language, English, and the second group was taught English using the ‘indirect’ or vernacular approach. The children in the other group in each centre, who were taught by a native English language speaker, were from a different class but based on the same criteria. The children in these classes were randomly divided for all extra lessons whether it was drawing, dance, English or any other subject, and the rooms allocated rotated. The children formed groups of 17 participants in each of the four groups using bilingual Vietnamese teachers, while the two classes using a native English language speaker had 15 children in each of the two centres and taught using the ‘direct’ method of language teaching methodology.

A compromise to traditional classroom practices was incorporated, in that the children sat around in a U-shape, with a more teacher-centred as opposed to a child-centred approach. However, there
was far more interaction between the teacher and children than in the structured Vietnamese classroom and the children moved around in response to words or expressions used. Children continued the custom of beginning and ending lessons by greeting the teacher and crossing their arms, and clapping when questions answered were correct or when they finished a song or rhyme. Even though resources were extremely limited, it was possible to find pictures or objects to facilitate the teaching of the target language in a local context without undue expense. Resources and materials produced in western countries are not only expensive, but are not reflective of life in Viet Nam. Consequently, many English language teachers incorporated material produced in the Philippines or Singapore. Conversely, Vietnamese values, educational practices, and facilities, would not suit western contexts. With play equipment being limited, Vietnamese teaching practices incorporate rote learning and are highly structured. This contrasts dramatically to the western model of ‘free play’, small groups and extensive play equipment.

Reilly and Ward (1997, p.9) state, “activities most suited to very young learners are those which involve songs, chants, rhymes, stories, total physical response ... games” and drama, since it is through play that most of the learning takes place. However, teaching songs and rhymes in a second language posed an added challenge, so that it was necessary to choose activities that were clear in meaning, related to familiar experiences and were preferably accompanied by action to improve comprehension. Many songs and rhymes, particularly nursery rhymes popular in English-speaking countries, are not generally understandable in a different cultural context. Consequently, the songs and rhymes that were more easily understood in the Vietnamese context involved familiar themes and action, such as ‘Twinkle, Twinkle Little Star’, ‘The Wheels of the Bus’, ‘Open Shut Them’, ‘If You’re Happy and You Know It’ and counting rhymes ‘1, 2, 3, 4, 5, Once I Caught a Fish Alive’, ‘Five Little Ducks’ and ‘Three Little Monkeys Jumping on the Bed’. As young children learn quickly through songs and actions, it is in this way that second language acquisition is facilitated in an early childhood setting (Reilly and Ward, 1997).

The development of the curriculum and resources became very specific, even with respect to the choice of pictures and words used in the lesson discussions, along with the songs, rhymes and experiences of the Vietnamese children. Consequently, many of the same pictures used in the Vietnamese language class were also used in the English lessons. This procedure was also used in storytelling, using children’s stories written in Vietnamese with translations provided in English. Some materials from other Asian countries had to be adapted to a Vietnamese Buddhist context since material, for example, from the Philippines usually reflected Catholic images that were not familiar to most Vietnamese children.

As nutrition and health share equal weighting in curriculum content with educational skills, this needed to be incorporated into English language curriculum parallel to the Vietnamese language themes. These included lessons about fruit and vegetables, hygiene and physical education due to the high incidence of nutritional problems in the country (Pham thi Mai Chi, 1994). In all centres, there is not only the allocation of a nurse, but also a doctor, and parents are given periodic guidance programs that include parenting skills, cooking nutritionally and hygiene improvement. In the curriculum, only content words for fruit or vegetables familiar in Viet Nam would be used in the lesson and for hygiene, pictures depicting a family washing in a basin rather than a European-style bathroom. This extended to decisions made over which English words and expressions were used.

This study extended over a six-month period and followed both the ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ methods, using the language as much as possible through daily routines within each lesson, particularly with regard to greetings and instructions. However, the difference between the two methods appears to relate to the direct method requiring greater intensity in listening skills and
more attention to body language or actions by the teacher. Young children are learning new concepts in their first language, so words associated with numbers, colours, and shapes often recapitulate the conceptual understanding as well as broadening into the new language being learnt. In this study, repetition in various formats became necessary regardless of the teaching method being used in order to cater for learner characteristics, absenteeism and levels of concept development. Nevertheless, the aim was not only to develop proficiency in English oral and aural communication skills, but also to gain some understanding of sound differences and be introduced to another language in an enjoyable way. However, because ‘competition’ between teachers, classes and the children is entrenched in early childhood centres in Viet Nam, the Vietnamese teachers involved always wanted to know how well their children were learning English in comparison to the other groups.

The lesson format maintained the ‘Vietnamese nature’ as it led to less confusion. The teachers, researcher and the Research Centre decided on this format for Early Childhood Education (Ministry of Education and Training). The lessons lasted 30 minutes, four times a week (this included Saturday) and usually an activity room was used rather than the ‘home’ classroom. The format of the lessons commenced with the traditional greetings, but in English, followed by counting with rhymes and activities, colour of the week, and games to reinforce the words learnt — then pictures or objects discussions of the theme with games or activities to reinforce the words or expressions used. This was followed by one or two relevant songs, finishing with one or two action songs such as ‘Hokey Pokey’ or similar types of whole movement songs.

AN ANALYSIS OF THE RESULT

In this study, the focus was on what the children comprehended as well as what they could say. Although there were commonalities in the way the children learnt and understood the target language, there were also individual differences. As indicated by Berk (1991, p.350) the “majority fit a referential style of language learning” wherein the children learnt the names of familiar objects. This has also been reflected in research carried out by Clarke (1996), “a smaller number of children used an expressive style”, learning more the social formulas or expressions used in communicating socially. This study revealed that a small number of children had learnt the social expressions more readily but did not rate as well on the naming of objects. Some children were more interested in ‘social language’ than the names of objects. This could also reflect more on the cultural values of Vietnamese, as very young Vietnamese children learn, according to Berk (1991, p.351), “an honorific pronoun system first”. This was particularly so in the groups learning by the direct target language approach. This is consistent, Berk (1991, p.351) points out, “with an interactionist approach to language development, involving interdependency between children’s inherent attributes and their physical and social worlds”. This further enhances the child’s understanding “that an object could be called by a different name in a new language” (Berk 1991, p.377).

In this study, the children began to develop some communicative abilities in English and enhanced their listening and speaking skills. They demonstrated that they had acquired knowledge about when to use the language they were learning with non-Vietnamese and in which situations. Although the level of language acquired over the course of this study was limited, they did try to use it outside the classroom. When given directions, most of the children understood what was required and responded appropriately by the end of the study. On occasions, they would interact collectively or in a group in English, but more often it was on an individual basis. The children who were taught English by the direct method of language teaching were clearer in pronunciation and the children learning with a native English speaker even more so, but with the accent of the teacher. The accent or pronunciation clearly reflected that of the teacher in all the direct groups.
However, with the indirect groups the English pronunciation was not so clear and was much more heavily influenced by the Vietnamese forms of construction. Although the teachers were all bilingual, except the native English teacher, the children learning by the direct method had teachers who were more confident with their spoken English. Nevertheless, having taught all these teachers on earlier visits, there did not appear to be any significant differences between them in regard to the children’s performance.

After the six-month period, the children in all groups did understand that there was a difference between English and Vietnamese. The lessons were designed to involve constant interaction, choral as well as individual responses, the emphasis being on communication. The children were also observed as a group, and the test results indicated a wider diversity of language knowledge than the classroom observations revealed. Children in the direct groups were more confident in interacting with native English speakers and their pronunciation much clearer as a group. Individuals in these four groups experienced difficulties, but overall the direct groups were more communicative and interactive with the target language. Listening skills with these groups were more intent as the children needed to observe and listen to the teachers more than in the indirect groups. By the end of the study, the English comprehension of most of the children in the direct groups were more apparent, when observing how they listened intently to stories in English using pictures and could dramatise some of them. Children in the indirect groups still required the stories to be explained in Vietnamese, even with the same pictures, before they understood and were able to dramatise them.

The indirect groups could initially be instructed more readily to, for example, “move back”, “sit down” or “get in a circle” and explanations of abstract concepts understood more effectively. With this method, there was less of a requirement of non-verbal language, physical action or visual resources. The test results, based on the processes mentioned previously, revealed a more even learning pattern with these groups but did not appear to create the opportunities for expansion on language learnt with the brighter children. These children were the ones who the teachers judged as progressing more rapidly in acquiring the target language. However, in the good to excellent category, the indirect groups performed better on the tests than the direct groups in both centres. The test results of the direct group were more diverse, covering a wider spread of ability than the indirect groups. In the latter groups, the overall test results tended to be less variable with more children acquiring English language skills, but not to the extent of the higher achievers in the direct groups nor, conversely, as little as the lower achievers of the direct groups.

This appeared to indicate that in the direct groups the children rating highly were advantaged but, conversely, this teaching method leaves a larger group of children in the limited range. A significant disadvantage with the direct groups would be the initial explanations needed to establish a routine in the lesson procedure and to assist in understanding instructions. With this method, there is a heavy reliance on visual resources and teachers who speak the target language relatively clearly as a model. There were also discipline problems, particularly in the disadvantaged centre with the direct English language groups, where the children were initially more easily distracted. There was certainly less confusion with the children in understanding what the teacher was requesting or what was expected of the children in the indirect teaching method. As the study progressed, other children in all groups would assist a child who was experiencing difficulty. However, in all groups the children would copy exactly any mispronunciation of words or expressions.

The results of the tests were used to categorise children into ranges defined as limited, good, very good and excellent. Interesting results emerged in comparison with the children’s Vietnamese language learning whereby one of the children, who achieved the highest results on the tests and
had indicated a clear understanding and pronunciation in English language learning, was considered poor in Vietnamese. This was based on the judgement of the Vietnamese language teacher and the two research assistants. In enquiring into the possible reasons, it was found this particular boy enjoyed the more ‘active’ form of learning and so excelled. He, along with others with less dramatic results between the two languages, were all from the direct groups. However, in general most demonstrated similar language acquisition skills in both languages. Another interesting outcome was the results between identical twins: one achieved well while the other not so well. In considering the children exposed to some English in the home, all were in the direct groups, but there were three children in the limited range, who were in the disadvantaged centre and only one child in the affluent centre. In comparing the centres involved, the children in the disadvantaged centre appeared to have a broader range of test results, while the results from the affluent centre had a tighter distribution. In comparing the indirect groups, the affluent centre performances appeared better overall but there was a higher percentage in the disadvantaged centre that performed at a limited level. In comparing differences between the two centres, beside the availability of resources and facilities, absenteeism was a factor influencing the children’s performance and discipline difficulties were more marked, particularly in the direct methodology groups. Whereas the children in both types of groups in the affluent centre performed better than those in the disadvantaged centre, this was in spite of the number who achieved in the excellent range in the disadvantaged centre.

CONCLUSIONS

In considering the differences between the direct and indirect methods, the results in the indirect method appear better than in the direct method for children rated in the good to excellent range. However, the percentage of students in the limited range is higher within the direct groups but in considering only the children rated in the good to excellent range, then this is reversed and the direct method appears more as the approach to recommend. Nevertheless, neither proved detrimental as there were advantages and disadvantages with either method. Consequently, it depends from which perspective these results are viewed in order to assess the advantages and disadvantages in both methods. With respect to the use of teachers who are native speakers of the target language versus non-native speakers, there was very little difference between the direct groups, if any. As a result of this study, the indirect method was recommended at this level of education to the Ministry of Education and Training, at least initially. Maybe as the children progressed, an increased use of the target language could eventually lead to the direct method being the predominant teaching methodology.

In initial discussions and in the preparation of the curriculum to be taught, advice was provided by the teachers involved and the Vietnamese researchers on what to include and what to exclude sensitive to cultural context. Vietnamese classroom practices, culturally relevant teaching resources in English and the preparation of additional materials were all developed within a Vietnamese context for a young homogenous group of Vietnamese speakers. The curriculum incorporated not only traditional festivals and days of significance such as Teacher’s Day, but themes familiar to Vietnamese children in Viet Nam. As a non-Vietnamese researcher, this approach was important in minimising any Anglo-cultural intrusion. This included not imposing the same classroom practices as those used in an English-speaking country, nor requiring the same conditions as many economically advantaged countries consider necessary in class sizes, resources or facilities.

Some of the most significant differences in this regard in Viet Nam were the respect given to the teachers and the reverence for parents and Elders in the family and community. This is quite a contrast to English-speaking countries where the individual is paramount and the nuclear family.
In Viet Nam the high educational expectations of the children by their families (including the extended family) has an effect, as it is a tradition heavily influenced by ‘honour of the family’ which is not so prevalent in English-speaking countries. Confucian values influence Vietnamese educational practices in that “every descendent must strive to do his or her best, to engage in constant education and training to be worthy of the family tradition” (Le 1995, p.8). In this respect, these values are reflected in the moral lessons which feature significantly in the curriculum and continue to be highly valued.

The resources developed and used in these English language programs with the young children were localised with pictures, posters, books and objects made in Viet Nam and featured Vietnamese people, homes and the community. These resources also contained representations of traditional ceremonies, national days and various customs. English stories that were popular and often dramatised later in the program were the Little Gingerbread Boy, Three Bears, Three Little Pigs and the Farmer and the Beet; despite their European origins, these are popular in Viet Nam. Wherever possible, Vietnamese children’s stories in English were used to encourage the use of English in a Vietnamese context and provide materials to which the children could relate. This procedure assisted with increasing their English language understanding. Using these types of stories meant that the teachers were familiar with the full range of cultural meanings associated with the story. The songs, although in English language, were sung in a Vietnamese manner, which included swaying, clapping or with gestures typical of an animal, plant or object similar to songs in Vietnamese.

English cultural influence came in the form of greater interaction in the classroom. It became more of a compromise between the teacher-centred approach of Vietnamese classrooms and child-centred approach found in western classrooms. The child-centred approach, as a whole, would be difficult to introduce into the Vietnamese classroom for several reasons: the class sizes in early childhood centres were very large; the facilities used were small; and outdoor areas were either very confined or on the roof of the centre due to lack of space. The teaching style is heavily influenced by Confucian methods. As explained by Feeney (1992, p.16) the generally held belief was that the children’s intelligence is enhanced if there is early language training and for “the entire class to learn by rote or recitation in unison”. Moral lessons featured significantly in the curriculum. However, while maintaining these values many centres are moving away from the more structured teacher-centred approach and the English language program was developed more in the style of these newer directions while still reflecting the Vietnamese values and traditions.

This research supported the recommendations made by Scarino (1998, p.13) of the principles required in attempting to establish quality language programs as including:

1. An engagement with the system as a complex whole and connection among issues, across the layers of involvement (e.g. national, state, school), and across the key concepts in languages education (e.g. language and culture, language and learning, language and literacy), and among participants, (e.g. teachers, and researchers or policy makers);

2. The incorporation of a research-oriented approach;

3. The involvement of teachers as key participants;

4. A recognition of the value of national collaboration … and the improvement which comes from analysing and sharing different experiences; and

5. The understanding that in both languages education and policy formulation we are engaging with a dynamic process that must be continually improved based on research and our own experimental wisdom.
In attempting to provide ‘Education for All’, Viet Nam places science and technology at the top of the agenda for State policy according to Pham Minh Hac (1991, p.179). He further explains the need for “programs to be researched within a Vietnamese context” and the need to minimise cultural intrusion in the process of second language acquisition.

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Mobilising the Ethiopian knowledge Diasporas: Framing the issues

Rose C. Amazan
University of Sydney
r.amazan@edfac.usyd.edu.au

The number of highly skilled Africans leaving their country of origin, many with PhDs, has reached disturbing proportions. Meanwhile, Africa spends billions per year to fill the capacity gaps that are created by the exodus of the highly skilled. In Africa, Ethiopia ranked first in terms of rate of loss of human capital.

Many African governments are unable to match salaries or offer incentives to draw the highly skilled to return home in this context. The article focuses on the knowledge Diaspora, and the possibilities that exist to offset the potential impact of brain drain on their country of origin. The paper examines pathways for the mobilisation of the African Intellectual Diasporas, in particular the Ethiopian knowledge Diaspora, by addressing the main factors that played a role in shaping the new direction of the brain drain phenomenon.

[Key words: Africa, Ethiopia, knowledge Diasporas, brain drain, mobilisation]

INTRODUCTION

Brain drain has depleted Africa of key future development prospects. It has crippled the very essence, that of which it was meant to protect. However, many believe that Africa’s skilled and highly skilled residing in the Diaspora are the resources necessary to shift the tide. African knowledge Diasporas have the potential to activate further development and economic growth in Africa. The migration of the skilled and the highly skilled, once regarded as the so-called ‘brain drain’, is now the new hope: the ‘brain gain’ of developing countries.

In the area of skilled-labour mobility, research leans predominantly towards repatriation of the Diaspora, hence literature tends to concentrate on counter measures such as taxation (financial measures to compensate loss), regulation (restrictions of financial flows) and conservation (control of emigration). Thus, the brain drain discussion was based on the abilities of governments to tap the skills and the knowledge of their intellectual Diaspora, mainly in the sciences and technology, by inducing them to return. However, many African governments are unable to match salaries or offer incentives to draw the highly skilled to return home. Currently, the focus of studies has been to examine and develop governmental policies in order to address the problem of brain drain. While policy decisions are important in addressing the issue, grassroots organising and self-mobilisation of African intellectual Diasporas, in an effort to offset the potential impact of brain drain, is critical to the success of alleviating the brain drain phenomenon. According to Teferra (2000, p.8) the African “… Diaspora is a vital influential community of undercover ambassadors [capable of providing] … another window to the industrialised world … another bridge in knowledge transmission and exchange and another catalyst in fostering knowledge creation and utilization.”

Given the considerable research on migration and brain drain, it is inevitable for research to start directing attention towards the mobilisation of the intellectual Diasporas. In an attempt to go beyond the loss of human capital approach, this paper would analyses the mobilisation of the
African intellectual Diasporas, in particular the Ethiopian knowledge Diaspora, by addressing the main factors that played a role in shaping the new direction of the brain drain effect.

**CONTEXTUALISING THE BRAIN DRAIN**

The concept of brain drain has been around since the 1950s and was used to describe British intellectuals and scientists migrating to the United States (Gaillard and Gaillard, 1997). After World War II, about 97,000 highly skilled scholars immigrated to the United States, mainly from Great Britain, Germany and Canada (Teferra, 2000). Nowadays the term ‘brain drain’ is mostly used to refer to the flight of highly skilled professionals from developing countries to developed countries. According to Teferra (2000, p.3), the particular use of the term often implies the “magnitude of the net flow and the perceived impact the movement has caused on the losing countries”.

The migration of the highly skilled has attracted significant interest in the international community. This is mainly due to reports that have related this phenomenon to developmental constraints (Sako 2002). In Africa alone, it is estimated that one-third of the most highly qualified are residing outside their country of origin, mainly in Western Europe and North America (World Bank 2000).

**Figure 1: Where are the African Diasporas?**

In 1994, Speer stated that nearly 88 per cent of adults who emigrate from Africa to the United States have a high school education or higher, compared with the national average for native-born Americans, which is 77 per cent. An article from the *Economist* in 1996 (pp.27–28) further confirmed what Speer stated two years prior “…three quarters of [African-born and residing in the United States] have some college experience; one in four has an advanced degree”, surpassing the figures for native-born Americans. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM, 2005), there are currently 300,000 highly qualified Africans in the Diaspora, 30,000 of whom have PhDs. Meanwhile, Africa spends US$4 billion per year (representing 35% of total official development aid to the continent) to fill the capacity gaps that are created by the exodus of the skilled and the highly skilled (Sako, 2002).
The brain drain phenomenon has hurt some countries more than others. In Africa, Ethiopia ranks first in terms of rate of loss of human capital, followed by Nigeria and Ghana. Over the past 10–15 years, about 50 per cent of Ethiopians who went abroad for training did not return after completing their studies (Teferra, 2000). From 1980–1991 Sethi (2000) estimated that a mere 5,777 of the 22,700 students who studied abroad (39%) returned to Ethiopia. During Teferra’s (1997) tenure in Addis Ababa University, 20 faculty members from the Physics department went abroad for training and never returned. He further states that this happened in all departments and as a result the employment of new graduates has become the norm. Mr. Kibre Moges of the Ethiopian Economic Association reiterates that “today if you visit colleges and universities in this country [Ethiopia] you will not find any lecturers who have been there for more than seven or eight years” (IRIN, 2002).

This loss of highly skilled staff in the higher education institutes inhibits all aspects of development in Ethiopia, especially the medical sector. Citing a report by the Ministry of Health in Ethiopia, Shinn (2002) reported that between 1988 and 2001 Ethiopia trained 2,491 public health specialists; however one-third have left Ethiopia, leaving only 1,366 physicians. He later concluded that there is only one physician for every 47,000 people.

Brain drain has not always been a problem in Ethiopia. According to Shinn (2002) the political persecution during the 1974 Revolution (Red Terror era) was a major turning point in the emigration of highly skilled Ethiopians. Prior to the Red Terror era, almost all Ethiopians who attended university stayed in Ethiopia and worked. The vast majority of Ethiopians who went abroad for training were eager to return home. Many of them returned before graduation and had their diplomas mailed home (Getahun, 2002). Higher institutions in Ethiopia have been traditionally responsible for the development of new ideas, innovation, and creating responsible citizens. Now, however, universities must rely on recent graduates to fill professorial vacancies and are unable to adequately provide the basic functions of a higher institution or to properly train students.

Strategies have been implemented by the labour-sending countries to offset the brain drain. These strategies have been divided by Meyer et al. (1997) into two groups: brain drain as a loss of human capital and the ‘brain gain strategies’. Historically, the human capital approach to brain drain held that when a government invests in an individual’s educational qualifications, abilities, skills, and competencies it is entitled to expect a future return on its investment (Brown, 2000). Governments, seeing brain drain as a loss of human capital, designed restrictive policies (making it difficult for people to migrate), incentive policies (countering the romantic effect of migration by offering incentives to the highly skilled to stay in the home country), and compensatory policies suggested by Bhagwatti in 1977 where migrants are taxed to counterbalance the loss of human capital. For example, the Ethiopian government has attempted to mitigate the loss of academics by requiring university instructors and others who leave for further education to sign a contract stipulating that they will return to work in Ethiopia for 12 or 15 years (for those going for doctorates) or pay Birr 140,000 (approximately US$17,000) to compensate the government (Getahun, 2002).

This is an interesting approach, however, it is unenforceable due to the inability to keep track of those that leave, and lack of consensus between the Ethiopian government and the labour-receiving governments. For example, in 2001 the University of Asmara in Eritrea was planning to send 300 graduate students to South Africa for further education. The university asked each student for $15,000 as insurance for their return and the students protested they could not afford it. In the end, the university backed down and instead decided to withhold students’ certificates, pending their return (Shinn, 2002).
A study by the International Organization for Migration (IOM, 2002) reported that one-third of Ethiopians who were sent abroad for further education have not returned. Restrictive policies are often ineffective because it is costly to implement systems that track migrants and also because they alienate expatriates and build resentment that stifles willingness to contribute to the development of their home country.

**BRAIN DRAIN: PERSPECTIVES**

There are many reasons why highly skilled professionals choose to migrate. Oyowe (1996, pp.59–60) points out “when a highly qualified professional chooses to leave his country for another, he does so for one or several legitimate political or economic reasons; peace and security for himself and his family; job satisfaction; better conditions; higher standards of living...”

The reasons stated above are classified by Odunsi (1996) as ‘push and pull factors’. The ‘push factor’ is the conditions that drive the highly skilled from their country of origin. The ‘pull factor’ is the attractive conditions offered by the developed countries, including current migration schemes that deliberately target the highly skilled (Canada, United States, Australia and Germany).

However, Getahun (2006) argues that, of the push factors, it is not poverty, population pressure, drought and famine that triggered migration of Ethiopians because Ethiopia was already a poor country prior to the Ethiopian Revolution. He believes Ethiopians failed to return home because of the political upheaval, persecution and uncertainty in Ethiopia.

It is also important, however, to emphasise the ‘pull factor’ here because developed countries do contribute a great deal to the exodus of highly skilled Africans from Africa. For instance, the American government has several visa programs that target the highly skilled, such as the Immigration and Nationality Act, which targets highly-skilled individuals in the sciences, arts, education, business and athletics. Similar criteria are used for the temporary workers visa and, the most popular one in Ethiopia, the Diversity Visa (DV) lottery (US Department of State, 2007). The DV, introduced by the United States in the 1990s, is one of the many avenues that are open for Ethiopians to immigrate to the United States. Although the DV is a lottery that is intended to attract diverse groups of people, it is highly selective. Aside from other qualifications, applicants must have at least a high school diploma, which, in the context of Ethiopian education, means the elite and the highly educated Ethiopians who have already been tracked to attend university. Numbers of Ethiopians have taken advantage of the DV: in 2003, as many as 5,562 Ethiopians were selected to apply for immigration, the third highest number worldwide after Ghana and Nigeria (Shinn 2002).

One can analyse the brain drain phenomenon from various perspectives. One group views brain drain as a devastating effect that damages/hurts developing countries due to the loss of their elite minds. This loss of human capital is damaging to the home country because its substantial investment in human resources will not be compensated (Brown, 2000; Sako, 2002). Highly skilled emigration disturbs the living standards of those left behind, and also the overall growth of the sending country. Those who are left behind lose the prospects for training and the benefit of exchanging ideas. The country’s health and education system may be damaged; opportunities to attain economic growth may be reduced. This means that if the highly skilled had stayed in their country they could have helped to improve education, governance and the overall quality of life of the country. The negative impact of brain drain has been linked to the lack of development. According to the IOM (2001, p.6) “large cross-border movements can be a response to the ever-increasing gaps in living standards and income between countries; and this often means a loss of human capital where it is most needed for development.”
By contrast, Cervantes and Guellec (2002), Nyikuli (1999) and Patel (2002) view brain drain as a benefit to the migrants as well as their home countries because of the recovered remittances (money sent to family members by the expatriates). According to Hunger (2002) the foundation of the ‘brain gain’ hypothesis is based on two basic ideas: (1) those highly skilled who returned to their home countries through return migration and/or transnational networks are able to contribute to the developmental process; (2) sufficient incentive as a form of motivation must be available to those who wish to repatriate, even if they have already been living abroad for a long time and have not yet built up any productive contact to their country of origin.

A third group views brain drain as a non-beneficial process, where neither the host nor the home country benefits from the process. This is because workers considered skilled in their home countries are often regarded as unskilled in a host country, at least initially. Therefore, the country of origin has lost a skilled worker and the host country gained a worker with training that is irrelevant or under-utilised (Dei and Asgharzadeh, 2002). Due to the variety of perspectives on brain drain, researchers must be conscious of the lens through which they conduct their study.

It is estimated that about 200 million people migrate around the world yearly (Solimano, 2003). “Latin America and Africa are the two regions of the developing world that have the highest shares of skilled and highly skilled migrants residing in the developed countries…” (Page and Plaza, 2006, p.257). In Africa alone, approximately 23,000 qualified academic professionals emigrate annually (Pang, Lansang and Haines, 2002), leaving the African continent depleted of intellectual resources. This impact on Africa’s development is further acknowledged by Miyagiwa (1991), while Haque and Kim (1995) point out that a person’s knowledge not only affects the availability of skills, but also the productivity of the others in that country. Thus, the emigration of the skilled eliminates that benefit to the country, although at the same time providing opportunities for those somewhat less qualified. Fuita (1999, cited in Page and Plaza, 2006) went a step further, stating that skilled labour is an important factor in attracting foreign investments, while a lack of it would reduce the amount of foreign investment in the country.

The United Nations Commission for Trade and Development (UNCTAD) estimated that each migrating African professional represents a loss of US$184,000 to Africa (Pang, Lansang and Haines, 2002). The magnitude of the migration of the highly skilled is one of Africa’s major development constraints (Sako, 2002; Dei and Asgharzadeh, 2002). Dei and Asgharzadeh (2002) believe that what Africa has ‘sown’, other countries ‘harvest’. In other words, host countries reap the skills of the African continent. The IOM report in 2001 (p.18) stresses this point by pointing out that “Africa bears the cost of raising and educating its professionals in their unproductive years before the latter seek greener pastures abroad.” Concerned about the negative impact of brain drain on the African continent, African governments and the international community designed strategies and policies to counteract this loss, by turning brain drain into brain gain. Mountford (1997), Stark et al. (1998), Vidal (1998) and Beine et al. (2001) argue that migration could promote growth in labour-sending countries. This triggered research to focus on remittance inflows. The United Nation's International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) in 2007 estimated the annual remittances in 2006 to be US$300 billion worldwide, which has been a tremendous increase from US$15 billion in 1980. In Ethiopia, remittances stand at US$591 million in 2006, representing nearly 4.4 per cent of GDP.

Several studies have correlated remittances with increased schooling, thus building a relationship between remittances and increased schooling for children. A 2006 IOM report claimed that remittances raised children’s education level in several countries including Jordan, Thailand and the Philippines. Wadda (2000) argues that “households with migrants are more likely to invest in education and less likely to send their children to work” (IOM 2006, p.51). However, one cannot
help wonder whether remittances are the main factor for the rise of schooling in households with migrants, or whether households with families abroad are more likely to use extra money on education.

Although research on the impact of remittances on development is still being carried out, it is likely that the migration of the highly skilled from LDCs to developed countries cannot be fully compensated by remittances (Rapoport and Docquier, 2005). It has been suggested by Ratha (2003) that the more educated a migrant is, the less likely that they will remit. This could possibly be due to the fact that highly skilled and educated migrants are more likely to assimilate into the host country. Suro (2003), in his study, showed that only 19 per cent of migrant workers that earned more than $50,000 a year sent remittances. Seguin et al. (2006, p.81) went a step further, concluding, “the potential of highly skilled Diaspora is not being harnessed through remittances”. If that is the case then the best way to harness the skill of the knowledge Diasporas is to find other means for them to be effective in the developmental process of their country. This suggests that the mobilisation of the African intellectual Diaspora community is the key to the development of their country of origin.

**MOBILISING THE ETHIOPIAN KNOWLEDGE DIASPORAS**

Stark et al. (1997) reported that knowledge brought back by returning migrants could contribute to technological advances and this in turn would be a potential source of growth. In 2003, Dos Santos and Postel-Vinay suggested that policy change may be able to contribute to a rise in contributions by migrants and thus this flow of knowledge could increase the ‘brain bank’ of labour-sending countries. Consequently, the mobilisation of the African intellectual Diaspora community is key to the development of their country of origin.

Saxenian (2006) later painted an optimistic picture of those becoming part of the brain circulation, who she refers to as the ‘New Argonauts’. She argues that those joining the brain drain circulation were well equipped with education from top universities, Silicon Valley experience and network relationships and thus were able to operate in several countries at the same time. This in turn allowed them to identify new markets, locate foreign partners and manage cross-border business operations, and in the process, influence development and economic growth:

The ‘New Argonauts’ are undermining the old pattern of one-way flows of capital and technology from the core to the periphery into far more complex and decentralized two-way flows of skill, capital and technology. [And] they have created innovative collaborations in distant and specialized regional economies while avoiding head-on competition with industry leaders. (Saxenian, 2006, p.6)

The ‘brain gain strategies’ approach, divided into the return option and the Diaspora option (Brown, 2000), was used as a mechanism to attract expatriates back home. The return home option was established and implemented from the 1970s to the 1990s by many developing countries; however, only India, South Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan were effective at implementing it. South Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan were successful notably due to their growing economy. More recently, the relatively poor country of India, was successful at attracting its best and brightest diasporas back, mainly due to its ICT and biotechnology boom. Its “private sectors offer opportunities for skills of expatriates to be utilised, in addition to government’s ability to coordinate the policies and programs of multiple government ministries including that of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Overseas Indians, the Ministry of Science and Technology, and the Ministry of Education” (Seguin et al. 2006, p.85). One of the difficulties with the return option was the fact that many developing countries, including most of Africa, were unable to match salaries or create sufficient incentives to draw expatriates back home.
BACKGROUND

Ethiopia, known by many as Abyssinia, is located in Eastern Africa (what is known as the Horn of Africa). It has one of the oldest civilisations in the world and is unique among African countries. It is the only country in Africa, with the exception of the brief (1936–1941) occupation by the Italians during World War II, which maintained its freedom from colonial rule. It is credited with being the origin of mankind by the discovery of human bones — ‘Lucy’ (known by Ethiopians as Dinkenesh, meaning thou art wonderful) — and today forms the second most populous country in Sub-Saharan Africa, with a population of 78.2 million. Of these, 84 per cent reside in rural areas where agriculture is the predominant economic source and where infrastructure and social services are not developed (Ethiopia Population Image Report, 2006).

Ethiopia has experienced various conflicts, ranging from the rise of Islam in the 7th century to the resistance to the Portuguese control over the Indian Ocean. However, the overthrow of the last emperor, Haile Selassie, in 1974 by the military junta (the Derg) was the beginning of the suffering. This era, known as the ‘Red Terror’, resulted in the jailing, torture and death of over 609,000 people, of which 500,000 were civilians (Webb and von Braun, 1994, p.36).

By 1982 up to 4.5 million people had been displaced as a result of occasional drought, past civil strife and border fighting. It also sent thousands of young, educated Ethiopians abroad seeking asylum. During the Red Terror of 1977–1978, thousands of students and professionals were killed because “human rights violations characterized the government’s policy toward dissidents” (Library of Congress, 2005); this resulted in a major exodus of the young and educated. Today, it is estimated that there are one million Ethiopians living abroad (Nega et al., 2004). Of the estimated one million Ethiopians who reside outside the country, most are known to be concentrated in North America, the Middle East and Western Europe (Addis Tribune, 2004).

Ethiopia, a country that was once considered the oldest and the greatest civilisation in Africa, has been crippled and reduced to drought, famine and poverty. The participation rate in Ethiopia’s education sector is considered by many as one of the lowest in the world. The World Bank (2001) reported enrolment ratios of 30 per cent at primary, 13 per cent at secondary and less than one per cent at tertiary level.

There has been dramatic growth throughout the education system, especially in the last five years, in attempting to meet the 2015 Education For All (EFA) goal and also as part of the Ethiopian Millennium goals (Ethiopia uses the Coptic Orthodox Church calendar, which means 2000 began on Wednesday September 12th, 2007). In 2003/04, the education system had grown to about 9.5 million students in primary school and more than 700,000 in secondary schools (Dufera 2005). The 2005/06 Gross Enrolment Ratio (GER) at primary level (Grades 1–8) has reached 85.8 per cent compared to 30 per cent in 2000/01. With 43 per cent of the population under the age of 15, the Ethiopian government tries its best to make sure primary schooling is spread across the rural areas. However, access to basic education in Ethiopia remains a challenge for the government. Although the government has put a considerable amount of effort into providing basic education to all school-age children, 4.5 million of them are still out of school (Dufera, 2005), making the 2015 EFA goal much more difficult to attain.

ETHIOPIAN MIGRATION LINKAGES

The majority of Ethiopians residing abroad are found in the United States and Israel. However, Ethiopians are also found in Sweden, Germany, France, Greece, Canada, Australia, Belgium, Switzerland and New Zealand. Kasahun Ayele, the Ethiopian Ambassador to the United States, told British Broadcasting Commission (BBC) reporters in 2002 that there were over 500,000
Ethiopians living in the United States willing to contribute to the development of the country (BBC Monitoring Africa, 2002). In 2005, Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics estimated the Ethiopian-origin population to be 105,500.

According to Abye (2004 cited in Terrazas, 2007), Ethiopian migration to the West happened in four waves. The first wave of elites migrated before 1974. Abye (2004) finds that of this wave, 72 per cent of Ethiopians who migrated to France were from the ruling class. The second, much larger, wave of privileged migration was 1974–1982. The third wave, 1982–1991, comprised mainly Ethiopians who left Ethiopia to reunite in the West with families who had to leave the country for political reasons, or Ethiopian tourists who overstayed their visas. The fourth wave of migrating Ethiopians started in 1991 with highly skilled Ethiopians leaving their country in quest of better opportunities. The American Community Survey conducted by the United States Census Bureau in 2005 estimated 103,000 Ethiopian-born to be living in the United States and that 62 per cent of Ethiopians that were living there in 2000 had entered from 1990 to 2000 (see figure 2) (Terrazas, 2007).

The United States Census in 2000 also revealed that “approximately 29.5 per cent of US residents born in Ethiopia age 25 or older had at least a bachelors degree, and 84.1 per cent had a high school education or higher” (Terrazas, 2007, p.3). On the other hand, in Addis Ababa University, the leading university in Ethiopia, 70 per cent of the faculty (out of 850 pedagogues) did not have graduate-level training (Getahun, 2002).

Several capacity-building strategies, such as TOKTEN (Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals), were put in place by the United Nations and the Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA) in an effort to physically mobilise African intellectual Diasporas back to Africa and to transfer their knowledge, even if they did not return. MIDA seeks to contribute to the socio-economic development through the mobilisation of skills, financial and other resources of the African Diaspora, to reduce poverty and strengthen the technical and institutional capacities of the public and the private sectors. The Return and Reintegration of Qualified African Nationals (RQAN) program, one of MIDA’s programs, was designed by IOM in 1995 and was jointly implemented with participating countries. Although RQAN ran from 1995 to 1999, only 66 Ethiopian professionals were assisted by the organisation to return to Ethiopia (Kebede and...
Mehari, 2004). Thus, efforts to enhance contributions of African intellectual Diasporas that only focused on resettlement have not produced desired results.

Today the mobilisation of knowledge Diasporas has shifted to virtual participation, which is referred to by Meyer and Brown (1999) as ‘distant cooperative work’. Virtual brain mobility is defined by Teferra (2000) as skilled immigrant participation in nation building without physically relocating them to their native countries where their expertise is sought. Although efforts to regulate the impact of skilled personnel mobility has, in the past, relied on physical movement, the potential to exploit virtual mobility of the African knowledge Diasporas has been limited (Teferra, 2000). In 1994 only South Africa and Egypt had full access to the Internet; however, today there is hardly any country in Africa without some form of connectivity to the Internet (Teferra, 2000). If networks are vehicles for mobilising the Ethiopian Diaspora, technology such as the Internet is the fuel that maintains that connection. Thus, these developments in technology have the ability to provide another avenue to maximise the brain mobility option.

**TRANSACTIONAL NETWORKS**

Network approaches are the foundation of the Diaspora option. These networks of highly skilled expatriates, sometimes referred to as expatriate knowledge networks, transnational migration circuits, transnational social fields, transnational communities or bi-national societies, are defined by Brown (2000, p.5) as “a regular set of contacts or similar connections among individual actors or groups.” Brown (2000) has identified the purpose of the networks as the following: to mobilise Diasporas to contribute their skills and expertise to the economic and social development of the country of origin through setting up linkages and connections between network members and between them and their counterparts at home. Meyer and Brown (1999) have identified 41 formal knowledge networks, but only six of them are linked to African countries.

One of the main characteristics of these networks is their ability to provide highly skilled expatriates a way to set up links with their country of origin. These links provide opportunities for them to transmit their skills and expertise to their country of origin without necessarily returning home. With this approach the home country can benefit from the transfer of knowledge and expertise of the expatriate, the host country can continue to benefit from the knowledge and expertise that it sometimes helped create, and the members get to contribute in ways that were not possible before. Boyd (1989, p.641) sums up the network initiatives by stating:

> Networks connect migrants across time and space. Once begun, migration flows often become self-sustaining, reflecting the establishment of networks of information, assistance and obligations that develop between migrants in the host society and friends and relatives in the sending areas. These networks link populations in origin and receiving countries and ensure that movements are not necessarily limited in time, unidirectional or permanent.

These networks served as a vehicle for mobilising the Diaspora in giving back while still in their host countries. The networks are non-profit, non-governmental and started out spontaneously and sporadically around the world. However, it has set forth a structure that has potential for developing countries on which to capitalise (Brown, 2000). As stated by Vertovec (2002, p.12) “the resultant long-distance networks among local and foreign-based professionals can provide highly important channels throughout which run flows of capital, skill, managerial know-how and information.” The same point is reiterated by Lowell and Findlay (2001) who argue that the re-supply of highly educated populations to the sending country does not have to be achieved through permanent return or the physical presence of expatriates.
It is important to acknowledge that there is no uniform solution in reversing brain flow and thus various strategies and approaches should be used to address the issue. Additionally, the mobility of skilled labour is inevitable and attempting to control it with restrictive policies is nonsensical.

CONCLUSIONS

Brain drain is a migration trend that has continued to impede the development growth of the African continent. Some may choose to dismiss this phenomenon and write it off as the natural consequence of a globalised market economy. However, that in itself does not nullify the devastating effect that brain drain has been having on African countries. In order to move forward in turning brain drain into brain gain it is important to acknowledge this fact and thus mitigate the negative impact. In doing so, the African intellectual Diasporas abroad could be the new agents and the pioneers in transforming brain drain into brain gain, and the knowledge networks would be the gateway through which information, new technology and innovative ideas come to fruition. As Saxenian (2006, p.9) points out when the intellectual diasporas abroad invest in their home countries “…they transfer first-hand knowledge” and “…they bring the worldviews and identities that grow out of their shared professional and educational experiences.” With that in mind, African governments need to find new ways in which to invest and capitalise on one of their most essential assets: their intellectual Diasporas overseas.

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Deconstructing Neo-colonialism and liberalism: 
Kenya and the NGOs — A discourse analysis

Kiprono Lang’at
Charles Sturt University
klangat@csu.edu.au

Neo-colonialism theories bring back to life memories of colonial imperialism especially to the locals in countries such as Kenya where, 43 years after the proclamation of self-governance, most rural communities appear to be still awaiting the ‘true’ independence. The locals may have seen the political ‘peace’ and sovereign recognition of their state, but many are yet to realise the education and development systems that will set them free from being constructed by both their own government and non-government aid agencies as impoverished subjects. Perceived from the Kenyan experience, Spivak’s questions on ‘representability’ become not only relevant but, more importantly, identify a need for studies that will attempt to give voice or deconstruct the notions of the wamaskini (impoverished subjects) or in Spivak’s words ‘the subaltern’. The question made by Spivak (1985 cited in Gandhi, 1998, p.1) was, Can the subaltern speak? Indeed this was and still is a contested question. And even though such studies as this current one attempt in some way to let the selected impoverished subjects in Kenya speak in relation to the NGO-aided projects, the best it can offer is to add to the debates.

[Key words: Neo-colonialism, Kenya, NGOs, NGO Co-ordination Act]

INTRODUCTION

The descriptions of Nkrumah (1965 as cited in Smith, 1996) of neo-colonialism may still be applicable to the situation in Kenya. Nkrumah had said,

the essence of neo-colonialism is that the state which is subject to it is, in theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside. (Smith, 1996, p.121, emphasis in the original)

In summing up this neo-colonial ambivalence, Smith (1996) reiterated that “neo-colonialism operate[s] according to a number of distinct processes: through the terms of trade; the need for aid; the repatriation of profits; and technological dependency” (p.123). Of particular interest in this paper are the aid debates and, more importantly, the relation of the Kenyan government with the ‘community development’ aiding agencies, in this case the NGOs. This has been presented in an attempt to address two of the questions namely, how has the ‘state power’ enacted in the NGO Co-ordination Act of 1990 (Kenya Gazette Supplementary Acts, 1991) affected the NGOs operations in Kenya? What are the competing discourses resulting from stakeholders affected by the ‘Act’? It should be noted also that most of the discourses presented here are extracted largely from data collected from six (6) of the 39 informants interviewed in Kenya for this particular study. A brief history of neo-colonial Kenya follows as background to the conceptualising and deconstruction of the neo-colonialism debate that houses the discourses of education, poverty and development in Kenya.
NEO-COLONIAL KENYA

In 1963, almost two decades after the end of World War II, Kenya attained its independence from the British imperialists. Like other colonies ‘discovered’ by the imperialists, Kenya was ‘founded’ by Sir William Mackinnon in 1888 ‘in a London office’ (Dilley, 1966). In 1895, Kenya became one of the British White Colonies, as were Australia and Canada. The main interest for the White Settler imperialist was to exploit Kenya’s ‘underdeveloped resources’, mostly the fertile land (PPS, 1995). Until 1920, it was named British East Africa since Uganda, Tanganyika and Zanzibar (the two later became united to form Tanzania) were part of the colony. Before ‘discovering’ Kenya, the British colonials were more concerned with the ‘Anglo-Indian’ activities in the coastal regions of East Africa. The Indians, the Portuguese, and the Arabs who had arrived and ‘colonised’ the East African coast earlier had attracted the British. Their main objectives initially were the ending of the slave trade and the building of the Uganda–Kenya Railway (1896–1901). But the subsequent arrival of the Germans “making treaties with the natives, and indicating an intention of permanence” (Dilley, 1966, pp.4–15) at the coast around 1880 aroused British interest in East Africa (Leys, 1975). Following an agreement between the Germans and the British in 1886, the British imperialists began to access the interior regions of Kenya. What was ‘discovered’ in the interiors became the scene for the major colonialist exploits in Kenya until 1963.

Colonialism in Kenya has a long history. To continue with such a snippet of it would not only be unjust but will also divert the focus of this paper. That is, to trace the history of economic and political development in neo-colonialist Kenya with specific reference to the operation of the NGOs in Kenya. However, it should be noted that the geographical features and the location of Kenya have made it an attractive destination for many countries with interests in the imperially constructed Sub-Saharan African region. About four decades ago, Dilley (1966) explained why there were many white settlers rushing to Kenya after it became a British colony. Dilley said the “colony lies between parallels four north and four south of the equator. It is divided into three zones — Lowlands, Highlands, and Lake ... or coastal section” (p.6) which made Kenya conducive for the Europeans to inhabit because as Dilley (1966) wrote, the colonial imperialists ‘assumed’ they would “live without injury to health” (p.6).

The geographical features in Kenya also influenced the colonial settlers’ attraction to the colony and their subsequent ‘selfish-ownership’. Dilley (1966) and more recently Kenyaweb (2000), reveal Kenya as a plateau with a huge gash — the Great Rift Valley that cuts north and south of the country — the hot-water springs and volcano, and the snow-capped Mount Kenya. These features, along with economic opportunities arising from control of the agricultural highlands, led the imperialists to resist for more than 60 years attempts by the locals to reclaim their land. Andy, a community leader and farmer for many years, claimed during the interview that the land usage and governance in Kenya was put under the British protectorate in early 1900. Andy said, “they [settlers] took our land. They made us [locals] to be squatters in our own land and controlled us using the Kipande [personal identity card] ... it was horrible.” Andy is not his real name. Pseudonyms are used throughout this paper to protect the identity of the participants.

The ideas contained in the above texts can be interpreted in terms of Foucault’s notions of ‘governmentality’ and ‘managerialism’ (Burbules and Torres, 2000; see also, Foucault, 1991). Imperialists like Lord Delmare, and others who still own thousands of acres of land across the Kenyan highlands 43 years after independence, wanted to control the fertile highlands themselves.
Another reason that made Kenya a destination for the colonial imperialists was its location, Dilley pointed out:

Kenya reveals three outstanding features. It is cut east and west by the equator and by the Kenya and Uganda Railway, and north and south by the highlands. These features constitute factors of fundamental importance in the history and the progress that is Kenya. The combination of the three has produced a European population living permanently in the tropics in the midst of a larger native population (p.7).

Within the current neo-colonial Kenya, Dilley’s description of ‘authorities’ propagating selfish-individualism and capitalism appears still to be true, and even more intensified. According to Mwangi (2000), one administrative district in Kenya “has over 140,000 landless people against 500,000 hectares owned by 35 whites. Over 40,000 residents are squatters on these farms.” Mwangi’s report observes a situation in which individual Kenyans own large properties and continues to enslave fellow citizens in the post-independence era.

Criticising similar phenomena, that is, neo-colonialism, imperialism, capitalism and colonial desires, Loomba (1998) and McConaghy (1998) offer similar sentiments. Loomba points out, “colonialism can be defined as the conquest and control of other people’s land and goods ... [and] has been a recurrent and widespread feature of human history” (p.2). Further, Loomba argues that “modern colonialism was established alongside capitalism ... [And] did more than extract tribute, goods and wealth from the countries that it conquered — it restructured the economies of the latter, drawing them into a complex relationship with their own” (p.3). This new colonialism, that as I have noted is relevant to Kenyan situations, involves colonial desires which McConaghy (1998) argues, “connect the moral, the economic, the political, the scientific and sexual interest of the colonisers” (p.6). From these more recent claims it can be argued that the history of neo-colonial imperialism in Kenya may indeed be an ongoing phenomenon. The only difference could be that it is now both an ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ practice.

On the one hand there are remnants of the White Settler colonial imperialists who still own large farms and firms while larger populations of the locals remain squatters on the same properties. And on the other hand there are the ‘haves’ tribe (to use Ngugi’s words) who are mostly those in ‘power’ or who have the resources and have continued to amass wealth either through ‘legal’ means created by themselves or by way of ‘bureaugaracies’ (using legitimate power dominance to amass (corrupt) or embezzle public properties) or ‘kleptocracies’. Mwangi (2000) in his special report pointed out that the environment in Kenya “is at risk as grabbing goes on unabated”. Mwangi argues that a fresh water catchment area serving more than 30,000 locals had been allocated to an Italian investor to put up a casino. Mwangi concludes, “[c]ivil servants have joined the fray, either as grabbers or facilitators of the illegal acquisition of land.” At the heart of these latter ‘liberated’ local imperialists, lies the Kenyan impoverished masses living under the ‘dense web’ of double imperialism (the emerging own ‘blood/colour’ imperialists and the reincarnated likes of Lord Delmare). These masses are still waiting for uhuru (independence). Colonialism is still real in Kenya and to a large extent remains the key generator of poverty in Kenya and other regions. In what appear to be mouthpieces of the ‘unvoiced’ impoverished subjects (wamaskini) or subalterns in Kenya are the NGOs and their neo-imperialism theories of ‘advocacy’, ‘empowerment’ and improving the living standard of the poor. This current study has attempted to trace the operations of these NGOs from 1990. This period was considered important since this was the time the Kenya government formed an NGO Co-ordinating Board (hereafter referred to as NGOCB) to ‘regulate the growing number of its NGO bodies’ (Zack, NGOCB representative and one of the informants in this current study) (see also Kenya Gazette Supplementary Acts, 1991).
Before attempting to situate the emerging debates about the partnership between the Kenyan government and the operation of the co-ordinating board of the NGOs (the offshoots of neo-colonialism), I will outline the 1972 decolonising narratives of Ngugi wa Thiong’o. The main objective in doing this is to attempt to apply to this current study some of these narratives to the emerging discourses of education, poverty and development in the neo-colonial Kenya and, indeed, in the new century.

More than three decades ago, Ngugi (1972) pointed out that Kenya’s inherited economy and other institutions have simply ‘blackanised’ the personnel, but that the inherited colonial past has not been broken (p.xvi). Ngugi went further to argue:

*There has been no basic land reform; the settler owning 600 acres of land is replaced by a single African owning the same 600 acres. There has been no change in the structure and nature of ownership of various companies, banks and industries ... the companies remain foreign-owned ... no socialisation of the middle commercial sector ... not much structural reform in the education system; the former white schools remain as special high standard schools, attended by those who can afford the exorbitant fees (p.xvi).*

In what appears a reinforcement of Spivak’s question of 1985: Can the subaltern speak? Ngugi had posed the question:

*Do we think that Western capitalism and classes that run it have suddenly changed their motives and interest in Africa? Aid, loans, Oxfam, and other freedom from hunger campaigns — where has this disinterested philanthropy, not manifest when Europe was in actual political control of Africa, suddenly emerged from (p.xvi)?*

As I stated at the beginning of this paper, one simple answer to these contested questions is to label them as rhetoric. The other possible way is to rethink the challenges posed in the questions and address them by using more recent critical research tools such as post-colonial and critical discourse analysis (see for example, Fairclough, 1989; Luke, 1999; Taylor, 1997). This current study attempts to apply analysis to post-colonial discourses like new corporatism, neo-liberalism, partnership among others. This is done by analysing the data collected from a case study of an international NGO selected stakeholders in Kenya. Analysis of these discourses as Gandhi (1998) argues assists in the decolonising process, which is indeed the main objective in this paper (p.4). It is part of the process of overcoming post-colonial amnesia that is “symptomatic of the urge for historical self-invention or the need to make a new start — to erase painful memories of colonial subordination” (Gandhi, 1998. p.4).

The data presented in this paper were collected from six informants/participants. All were stakeholders in the NGO case chosen for this present study. As stated earlier, the participants were selected government agents, donor agents, NGO officers, and beneficiaries of the case projects. In summary, the key objective was to focus on the operation of Buddy (pseudonym for the NGO) in Kenya, its modes of implementing education and community development projects and the perceived importance of education and training to the cultural backgrounds of the recipients, and to probe for alternatives for better participation in, and sustainability of, selected Buddy-based projects.

The next sections discuss competing dominant discourses of political non-alignment, *TKK* (bribery), grassroots advocacy, radicalism (autonomy), accountability and transparency, and territorialism claimed by most informants from without the Government arena, and the discourses of new corporatism, partnership, governmentality and managerialism held by the informants who were mostly government representatives. The first part presents perceived opinions of the
informants outside of the NGO Board (Kenyan Government’s NGOs regulatory body). The second part highlights the Board representative’s response as a way of comparing and contrasting the opinions in order to draw possible conclusions. The names are not the real names of the informants. They have been used for anonymity purposes. [Note. Itx0 represents the interviewer].

The discourse of political non-alignment, TKK, community grassroots advocacy, radicalism (autonomy), accountability and transparency, and territorialism

The following are some of the interview extracts between me and four informants interviewed individually. Although the four were interviewed as Buddy’s stakeholders, Nick and Edna were also involved with other NGO activities in other regions. Details of their responsibilities have been mentioned in the analysis that follows the extracts.

Itx0: How has the introduction of the NGO Co-ordination Act impacted on your operations?

Mick: …over the recent past there has been complaints that it is politically driven. Hence, we had minimal contact with the NGO Board. Except for the annual reports we send, (shakes the head) we do not hear much from them [board] …

Nick: You see, Board should be holding regular meetings with us [NGOs] but like other government offices, the board becomes active only when it comes to receiving reports at the end of the financial year. And of course (with laughter) when they know they will benefit financially as individuals from the programs being run by either [specific] NGOs or they have gotten money from somewhere [donor agents] and are forced to hold seminars.

Itx0: What sort of ‘regular meetings’ are you suggesting?

Edna: There are a lot of challenges we encounter during the implementations of some of our projects. Sometimes these challenges may be issues requiring attention outside of our objectives or advocacy that might be seen as political by the government officers in that region. Regular forums help to correct such issues … but as it happen to one of our partner NGOs recently, the board, on receiving the claims, went on to police and investigate secretly…. Yes, not all NGOs [in Kenya] are sincere in their activities and the Government [NGOCB] has a right to deregister them. But it should not be partial like in 1990s when the NGOs opposed to KANU were....

(Probed whether the collaboration with the Government is necessary, the officer responded):

Surely yeah, we are operating because of the recognition we get from the Government…. What I am saying is, even though the Government plays a leading role in our community work, we all need to be transparent and accountable with each other to avoid uncalled suspicions.

Responding to same questions in a different forum, Amon, another informant, was consistent with the contribution to the above interviewees’ allegations. Of importance, however, was the last submission in regard to the question. Appearing irritated, Amon said:

This [subscription to the Board] is all politics and I hate it, personally I have no problem with NGO Board, but I think the Government feels insecure when an NGO reports or advocates for issues contrary to its political wishes. Hence, [the Government seems to] use the Board as a tool to gain dictated political allegiance and since all NGOs subscribe to the Board, they should be sympathetic to the Government…. Not all regions we operate are
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‘KANU Zones’ [regions where the then ruling political party claims the mandate of the local people]. Our organisation operates irrespective of tribes, religions or political parties…. The outlined objectives of the board are reasonable but it [may] have ceased to be effective due to ongoing corruptions and pressure from the ruling party. It is unfortunate, that even at multi-party era, the political democracy we often hear [in Kenya, seems] not to have been achieved.

If we look deeper into the responses of the informants above and in relation to their positions or roles, we come to understand why they responded the way they did. Mick is one of the officers of Buddy with three years experience in local community micro-credit business, and reports to a senior officer. This explains why Mick’s contact with NGO Board is ‘minimal’. During the interview, Mick’s body language like shaking his head, the choice of words such as ‘politically driven’ and ‘minimal contact’, reveal the attitude of political non-alignment. This is the act of removing oneself from the mainstream party or public politics to concentrate on ‘closed-door politics’ that goes on in most organisations. Amon, who is a senior Buddy officer with more than 12 years experience of monitoring and planning the activities of the NGO, reiterated a similar discourse of political non-alignment as Mick. This could be attributed to the fact that they are both officers affiliated to a religious-oriented NGO that claims in its mission statement not to subscribe to any political party or movement.

Both Mick and Amon seem to agree that the NGOCB is ‘politically driven’. It is unclear from Mick’s text who is behind the political influence of the Board. However, the ‘advocacy’ claimed by Amon may be an answer. Amon mentioned that sometimes the NGOs ‘advocacy’ puts pressure on the government, making it feel insecure and leading to government threats to use its ‘state power’ through the Board to ‘discipline’ the NGOs. In what looked like avoidance of conflict with the government, Mick, unlike Amon, opted to keep a distance from the Board. Although Amon claimed to ‘hate politics’, his grassroots advocacy that sometimes conflicts with the wishes of the government contradicts his assertions. His contradictions were further revealed when he talked of the failure of multi-party politics to bring ‘democracy’ in Kenya.

Also found in these responses is a discourse of endemic corruption claimed by both Amon and Nick. The corruption is endemic in the sense that Amon refers to it as ‘ongoing’, that is continual. Nick used phrases that may be summarised in terms of bribery discourse: government officers being activated through tipping which is also a sign of endemic corruption. Nick, who despite participating in this study as a member of the advisory board in one of the Buddy’s capacity building educational projects, was working as a consultant in another NGO after retiring as a government education officer. His allusion to corruption when referring to the government’s NGOCB operations, therefore, could be a reflection on the situation in government offices during his tenure. His claims on bribery, that in Kenyan discourse is better known as Toa Kitu Kidogo (TKK: give something small), was also identified as common in Kenyan government offices through the reviewed newspaper reports by Mugonyi (2000), Mutahi (2000), and Mwangi (2000). They claimed that a number of government officers are demanding TKK for almost every service needing their attention. Sadly, the Kenya Bribery Index 2007 report by Transparency International Kenya (2007), indicates that demanding of TKK in a number of public institutions in Kenya remains endemic despite the current Kenyan government winning the elections in 2002 on a “zero-tolerance to corruption” (Kibaki, 2002) campaign (see also Daily Nation Editorial, 2007).

Continuing with an analysis of the informants’ texts above, the discourse of grassroots advocacy that was mentioned earlier in the analysis is also prevalent in Edna’s text extract. Compared to Amon, Edna shows that she is more political and radically involved in the affairs of the NGOCB. Edna, a community leader, is actively participating in ‘community grassroots advocacy’
programs. Her discourses of community grassroots advocacy and radicalism appeared to be inclined to one of a busy advocate. She claimed to encounter many challenges in the implementation of projects. The ‘sweet business (market) language’ of neo-liberals that she uses is also noticeable. She argues that the NGO involvement in politics is not really the intention but the nature of advocacy forces it on them. She acknowledges the fact that “issues requiring attention outside of [their] objectives or advocacy” may arouse the government’s attentions but thinks regular forums help to streamline the co-operation. She also introduces some other discourses of accountability and transparency that are common in neo-liberalism where the focus is in the project or the ‘market’. According to her, if the two processes are followed, problems of partialities and threats of deregistrations will be minimised. Edna argues that as partners in ‘community work’, the government should “avoid uncalled suspicions”.

The partialities and suspicions of the Board in the 1990s that Edna refers to are also implied in Amon’s text. They could be the outcome of two major incidents involving NGOs noted in the literature. These were the advocacy during the shift from single to multi-party politics by the Kenyan government in the early 1990s (Bennett, 1995; Porter et al., 1991). The other was the deregistration of five NGOs in 1998 by the government that led to particular NGOs claiming that the government acted with partiality (You can appeal, NGOs now told, 1998).

When one combines the texts from the informants who contributed and held similar allegations it is clear that the informants were all affected in one way or the other by the outcomes of the 1990 Act, despite engaging somewhat different discourses when discussing it. This appears to be because of the extent to which the NGOCB has in some ways failed to deliver services beyond being an NGOs’ watchdog, issuing certificates and collaborating with the ruling party in a way that has resulted sometimes in a breach of its own Act.

**Discourse of new corporatism, partnership, governmentality and managerialism**

Despite the allegations made against the NGO Co-ordination Board by some of the informants in this current study and backed by the evidence cited from the available literature, the data collected from the Board’s representative (Zack) and a Government officer linked to the Board (Tim) seemed to negate them. As mentioned earlier, the government representatives maintain that harmony has been sustained with all the 5,000+ currently registered NGOs in Kenya (Beja, 2007) over the past years through dialogue and transparency. The discussion with the officers follows [Itx0 is my identity].

**Itx0:** Did the introduction of the NGO Board Act affect the operation of NGOs in Kenya in any way?

**Zack:** Definitely yeah…

**Itx0:** Could you please explain some more?

**Zack:** NGOs are more accountable and transparent now than before, we are able to dialogue, monitor and keep track of their development contributions through the annual returns we receive from them [NGOs].

**Itx0:** Did the NGOs welcome the move?

**Tim:** You see, the enactment period of the Act [1990] was indeed a challenge … [Some] NGOs at first saw the Board as an enemy. (Probing why it was the case, the response was) … you know at first the NGOs were seen [by political leaders] to be the enemies to the Government and we happen to be a government body. So we [the Board] were seen to be against the NGOs’ activities. This was a misconception! Because many donors used to see
the Government to be not transparent and therefore they were looking at it [the registration policy] to be kind of against the NGOs’ legislation, which actually was not the case.

Itx0: *Was the issue addressed?*

Zack: The Government thought that it was necessary to bring together [NGOs and Board members] to iron out issues like transparency, governance, and accountability. And that is why in the process, these accountability and transparency is now, you know, many NGOs are nowadays giving their annual returns. They are giving what they have [assets] and they are saying what they are doing [projects] … there was always what we call suspicion.

Itx0: *When did the actual registration of NGOs by the Board begin?*

Zack: … the time of registration was after 1992 when multi-partism [sic] … came in. So, it was suspected that it [the Board] was against the NGOs. [Since particular] NGOs were seen to be partisan to other [political] parties, not the KANU Government. That was the reason [for enmity] but that environment has already been cleared through workshops and seminars. NGOs have understood development, the Government have understood NGOs, and they are now working together. That is why there is partnership in development [between the NGOs and the Government].

Although there was no documentation or proof of any recent or current training seminars or workshops attended by both the National NGO Council and the NGO CB, what the officer claimed as having created an ‘enabling environment’ could be those seminars held immediately after the passing of the NGO Co-ordination Bill in 1990. Bennett (1995) to a greater degree supports Zack’s assertions of the outcomes of such meetings. Bennett says:

> This strategy [the dialogue with the government representatives] succeeded, firstly, in slowing down the enactment of the Act until 1992 and secondly, in securing amendments to two sections of the Act. The judicial powers of the Minister were reduced and hence NGOs could seek redress from courts in arbitration of disputes. Further, NGO representation on the NGO Board was increased from five to eight members (p.94).

Throughout the discussions with the informants, it was evident that the NGO CB management had adopted new discourses to describe, legitimise and justify their approach to the work of its clients, the NGOs. Apart from being the ‘monitor’ and a tool kit for registration, the board talked in terms of partnership or co-operation with the NGOs. What is interesting and important to note in the above interview extract is the similarity in the choice of words and expressions used by the informants. Like Edna, an NGO officer, whose text was analysed earlier in this paper, Zack and Tim, both key personalities in the government’s established NGO Co-ordination Board, use words like challenges, accountability, and transparency to describe the operation and relationship between the NGOs and the Board. Edna had said they (the NGOs) were facing “a lot of challenges”, both in their co-operation with the Board and in their implementation of projects, and called for a regular forum to correct such challenges. Tim reiterated that their relationship with the NGOs “was indeed a challenge” because the “NGOs at first saw the Board as an enemy”. But as Tim claimed, “this was a ‘misconception!’ Why? Because as Zack claimed, the “environment has already been cleared through workshops and seminars” or in Edna’s words, through “regular forums”. The use of ‘past tense’ by the Board officers is also worth noting. Both Zack and Tim refer to the misunderstanding with the NGOs as an issue in the past. They use verbs like ‘used to’ and auxiliary verbs such as ‘was a misconception’ and ‘were seen’, and ‘were looking’. The reference to the problems as ‘challenges’ by Edna and Tim is an acknowledgement that the problems were solvable rather than irreconcilable conflicts. All of these issues raised by the Board
representatives are aspects of the discourses of partnership, which in some cases has been taken up by NGO representatives themselves.

The discourses of accountability and transparency mentioned above are aspects of neo-liberalism, which emphasises being accountable and transparent. Yet at the same time, the work of the NGOCB contradicts other aspects of neo-liberalism, such as privatisation and an unregulated free market (MacEwan, 1999).

In order to assess the foreign aid that has been channelled through the NGOs operating in Kenya, the Government has had to rethink ‘market-friendly policies’ (MacEwan, 1999) that would attract or retain the NGOs. According to MacEwan, market-friendly policies are one form of neo-liberalism that states such as Kenya apply in order to access more of the World Bank’s, the IMF’s and other donor agencies’ funds that would otherwise be difficult for the Government to obtain (p.8) (see also, Lang’at, 2001; ‘The World Bank—NGOs’, 1998). In Kenya, these market-friendly strategies include privatisation of most state-owned authorities and companies particularly in the transport, communications and agricultural sectors.

If this market-friendliness of the Kenyan government is accepted as a possible reason for the new corporatism (forming one body of a large organisation or group of companies for business purposes), then it would explain the reason why the number of NGOs being registered in the country has grown from about 600 in 1992 to more than 5,000 in 2007 (Beja, 2007; NGOCB, 1996; NGOs Kenya, 2000). Also it would imply that the Government to some extent has ‘empowered’ these NGOs for marketability purposes, that is, to operate as a free market. That is why they are now ‘partners in development’. The Board is now, as the NGOs informants put it, ‘only active when it comes to collecting reports at the end of the year’. Further, Tim had said, “the reason why some of these NGOs are effective in community development is due to their working experiences at the community grassroots levels. They understand the needs of the poor in those villages sometimes more than the Government.” This could be a clear affirmation that these NGOs have not only been empowered but are also ‘democratically’ accepted as understanding the needs of the impoverished subjects seemingly more than the Government itself. What is noticeable from the responses of the government officers is a contradiction between the recognition by the government of the private provision of the social services via the NGOs and the government’s desire to control NGOs through the NGOCB. Also, from the analysis of the responses of the NGOs officers and the NGOCB representatives, I would argue that in the last decade there has been a shift towards minimal control by the NGOCB and greater autonomy for the NGOs (see for example, Ogutu and Ruto, 2007).

**IMPLICATIONS**

The immediate questions that may be asked are: Who are these NGOs? Where is their strength coming from? The possible answer in the context of this current study is found in discourses of neo-colonialism already highlighted. At the beginning of this paper, Gandhi (1998), McConaghy (2000) and Ngugi (1972, 1986) identified neo-colonialism as a process which in countries like Kenya perpetuates former colonial imperialists’ discourses of ‘assimilationism’ or ‘mimicry’ and have continued desire for foreign donations as a way of rebuilding their economic development. Where is the possible way forward for development in such countries as neo-colonial Kenya? Handelman (2000) argues for rethinking socioeconomic revolution. Although mention of revolution may conjure notions of revolts, coups and tribal/ethnic wars, Huntington (1968 as cited in Handelman, 2000) suggested an alternative understanding of revolution:

> A revolution is a rapid, fundamental, and [radical] domestic change in dominant values and myths of society, in its political institutions, social structures, leadership
and government activity and policies. Revolutions are thus to be distinguished from insurgencies ... and wars (p.157).

Further, Handelman identifies ‘regime decay’ as a state in which leaderships are not fully independent in economic, social and political development and still rely largely on foreign donations (Handelman 2000, p.160). This line of thinking may further reinforce the need for a revolution that challenges neo-liberalisation when the ‘great’ rich control the economy at the expense of the constructed impoverished subjects. This revolution could be what Handelman (2000, p.162) called “challenged from below” or in MacEwan’s (1999) words “democratic economic development strategy” where, the inputs of the locals are considered equally and where ‘development’ is viewed as a down-up change of lives. Handelman asserts, “[r]evolution opportunities ... may develop when the economy deteriorates, standards of living decline, and the government is unable to meet long standing economic responsibilities to its populations” (p.161).

Could this be relevant to the current economic situation in neo-colonial Kenya? These ideas are beyond the scope of this paper. It calls for more research that will attempt to identify further the neo-colonial legacies of education, poverty and development in Kenya. The relationship between the Kenya government and its NGOs brought about by the enactment of the NGO Co-ordination Act of 1990 is a complex one. Discourses of neo-liberalism dominate the relationship and as it has been argued by a number of renowned scholars and critics of colonialism, modernity and development, the Kenyan situation is neo-colonial. Gaining political independence appears not to have changed the living situation of most of its population. Instead of the Government providing for its citizens, some relevant bodies appear to have ‘democratically’ licensed and empowered the non-governmental bodies to ‘develop’ the impoverished subjects at the ‘grassroots levels’. In other words, the Government has entered into a new corporatism with ‘development partners’ who are largely being supported and aided by Euro-western agents. This takes us back to Ngugi’s 1972 question that was posed at the beginning of the paper: Do we think that [Euro-] Western capitalism and classes that run it have suddenly changed their motives and interest in [Kenya]?

Hence, throughout this paper it was shown that there is a need for more practical and workable strategies to enable the locals to progress in various aspects desirable to their short- and long-term existence. Furthermore, more intense post-colonial studies that aim to revisit, remember and, crucially, interrogate the colonial past (Gandhi, 1998) are required. These studies, I argue, will counter and deconstruct the challenges of neo-colonialism and neo-liberalism legitimacy brought about through neo-colonial legacies in both the Kenyan government agencies and the non-government development agencies.

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Deconstructing Neo-colonialism and Liberalism


Mar Elias, Arab Christians of Israel, and the Sign of the White Dove

Brian D. Denman
University of New England
bdenman@une.edu.au

Marie Loller
Mar Elias Educational Institutions
peacecenter@m-e-c.org

Rebecca Spence
University of New England
rspence1@une.edu.au

The intent of this paper is to relate the formation of a tertiary institution as part of Mar Elias Educational Institutions and to identify the spheres of influence and relevant factors that may lead to its success or demise. It considers the relevance of its founding president, Abuna Elias Chacour, whose installation as Archbishop of the Galilee in early 2006 has brought a sense of cautious optimism. It identifies some arguments for and against the Mar Elias project’s possible identity as a Christian-oriented and peace-building institution and the goal of increasing educational standards and opportunities for the community-at-large. It also maps the current climate of tertiary education in Israel with emphasis placed on those institutions serving the Arab population and considers possible scenarios for a future Mar Elias university.

[Key words: Mar Elias, Israel, Chacour, Arabs, Jews]

INTRODUCTION

Situated between Haifa and Nazareth, the Mar Elias Educational Institutions (MEEI) are located in the heart of a large Arab14 community in northern Israel. The geographic position of MEEI is significant because Christianity originated in this region. Arabs represent the majority of those who reside there, even though there are pockets of Jewish settlements strewn throughout the area that have been increasing since the 1990s. The Arab population is one people of various religious, ethnic and cultural heritage (i.e. Muslim, Christian, Palestinian, Bedouin), but is often collectively persecuted and marginalised as a consequence of their cultural and religious beliefs and contentious issues relative to land ownership.

MEEI consists of a cluster of buildings representing a school campus for primary, secondary, and post-secondary students. Both MEEI and the Arab community-at-large have experienced much conflict and hardship from within Israel and abroad. Beyond instability and conflicting interests stemming from a torn nation-state, MEEI has also suffered in its quest to establish a recognised academic institution with degree-granting authority.

This paper makes no attempt to analyse the complex rift between the peoples identified as Arab and Jewish citizens of Israel. Such contestations have been well documented on both sides.

14 In this paper the term Arab is used to indicate only the Arab Palestinian citizens who constitute approximately 20% of the population of Israel. They are also often referred to as Arab-Israelis, Israeli-Arabs or Palestinian-Israelis.
Instead, it attempts to highlight salient aspects pertaining to the socio-educational gaps between the two, which may help set apart disparities in educational provision. This is necessary in order to conceptualise and analyse aspects of Israel’s educational system and provide a more detailed picture of education for Israeli Arabs in northern Israel.

Methodologically, this paper utilises a combination of empirical research, comparative and national system case studies, and theoretical explorations to contextualise the Arab social-cultural context and circumstance. In the process, it attempts to argue the position for a more peaceful resolve between Arabs and Jews by establishing a formal tertiary institution geographically situated in northern Israel, which specifically caters for the region’s marginalised peoples. In addition, it compares and contrasts a limited range of Israeli higher education institutions in an effort to distinguish MEEI from others in terms of curriculum, teaching, learning, ideas and practices. Finally, it critically examines its formation with that of other newly formed universities in the developing world that serve to support a nation or culture.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The land today known as Israel/Palestine has been at a crossroads for trade and pilgrimage for over 5000 years. It has been the subject of invasion, colonisation and a continuum of competing religious and political claims over the millennia. There have also been periods of calm when its inhabitants (the peoples of Islam, Judaism and Christianity) have lived together harmoniously. In more recent times, the rise of religious radical groups, retaliatory violence, and issues involving identity have brought instability, uncertainty, and turmoil to the region.

The differing narratives of Jewish and Arab histories in Israel have developed largely through isolation or ignorance. The Jewish national perspective has been built upon a strong ideological and religious framework in relation to their belief that the ‘promised land’ in the region of Canaan was given to their ancestors by the God of Abraham. The Arab perspective relies on the notion of belonging to the land and ancestral heritage dating back to the Canaanites, Edomites, and Philistines (Ichilov, 2005). Since the declaration of the State of Israel in 1948, seven major wars and ongoing conflict have deepened the divisions between peoples and entrenched systemic inequities for the minorities. Attempting to bring stability and peace has resulted in a range of major international and multilateral interventions of the United Nations, numerous resolutions put to the Security Council, direct involvement of the United States, and instruments such as the Oslo and Geneva Accords. The success of these and other international interventions has been questionable. Contentious issues regarding land, security, identities and special segregation seem unresolvable in the quest for a mutually agreeable end to the conflict. Militarisation and the might of weaponry have not brought stability or security to the region. Retaliatory violence continues to exacerbate conflicts and escalate destruction and despair. All Israeli citizens live in a constant state of tension and insecurity.

From an outsider’s perspective, Israel is widely perceived as both a tiny Jewish minority and yet an integral part of the Arab Middle Eastern region. From an insider’s perspective, however, the State of Israel — in terms of cultural, societal and political norms — perceives itself as more aligned with Mediterranean Europe. Politically speaking, it is described as the only democracy in the Middle East and its economic and educational systems have been developed in line with Western ethos and practice. These support a normative approach to majority rule. Although the Jewish population constitutes a majority, there is a significant Arab population residing in Israel (as opposed to West Bank and Gaza). Despite this, Israel “…is the only country in the Middle East where Arabs are a minority, constituting about 13 per cent (in 1948)” (Ichilov, 2005, pp.46–47).
THE CURRENT SCENE

At present, Arabs in Israel, both Muslims and Christians, constitute approximately 20 per cent of Israel’s diverse population as illustrated in Figure 1. The emphasis placed on minority/majority ratio deepens the degree of separation among people in an ethnic, ideological and cultural sense. The asymmetry of power relationships in all sectors has exacerbated divisions. The voices of minorities, for a range of reasons, are rarely heard and usually unrecognised in public discourse. In turn, this reinforces notions of victim-hood and reliance on welfare within minority groups, and further promotes oppression and discrimination throughout all areas of human endeavour: economic, educational, health, political.

Figure 1: Population of Israel by group, 2004

Note: In 2004, the Israeli–Arab population totalled 1.3m and the Israeli–Jewish population totalled 5.5m. The ‘others’ refer to non-Arab Christians and those not classified by religion.

Lack of access to quality education and employment opportunities — especially for women — under-representation in community development, high levels of child poverty, racial profiling and the psychological effects of suspicion, fear and negative stereotyping within the Arab population are well documented (Kamm, 2003), and supported by census figures (Central Bureau of Statistics, Israel: Online). The future for Arab citizens in Israel also appears highly uncertain. Discrimination in employment has forced many Arabs into lower paying, physical work, and it is not unusual to find Arab graduates highly overqualified for their jobs (Kamm, 2003 p.51 and Al Haj15). Security clearance for Arabs is an issue for the State of Israel that places immense emphasis on the need for constant vigilance against threats to the safety and security of its majority. Military service is often required as a prerequisite for employment of all residents and since this is largely limited to the Jewish, Druze and Bedouin populations, Israeli Arabs are often disadvantaged.

Co-existence between Arabs and Jews in Israel is perceived as one of the requisites for national stability and eventual reconciliation; however, two separate communities have emerged as each struggles to maintain the integrity of its own heritage. There is also the ‘deliberate segmentation of the Arab sector’ supported by separate school systems (Kamm, 2003, p.3). “Education is the central vehicle for nation building in Israel, [and] … minorities are integrated to the degree that their integration does not threaten the state’s basic Jewish character” (Kalekin-Fishman and Eden, 2003, p.33). Very limited budget allocations for education have generally resulted in lower levels of achievement in the Arab population, which in turn impacts on future employment opportunities as described above. A recent government directive encourages affirmative action in order to facilitate the employment of educated Arabs, but this does not address the root causes of the issue (Halpern, 2006).

15 Professor Majid El Haj, Sociologist, Haifa University: From an unpublished address to the Al Qandil conference on Arab Higher Education, Nazareth, May 2006.
Bridging the Divide

Addressing the Arab Christian population, a trend of increasing emigration and brain drain has become a source of great anxiety (CNEWA 2002). This group tends to seek higher education degrees and job opportunities in specialised fields in Western countries. Israeli government statistics show that the number of Christians has declined significantly from 29 per cent in 1949 to approximately 2.1 per cent in December 2005 (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2005).

The decline in overall numbers of Arab Christians and Druze is illustrated in Figure 2 and suggests a possible Diaspora, natural decline in fertility, or both.

![Figure 2: Comparison of Israeli Arab Population by Religion (1950 and 2003)](image)

Figure 2: Comparison of Israeli Arab Population by Religion (1950 and 2003)


SIGNIFICANTLY, HOWEVER, IT IS ARAB CHRISTIANS WHO RELIGIOUSLY, PSYCHOLOGICALLY AND EDUCATIONALLY STRADDLE THE SO-CALLED EAST/WEST DIVIDE AND WHO INCREASINGLY ARE BEING RECOGNISED AS A FORCE OF MODERATION IN THE CONTEXT OF MUSLIM AND JEWISH GROUPS IN ISRAEL.

As an educational institution founded upon Christian values and which includes a predominantly Muslim student body (high school 65%; college/university 80%) Mar Elias Educational Institutions has been modelled as a strategy to increase educational access and equity and to stem emigration by retaining young people in the Galilee region.

Mar Elias as a Tool for Peace

In 1965, a newly ordained Arab Palestinian Israeli Melkite Catholic priest named Abuna Elias Chacour\(^{16}\) set in motion a bold new direction for the Arabs of northern Israel. Chacour had been sent on a temporary placement to the — then — isolated and impoverished village of Ibillin (near Nazareth in central Galilee, Israel). At that time, Ibillin’s population of 3,500 Muslims and Christians included some 50 per cent who were under the age of 14 years. It was common for entire families, even three- and four-year-olds, to work in the fields during the harvest season. Chacour’s first practical initiative was to persuade three Catholic nuns from Nazareth to open a small kindergarten in the parish house located in Ibillin. Chacour believed that if his people were to improve their life situation in the midst of ongoing conflict within the general culture,

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\(^{16}\) Chacour has received numerous awards for peace-building work, among them three Nobel Peace Prize nominations, the Niwano Peace Prize (Buddhist equivalent to Nobel Prize), America’s First Freedom Award, Israel Lion’s Man of the Year, and several honorary doctorates.
education had to become a priority. The completion of the local high school in 1982 marked the official beginning of Mar Elias Educational Institutions (MEEI). Its institutions currently include kindergarten to tertiary levels. Figure 3 notes the distribution of students by school level.

Figure 3: Student Distributions According to School Levels at Mar Elias

NOTE: The Regional Teachers’ Center is included as part of Mar Elias, since it offers a necessary training and professional development facility for teachers in the region. The 220 students of the Mar Elias Branch Campus of the University of Indianapolis are not counted since it is as yet not a fully recognised Israeli academic institution.

The Mar Elias complex today has itself grown into a small village of over 3,850 pupils and students who, if they wish, can continue their studies at all the various school levels. Over 290 teachers (Christian, Muslim, Jewish and Druze), administrative and caretaker staff are employed. Many of the Arab teachers are overqualified. Over 60 PhD recipients are employed as teachers, for example, and several of these teach only in the high school.17 Muslim, Christian and Druze students receive an education uncompromisingly focused on inclusion, openness, and mutual respect of the other.

Remarkably, this extensive complex was begun with no financial resources on a small piece of non-arable land owned by the Melkite Church. As an Arab institution, it suffered much opposition from local and regional authorities and, consequently, received minimal government funding. The local villagers, together with the high school students and their teachers, volunteered their time to work on the physical building of the school after dismissal of classes. Local contractors provided materials and labour at very much reduced rates. From the outset, Chacour insisted that the school be open to all students of any faith affiliation or ethnicity, since the building of a harmonious society would depend on instilling respect, acceptance, and mutual trust in the hearts and minds of all citizens of Israel. At present, it is considered a multicultural and multifaith complex with 10 per cent Jewish, 35 per cent Muslim and 54 per cent Christian and 1 per cent Druze faculty members.18

17 Statistics obtained from MEEI Administration Office, February 2006
18 Statistics obtained from MEEI Administration Office, February 2006
Unlike other schools in Israel, the educational philosophy of Mar Elias has promoted a system that accepts Jewish standards as laid down by the Ministry of Education and at the same time ensures that Arabic culture, values and heritage are an integral part of the daily curricula. Students are expected to be at home on a campus where they are encouraged to ‘be the best Muslim or Christian or Jew that they can be’. Formal participation in Arab/Jewish dialogue and personal development programs is important and fundamental in breaking down a segregated system of public education.

Higher Education in Israel and Mar Elias

Unfortunately, at this writing, there is no Arab public university in Israel. The Central Bureau of Statistics (2005) records the median age of the Arab population as 19.7 years compared to 30.3 years for the Jewish population. Yet Arab students comprise only 8.1 per cent of all university students in Israel. In 2003, 51 per cent of Arab high school graduates matriculated but only 31 per cent of these met university entrance requirements. Among Jewish high school graduates, 57 per cent matriculated and 48 per cent were accepted into university programs. According to Mar Elias’ planning estimates,19 each year over 5,000 Israeli Arabs enrol in offshore academic degree programs in Jordan, Europe and North America. Although all the reasons for these circumstances may be unknown, what is clear is that there is a significant loss to the knowledge base and socio-economic development of Israel.

Apart from their exclusion from educational opportunities, there are ranges of social and cultural factors that disadvantage Arab students in their quest for higher education at Israeli universities. The following list notes some of the most important factors:

• Arabs represent only 1 per cent of university lecturers nationwide (Levy-Barzilai, 2001).

• Military service is not a legal requirement for Arabs but evidence of successful completion of army service is required for many social and economic benefits. A recent report by Traubmann and Joffe-Walt (2006) details a high court ruling disqualifying military service as a criterion for granting benefits, a common practice among institutions of higher learning.

• A large proportion of Arab society, especially Muslims, hold very conservative views and education is often denied young women based on the fear of ‘corruption’ in a western style institution (MEEI, 2006).

• The Israeli university entrance requirement includes a compulsory psychometric test that is culturally biased in favour of Jewish students. Knowledge related to Judaic culture and Judaism is not well known and understood by Arab students. Interestingly, when the test was suspended in an effort to benefit poorer Jews from Middle Eastern countries, there was a corresponding sixfold increase in Arabs studying medicine at Tel Aviv University (McGreal, 2003).

• Academic studies do not reflect the personal collective experience of Palestinians and Arab students are not encouraged to participate in gathering such information.

• Learning style is problematic since Israeli–Arab schools tend to focus on rote learning. Creativity is stifled and this limits students’ potential for research. Abu-Bakr (2006)20 cites a range of cultural and psychological difficulties for Arab students. She notes that they experience cultural alienation and there are other learning and language-related problems.

19 From a private interview with Dr Raed Mualem, Head of the Mar Elias university project, February 2006
According to the *World List of Universities*, there are currently seven universities and nine other higher education institutions in Israel. In addition, other less-known institutions are seeking accreditation by the Israeli Council of Higher Education and authorisation to confer degrees. Figure 4 lists the current higher education institutions authorised to award academic degrees.

**Figure 4: List of Universities and Other Institutions of Higher Education in Israel (2006)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution Name</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bar-Ilan University</td>
<td>Tel Aviv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bezalel Academy of Art and Design</td>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ha'Universita Ha'Ivrit Bi'Yerushalayim</td>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ha'Universita Ha'Petuhah</td>
<td>Tel Aviv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamaslool Ha'akademi shel Hamichlala Leminhal</td>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamikhlalah Ha'academit Lehandassah Sami Shamoon</td>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machon Weizmann Lemada</td>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netanya Academic College</td>
<td>Netanya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technion-Machon Technologi Le' Israel</td>
<td>Haifa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Academic College of Tel-Aviv, Yaffo</td>
<td>Tel Aviv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Interdisciplinary Center</td>
<td>Haifa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Jerusalem Academy of Music and Dance</td>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Zinman College of Physical Education and Sport Sciences at the Wingate Institute</td>
<td>Netanya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universitat Ben Gurion Ba-Negev</td>
<td>Beersheba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universitat Haifa</td>
<td>Haifa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universitat Tel Aviv</td>
<td>Tel Aviv</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: The following institutions have received a permit to open and maintain an institution, but are not accredited as institutions of higher education nor are they authorised to award academic degrees to graduates: Schechter Institute of Jewish Studies; Ashkelon Academic College; Jordan Valley College; Machon Lander and The College of Sakhnin for Teacher Education; and Mar Elias university project.

The Mar Elias university project has been added to the above list, as the Israeli Council for Higher Education has granted a permit to exist as a branch campus, contingent on inter-institutional partnership with the University of Indianapolis (USA). Intense scrutiny of all aspects of curricula, infrastructure, staffing and teaching of this fledgling university has stretched scarce resources and finances to their limits. Added to this, demands for compliance and denial of government funding (yet all students are Israeli citizens) has resulted in very stressful conditions for staff and students. The compliance requirements can go well beyond the boundaries of reason: a reference book supplied in the sixth versus the fourth edition almost led to the institution’s closure at the end of its first semester.

Walbiner\(^{21}\) has written that Arab universities throughout the Middle East are often considered teaching-only institutions lacking research facilities, a circumstance, if true, that inhibits the generation of new and culturally appropriate knowledge and technology. He also observed that only a few of the 22 Arab countries are active in higher education, including Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. He concluded that any success of Arabs within higher education in Israel might lead to further successes both within Israel and in the global context. If the community in Ibillin were to succeed, for example, it would serve as a challenge to the rest of the Arab world.

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\(^{21}\) Dr Carsten Michael Walbiner is an Arabic Studies scholar working at the Catholic Academic Exchange Service (KAAD) in Germany. His unpublished speech was given to the Mar Elias Campus staff in June 2005.
Teaching and research are heavily regulated, particularly since Israel is strongly dependent on overseas funding sources. Teaching, curricula development, and the authorisation to confer university degrees are assessed and monitored by the Israeli Council for Higher Education. Israeli institutions recently experienced unwelcome international attention with a boycott related to admissions practices that favour enrolling Jews over Arabs. At the same time, most international university partnerships have been shut down to re-establish control over the development of Israeli higher education (Joffe-Walt, 2006). The introduction of a revised system of Israeli Academic Institutions, which will be implemented nationwide by 2007, suggests that Israel may be developing a binary system of higher education based on the teaching and research capabilities of its current academic institutions. Research in Israel, however, appears to be skewed towards national agendas. Mar Elias appears to hope that as it endeavours to implement some of the suggestions of the Israeli government that call for education for democracy, dialogue and cultural exchange, a more inclusive agenda will emerge.

Nascent Mar Elias University is also being prepared and primed for participation in an innovative multicultural model for higher education. Seven well-established Israeli-Jewish academic colleges of higher education in the Galilee region are expected to form a consortium to constitute a new University of the Galilee, which might also include Mar Elias. There are already eight well-established universities in major centres throughout Israel, but it has been suggested that a well-chosen consortium of established colleges would bring together the expertise and curricula to serve the specific developmental needs of the Galilee region.

If supported in its development, the Mar Elias university project could be well placed to provide the currently missing perspectives of Arabic culture and Arabic studies that may make a strong contribution towards cross-cultural learning and understanding in the Middle Eastern region. Mar Elias leadership has ascertained that there are approximately 5,000 to 7,000 Arab–Israeli students currently enrolled in universities in other Arab countries, in Europe and the USA. This indicates that there is a significant pool of students for a regional university and the new Mar Elias university might be in a favourable position to attract a large number of Israeli Arabs.

The Mar Elias Campus Director of Research, Dr Fauzi Silbfaq has asserted that, “There is a chance for integration in this country for a strong future ... We have to be united but not assimilated and uniform. ... We believe that diversity is a chance and opportunity of richness, not a source of problems. It is a source of peace — a complementary element to the other.”

**Mar Elias and Peace Building**

Among the many approaches to peace building in divided and distrustful societies like that of Israel, the process of rebuilding relationships is often seen as the key to creating the conditions for enduring peace. The question constantly before Mar Elias Institutions’ students and staff is, “How do we transcend the cycles of violence that bewitch our human community while still living in them?” (Lederach, 2005, p.5). A response to the existential needs of a small local community that has now stretched over three generations of children, renewing trust between Arab and Jew, Druze and Christian, Muslim and Christian, holds some possible ways forward. Healthy relationships are fundamental to peaceful existence together and the deep generational change needed to sustain it.

Alongside the political and economic endeavours that seek to right the structural inequities that conflict has perpetuated and created, the process of relationship building must be given
precedence, particularly in societies divided along religious or ethnic fault lines. Many relational approaches to peace building are aimed at reducing prejudice through encouraging contact around superordinate goals. To be effective, prejudice-reduction education programs must not only increase contact between the opposing parties but also encourage tolerance and reduce discrimination and hostility with a view to developing empathy. Hughes and Donnelly (2006, p.81) discuss the primary conditions for effective inter-group contact:

- a parity of status for all parties involved in the process;
- ongoing personal interactions between individuals (the contact cannot be short-term); working towards a common goal; and,
- institutional support where there is official social sanction for contact between the groups.

Pettigrew (1998) suggests that, supplementary to these conditions, it is the way in which the contact is mediated that can influence attitudinal change. If the contact process allows the groups to re-assess their prejudice about each other and, in the process, reflect upon how and why stereotyping occurs, then attitudinal change can take place. Similarly, if emotional ties are built through the contact process leading to an increase in inter-group trust and confidence, then anxieties can be reduced and empathy built. The results of a study by Hughes and Donnelly (2006) undertaken in integrated schools in Northern Ireland and Israel, demonstrate the importance of learning about each other’s language, culture, history and beliefs as a means of undoing previously held stereotypes. Their research also suggests that having a cohesive staff, with strong interdependent relationships that is committed to the contact process and has a clear understanding of how contact can mediate trust and relationship building, is vital.

Relationships and openness to the other are integral to the ethos of Mar Elias institutions, which are purportedly founded with Christian values of responsibility for and acceptance of each other. Mar Elias staff have earned a reputation for working hand-in-hand with Jewish, Muslim, Christian and Druze compatriots in social and religious domains as well as in education. From the outset, the Mar Elias High School has actively participated in and hosted a range of Arab/Jewish initiatives such as inter-school visits for dialogue and workshops. Jewish teachers comprise about 10 per cent of high school staff. The number of Muslim, Christian and Druze students across all of the Mar Elias institutions parallels the national population distribution except there are no Jewish students.

Besides the issues that may be attributed elsewhere, there is the fact that very few Jewish people have a working knowledge of the Arabic language. There are compelling reasons for students to be educated in both languages of their region and this has begun to be officially recognised with the establishment of bilingual schools at the elementary level. Mariam Bawardi Elementary School has been one of the first Arab schools to pilot a program of exchange where Jewish and Arab students participate in a weekly program of formal and informal education including science, English and cultural studies delivered in both Arabic and Hebrew by native speakers.

Despite some success in building trust and friendly relationships in the school environment, there is little evidence yet to suggest that the pattern is being replicated in the broader community. Yet, even amid ongoing conflict, Chacour and his people insist that, in this pluralistic society, diversity be embraced as social and spiritual enrichment rather than a threat.

Questions must be raised about the ways in which contact and prejudice-reduction strategies at a micro level can have an enduring impact, if the socio-political and economic structural inequities

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24 Statistics obtained from MEEI Administration Office, February 2006
25 MEEI’s elementary school named for a local saint
at a macro level are not addressed. Anderson et al’s (2003) peace-building matrix (Table 1) recognises that peace programs/projects are most effective when they reach a range of people and particularly those key players in the conflict. Programs that effect change at an individual/personal level and at the socio-political level will have a greater impact than programs that operate in one arena alone.

The efforts of the MEEI programs and activities are strongly focused within the Arab community in Galilee and remain largely peripheral to Israeli society at large, but do have some increasing influence through relationships established with Members of the Knesset, church, and community leaders.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual/personal level</th>
<th>More People</th>
<th>Key People</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MEEI’s starting point and major effectiveness:</td>
<td>Mar Elias President, principals,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Students, faculty, visitors (local &amp; international), community – changing</td>
<td>directors, teachers, student</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>hearts and minds</td>
<td>leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-political level</td>
<td>Some influence at level of local &amp; governmental officers, ministers –</td>
<td>Mar Elias President,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>advocacy</td>
<td>local and national leaders</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Describing the practice of achieving peace provides an indication of Mar Elias’ spheres of influence. As an educational facility, it is focused mainly in the individual/personal quadrant with the involvement of many students and local community. It is rather less influential and less involved in the lower quadrant that might be labelled ‘peace writ large’ in spite of the fact that, as Stern and Khoury (2005) report, Arab Christians number one out of eleven among the membership of the Knesset (the Israeli Parliament) and the Director General of the Ministry of the Interior is also Christian. Mar Elias would possibly increase its effectiveness by creating linkages between the people within the local community and those within the socio-political context. In these sectors, there remains a generational legacy of fear and hatred, suspicion and mistrust to be overcome.

**The Strategic Significance of Mar Elias Campus**

Mar Elias Campus is well placed in central Galilee and serves a network of over 70 towns and villages with some students coming from Jerusalem and as far south as Beersheva. With the possibility of Mar Elias Campus becoming a university for the region, there is a communal sense of hope and opportunity for Arab students. The language of course delivery is to be English, which will offer a range of advantages in providing a broader selection of programs with the options of building academic relations with international higher education institutions. From the very outset, the Mar Elias Campus has planned to build on sustainable development for the Arab population in the northern region. Despite their smaller number, Arab Christians are a significant influence and force for social and economic development, and for promoting coexistence between Arabs and Jews in the region.

There is a strong basis for professional and leadership development in Galilee. The three remaining Arab Christian villages, Mi’ilya, Fassuta and Tarshiha are situated in the northern region. Significant Christian populations reside in the major towns of Haifa, Nazareth and Akko,
as well as a number of villages such as Kfar Yassif, Jish, Mughar, Shefaram, Maker and Judeideh. Among others, several significant NGOs founded and strongly staffed by Arab Christians are based there – Mossawa, a centre for advocacy and public policy related to issues of discrimination, access and equity for the Arab population in Israel; Adalah, a successful law agency advocating human rights, and the Galilee Society for Social Research, advancing opportunities for Arabs.

With an informed Arab voice in development, there will be a clear direction and thus the opportunity for a significant contribution to a sustainable future. Real equality for the Arab population means valuing their contribution as significant members of the community and valuing their heritage. Assimilationist forces consistently use the catchcry of integration in order to control and manage the population. The promotion of integration, which is perceived by Arabs as negation of their own cultural heritage and aspirations, places scant value on their contribution to community and nation building. Salman and Folkman (2005 p.5) warn that, “the failure to exploit human potential of an entire sector of the population, [the result of] official and informal discrimination, seriously damages the potential for economic growth in Israel.” Lederach (2005, p.48) argues that, “constructive change must build responsive processes that address the deep challenges rooted in the relational contexts.”

A key opportunity for building linkages will be Mar Elias’ involvement in planning and engagement in initiatives in the development of the Galilee region. Contact between Arab and Jewish towns and communities is minimal and, as a counterpoint to Arab villages and towns, exclusive Jewish settlements and towns have been established throughout the region. Grossly inequitable allocation of public resources for Arab infrastructure and services is a source of resentment. This is consistent with the government’s strategic plan for economic and social development that, since 1993, has been directed at the Jewish population through increased residential, business and industrial initiatives. (Humphries, 2005, pp.12–13; Galilee Development Authority,26 and Salman and Folkman, 2005, pp.1–2). Moreover, to date the Arab population has been excluded from this important venture for the future of northern Israel. Development continues overwhelmingly to benefit the Jewish population, yet at 60.1 per cent of the population in the broad region of Haifa and Galilee, Arabs are a significant population just edging into the majority. (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2005, p.2). This further suggests that there is a profound need for an alternative vision for a supposed minority of the nation, which comprises nearly a majority in northern Israel and an opportunity to improve the potential for economic growth for all citizens.

Some scholars contend that academic neo-colonialism (Lee, 2004) or academic capitalism (Slaughter and Leslie, 1997) is influencing educational policy development and practice in international higher education. These arguments suggest that any imposed standards, norms, and/or values from the West may be undermining the education-to-work schemes of non-Western countries (Bollag, 2005), particularly if they do so with ulterior motives related to self-interest. Such countries often are seeking assistance and aid from the West to establish newly created, ‘home-grown’ academic institutions and to build on local expertise. Specific to American philanthropic organisations that fund international educational initiatives, Berman contends that they have propagated a “crude form of economic and military imperialism” to “move nations along the path to development ... in a way to guarantee political stability, economic growth, and minimally, a policy of benevolent neutrality towards the Western bloc” (Berman, 1984, p.254). Evidence suggests that many of these types of cross-border educational providers are unrecognised and rogue (Knight, 2005) or sow further confusion and cheapen academe (Altbach,
2005). If correct, this picture suggests that there may be varying levels of quality dependent on the transformational processes of international higher education development. Whatever the context in international higher education, increasing emphasis seems to be placed on form rather than substance. The residing fear in non-Western countries and contexts is that form may include inappropriate Western-based influence.

The Mar Elias university project is aspiring to meet this challenge by developing a culturally appropriate academic structure and curricula, together with an appreciation of and skills for effective responsible citizenship. Faculty and students are painfully aware that in the midst of conflict voices of moderation are too often drowned out by fundamentalist viewpoints and actions. At the heart of the Mar Elias University venture is the planned development of an interdisciplinary program of peace studies that will be embedded within the three majors (Communication, Environmental Science and Computing Science) currently offered. Mar Elias Campus is building on the 25-year successful tradition of the Mar Elias Educational Institutions, working with the present lived experience and reality of Arabs and Jews in Israel so that young people can immerse themselves in a web of relationships even with those perceived as enemies. Lederach (2005, p.48) reminds us that “authenticity of social change is ultimately tested in real life relationships.”

In light of the many challenges outlined for establishing an Arab Christian Israeli academic institution of higher education, the following encouragement from an Israeli Minister was received with great optimism:

> We think this (Mar Elias) will be a very important campus in the Galilee. … You can see at least a part of the dream realised here now — Christians, Moslems and Jews working together. The teaching of Peace Studies is not dealt with in Israel. The idea of creating and maintaining peace — no department is devoted to that idea. Most of the students in Israeli universities do not have the opportunity to breach the divide. The Department of Security have decided this is very important.

**SUMMARY**

The following statements reflect the major issues discussed throughout this paper:

- The conflict between Arabs and Jews in Israel is highly complex, and the narratives of the two peoples have developed primarily due to life experiences, religious beliefs and nationalistic ideologies.

- History has played a major role in the polarisation of these narratives and, in several cases, international and multilateral interventions have been required.

- Arab Christians have been a moderating voice between Arab Muslim and Jewish groups in Israel, yet brain drain through emigration is steadily diminishing this voice.

- An alternative vision is required to rebuild a torn society and empower the people to be architects of their own future.

- Relationship building is aimed at reducing prejudice while encouraging dialogue in divided and distrustful societies such as Israel. It is believed that conditions set by relationship building may well develop towards outcomes of peace building.

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27 Mr. Ehud Prover, Deputy Director of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Security in an unpublished address to Mar Elias faculty and Board Members, January 2006.
The establishment of the Mar Elias Educational Institutions is an attempt to (1) educate the youth of a small community in Galilee; (2) raise levels of social stratification equal to that of their Israeli–Jewish counterparts; and, (3) serve as an instrument of pride, empowerment, and aspiration for all Arab citizens of Israel.

Western notions of education cannot be superimposed into the Mar Elias model. Despite attempts to undermine its existence, MEEI continues to develop a curricular model that best suits its students and the local community-at-large.

Postscript: Whither the sign of the white dove?

Highly visible across the valley from the village of Ibillin, the mural of a white dove in flight is situated high on a grey concrete wall on the Mar Elias campus. On another wall below is a mural, the unseen qualifier to this universal symbol of peace, of a tattered procession of human shapes, donkeys and bundles reminding all that the Palestinian Arab Diaspora and dispossession of 1948 still continues. Mar Elias is seen to be committed to building a future that encompasses not only a reconciled Israel, but also an internationally focused global outreach where East and West can find mutual trust and complementarity. Whether the sign of the white dove symbolises the myth or reality of peace is yet unanswerable.

Given the points addressed, the conclusion of this discussion raises two important questions: Could international higher education development lead to a multi-tiered post-secondary educational system worldwide? Is there a possible shift in educational policy and practice from one that develops the educational needs of the community to one that concentrates on educational expectations and hope of the individual?

REFERENCES


Notes on Contributors

**Amazan, Rose**

Rose Amazan is a PhD candidate at the University of Sydney, pursuing her doctorate in international education. Her current research interests concern the mobilisation of the African intellectual diasporas. Rose is committed to community and grassroots development and has been involved in urban education in NYC as well as her ongoing research in Ethiopia.

**Cassity, Elizabeth**

Elizabeth Cassity is Lecturer and ARC Senior Research Associate in the Faculty of Education and Social Work at the University of Sydney. Since 2007, she has been working full time on the ARC Linkage grant ‘AusAID at Work: The Design, Delivery and Impact of Australian Aid to Education in Asia and the Pacific’. She has extensive international research experience in both university and professional sectors. Dr Cassity has published widely in the fields of foreign aid and international educational development, policy studies, and youth transition.

**Denman, Brian D.**

Brian Denman is the current President of the Australian New Zealand Comparative and International Education Society (ANZCIES) and Editor-in-Chief of the *International Education Journal: Comparative Perspectives*. He lectures at the University of New England in higher education and administrative studies with current research pursuits in the areas of international higher education, policy studies, and comparative and international education.

**Hall, Beverley**

Beverley Hall is an Honorary Associate of Macquarie University and a Visiting Research Fellow at the University of Adelaide. Her work is in early childhood and linguistics.

**Lang’at, Kiprono**

Kiprono Lang’at is Lecturer in the School of Education, Charles Sturt University, Australia. His research focuses on education contexts (pedagogy and practice), literacy and international development, and refugee studies. He is especially interested in rural and regional education and development studies including aid effectiveness and representation discourses.

**Loller, Marie**

Marie Loller is a PhD candidate of the University of New England, Armidale, pursuing her doctorate in peace studies. She has taught in the Catholic education system for over twenty years and until recently was the Director of the Mar Elias Peace Centre in Ibillin, Israel. Her research interests are in social justice, peace-building and education development.
Spence, Rebecca
Rebecca is Director of Peaceworks and a part-time Senior Lecturer in Peace Studies at the University of New England, Armidale. She has an international reputation as a peace/conflict specialist and researcher. Her current research involves conflict sensitisation of development programming, gender and peacebuilding, peacebuilding after armed conflict and community reconstruction processes.

Tolley, Hilary
Hilary Tolley has a background in science education and extensive experience of living and working in developing countries. She gained her MA in Development Studies from the University of Auckland in 2004, and has since worked as an educational researcher in the Faculty of Education and independently. Her particular interests are in Pacific education and development aid. Hilary is currently a PhD candidate in Development Studies at the University of Auckland.
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