EARLY MODERN CELTIC WARFARING

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Introduction

Whenever the need arose and a war broke out … they all joined the battle.¹

The whole race is war-mad, high-spirited and quick to battle.²

Caesar’s self-serving memoir of his Gallic wars (58-51 B.C.) reveals much about the ancient Celtic attitude towards war. Fighting was a key component of the life of the Celtic elite, but also pervaded the culture at all levels. The legends of other Celtic lands give a similar impression of small war bands, great heroes and large set-piece battles – much as Caesar himself described them in Gaul.

From about the early fifth century B.C. in central Europe to its high-point in the third century B.C. the Celts came to dominate much of Europe, from Spain to Asia Minor. Their growth and expansion was not synonymous with war; trade and industry played a large part in their cultural primacy by the 200s B.C. However, war was the key to opposing the expansion of others, including Romans and the Germanic tribes. In the British Isles, Rome’s influence contained Celtic culture within Scotland, Wales and Ireland, and fifth century Christianisation challenged some Celtic practices.

War was an all-male activity. Archaeological evidence suggests as many as half all adult males were buried with weaponry. Caesar reported the high level of ownership of weapons among some groups (did this make his victory sound all the more impressive?).³ The typical Celtic warrior carried a spear over a metre long as well as short throwing spears and a large round shield of wood covered with leather and bearing a metal boss to protect the hand that gripped it. No uniform existed with civilian clothes

¹ “hi, cum est usus atque aliquod bellum indicit … omnes in bello versantur.” Caesar, De Belli Gallico, 6.15.1.
² Strabo, Geographica, 4.4.2. See R. L. Jimenez, Caesar against the Celts (New York: Sarpedon, 1995).
³ Caesar reports the Helvetian census, stating that of 350,000 people 90,000 bore arms, amounting to about a quarter of the population: Caesar, De Belli Gallico, 6.15.1. See B. Cunliffe, The Celtic World: An Illustrated History of the Celtic Race (London: Greenwich House, 1992).
being worn into battle, usually a cloak over a smock and trousers. Nobles differed from common men in two respects: a torc, or neck ring, and a fairly long sword. The elite warrior might also be protected by a helmet and body-armour of leather or metal.

Ancient Celtic warfare was predominantly a pedestrian affair, however, in Ireland, charioteers consisted of two-man teams that travelled near a warrior to allow him to escape from the battlefield if he were seriously wounded. The Irish Ulster Cycle and Roman and Greek historians refer to this practice. So too do they mention war bands, including the Irish *fianna* or the *Gaesates* that each played a part in the Italian Wars fought against the Romans. Fionn Mac Cumhaill is just one of the charismatic leaders of such a band. However, these men were clearly not part of settled Celtic society, but rather were ‘professional’ fighters; early Celtic mercenaries, or swords-for-hire. The best known battle tactic of the Celt was the mass charge; an attempt to overrun the enemy by sheer force. This tactic was familiar to Caesar in the period of the Gallic wars and would again re-appear, many centuries later, in the famous “Highland charge” employed by McColla’s forces under the Marquis of Montrose in the British Civil Wars of the 1640s.

Originally, war bands and battle forces were arranged along regional or family lines. Equally, the warfare of later ages reflected the proverbial ‘clannish’ nature of the Celt. But with so much effort put into a massed charge, including lots of noise to unsettle the enemy, there was often little endurance in the Celtic fight. Polybius reported the “noise, impetus and colour of the Celtic battle-charge, and the frenzy of the warrior group called *gaisatai*, who fling themselves naked into the fight.” Yet at the same time he disparaged the weapons of the Celt – swords too cumbersome and unwieldy for battle – and their reliability due to old habits of cattle raiding. It is important to remember the great exception to the general rule of Celtic

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7 Polybius, *Histories*, 2.22, 2.27.
warfare that is posed by the superior generalship and organisational ability of the Celtic Gallic leader, Vercingetorix, at the Siege of Alesia in September 52 B.C. Caesar did not triumph by patience and the Celts proved their staying power, only breaking after dogged Roman resistance to their attempts at a coordinated attack. Another Celtic war leader, the queen of the Icenii – Boudicca – led a rebellion against Rome in 61 A.D. 9 Meanwhile in 83 A.D. the battle of Mount Graupius in the far north-east of modern Scotland witnessed the last recorded use of the Celtic chariot. 10

**Early Modern Scottish Warfare**

Continuity is the word often used to describe the nature and capacity of Scots armies across the mid-sixteenth to early-seventeenth century. Julian Goodare is the strongest contemporary advocate of the connectedness of early-modern Scots armies with their medieval forerunners. Indeed, the mechanics of raising, equipping and training the armies of Mary, Queen of Scots’ reign was essentially that used by Robert the Bruce before the campaign that culminated almost 250 years beforehand in the battle of Bannockburn in 1314. 11 However, army organisation and strength alone do not convey the full implications of warfare in early-modern Europe generally, or Scotland specifically. Diplomatic and religious innovations had a direct impact upon where and why Scottish armies fought, and (significantly) how army personnel viewed armed struggle in the period. While the Scottish Reformation had little impact on how armies were raised, Protestantism became a major force in Scottish affairs. The new national faith altered traditional allegiances (most notably with France), prompted rebellion from Catholic groups within Scotland and influenced aspects of foreign policy that had implications from why and where Scots fought.

Military innovation occurred in a number of areas, including the use of cavalry and gunpowder weapons. For example, an act in 1540 demanded that all soldiers be “unhorsit except greit baronis” reflecting, in part, the European trend away from heavy cavalry in favour of cheaper and faster-trained infantry forces. 12 Far from being a trend in the wider so-called

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12 10 December 1540: Parliamentary Register, 3 December 1540, Records of the Parliament of Scotland, 1540/12/29.
‘military revolution’ that swept through Europe in this era, Scots’ horses traditionally played little role in Scottish warfare; terrain, poor local specimens and the often guerrilla nature of war in Scotland played a role in limiting cavalry efficacy north of the border.\(^{13}\) Even abroad, few Scots made their name as cavalry commanders, as opposed to the multitude of infantrymen.

Gunpowder-weapons – primarily the musket and cannon – represent the most strikingly innovative elements of military equipment across Europe in the 1500s. Scotland fell far behind other, wealthier and more central states, in its adoption and use of firearms. The Scots crown had at its disposal a six-tiered system to deal with military threat, whether domestic or foreign. First, it drew on friendly magnates for support augmented, secondly, by the common army. Third, mercenary troops might be employed and, if that faltered, recourse could be made to England, the powerful neighbour. Fifth, royal castles were crown strongholds scattered strategically and powerfully across the land, including Edinburgh, Blackness, Stirling, and Dumbarton. Finally, the crown had a monopoly on huge, expensive bronze cannon, established early-on with the acquisition of Mons Meg in 1453 and continued in the attempt to exploit a native foundry (only abandoned in 1558).\(^{14}\)

**The Common Army and Wapinshawing**

The common army is the term used to describe the traditional unpaid, fixed-service period armed band relied upon by Scots monarchs from the period of the middle ages. The *wapinshawing*, or official muster of fighting men within specific districts of the kingdom, was used as a means of assessing numbers and the responsibility to serve of Scots throughout the period (and, incidentally, carried by Scots colonisers into Ulster in the early-1600s).\(^{15}\) Soldiers fought unpaid, due to their obligations to the crown, though they were arranged in units described by Goodare as “autonomous, unpaid forces of private lords”.\(^{16}\)

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13 For questions about the nature and extent of the military revolution see J. Black, ‘Was There a Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe?’, *History Today* 58 (7) (2008), pp. 34-41.


15 See, e.g., Muster Roll for Co. Cavan, 1630: Public Record Office of Northern Ireland, D/1759/3C/1.

Before the personal reign of James VI in 1578 (though he did not gain full control of his government until 1581), little had been attempted to alter the unwieldy, traditional nature of domestic Scottish warfare. In a speech to parliament, made in 1607 on the occasion of his penultimate visit to Scotland post-Union, James said:

In respect the kings of Scotland did not so abound in treasure and money to take up an armie under pay, as the kings of England did; therefore was the Scottish army wont to be rysed onely by proclamation, upon the penaltie of their breach of allegiance; so as they were all forced to come to the warre like snails who carry their house about with them; every nobleman and gentleman bringing with him their tents, money, provision for their house, victuals of all sorts, and all other necessaries, the king supplying them of nothing.

The speech reflects the king’s frustration with the inefficiency and factious disposition inherent in this model of army raising – the mass levy, encompassing “all maner of man betuix sexti and sextene”. James also believed reform, as much as consensus, was needed if armies in Scotland were ever to achieve an up-to-date capacity in warfare. From roughly the late-1540s to the time of Union in 1603, Scotland’s governing powers developed an increasing antipathy towards the mass levy.

Change began after the disastrous battle of Pinkie Cleugh (10 September 1547), in which some 15,000 Scots were killed and 1,500 captured and the English said to have lost only 500 of their own men. French soldiers had drilled the Scots pike-men before the battle, and it was to France that the Scots turned for greater military assistance during the

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17 His final visit was in 1617, when he attempted to influence parliament to allow the introduction of bishops into the kirk structure. In 1618, James’s bishops forced his Five Article of Perth through a General Assembly; but the rulings were widely resisted: Pauline Croft, *King James* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p 166; David H. Willson, *King James VI & I* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1956), p 320.


latter part of the so-called ‘rough wooings’ of the 1540s. But this did not result in military innovation; rather, by 1560, an absent monarch and a new religion prompted Scotland to move away from France towards England, resulting in peace at an international level. Within the kingdom, violence and the need for bodies of armed men remained the norm due to prevalence of blood-feud and noble factionalism. Private feuds had the blessing of the state, while the legal machinery of the kingdom relied on violence in order to function – for example, “putting to the horn”, that is, placing offenders beyond legal protection from violence and theft of their goods, or Letters of Fire and Sword, were a feature of the Scots legal system. A prominent example of the granting of Letters of Fire and Sword exists in those granted to Sir Humphrey Colhoun of Luss to suppress Alasdair MacGregor of Glenstrae and his clan, leading to the battle of Glen Fruin in 1603. Unusually for this Highland battle, cavalry featured strongly on the Colhoun side, but this proved disadvantageous as the horses became stuck in the glen’s boggy terrain, allowing the MacGregors to route the invading force. This single battle carried a high death toll with as many as 300 Colhouns killed. According to their traditions the Clan Gregor lost few men, although among the slain was John dhu MacGregor, the chief’s brother.

Even in the ‘civilised’ Lowlands there was no state armoury and no local weapons stores, ensuring the continued reliance of the crown upon freeholders and gentlemen as the backbone of Scottish armies: for example, in 1596 it was the “haill gentilmen and frie halderis” of the sheriffdome of Edinburgh that were called upon to appear and do service. Pikes and muskets were little used or needed in private hands, so the vast majority of weapons possessed by Scots obliged to form an army were swords, axes, spears or pole-axes of various types, and handguns among wealthier men. This was not the stuff to make a modern cohesive early-modern army.

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22 Sir Walter Scott, Manners, Customs and History of the Highlanders of Scotland; Historical Account of the Clan MacGregor (Glasgow, 1893), pp. 121-4.


25 National Archives of Scotland, Treasury accounts, 1596-7, E21/71, ff. 73-4.
Official standards recognised the paucity of ‘modern’ weaponry: in 1596, to “pas to the kingis wyris” a man might possess only a jack (reinforced leather jacket) and two-handed sword, or alternatively a bow, sword and target (small round shield) “according to the hiland [Highland] custowme”. Goodare estimates the typical Scottish Lowland force of the period would include 5 per cent horsemen, 18 per cent well-armed footmen, 35 per cent lightly or non-armed infantry, and 42 per cent non-combatants (including servants, baggage handlers, horse-holders, etc). By contrast Highland forces operated mostly on foot. As stated, firearms were little in evidence and the Regent Moray’s expedition to the south-west in 1568, including 5,000 fighting men and 3,000 non-combatant followers, contained only nine firearms among them all! Here it is apt to quote Goodare, who says: “the Scottish professional army was hopelessly ill-equipped by the standards of professional continental armies”, and yet Highland mercenaries abroad in such advanced Continental armies enjoyed a high reputation.

The wapinshawings had a four-fold purpose: militarising Scotsmen; establishing crown command over citizens; ensuring they were armed; and training. The musters were neither regular nor common events, and, in practice, offered very little in the way of training they did observe a strict socio-economic hierarchy though some special musters existed from 1573, designed to give explicit training in weapons handling, but these could be little more than “popular holidays”, according to Goodare. A lack of any adequate supply of money by the state or modern weapons among Scots was the central downfall of the wapinshawings as an adequate means of raising an early-modern army. As a precursor to the period covered by this chapter, in 1540 a code of procedure for the efficacy and efficiency of the wapinshawing was established in Scotland and again revived in 1575 (but with no demand for drilling men in their weapons by parish). This procedure, in hand with a militia statute of 1558 stating the legal requirements of weapons ownership, placed Scotland well ahead of England.

27 Goodare, State and Society, p. 138.
28 James Stewart, 1st Earl of Moray (c.1531–1570), Regent of Scotland from 1567 until his assassination in 1570.
29 Goodare, State and Society, p. 139.
30 Goodare, State and Society, pp. 151-152.
in terms of the theory of raising men to fight.\textsuperscript{32} In practice, however, England always enjoyed a practical superiority over Scotland in these matters.\textsuperscript{33} Between 1595 and 1600 wapinshawings were at their peak, whilst other, smaller and directly crown-controlled experiments with armed forces were being abandoned as an alternative form of military organisation. Ironically, the Highlanders were natural warriors whose primitive arsenal of weapons and basic fighting style liberated them from the concerns of Lowland war administration.

Mercenaries – paid, full-time soldiers, defined as ‘professionals’ because they took money for their service – were the mainstay of continental armies from the late-1500s through to the end of the seventeenth century. Scotland needed to rely on its feudal, amateur army as there was no chance of establishing a permanent military force, centrally paid and constantly needed by the crown – neither money nor opportunity existed for this. Consequently there was no hope of a professional military career for Scots in their native land. When a few military careerists appeared home in Scotland after time spent abroad, they were viewed with suspicion. The crown well recognised the potential of trained professional warriors for supporting intermittently unpopular regimes in Scotland, but other groups in society feared their apparent separation from factional loyalty and kinship groups, while all were suspicious of the perceived susceptibility to bribery and violent conduct of wage-earning soldiers. Captain James Stewart (later Earl of Arran from 1581 to 1585), and his “waged men”, and Colonel William Stewart were the most prominent of this new breed in the 1570s and 1580s.\textsuperscript{34}

Wage-earning soldiers were responsible for the sack of Hamilton in 1570 “without commiseratioun or pitie”, during the civil war that followed Mary, Queen of Scots’ flight into England.\textsuperscript{35} After this event mercenary troops numbered but a few dozen men at most, deployed periodically in the

\textsuperscript{32} Goodare, \textit{State and Society}, p. 156.
\textsuperscript{35} David Calderwood, \textit{History of the Kirk of Scotland}, ed. T. Thomson and D. Laing (8 vols, Wodrow Society, 1843-9), vol. 3, p. 487. \textit{Diurnal of remarkable occurents that have passed within the kingdom of Scotland since the death of Knig James the Fourth, till the year 1575}, ed. T. Thomson (Bannatyne Club, 1833), p. 192; p. 171.
Borders in the later 1570s; but by the 1590s the Earls of Huntly and Bothwell did attempt to raise foreign funds – the former from Spain and the latter from England – to challenge the crown: both lost in the end. Colonel Stewart stands almost alone as an early example of a Scottish military entrepreneur. One of the few other examples is that of James Colville of Easter Wemyss, who commanded a regiment of Scots numbering 1,500 in 1589 when he fought under English pay on behalf of Henri IV of France in his struggle against the Catholic League during the French Wars of Religion.

**Thirty Years’ War**

Scots were among the most prominent participants in the conflict of 1618-48 and Scottish recruits for Swedish service, for instance, were remarkably high from the late 1620s and continued throughout the 1630s. Few of the ordinary rank-and-file of these men ever saw Scotland again, and only a handful of their officers ever returned home (assuming they were not among the appallingly high casualty rates recorded by these units). One explanation for the widespread service rendered by Scots of both religious persuasions (for many Catholic Scots also served abroad) might be found in the conclusion arrived at by Christopher Duffy that principles of military and noble honour often bore little relation to Christian morality. The thirst

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of many Scots for honour on the battlefield, and the contemporary early-modern aversion to bringing disgrace upon one’s family’s name, supports Duffy’s view that religion might have played a subsidiary role in the career decisions of many professional Scottish soldiers.\textsuperscript{40}

Contemporary Scottish officials believed that something in the order of one in twenty adult Scottish males were required for military service abroad.\textsuperscript{41} Geoffrey Parker has produced a map, showing the recruiting grounds of Europe’s armies between 1550 and 1650, which demonstrates that, overall, most Scottish soldiers came from a swathe of land across central Scotland, encompassing both Lowland and Highland areas.\textsuperscript{42} One of the most important requirements for the continuity of Scottish military involvement in the Thirty Years’ War was a readily available pool of able-bodied men.

At a fundamental level, any Scot who decided upon a career in the army, needed to possess the quality of raw courage as he was entering into a way of life which might demand of him both life and limb. Similarly, young gentlemen were expected to have the commanding presence that breeding alone could produce, whether on the parade ground or the battlefield.\textsuperscript{43}

\textbf{Diaspora: Case Study of Russia}
A number of native born ‘Celtic’ Scots entered Russian service, many from the Swedish army.\textsuperscript{44} In the late 1500s many soldiers escaped Swedish service and ventured to Moscow to serve the Tsar; among them Gabriell Elphingsten, a “valiant Scottish captain”, who arrived with a commendation from a fellow Scot, Colonel Stewart (who served the King of Denmark). Six

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{40} Christopher Duffy, \textit{The Military Experience in the Age of Reason} (London: Routledge & Keegan Paul, 1987), p. 74.
\item \textsuperscript{41} RPC, vol. 1, p. 88.
\item \textsuperscript{42} Geoffrey Parker and Angela Parker, \textit{European Soldiers, 1550-1650} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 24-25.
\item \textsuperscript{43} “The posture, gait, voice, and the movement of the body and hands must ... all convey an impression of grace, avoiding that which is coarse and boorish, and equally that which is over-sweet and effeminate”: Wolff, \textit{Versuch über die Sittlichen Eigenschaften und Pflichten des Soldatenstandes}, p. 404, cited in Duffy, \textit{Age of Reason}, p. 84.
\item \textsuperscript{44} Sir J. Horsey, \textit{Extracts out of Sir J. H.’s Observations in seventeene yeeres travels and experience in Russia, and other countries adjoyning} (S. Purchas the Elder, 1626) republished in \textit{Russia at the close of the sixteenth century. Comprising the treatise “Of the Russe Commonwealth,” by G. F., and the travels of Sir J. Horsey, now for the first time printed entire from his own manuscript}, ed. E. A. Bond (London, 1856), p. 225.
\end{itemize}
other Scots came with him “but all verie bare of monny and furniture [n.b. possessions]”.

Elphingstone took charge of a large number of Swedish deserters, of whom the Scots were the most favoured. He was soon followed into Russian service by General Carmichael, uncle to Sir John Carmichael, Warden of the Border in Scotland, from the family settled at Hyndford in Lowland Scotland. In 1570 Carmichael was given command of 5,000 of the Tsar’s men during the Great Northern War, and later became Governor of Pskoff. Giles Fletcher, writing in 1591, says “of mercenarie soldiers that are strangers (whom they call nemschoy), they have at this time 4,300 of Polonians: of Chircasses (that are under the Polonians) about four thousand, whereof 3,500 are abroad in his garrisons, of Deutches [Germans] and Scots about 150, of Greekes, Turks, Danes, and Swedes, all in one band an 100 or thereabouts. But these they use only upon the Tartar side and against the Siberians”.

The Scottish settlers, excluded like all non-Orthodox residents from the kitai gorod (China City) and the byelo gorod (White City) of Moscow, were placed in the nemetskaya sloboda, beyond the gates of the capital, north–west of the city. Most Scots married their fellow exiles, mainly Livonians and Germans. One, a Hamilton, was almost certainly among the Swedish prisoners, mentioned previously and left two sisters as descendants, who both married Russians: one wed Artamon Sergievitch Matveeff and the other Feodor Poleuuktovitch Narishkin, both members of prominent Russian noble families.

The career of just one of these Scots is worth citing as it says much about their role in Russian history. When Tsar Feodor was overthrown by his wife’s brother, Boris Feodorovitch Godounoff, Captain David Gilbert, a Scot, cooperated with the Frenchman, Captain Margaret, and other international scoundrels, to support Godounoff. On his death, Gilbert served in the bodyguard of the so-called ‘False’ Dmitri, composed entirely of foreigners. The bodyguard consisted of 300 English, French and Scots, divided into three squadrons, and commanded by officers of each nation.
Gilbert was one of the 52 strangers whom the second False Dmitri wished to drown in the river Oka. Gilbert subsequently served in the ranks of the Polish army, but was soon taken prisoner and brought to Moscow. The MSS. of the Orusheinaya Palace at Moscow show that Gilbert, Captain Jacob Margaret, Robert Dunbar (another Scot), and Andrew Let were taken into the military service of another Russian magnate, Afanassi Ivanovitch Vlasseff in 1600-1601.\(^50\)

In 1610 the Scotsman, Captain Robert Carr, accompanied Gilbert and his son, Thomas, on their return to Russia. Carr commanded one of the six companies of British cavalry which on 24 June 1610, remained for the longest time on the battlefield in the defeat of the new Tsar Vassili Shuiski's army by the Poles at Kluchino under the Grand Hetman Zolkiewski. Carr lost his whole company, but remained unwounded. The names of the other captains were Benson, Crale, Crichton, Kendrick and York. Disillusioned, Thomas Gilbert and Captain Carr returned home in 1619, but the elder Gilbert remained in Russia and probably died there.\(^51\)

In 1631, at the height of the Thirty Years’ War (1618–48) – when the first Romanov ruled in Russia – another Scot, Sir Alexander Leslie of Auchintoul, arrived with a letter from King Charles I to the Tsar Michael.\(^52\) The Patriarch Philarete, then co–regent, sent him to Sweden to hire 5,000 infantry, and persuade smiths and wheelwrights, carpenters, and other vital tradesmen, to settle in Russia as part of his regimental community. By the

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\(^{51}\) He may have returned to Russia as a noble Russian family called Kar appears on record: see W. Tooke, *View of the Russian Empire During the Reign of Catherine the Second* (3 vols, London, 1799).

end of 1631 there were 66,000 mercenaries in Moscow. Captain William Gordon, another Scot, was at the same time in the Muscovite service. In 1634, a Lieutenant–Colonel Alexander Gordon was also present; he appears in Sir Thomas Urquhart’s Jewel among the “Scottish colonels that served under the great Duke of Muscovy, against the Tartar and Polonian”.

In the reign of the next Tsar, Aleksei Michaelovitch (1645–76), there was a marked increase in the number of Scots in Russia. The Tsar raised the number of foreign soldiers in his dominion, including two regiments, “one of cavalry and one of infantry … commanded by a Scotsman as colonel, and have a staff’s company in each of them. He received four times the usual pay”. This Scot was probably no other than Sir Alexander Leslie of Auchintoul. On 28 March 1633, Captain James Forbes received a commission to raise in Scotland 200 men for the Russian service under Auchintoul, and on 1 May 1633, was granted a warrant to levy the same number of men Auchintou as “Generall Colonel of the Forraun forces of the Emperour of Russia” was granted. Five years later, in 1638, the first Bishop’s War broke out between England and Scotland (precipitating the Civil Wars of the 1640s). Though many Scots returned from Sweden to defend their homeland, those in Russia were too far flung to heed the call home.

Following the disastrous conflict in Britain, a number of royalist Scots entered Russian service – if for no other reason than desperation at making a living in exile. In 1656 Thomas Dalyell of Binns (who never shaved his beard after the 1649 execution of his beloved master, King Charles I) and William Drummond of Cromlix entered the Russian service together. Binns became a general, and Cromlix a lieutenant–general and Governor of Smolensk. Both returned to Scotland in 1665, but only on the

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54 Sir Thomas Urquhart of Cromarty, *Ekskybalauron: or, The discovery of a most exquisite jewel, more precious then diamonds inchased in gold, the like whereof was never seen in any age: found in the kennel of Worcester-streets, the day after the fight, and six before the autumnal æquinoct, anno 1651*. Serving in this place, to frontal a vindication of the honour of Scotland, from that infamy, whereinto the rigid Presbyterian party of that nation, out of their covetousness and ambition, most dissembledly hath involved it (London, 1652).

55 Tooke, *View of the Russian Empire*, p. 474.


direct entreaty of King Charles II to the Tsar who was loath to allow any of his servants to depart his service. The autocratic rule born over their men by Cromlix and Binns was much commented on. Dalyell was described as a man whose “rude and fierce natural disposition had been much confirmed by his breeding and service in Muscovy, where he had the command of a small army and saw nothing but tyranny and slavery”. Later in the century, Gilbert Burnet wrote of Drummond of Cromlix that he “had yet too much of the air of Russia about him, though not with Dalziel’s fierceness”. Dalyell of Binns was also denounced as “a Muscovy beast who used to roast men”, and accused of having introduced the thumbscrews as a torture device into Scotland; though in truth it was already known, called by another name “the pilliewincks”. To confirm all of these prejudiced, the Catholic James II created Drummond of Cromlix Viscount Strathallan (1686), and Dalyell was Commander–in–Chief of the Scottish army till his death at Edinburgh in August 1685.

Cromlix and Binns were, however, unusual in that they came home. Most Scots in Russia would not, or could not, leave. Paul Menzies, a son of Sir Gilbert Menzies of Pitfoddels, came to Russia from the Polish service in 1661. The Tsar Aleksei showed him immediate favour and arranged his marriage to a Russian woman, and he was appointed a gentleman in the household of the Boyar Feodor Michaelovitch Milotawski, envoy to Persia. In 1672 Menzies acted as the Tsar’s envoy to Prussia and to Vienna to propose a league against the Turk and proceeded to Rome to petition Pope Clement X to assist Poland against the Ottoman Sultan, and succeeded in his mission. He returned in 1674, to become tutor to Peter the Great (which he remained until 1682). In 1689 he gained the rank of lieutenant–general; he died on 9 November 1694, leaving a wife and children. Incidentally, as a devout Catholic and a good Scot, when in Rome he obtained from Pope Clement X permission for a service to be held commemorating Saint Margaret, Queen of Scots. Several members of the Catholic family of Menzies travelled to Russia to capitalize on the Tsar’s good will; Lieutenant–Colonel Thomas Menzies of Balgownie was one. He married at Riga in July 1651, a noble lady from Curland, and was wounded and taken prisoner by his countryman, Lord Henry Gordon, youngest son of George,

second Marquis of Huntly. The young Gordon was fighting for the Poles and also happened to capture his distant cousin, Gordon of Auchleuchries at the battle of Szudna in 1660. Balgownie later died of wounds in the Ukraine. By contrast, Lord Henry Gordon died at home in Strathbogie; he was described as being a “little hair-brained, but very courageous” – a fitting description for many of the Scots who served so far from home.61

**Concluding Remarks: MacColla and the Highland Charge**

In the era of Early Modern Europe (*circa* 1450-1750 A.D.) clan chiefs could often achieve victory when on the offensive, but only when they led from the front by exerting personal control over their kin and followers. This worked best as guerrilla-style warfare against poor or under-motivated opponents, especially where generals attempted to establish isolated garrison posts within Gaelic territory. The dreaded ‘Highland charge’ of Montrose’s Celtic supporters during the Civil War battles of the 1640s carried the field at a number of notable battles. After generations of obscurity in their Highland fastnesses, the Celtic style of war seemed suddenly to burst forth and carry all before it. Forty years later this was proved most famously under Alasdair MacColla’s command at the stunning Jacobite victory at Killicrankie (27 July 1689) which demonstrated the ongoing primacy of the charge.62 However, increasingly well-trained government forces frustrated the tactic and dispersed Jacobites at turning-points such as Culloden (16 April 1746) during ‘Bonnie’ Prince Charlie’s Jacobite uprising. Indeed, the dreaded Highland charge presaged the mode of all the Jacobite uprisings – initially very successful, but soon frustrated through command squabbles or inflexibility of response to the enemy.

Duncan Stevenson says that by the mid-eighteenth century the English, with better equipment (notably the quick-firing musket and ring bayonet) and subject to strict parade-ground discipline in the 18th century manner took the advantage out of the Highland charge, dissipating its power and psychological strength.63 This was especially effective when the Scots could be lured into unfamiliar, enemy territory which stretched their supply

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61 Henry, Lord Gordon, came to Poland after his sister, Catherine, married Andrew John, Count Morsztyn, the “exiled” Grand Treasurer of Poland. Gordon became a Polish noble in 1658 and got from King Charles II a life annuity of 6,000 merks Scots from the Huntly estates in 1667: *Papers Relating to the Scots in Poland, 1576–1793*, ed. A. Francis Steuart, (Edinburgh: Scottish History Society, 1915), pt 2.


lines and taxed their knowledge of terrain. The Celts were lightly equipped and could (to a fairly good degree) ignore logistical demands that would stall more conventional forces. It has even been suggested they left this legacy to the Confederate forces of the American Southern states in 1861, allowing many genuine Scots descendants among those forces to experience something of the style of their ancestors’ Celtic warfare. It is even suggested (though it is perhaps far-fetched) that the famous Confederate ‘Rebel yell’ originated in the screams the Highlanders traditionally made during the charge!64