INTRODUCTION

Crete was among those territories that formed a Venetian protectorate. The Turks declared open war on Crete in 1648. It is tempting to assume the ‘long’ siege on Candia (modern Heraklion) is a relatively forgotten conflict, overshadowed by the geopolitically significant siege of Vienna in 1683. After all, Candia was a defeat for the forces of Christendom whereas Vienna, just fourteen years later, was a decisive victory that achieved a lasting halt to Ottoman expansion westward into Europe. However, Candia has received a surprising amount of scholarly attention and has found a place in most serious modern studies of the Order of St John, especially those focussing on its naval operations. The international diplomatic and military nature of the siege generated home-grown sources in Britain while contemporary interest in military siege-craft made Candia a case-study in combined land/sea operations. The strident genre of seventeenth-century pamphlet literature provided a slew of source material in several languages. Candia also features in the autobiographies of several prominent military figures who gained valuable technical experience there. Most importantly, it is regarded by many scholars as a key moment in Christian-Muslim interaction to which the word ‘crusade’ is applied.

THE SIEGE

The declaration of war was ostensibly provoked by the Venetian Republic allowing the galleys of the Knights of St. John to take shelter in Cretan waters in 1645, following an attack by them on Ottoman shipping. The historian Rhoads Murphy states however, that the siege was the result of an ongoing, single-front Ottoman military strategy. In


other words, the naval activity of the Order of St John was a mere pretext for Ottoman expansion. They arrived in force: almost 300 vessels and 50,000 soldiers, threatening a local population of largely Orthodox peasantry ruled over by a Roman Catholic élite. In August 1645 the Ottomans captured the north-westerly port city of Chania, defended by its inadequate local militia of 12,000 men. A year later, Rethymno fell to them, aided by the ‘passive neutrality’ of the locals, won-over by their lenient treatment by the Ottoman besiegers. Thus the Turks achieved an early presence on Crete, despite ongoing political tensions within the Ottoman empire during the reign of the young Mehmed IV. Indeed, Turkish morale on Crete was often low: in 1649 it collapsed completely when 1,500 Janissaries were granted leave from the siege, prompting those soldiers who remained to demand a similar return home. The Turks besieged Candia intermittently over the next twenty years.

Initially, Venice did well against the Ottoman forces, winning naval victories in 1649 and 1656 by using a naval force of a size not achieved since the great campaign at Lepanto. However, this prompted an expansion of the Ottoman navy which led to Turkish victory in the Dardanelles in 1657, securing control of the Aegean seaways and placing increased pressure on the beleaguered defenders of Candia. The breakthrough in the Dardanelles was the first major achievement for Köprülü Fazil Ahmed Pasha as Grand Vizier (in office 1661-76). However, in the intervening years, the oscillating intensity in the Turkish siege allowed Candia to put itself on a footing for protracted resistance. Thus began a long drawn-out cat-and-mouse game of mining and counter-mining the walls around the city. Venice, aided by the Knights of St John, maintained supremacy on the sea, thus preventing the blockade of Crete, but it was never able to raise European support to field an army of sufficient strength to dislodge the Turks. Even after the Peace of Westphalia, which concluded the Thirty Years’ War (1618-48) in continental Europe, it was hard to recruit sufficient enthusiasm to break the deadlock: for example, in 1651 the alliance forces consisted of 36 per cent Swedes, Germans, French, Swiss; 22 per cent Greeks; 18 per cent Corsicans; 15 per cent Italians; and about 8 per cent Croatians. Altogether this amounted to no more than approximately 6,000


5 S. F. Halil İnalçık and D. Quataert, An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 423-424.


7 Alberto P Guglielmotti, Storia della marina pontificia (Roma: Tipografia Vaticano, 1856), p. 11.
infantry and 450 cavalry, of which only about 5,347 were fit for battle. The Venetians realised their chief strategy must be to strike at sea.

An intensification of the siege of Candia in 1666 prompted the despatch of a European alliance relief force. Far from being a nation-state force composed of regular army personnel, many of those involved were volunteers engaged in a business venture as military entrepreneurs. Their efforts did not pay off. The German contingent under the Prince of Waldeck met with frustration and the French force, commanded by the Duc de Beaufort, failed to make any headway against the Ottoman besiegers. The French managed to fire off more than 3,000 cannon balls at the besieging Turks, but these were gathered up by the enemy and fired back at them, via three guns which were cast on the spot for this purpose. The leaders of each force were killed in the fray. The failure of this final effort prompted the Venetian commander, Morosini, to surrender on 27 September 1669. The victory had cost the Ottomans an estimated 200,000 soldiers; the European alliance force lost almost 30,000. The subsequent peace negotiations in 1670 saw Venice lose control of almost all of Crete, much of Dalmatia and of the Aegean islands. This had obvious negative implications for the ongoing effectiveness of the Knights of St John to prosecute their perpetual struggle on sea against Islam.

THE ORDER OF ST JOHN

The Knights of St John maintained a presence throughout the period of the ‘long’ siege. At the start, the Thirty Years’ War was still raging in Europe, leaving Papal forces and the Order to form the backbone of local resistance against the Ottomans in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Order maintained more than sixty knights in Candia as a


12 M. Rashid, Tarih–i Rasid (Istanbul: Ibrahim Muteferrika, 1740), fol. 52v, quoted in Murphy, Ottoman Warfare, 1500–1700, p. 242.


reliable battalion in addition to knights on the water engaged in patrolling the Aegean.\(^\text{15}\) The Order’s fleet of eight galleys was active, having abandoned sailing ships completely after 1645 due to the availability of Venetian ports for its oared galleys.\(^\text{16}\) However, the Order’s relations with Venice were at times tense: for example, at the high-point of the siege, in August 1668, a dispute over naval precedence prompted a Venetian ship to fail to salute with a canon salvo the flagship of the Grand Master. This caused scandal and offence to the knightly captain, Clemente Accarigi, and led to the hasty departure of the Order’s forces from the waters surrounding Chania. The disagreement was not fatal to the siege and the overall commander, Vincenzo Rospigliosi (nephew of Pope Clement IX and commander of the papal galleys), was soon writing to the Grand Master in praise of Accarigi.\(^\text{17}\)

The story of one young knight exemplifies the generally pugnacious attitude adopted by the Order during the siege of Candia. Fra’ Agostino Grimaldi, a scion of the ruling house of Monaco, was one of seventy knights commanding 400 soldiers led by Fra’ Antonio Correa Montenegro. When he wrote a letter to his mother on 23 August 1660, he signed it: ‘Your most obedient son on the way to become eternity’.\(^\text{18}\) During an assault on the small fortress of Santa Veneranda, shortly after his twenty-first birthday, Grimaldi – fighting ‘like a lion’ (according to his companions) – was hit by a Turkish musket ball which entered over one hip and went out through the other. The Turk who shot him was quickly killed by Grimaldi’s companions, and his head lopped off and taken as a gory trophy to the generalissimo of the Christian armada. His brother knights buried his corpse in the church run by the friars of St Augustine, in the fortress of Suda.\(^\text{19}\)

In the final great push of 1668, the knights fought valiantly (as, indeed, they continued to do; for example, at the Conquest of Belgrade in 1689 as part of the Dalmatian campaign begun by the Turks as a diversion during the Candia siege).\(^\text{20}\) To emphasize the length of the siege, no less than five Grand Masters of the Order of St John served in that position during the course of the siege of Candia. Though small


numerically, the efforts of the stout battalion of the Order that existed and fought on Crete throughout the long siege was precious in the memory of the Knights of St John and their Grand Masters. The Order even went so far as to honour non-members of the Order who assisted its efforts on Crete, including in 1650 the French paladin, Louis, duc d’Arpajon. He was granted the rare honour of a hereditary Cross of Devotion of the Order in recognition of his efforts in the defence of Candia.\footnote{R. Béteille, *Louis, duc d’Arpajon, seigneur de Sévérac et grand du royaume (1590-1679): Actes de la journée d’étude organisée à Lapanouse de Sévérac, le 28 octobre 2006 par la Société des lettres, sciences et arts de l’Aveyron, en collaboration avec la Communauté de communes du canton de Sévérac et l’Office de tourisme du canton de Sévérac-le-Château (Aveyron: Société des lettres, sciences et arts de l’Aveyron, 2007).} The Order and its Grand Masters understood very well the intimate connection between the fate of Candia and the future of their island stronghold of Malta. When the siege ended in defeat in 1669, Grand Master Nicolas Cotoner realised Malta had become the front line against the Ottomans. He promptly set about enclosing the Three Cities on the south side of the Grand Harbour in a ring of walls still called the ‘Cotonera Lines’\footnote{D. Calabi, ‘Il regno di Candia e le “fatiche” del governo civile: le “cento città”, le popolazioni, lefabbriche pubbliche’, in Redolfi, (ed.) *Venezia e la difesa del Levante*, pp. 97–106; Sire, *The Knights of Malta*, p. 80.}.

**A CRUSADE?**

But was Candia a crusade? Voltaire described the conflict in terms of a battle between rival faiths:

> Times were greatly changed. Formerly, when Christendom was in a barbarous state, a pope, or even a monk, could send forth millions of Christians to make war upon the Mahometans in their own empire … and now that the island of Candia, deemed the bulwark of Christendom, was overrun by sixty thousand Turks, the Christian kings looked on with indifference while it was lost. A few galleys sent by the Maltese and the pope were the only reinforcements this republic received to defend itself against the whole Ottoman Empire. The senate of Venice, with all its prudence, was unable with such weak aid to withstand the grand vizier, Kiuperli.\footnote{The *Works of Voltaire*, Vol. 12 (1751), trans. W. F. Fleming (New York: E. R. Dumont, 1901), p. 139.}

It is interesting that the most recent work of scholarship on the siege of Candia also refers to the concept of crusade.\footnote{Ozkan. Bardakçi and F. Pugnière, *La Derniere Croisade Les Francais et la guerre de Candie, 1669* (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2008).} The French historian, Géraud Poumarède, similarly highlights the ongoing antipathy created between Christian and Muslim by the activities...
in the Mediterranean of the knights of the Order of St John. A variety of European nations supported the struggle on Crete, but this did not translate to them sending sufficient men to fight there. For example, in England in 1653 the Protectorate government of Oliver Cromwell expressed sympathy for Crete. However, sensitivities regarding English trade and international relations led to a very cautious attitude towards assistance. Cromwell refused to be drawn into the conflict, resulting in comparisons being made between his regime and the Ottoman Turks in contemporary anti-Protectorate literature: in 1656, besieged Royalists in Dunkirk were equated to Christians on Crete. In his defence, Cromwell sent a fleet under Admiral Stokes to strike at Tripolitanian corsair activity threatening English merchant shipping. In very broad terms, this action could be said to have assisted Venetian concerns in the Mediterranean.

Regardless of deep-seated confessional conflict in Europe, moral support remained high for the majority-Catholic alliance forces ranged against the Ottomans. For example, an account of the siege was written by Roger Palmer, Earl of Castlemaine, a Roman Catholic English nobleman who served in the Venetian fleet. He was charged by Charles II with writing about the prolonged Ottoman-Venetian war and his narrative of this ‘Christian war’ was eagerly translated into German in the final year of the conflict. Poumarède highlights lingering uncertainty among scholars about the motivation that lay behind participation in the siege of Candia. Religious faith appears to have motivated the commander of the French volunteer relief force, François de Vendôme, Duc de Beaufort, a cadet of the French royal family. In March 1665, his small fleet defeated an Algerian force near the Goletta, Tunisia. In 1669, he led the French troops sent by Louis XIV to relieve the alliance forces defending Candia against the Ottoman Turks. Beaufort was killed leading the newly arrived vanguard against the Ottoman besiegers, dying in a night sortie, on 25 June 1669. His body was brought back to France for a state funeral.

By contrast, the fighting career of Josias II, Count of Waldeck, the younger son of a German princely dynasty, suggests that military professionalism inspired his participation. He was a veteran of the army of Frederick William, Elector of Brandenburg, and had served in a Swedish army against the Ottomans in central

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30 Setton, *Venice, Austria and the Turks in the Seventeenth Century*, p. 190.
Europe. Following this, he took service with a cadet of the royal House of Hanover – George William, Duke of Brunswick-Lüneburg – who appointed him major-general and, in late autumn 1668, sent him with the Hanoverian army of 3,300 men as part of the alliance relief of the siege at Candia. He was injured by shrapnel on 6 July 1669 and subsequently died of his injuries. Among the force sent to Candia from Hanover were a number of exiled French Protestant Huguenots, who had found a new home in Hanoverian territory. The wife of George William, Duke of Brunswick-Lüneburg, was herself a Huguenot which caused a flood of French exiles to seek refuge in the Duke’s domain. One of them was Alexandre Desmier, Seigneur d’Antigny-Olbreuse, the eldest brother of Éléanor, Duchess of Brunswick-Lüneburg.31 There were also Scottish military professionals, including Sir Andrew Melville.32

THE DOUGLAS REGIMENT

A Scottish regiment in French service played an unexpected role in the story of the siege of Candia. The story of this regiment reveals much about French attitudes to the conflict (and to military operations generally in the era). The régiment de Douglas – later The Royal Scots, Scotland’s premier infantry regiment – was the family regiment of the Scottish Douglas dynasty. It had existed in France since 1633.33 Lord George Douglas took command of the unit in 1656 as his inheritance from the Douglas estates; in other words, the unit was a money-making venture equivalent in value to land.34 Douglas recruited thousands of Scottish soldiers for the family regiment in France.35 He is an interesting character: loyal to Charles II as King of Scots, but tied to Louis XIV as an employer; a proud Scot, but profoundly Francophile, having been ‘brought up to favour the French from his youth’ (as a boy he had been a page to Louis XIV). He was also a devout Roman Catholic.36

Douglas was eight years old when Charles I was executed and so had never known (to date) a ruling British sovereign. His only example of a successful, reigning monarch


32 Jacques Desbordes, Memoires de monsieur Le Chevalier de Melvill (Amsterdam: Jacques Desbordes a la Bourse, 1705), pp. 272-275.


34 For example, State Papers Venetian (hereafter SPV), Vol. 26, pp. 39, 229, 290.


was Louis XIV, who had provided him with employment, honour and a courtly position since his childhood. Douglas was, therefore, presented with the problem of maintaining the integrity of his obligations to Charles II, while supporting the not-always complementary policies of King Louis XIV of France. The Candia episode of 1669 highlights the vexed position of expatriate soldiers like Douglas. In 1669 – right at the end of the long story of Candia’s siege – Douglas, like so many of his countrymen, all too easily became a pawn in a political game between two masters.37

Some background helps: England went to war with the Dutch in 1665, and that conflict – the Second Anglo-Dutch War (1665–7) – tested the loyalty of British soldiers serving in foreign armies. Charles II was obliged to declare war on France due to that country’s formal alliance with the Dutch. This resulted in the formal cessation of many of the networks which supported Scottish military service in France, and was a major rupture in the traditional ‘auld alliance’ between France and Scotland.38 Douglas was obliged to choose between the service of Charles II and that of France, creating a serious and embarrassing conflict of interests on Douglas’s part. Charles II ordered Douglas and his regiment to quit French service. Douglas tendered his resignation to Louis XIV.39

Peace in 1667 allowed Douglas’s regiment to return to French service.40 However, Louis harboured a grudge against Charles II and in retribution he broadcast his intention to place Douglas’s regiment in the vanguard of the French relief force he had been pressured into sending to Crete. The reason for choosing Douglas’s regiment for this mission was never clearly articulated.41 However, the choice of the Douglas regiment lies in Louis’s distrust of Charles’s motives stemming from the secret negotiations that resulted in the 1670 Treaty of Dover. It was clear to Louis XIV that the British king was cynically desiring an increase in his French pension, making promises he never intended to honour.42 The threatened sacrifice of Douglas’s regiment was designed to teach Charles II a lesson about avarice.43 This explains Douglas’s extreme indignation

37 Hales to Arlington, Paris, 6 March/26 February 1666: National Archives (Kew), State Papers (hereafter NA SP) 78/122, fol. 96.


39 For example, SPV, Vol. 26, pp. 39, 229, 290.


at the unexpected news that he and his men were to lead the attack against the Turks at Candia. Douglas knew this was a suicide mission, against which he was highly motivated to preserve his regiment.

When Charles learned of the proposal concerning the Douglas regiment, he was outraged that his diplomatic and mercantile connections with the Ottoman Porte were to be compromised by his own subjects’ forced involvement in an attack on the Ottomans on Crete. As soon as Douglas informed him of the plan, Charles made ‘a decision … to stop the dispatch of this body of troops at all costs, as, if they entered Candia, it was feared that they might be recognised by the Turks’. The danger posed to English trade was explicitly stated as the reason why Douglas should not fight in Crete. At least one historian, Paul Sonnino, supports contemporary suggestions that Douglas’s regiment was specifically chosen to participate in the attack on Candia, in order to strike at Charles II’s interests, as Louis XIV had been piqued and frustrated by the British king on a number of issues. Douglas’s predicament stood unresolved until March 1669, when the Earl of St Albans reported to Lord Arlington that the Scottish colonel ‘has made such a kind of diligence that he has inspired others … to keep pace with him’. In the end, Douglas was justified in placing his trust in his king’s attachment to trade with the Ottomans.

The Venetians at the French court suspected all along that Louis XIV intended to use the siege to advantage his own trade with the Ottoman Porte to the detriment of England’s, by conveying Douglas’s regiment to Candia. Ironically, some former officers of Douglas’s regiment were part of the volunteer relief force which fought at


45 Colbert de Croissy to Louis XIV, 28 February 1669: Archives des Affaires Étrangers, Quay d’Orsay, Paris (hereafter AAECP Angleterre 94, fol. 97–8; AAECP Angleterre 93, fol. 273; Piero Mocenigo to the Doge and Senate of Venice, 1 March 1669: SPV, Vol. 26, p. 23.


48 St. Albans to Arlington, 13 March 1669: NA SP 78/126, fol. 49.

49 St. Albans to Arlington, 13 March 1669.

50 Mocenigo to the Doge and Senate of Venice, 22 March 1669: SPV, 26, p. 30.
Hugh Mackay of Scourie, formerly a junior officer in Douglas’s regiment, fought as a volunteer in the Venetian relief of Candia. A committed Protestant, Mackay was later a prominent supporter of William of Orange in the Glorious Revolution of 1688, but at Candia he was one of a number of men who, according to his biographer, ‘volunteered their services on the expedition, and were accompanied by a corps of a hundred … officers, all eager to gain military experience’.\footnote{Mackay, \textit{Life of Lieut. General Hugh Mackay}, p. 5.} For his part, Douglas came out of the Candia incident with the gratitude of Charles II, but in France he had to fight a duel. His opponent was a French princeling who was a veteran of the Candia campaign. The prince’s links to the French royal family suggest he acted as a proxy for King Louis in meting out punishment to Douglas.\footnote{NA SP Dom., Car. II 266, p. 53; John Carlile to Williamson, Dover, 18 October 1669: NA SP Dom., Car. II 266, p. 133; Glozier, \textit{Scottish Soldiers in France in the Reign of the Sun King}, pp. 96, 126.} Clearly, for the French king, Candia provided an opportunity not for a crusade, but for political and economic advantage.

French attitudes to the siege of Candia are also highlighted by Douglas’s link to the Order of St John. One of the Scottish colonel’s closest friends was Philippe de Vendôme (1655–1727), the Grand Prior in France of the Order of St John. Vendôme had been appointed Grand Prior while still a minor in 1666. In 1675, Douglas brought him over to England to assist with lobbying Charles II for more recruits to his regiment.\footnote{Richard Watts to Williamson, Deal, 16 February 1675: NA SP Dom Car II 368, no. 76.} Almost a decade later, Douglas served as Charles’s official representative to commiserate with Louis XIV on the death of his queen. Vendôme was, at that time, in England conducting an illicit affair with Charles’s mistress, Louise de Kéraille.\footnote{H. Fornéron, \textit{The Court of Charles II, 1649–1734: Compiled from State Papers} (London, 1897), pp. 264-269; Newsletter to Madam Katherine Radcliffe, Dilston, 28 July 1683: Admiralty Greenwich Hospital 2, no. 71.} Vendôme’s character reveals the true capacity of the Order’s leadership at the royal court of France in the closing stages of the siege of Candia. The Grand Prior’s portrait by Jacob Ferdinand Voet shows how lightly he appears to wear his position of leadership within the Order; his knightly mantle is draped loosely over one shoulder. Despite having taken vows of poverty, chastity and obedience, Vendôme was a headstrong cadet of the royal dynasty who was also a spend-thrift libertine. This goes some way towards explaining the Order’s ineffectiveness in inspiring action from Louis XIV against the Ottomans on Crete. Vendôme was not a strenuous advocate in France of the Order’s Mediterranean interests and displayed none of the resolve and courage of his great-uncle, the Duc de Beaufort, who died leading the French vanguard against the Ottomans at Candia in 1669.
CONCLUSION

The result of the Candia campaign was that the Turks gained both Crete and a valuable knowledge of the latest French siege techniques. They later employed these ideas to their advantage during their siege of Vienna, where the lessons they learned at Candia about the advantages of tenacious entrenching were repeated with dangerous effect. On the wider geo-political scene, the loss of Candia freed the forces of the Ottoman Empire to press the army of the Holy Roman Empire on its eastern front in Hungary. This represented a blow to Imperial Christian diplomatic and military initiatives as it forced Emperor Leopold I to engage enemies on two fronts: the French threat to imperial lands in the Spanish Netherlands (Flanders), and the suppression of Hungarian separatism aided by Ottoman incursions in Hungary. Given this scenario, it is not too difficult to see why Louis XIV did what he could to ensure that Candia was not successfully defended and would thus fall to the Turks in order to weaken the Imperial forces that were his enemy in Flanders. By choosing the one unit (Douglas’s) for the job which, he knew, had the ability to disrupt and delay the French relief sent to Candia, Louis XIV ensured an inadequate and confused French response to the situation. Obviously, this was much to the detriment of the hard-fighting alliance forces already on Crete, whose back-bone was formed by the pugnacious Knights of St John.

Figure 1: City of Candia with its fortifications (1651) published in Marco Boschini, Il regno tutto di Candia. Delineato a parte et intagliato (Venezia: con Privilegio nelli Stati della Chiesa, e della Republica Venezia, 1651).
Figure 2: The Venetian Protectorate of Candia (1651) published in Marco Boschini, *Il regno tutto di Candia. Delineato a parte et intagliato* (Venezia: con Privileggio nelli Stati della Chiesa, e della Republica Venezia, 1651).

Figure 3: The Siege of Candia with details of a naval battle between the fleet of the Order of St John and Ottoman ships (1668) published by Nicolaes Visscher (1618-1679) in the *Atlas Van der Hagen* held in the catalogue of the Koninklijke Bibliotheek: [http://opc4.kb.nl/DB=1/TTL=1/LNG=EN/PPN?PPN=353012750](http://opc4.kb.nl/DB=1/TTL=1/LNG=EN/PPN?PPN=353012750).