

# Beautiful Lotuses, Beautiful Roses

TOWARDS THE CONSTRUCTION OF A POLYPHONIC,  
MONADOLOGICAL, CREATIVE SPACE

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The lotus is a well-known symbol of the East, and the rose that of the West. However, the reason for putting them in the plural form for the title of this conference is to emphasize the fact that even within both the so-called “Eastern” and “Western” cultures, there actually exists a wide variety of differences which should not be ignored. The world’s various cultures have truly flowered each in their own way: the question remains as to whether people who have grown up under the influence of one, can really learn to appreciate the beauty of another one, perhaps a very different one. Can we even learn to find the differences themselves that exist so clearly between one culture and another, truly as beautiful as they are?

I believe that these questions are very important for our day, and concern both our academic study and our social lives. Just what does it mean to truly understand a different culture, indeed, how do we understand the concept of culture itself? This question is being newly addressed in our time. It has been a long time since investigations of culture have been referring to such concepts as “interculturality”, “multiculturality” and “transculturality”, and these discussions have often attempted to use these concepts to uproot traditional ideas of culture. One researcher calls such traditional interpretations of culture “unificatory”, (monolithic) “folk-bound” (ethnically or regionally defined) and “separatory” (divisive in their effects) (Welsch<sup>1</sup>). When we refer to traditional concepts of culture, and think of cultures as “islands” or “spheres,” we tend to take such ideas for granted as the “inner homogenization” within each culture, and their “outer separation” from each other. In this way, intercultural-

tural conflicts would seem almost inevitable. It therefore becomes beneficial to think rather of transculturality, which allows for each culture to influence each other and even depend on each other for their very existence. However, we have to closely investigate the kinds of relationships that can exist between cultures. To speak of relationships of course does not exclude even the possibility of mutually destructive ones! For this reason, in order to reduce intercultural conflicts and instead develop truly harmonious relationships, we must look into what the origins are of this way of thinking of cultures as “islands” or “spheres.” We must carefully investigate how we arrived at the idea of cultures as things existing as monolithic, independent units; as things that would continue to exist unchanged even if removed from their contexts. When we think about culture in general, we sometimes start from assumptions the very existence of which we are unaware, assumptions which may lead us inevitably into the very conflicts we most wish to avoid. I personally think one origin of these assumptions lies in the paradigms of Western scientific thinking: a fundamentally atomistic approach. This approach seems to rear its head not only in discussions of matter and its properties, but also in various other areas where its application would seem more dubious. One such area worth mentioning is the coveted Western “individualism,” where we can clearly see the word “individual” itself, implies a definition of the person as an “indivisible unit.” The parallels here are obvious with the Greek idea of the “*atomon* (*tomon*)”. When these atomistic paradigms are applied to the mind itself, we see philosophers and logicians seeking “simple ideas” and “logical atoms.” In linguistics as well, we only have to remember the kind of research being done, until Saussure finally gave his field the freedom to study languages as “systems of units that are not in themselves objective substances.”<sup>2</sup> In each field above, we can see customary paradigms applied of the fundamental units of each field being independent, permanent and unchangeable.

According to the atomistic way of seeing things, the fundamental elements comprising our world are as it were completely solid: they are defined as being indestructible.<sup>3</sup> Furthermore, in whatever context these atoms may be found, they remain completely unchanged, because they are impenetrable by anything else. As these atoms are uncomposed and partless, by definition they have no “inside”: only external relationships may be postulated of them.<sup>4</sup> They are as it were pure being: they have no

parts which could be differentiated from the whole, they find their existence solely in the relative movement, friction or pressure they exert on all the other atoms at any given moment.<sup>5</sup> As they have no “inside,” they possess absolute impenetrability: the atomistic approach understands physical existence in terms of an impenetrable mass, *une masse impénétrable*. In spite of the fact that Leibniz stated long ago that real bodies, *le corps réel*, did not exist in this way, modern physics continued to seek ever smaller indivisible particles, and this search finally led them to the concept of fields instead.<sup>6</sup> With the rise of quantum theory, it became clear that the ultimate particles of matter were in fact really not particles at all, but rather vibrating sets of quantum fields.<sup>7</sup>

And so even though matter itself is now finally comprehensible in these terms, many other aspects of our daily experience have not benefited from this development, and continue to be understood in old “atomistic” ways. Our approach to various problems is often still to analyze them into elements which are completely “other” with respect to the remaining elements of the problem.<sup>8</sup> Even today, the majority of the discussions of culture-related issues seem to remain along these lines, treating questions of humanity and society with the same tools as used to be used for analyses of physical matter. This may perhaps be traceable to the overwhelming success of the physical sciences solving so many of the problems in our daily lives.

In order to understand how this success was possible, it may be useful to see what Bergson had to say about the origin of this concept of “impenetrability”: he describes this concept as arising simultaneously with that of number itself.<sup>9</sup> Material objects (*les choses matérielles*) enter into mutual relationships in which they are completely external to each other (*partes extra partes*), as they are to the observing subject as well. When defined in this way, it becomes possible to then define the space or separation lying between them, as well as to determine their outlines or forms, which arise on a uniform background or “empty space” surrounding them.<sup>10</sup> It is easy to see how this way of thinking arises, by taking a closer look at just how it is we go about “counting” things. If we take humans as an example, each one will of course have his or her own personality, making for qualitative differences between them. If we take these personalities too closely into consideration, however, we will find ourselves unable to count them, because they will

seem to us as all qualitatively different units; apples and oranges, as it were. Seeing them in this way, each one will appear to us as irreplaceable individuals, which indeed they of course are. When we wish to count them, however, we will have to consider them not as qualitatively different individuals, but rather simply as specimens of the *uniform* category of “humanity.” We can then go about counting “one person, two people, three people...” and so on. It is also important to note in this connection that the counting is done by a conscious perceiver of the objects to be counted; indeed, the counting depends for its very existence upon the presence of such a perceiver. Every one of the objects to be counted must seem to such a perceiver, at least for the moment, to not be qualitatively different from the others, they must seem “all the same,” as it were.

If we understand this sort of mental “levelling” that must occur for counting to be possible, therefore, we have a reference point for then understanding the viewpoint of transculturalism: its viewpoint is at the completely opposite pole, where qualitative differences are recognized and appreciated to the greatest possible extent. The best we can arrive at with an approach which would attempt to cultures by reducing them to their common denominator, is a kind of “multiculturality”. If we then attempt discussions of “interculturality”, we still get the feeling of being trapped in one of the world’s “cultures” defined in generic terms, somehow trying to “join hands across the divide,” as it were, with members of “other cultures” similarly defined. Those who work in academic or research fields may also recognize a similar phenomenon at work in so-called “interdisciplinary” efforts and studies!

I wish to show below that by carefully analyzing the above situation and questioning its fundamental assumptions, we may arrive at a new way of thinking about the meaning of space. We may often unconsciously tend to see space just as something used by the mind “to count items in”, as a place or milieu for the mind to create number, as it were.<sup>11</sup> By rising above this simple way of considering space to be just “empty”, we can start to understand a qualitatively different kind of “space”, one that will provide adequate foundations for an understanding of true transculturality. On the other hand, we can get an idea of just how far so-called “globalization” has progressed, when we find all cultures looking roughly the same, ready for counting! The world

may boast many cultures, but if they all resemble each other, it will be the same as if they were only various extensions of one culture after all. In order to avoid this danger, I would prefer to picture a space in which a discussion of the real differences between cultures would remain possible. In order to distance this view from the “atomistic” kind<sup>12</sup> described at length above, I would like to offer the term “monadological space” as an alternative.<sup>13</sup> In my discussion below, I will describe just what kind of space qualifies as “monadological”, and then also offer the term “polyphonic space” as an even further development of its basic principles.

First, “monadological space” would have as one of its defining features the fact that the space itself is seen, not merely as quantitative and empty as in modern physics, but rather as qualitative and meaning-filled. By taking a new look at these old philosophical chestnuts, quantity and quality, we can arrive at new ways of seeing and discussing culture-related issues. A qualitative space would allow for cultures not just to have an “external” relationship with each other, but rather to fully communicate and even transform each other in the process. Each culture finds itself in an intimate relationship with other cultures, and aspects of one are internalized into others, sometimes forming important cultural strata within each other as they are assimilated and digested. This process of mutual interpenetration allows for a true fusion, which only then, in a way that might seem contradictory, allows for their distinctive individual traits to shine forth. We can clearly see here that cultures cannot be considered as the impenetrable atoms of traditional physics. The French philosopher Michel Serres calls the things arising in the context of kind of qualitative space, “mixed” (*mêlé*): “the philosophy to come, which will grasp this process of “mixing”, will succeed in smoothly unifying the whole and its various parts, on the basis of completely different ontological assumptions than the ones we now have.”<sup>14</sup> Clearly, here we no longer see any trace of the atomistic assumptions of mutual impenetrability. It has become rather as Leibniz writes in his monadology, that each unit, or rather monad, envelops all the others, even as it expresses them at one and the same time. His idea of the communication between substances surely can be considered a precursor of these modern approaches. Serres himself makes the following comment:

We should note that in Leibniz we find a philosophy of the communication of substances, side-by-side with a new physics of elastic bodies. Hence we find him even at a young age publicly stating that he did not accept the ideas of infinitely hard atoms in empty space, and at no time thereafter retracting this position. On the contrary, the ascertaining of impenetrability and relative elasticity form an essential part of his physics of communication.<sup>15</sup>

In a word, a philosophy of mixing and blending, a philosophy in which the identity (*identité*) of one thing is achieved in combination with others and even arising together with them: it is such a view of the world which we are once again now struggling to understand.<sup>16</sup> Leibniz described his monads as differing not quantitatively (as they were all one), but rather only qualitatively.<sup>17</sup> We therefore have to understand how many things can exist within one thing, as it were: how much of what can we pack into a single thing. We have to take a good look once again at the process of individuation, and when an individual individuates, as it were, just what is possible and how it is possible for that individual.<sup>18</sup> There have been a multitude of previous assumptions (cf. Carlos Castaneda's *The Great Assumptions About Individuation*): usually the individuator of the individual is seen to belong only the individual itself, and usually the individuator of a thing is thought of as the individual thing itself. We have to learn to question these assumptions.<sup>19</sup> I believe it has become necessary for us now to take another look at just what individuation is and how it occurs. Just what is it for a culture, say, to maintain its own originality, and how does it arrive at it in the first place? Serres gives us the following:

Individuation or differentiation happens as the way information is taken in and stored, in the way a form is given and then retained.<sup>20</sup>

The question may now arise of just where such "information" or "form" comes from. It is with just this important question that we can investigate further into the arising of individual things or cultures. In order for an individual thing with its own distinctive qualities to arise or

to be formed, we cannot think of it as just somehow arising out of the blue, unconnected to any other thing. Of course, an objector might here start to talk of “subjectivity” and adopt an existentialist stance in the name of some sort of freedom, but I do not believe that this kind of “lonely individual” is a good example of the way true individuation occurs. This of course does not mean that I consider all discussions of subjectivity irrelevant, and with structuralism maintain that the control of underlying structures is responsible for everything we see. An individual cannot grow without some sort of communication in language with those around him (which refutes an existentialist approach of absolute subjectivity), and yet it is even more important that he use the language he has acquired to richly express his own personality in various situations. Cultures also can be considered in this light, as a process of learning and acquiring, and then a going beyond, almost as a flower will need periods of both preparation and blooming. The process of learning itself is a thematization through communication, leading to a full flowering of this theme later on as the learning is expressed in living. It is for this very reason that we should perhaps call individual people and cultures not even “individuals” as such, but rather “ongoing processes of individuation.”<sup>21</sup> We use language to pass on our respective cultures to succeeding generations. Of course, this process of transmission is not limited to the use of language. Architecture, just to take one other example out of many, can fulfil a similar function. As long as a specific building exists, it can continue to act as a “production mold for ceremonies” (*un moule en creux des cérémonies*)<sup>22</sup>: by its function as a treasured building, it can play an important part in the creation and continuation of a society or culture.<sup>23</sup> First there must be that appearance or existence of a certain form, which is required for any process of individuation. However, this form appears as always in the process of growing and re-forming itself, for the reason that were we to consider it as complete, fully-formed and static, we would once again be under the spell of thinking of cultures as “islands” or “spheres.” In short, form cannot exist in complete isolation, nor can it permanently remain unchanged. If we misunderstand this point, we fall into a combination of idealism and hopelessness. It may be useful at this point to consider the following extract from “Orientalism”, by Edward Said:

Memory of the modern Orient disputes imagination, sends one back to the imagination as a place preferable, for the European sensibility, to the real Orient. For a person who has never seen the Orient, Nerval once said to Gautier, a lotus is still a lotus; for me it is only a kind of onion. To write about the modern Orient is either to reveal an upsetting demystification of images culled from texts, or to confine oneself to the Orient of which Hugo spoke in his original preface to *Les Orientales*, the Orient as “image” or “pensée”, symbols of “une sorte de préoccupation générale (a kind of general pre-occupation).”<sup>24</sup>

Being taken in by such idealized, fixed images is certainly not uncommon in our everyday conscious life. If we have a wonderful experience, or perhaps one of intense suffering, we are sometimes apt to hold on to that moment (even if unwillingly, in the case of the painful experience): it is somehow that time, for us, stands still.<sup>25</sup> Seen in this light, the Ideas of Plato seem almost to be “snapshots”, as it were, of the most perfect moment of things, and therefore, by “stopping time,” can thereby reveal a kind of imperishability or immortality.<sup>26</sup> On the other hand, together with Bergson we might prefer to call this kind of “immortality” a kind of “eternity of death.”<sup>27</sup> Such a thing may be very beautiful, or rather may have been very beautiful: there is definitely a kind of beauty to be found there. However, this is a kind of nostalgic beauty,<sup>28</sup> and even the memory of it has a kind of aesthetic quality to it, and indeed a kind of beauty of its own. The moment we believe we have at last been able to grasp an eternal, unchanging Reality or Substance, in the same way we love a feeling of quiet stability and peace, we then indeed experience a kind of Beauty.<sup>29</sup> However, it is in the very moment that we believe we have succeeded in grasping this Beauty, that it begins to degenerate and disappear, for in the process of cutting the beautiful thing off from time and everything else, we acquire a habit of no longer paying attention to the appearance of new things, to the facts of change and growth. From here, we easily fall back into the habit of seeing individual or isolated things as islands or spheres. In contrast with this approach, a flower in the process of individuation cannot be separated from the whole in which context it arises, and its beauty seeks within that context to come to full fruition. Similarly, among



the profusion of flowers we call cultures, each achieves its full beauty in communication with the others. As one example of this kind of mutual enrichment, we can remember the rise of Neoplatonism in Florence during the Renaissance. As classical Greek ideas came together with Christian ones, new developments became possible and, as is well-known, this Neoplatonism in turn had a great influence on the works of people such as Botticelli and others. Further back in history, Indian Buddhism and Greek sculpture came together to create the magnificent Gandhara style of Buddhist art. In Japan, the importation and thorough digesting into Japanese of Chinese characters gave to the Japanese language an immense increase in expressive power.

We can of course recognize here the influence of the whole, as it works to shape the destinies of its individual parts. It is natural to think here perhaps of this whole as a kind of Hegelian Dialectical Universal, which guides, as it were, all the dialectical processes occurring within it to itself. However, we are no longer so complacent as to believe this anymore; no longer so self-unaware that we may blissfully use this kind of concept as a comforter, for reassurance that after all, all will be well. It is true that even within such a paradigm, “differing things” can meet, influence each other in complex ways, and perhaps even give rise to new things as a result. However, it is not always that new things must result from such a dialectical process: the Hegelian Universal Whole retains the power to place its own limits upon just what can possibly arise within it. Also, in reality, it may be finally impossible to completely reconcile varying opinions or occurrences into an overarching system which can accommodate all of them. It is too easy, after all, to just speak of a “universal whole” which can reconcile every sort of contradiction within itself. We have lost our thoroughgoing faith in the European version of the Ideal Spirit, or to put it in a different way, as Hegel states in his *Lectures on Aesthetics*, the Age of Art has come to a close, and we are now in the Age of Philosophy.<sup>30</sup> We no longer see things in terms of a reconciliation at the level of an ideal Universal Whole. We have come to see that such a faith in itself just reflects a dreamy Idealism, and even a Eurocentrism, and is therefore just another kind of the isolationistic individuation mentioned above. If we attempt to impose such a paradigm on the rest of the world, simply “pushing back the boundaries”, as it were, we may achieve a “globalization” of sorts, but it will not be one

in which true differences between cultures will find reconciliation.<sup>31</sup> Finally, it is time to recognize that after all, it is no longer even possible to apply such a paradigm of isolated cultural islands to the present true state of the cultures in our world. We have to be willing to accept that Intelligence itself is taking on whole new qualities and ways of being. Where Intelligence used to be isolated and individuated, closed in and clearly defined, “we have once again become nomads” (Pierre Lévy).<sup>32</sup> Let us see what Lévy has to say about the possibilities offered by the new kind of “collective intelligence”:

The space of the new monadism is not a geographical territory, not under the control of the various social orders or nations, but is rather a space of consciousness, intelligence and the ability to think. In such a space, the quality of existence, the way of forming societies, is finally free to bloom and grow. It is no longer maps drawn by powerful elements, no longer the boundaries between the various academic disciplines, no longer even the statistics of merchants, but rather a space which possesses a truly human quality, and is dynamic and full of life. It is what allows for the appearance of all these phenomena, what they aim for.<sup>33</sup>

This collective intelligence strives for a “fundamental letting go” (*un lâcher-prise essentiel*). It seeks to abolish ideas of identity, mechanisms of control and domination, limitations on communication.<sup>34</sup> It seeks also to help individual separate ways of thinking give new life to each other, by allowing them the fundamental freedom required for their true interaction.<sup>35</sup> We see in Said’s comments on Orientalism that this approach clearly lacked a true “letting go”: Because the relationship between Occident and Orient is a relationship of power, of domination, of varying degrees of a complex hegemony.<sup>36</sup> Orientalism is rather a distribution of geopolitical awareness into aesthetic, scholarly, economic, sociological, historical and philosophical texts.<sup>37</sup> This approach serves to maintain established relationship between various disciplines, as defined by power and domination. Deeply reflecting on this should obviously enable us to share our knowledge and acknowledge it to others.<sup>38</sup> Collective Intelligence is a form of universally distributed intelligence<sup>39</sup>.

No one knows everything, everyone knows something; all knowledge resides in humanity. There is no transcendent store of knowledge, and knowledge is simply the sum of what we know.<sup>40</sup>

It will announce the voice of the many (*la voix du multiple*).<sup>41</sup> Intelligence must be understood here in its etymological sense of joining together (*travailler en bonne intelligence*), as uniting not only ideas but people, “constructing society” (*intelligence avec ennemi*)<sup>42</sup>. It is in this way that we can truly begin to learn from others.

Even though I need to gather information and exchange ideas, even if I am able to learn from the other, I’ll never know everything he knows. Our need to listen to the other can never lead to the construction of knowledge about him. We cannot simply capture his expertise or the information he possesses. Apprenticeship, in the fullest sense of the word, also implies that we confront the incomprehensibility, the irreducibility of the world of the other, which is the basis of power for me. The other remains enigmatic, becomes a desirable being in every respect.<sup>43</sup>

Inquiring once again into what constitutes Collective Intelligence, we find the following description of it:

It is a form of universally distributed intelligence, constantly enhanced, coordinated in real time, and resulting in the effective mobilization of skills. I’ll add the following indispensable characteristic to this definition: the basis and goal of collective intelligence is the mutual recognition and enrichment of individuals rather than the cult of fetishized or hypostatized communities.<sup>44</sup>

It is very important that collective intelligence is a universally distributed intelligence which is enhanced, coordinated, and mobilized in real time,<sup>45</sup> and that collective intelligence is not the cult of fetishized or hypostatized communities. It is with such an approach that we can truly escape from our habit of seeing culture as islands or spheres. Collective intelligence must not be confused with totalitarian projects involving the subordination of individuals to transcendent and fetishistic communities<sup>46</sup>. By contrast, the ant colony possesses a rigidly fixed structure; the ants are sharply divided into castes and are interchangeable within

those castes<sup>47</sup>. The ant colony is the opposite of collective intelligence.<sup>48</sup> Collective intelligence is born with a culture and grows with it.<sup>49</sup> If this is the case, then once a culture stops growing, we may say that its collective intelligence begins to deteriorate and disappear. Lévy attempts to take this collective intelligence, and to develop it on the basis of a “space of intelligence”. I myself wish to take it one step further, and develop such a “space of intelligence” even further into what I wish to call a “polyphonic, monadological space”. Lévy noticed already that “far from merging individual intelligence into some indistinguishable magma, collective intelligence is a process of growth, differentiation, and the mutual revival of singularities”.<sup>50</sup> In this way, we can see that he is able to avoid a kind of melting-pot reduction of differences in a Hegelian “ethical substance”. When we seek to further develop Lévy’s ideas into the construction of the concept of a polyphonic, monadological space, we must strive to respect and protect the real differences existing between different cultures. We find a hint about how to go about this in Lévy’s approach to the idea of “hospitality”. Hospitality is the perfect representation of the maintenance of the social bond, one conceived in accordance with the formula of reciprocity.<sup>51</sup> L’hôte is likely to be either receiver or the received.<sup>52</sup> Hospitality sustains the possibility of travel, of meeting the other.<sup>53</sup> One must realize that one is oneself a traveller. The person who can find the traveller within himself, within his deepest idea of who he is, inescapably becomes a welcoming host (*hospes*) to other such travellers.<sup>54</sup> We do not refer here to some comfortable dialectical universal: indeed, the fact is, this kind of Hegelian concept cannot be understood in these terms at all. We must learn to find in our present situation a kind of “negating” way of thinking.<sup>55</sup> It is only in such “mutually negating” terms that we can arrive at a complete vision of the real dialectic occurring in reality. The most famous philosopher of modern Japan, Kitaro Nishida, arrived at the concept of a “generative or creative monadology,” which has far-reaching applications in modern aesthetics and transcultural aesthetics, as will be shown below.

Nishida’s “creative monadology” has also been referred to as a “dialectical monadology,”<sup>56</sup> and the differences between his approach and the traditional monadology of Leibniz should become apparent in the following description:

When we first start to think about individuals as representative units, the idea of a monadology may seem stunning and unsurpassable in its intricacies and its scale, but I cannot agree with Leibniz's ideas as they stand. I rather wish to insist that individuals interact, work on each other and negate each other. Paradoxically, it is by negating themselves that they affirm themselves. They are born into the world, and they die: individuals are not monads created unborn and imperishable by God. The latter kind are merely products of thought; products of the imagination. I rather see individuals existing in truly dialectical relationships, each to the others.<sup>57</sup>

Nishida perceived that there did not exist an idea of dialectic at the base of the monadology as proposed by Leibniz.<sup>58</sup> For this reason, the relationships existing between God and the monads were in no way paradoxical: the monads just existed in a sort of representative way, and they never arrived at a point of their existence being put radically into question, at a point of *having lost all hope*, as it were.<sup>59</sup> However, if we then consider the relationships existing between the monads to be dialectical in the Hegelian sense, we would have a situation where the monads would be swallowed up, as it were, and disappearing in the ethical substance which is the goal of his dialectical process, and thereby losing their independent identities as monads. This kind of dialectical opposition and the universal whole that accompanies the sublation of such opposition can be seen as a clear product of a Eurocentric way of thinking of "rational reality". To this way of thinking, the individuals have, a priori, by definition no hope of maintaining their independent existence. The universal reigns over all, even as it keeps its own substantiality. It is this kind of dialectic that Nishida criticized, calling it "noematic," i.e. just a product of thought, and not a true reflection of how things really are.<sup>60</sup> As he says, when we just intellectually consider a unification of various things, they must necessarily lose their individual identities in this process.<sup>61</sup> It is for this reason that the truly independent individuals become impossible within the context of a Hegelian dialectic.<sup>62</sup> If we see at the basis of the progress of history a fundamental substance or a permanent substrate of some kind, the various events of history then become just a series of appearances of

this fundamental substrate in various forms. It then becomes impossible to consider historical events as being unique and unrepeatable, and there really is no place in the system for us as agents working independently and of our own free will.<sup>63</sup> It is for this reason that we must see the historical world not as something with a substantial foundation, but rather purely as a series of events, as a world of occurrences with no underlying substrate.<sup>64</sup> This is the way of looking at the world not as a collection of fixed things, but rather as a process of fluid events, arising and disappearing moment by moment.<sup>65</sup> This way of thinking removes any kind of permanent substance from the events that arise, and enter into relationships with each other in a space (*topos*) that allows for these events and relationships to arise. This way of thinking therefore integrates “Buddhist Emptiness”<sup>66</sup> into the dialectical process, and might be therefore termed “Buddhist dialectics.”<sup>67</sup> Not only is the Universal seen in this light as not possessing any substantial existence, but also each individual lacks such an underlying substrate as well: it is purely through the process of opposition to each other that they become what they are.<sup>68</sup> This then gives rise to a fundamental contradiction in the nature of the individuals,<sup>69</sup> as described in the following extract:

When individuals are thought of as true individuals, each must by definition possess an absolutely independent existence, and they must be considered as not requiring any kind of medium or setting: they must be absolutely free to decide what they will be in themselves. And yet, they also negate themselves, in that they acquire existence as individuals only as they appear in relation to other individuals, and therefore can be said after all to possess a sort of medium or condition for their existence as individuals.<sup>70</sup>

And so we find a contradiction arising in the idea that individuals, which should theoretically be independent from any medium or external definition of their existence, actually depend on their mutual defining of each other for their existence as individuals: they therefore must simultaneously possess both a non-mediated and a mediated existence! When we face this kind of contradiction, we might attempt to eliminate it with logic, and with an approach which strives for a substantial universality. We might try to show that all dialectical contradictions are sublated into the Universal: not just that there is a dialectical progression

toward universality, but that the individual elements actually lose their independent existence in the universal substance. Indeed, this would be what we call the “European” way of attempting to solve the above contradiction.<sup>71</sup> Needless to say, this is not the approach used by Nishida in discussing the contradiction inherent in the existence of individuals. He rather pictures a generative or creative universe, where the contradictions are not eliminated, but rather are part of the mutual relationships between the various aspects of reality. The idea of individuals and the idea of the Universal both contain similar inherent contradictions, and even the relationship they are in to each other contains contradictory aspects to it, as a little thought along these lines will reveal.<sup>72</sup> Nishida’s way of explaining this is to put the multiplicity of individuals in relationship with each other with a medium or on a background, as it were, of absolute negation, which both allows them to enter into such a relationship and makes them what they are.<sup>73</sup> If we attempt to reconcile the contradictions by postulating a *comfortable* substantial background for the individuals, they paradoxically lose their ability to exist relative to each other, and would no longer be free to be creative and generative on their own. It is for this reason that Nishida states:

A world in which absolute negation serves the function of mediating between individuals, is a world which both creates and is created at one and the same time; a generative/generated world. Each individual point in such a world is a separate origin of this process of creation, and so we must say that this world is one in which the arising and disappearance of individual things takes place in a context of absolute negation.<sup>74</sup>

Furthermore, this creative/created world is a world in which forms determine their own form, which, Nishida notes,<sup>75</sup> is understandable if we think about the way Leibniz has defined the existence of his monads. In Nishida’s case, however, monads are not substances, but rather fluid events, as it were. The world is not a transformation of one substantial thing into another, but rather a series of events, with no ontological substrate underlying their separate appearance in time.<sup>76</sup> As a concrete example of thing that clearly exists in this way, Nishida refers to the short Japanese haiku poem by way of illustration. This kind

of poem takes a kind of “snapshot” of the world from a single point of view, and what it succeeds in capturing is not a substantial entity or thing, but rather a momentary event.<sup>77</sup> This procession from event to event can also be seen as the *working* of these individual events or individuals upon each other. As the following extract illustrates, it can even lead to a branching off in different directions of various worlds:

Things that act or do work, do so as individual worlds in themselves, and stand in opposition to the worlds defined by other similarly-working things. This is what is meant by saying that individuals are defined in opposition to other individuals.<sup>78</sup>

Can these mutually-opposed worlds, branching out in different directions as it were, be considered equally beautiful each in their own ways? This is the central issue of this whole discussion. From the above, it has surely become clear that the when various individual things, various worlds, various cultures and so on are considered to exist as concrete substances in themselves, we are limited to seeing such cultures only as isolated islands or spheres. We have also seen that when the comprehensive universal is considered to exist substantially and concretely in a similar way, we again arrive at the problems related to such a dialectical universal, as described above. It is for these reasons that we had to consider both universals and individuals as having no substantial existence in themselves. Indeed, Nishida’s creative monadology is just such an answer to the problems which arise in association with ideas of substantiality. It must also be appreciated that Nishida then took his solution one step further, with his idea of the creative/created world. Just what kind of world is this, what kind of space? We may find an understanding of it in the following words:

Things that act or do work do so not in simply empty space, but rather in a space that its own qualitative existence, as a field of force or energy.<sup>79</sup>

At what time can we say that such a space, defined not simply as quantitative and empty, but rather as qualitative and meaning-filled, is



“beautiful”? It is this kind of space that I wish to make the topic of the remaining part of this essay, and that I wish to call “polyphonic.”

Although it may not seem necessary to define the term “polyphony,” it may nevertheless be interesting to remember that this musical term refers to the sounds of various voices each arising in relation to one another. Over the history of Western music, this kind of polyphonic relationship seems to have started in Gregorian chant, in which all the voices chanted a similar melodic pattern and only differed from each other in pitch by a fourth or a fifth. There then gradually started to be movement in opposing directions, with one voice rising while the other fell or vice versa, and with still more complex developments leading us to the polyphonic music of today.<sup>80</sup> In the creation of such polyphony, each singer must listen carefully to and anticipate the productions of other singers, even as he or she also gives careful attention to singing his or her own part. There is no postulating of a fixed “transcendental listener,” as it were, separate from the singers themselves.<sup>81</sup> It is just the productions of a number of voices reflecting off each other even while they listen to each other; the projective transformation or supporting response of these voices of and to each other.<sup>82</sup> There is no one voice which can special precedence over all the others. However, after the well-known Council of Trent, it was decided that the special musical qualities of polyphony only served to distract the faithful from their attention to purely religious things, and its performance was publicly banned.<sup>83</sup> During the Renaissance, the unification derived from the power of the anti-religious revolution was again not a kind of harmonious unity. Around the sixteenth century, there was an attempt made to revive ancient Greek music by a humanistic group in Florence, called *Camerata*. Based on their unique interpretation of this ancient music, they also forbade polyphony and advanced a kind of homophony called monody.<sup>84</sup> This then became the origins of modern opera, and finally also developed into the music of the early Baroque period.<sup>85</sup> The point to be carefully noted here is that polyphony can be seen broadly as either counterpoint, in which two or more voices simultaneously sing either similar or different melodies at different pitches, or specifically as being the kind of multi-voiced singing which existed in the middle ages and during the Renaissance, before Bach and the baroque period in general. After the baroque, the simultaneous

singing of a melodic pattern by many different voices was seen to be too complicated, so it was streamlined and unified to provide a more harmonious sound.<sup>86</sup> Whereas before no specific voice had the special privilege of being the lead,<sup>87</sup> homophony, which stressed harmony, simplified this situation and gave precedence to the highest voice in most cases. This kind of music, which postulated a lead part and an accompaniment,<sup>88</sup> then replaced true polyphony.

Coming back to our discussion of culture, a true polyphony does not postulate one specially privileged, transcendently established, culture which can claim to dominate other cultures, but rather accepts the possibility of a multitude of cultures, without feeling the need to say that one has absolute precedence over the others. In other words, until now, there has been just this kind of assigning of precedence to particular cultures. For the most part, “Western Culture” has been assigned this role as a matter of course, but we now see that this era with its way of thinking has come to a close.

Indeed it is we ourselves who must finally put the nail in its coffin. Without such a determined approach, both the beautiful roses of the West and the beautiful lotuses of the East will fade and wither away. In order to prevent such a tragedy, we must work quickly to build new aesthetic paradigms, and this will require a truly transcultural aesthetics to lead the way. I would like to propose the following quotation as a hint towards the building of such a new aesthetic perspective:

In our modern world, we witness a lack of understanding, misunderstandings, and struggles between various peoples, various cultures, and various civilizations at various stages of development. In a certain sense, this world is becoming ever more energized and transformed. As no quick solution to these differences is ready to hand, virtually everyone agrees that the world would be a much better place if we could at least recognize the existence of such differences—as the foundation of mutual understanding—and if at all possible to respect others, even love others as others.

On the one hand, forms of poetry such as renga, renku and renshi respect the differences between each of the participant-poets, and on the other, it nevertheless offers a form in

which they can cooperate to create a living harmony which springs forth as a result of this cooperation. Given the present state of our civilization, we clearly can see the reason why even non-Japanese poets are interested in these poetical forms: they feel these ancient forms of poetry offer us an indication of just how we might start anew to rebuild our world together.<sup>89</sup>

Although the above quotation is right on the mark, for the purposes of the present argument, I would just like to change the words “harmony” to “polyphony.” The polyphonic singing of a melody by no means requires the voices to meld into an indistinguishable mass.<sup>90</sup> In a word, the difference between harmony and polyphony, the former lies in the direction of closure, whereas the latter remains continually open. Hegel’s dialectic is, as pointed out by Alain, a “continual invention” (*une continue invention*), it is indeed “understanding creation appearing out of opposition, following ordered logic, we find the next element.”<sup>91</sup> For any transition that appears within that movement, in the same way that these various transitions possess Ideas, they also create new Ideas as well, because it becomes necessary to find a new Idea that can “save”, as it were, these two elements from the opposition they are in.<sup>92</sup> The problem with this traditional dialectic, however, lies in the way these two ideas are saved. I personally believe that the general way of thinking prevalent in Hegel’s time had a great influence in this respect. Using the distinction above, it would seem to be a kind of “harmonic saving.” There remains, however, also a “polyphonic saving.” This polyphonic kind is exactly the kind described in the quotation above, the kind of “saving” that occurs in the poetic forms of *renga*, *renku* and *renshi*.

*Renga* is one kind of traditional form of Japanese poetry, and is an art that is done at gatherings, or *za* in Japanese. To the initial short stanza (made up of three lines of five, seven and five syllables respectively) is added (in many cases, by another person) another short stanza of two lines of seven syllables each. Then another five/seven/five stanza is added, and so on, as the poem develops and continues in this way. For example, three people might get together and each add one stanza at a time in turn. A kind of gathering called *za* is then created, which might equally be called, after Nishida, Basho or *topos*, place or field instead. One might

call this an art of conversation of a sort, or perhaps a refinement to a very high degree of the kinds of phrases one might exchange in greeting. Furthermore, one could think of it as the very opposite<sup>93</sup> of the kind of modern art which is far too obsessed with its own inspirations and individualized completely out of the reach of beauty. It is not, as may be gathered from the description above, a “lonely” or a “secret” art<sup>94</sup>: its fundamental difference from this kind of modern creation is in the fact that it is the cooperatively-created work of two or more people around a particular theme.<sup>95</sup> We further see its difference in that it is not limited to having given topics, contents or expressions, nor do we see it tied down to a particular way of thinking or feeling.<sup>96</sup> In fact, it tends to have as an unspoken rule that it should not be limited to any one topic, but rather that as new stanzas are added, there should be a “drift,” as it were, in the various topics highlighted by each stanza.<sup>97</sup> The process of creation of *renga* and *renku* seems almost to have a kind of centrifugal energy, an approach of “ever onward, ever outward!” Each individual stanza is the creation of a different poet, who absorbs the mood of the previous one, and then adds his stanza, which not only gives even further life to the original feeling of its predecessor, putting his own “spin” on it, as it were.<sup>98</sup> The creation of the previous poet, its “stance” as it were, is respected, and yet his successor is also free to express his own creativity to the fullest degree.<sup>99</sup> This whole process occurs on a topos called the *za*. Needless to say, this *za* is not just an area of some trigonometrically-defined “empty space.” Stated in another way, it is not that, through the medium of space defined as giving a form to sensibility, a phenomenological object created by a subjective viewpoint is located in space somewhere. We may venture to say that it is instead where the “*durées*” assigned to each existing thing by Bergson (in the process of his criticisms of Kantian philosophy) meet; a *topos* for their coming together. Nishida also founds the establishment of his Logic of the Basho of Absolute Nothingness on just this point. He writes as follows:

If we consider the Basho of Absolute Nothingness to be like a circle with its centre everywhere and its circumference nowhere, then we can see an infinite number of times being given rise to by its centre that is everywhere. True eternity is not simply a transcending of time, as it were, but rather a Basho

of the kind described above, upon which an infinite number of time centres can appear.<sup>100</sup>

It is important to take careful note of the expression “a kind of Basho upon which an infinite number of time centres can appear” given by Nishida above. In order to give a concrete illustration of this concept, we can simply think of the *za* of the *renga*-creating gathering. However, in order to first make this way of thinking even easier to grasp, we will take a little detour, as it were, into another concept: that of the garden. A garden gives us a good example of a place, *topos* or Basho of the coming together in collocation of the various *durées* of its various plants.

As Bergson says, if we want to make a glass of sugar water, we must wait for the sugar to melt in it.<sup>101</sup> This example is useful in that it gives us an illustration of how my *durée*, experienced as the irritation of waiting for the sugar to melt, can be qualitatively different from the rhythm of the *durée* of the melting sugar itself. The illustration works so well because it takes the abstract principle and shows just how it appears in concrete, experienced reality or space.<sup>102</sup> When the subject turns to Leibniz’s monadology also, it would not be surprising to find in the history of the development of his ideas a special, qualitatively different way of existing in time for each monad we consider.<sup>103</sup> We must be careful, however, this quality of existing in time is not direct, but rather indirect, as we can only grasp this temporality through the appearance of a physical body in space. This is exactly the way we can gain a new perspective on the problem of space itself. Although monads are defined as having no extension, they possess a certain location (*situs*) within Extension or space itself.<sup>104</sup> In other words, each monad enters into an ordered relationship of coexistentia with all the other monads by virtue of its controlling (*praesum*), and expressing itself through, a physical body.<sup>105</sup> If we wish to discuss the spatiality of monads, the idea that although they have no extension, they have a location in space, makes us think of them as having a kind of nesting (“Russian doll”) structure, one layer inside another. The various differing *durées* are inserted in this fashion, as it were, into the space, and therefore find their place in it as well. When Leibniz discovered that with the microscope one could see human sperm, the fact that there could be “spermatic animals” (*des animaux spermaticques*) inside an individual human body gave him great

cause for surprise. It is perhaps because of this surprise that he then proceeds to give us a view of the universe which borders on fairy-tale: in even the smallest particle of matter, it is possible to state that there exists an infinite number of creatures, of organisms, of animals, with their *entelechia* and even souls.<sup>106</sup> Every bit of matter can be thought of as if it were a garden filled with plants, or a pond full of fish.<sup>107</sup> Each branch of these plants, each part of each fish, each drop of water in the pond, is again a whole new garden in itself, a whole new pond.<sup>108</sup> The earth and air between the plants and the water between the fish are not in themselves plants or fish, but they are considered as containing (*contenir*) such plants and fish in their turn.<sup>109</sup> When we take this approach, indeed, we might be misled into thinking each part of the physical universe expresses the entire universe. We should actually be more specific and point out that each of these parts contains a living thing, which subjectively determines the universe for itself from its own point of view. Each of these living things is a “field” or “place” for the apparition of a monad.<sup>110</sup> It is interesting to note in this connection that religions with a strong tendency to animism, such as Hinduism and Japanese Shinto, objects of whatever kind can become the place for the self-revelation of the Divine through their possessing form. This idea of the Divine expressing itself in form is called *yorishiro* in Japanese. *Yorishiro* objects traditionally used in the past have been evergreen trees (cedars, pines, sakaki, bamboo and so on), and in fact, we can actually see many of these types of trees in parks with fountains or pools, where it may also be possible to sail a little craft around or at least walk about the park. (By the way, sometimes foreigners are surprised that the “water” in the garden is often just symbolized by small stones or gravel. This is called a *kare-sansui*, or dry landscape, garden.) We should also remember in this connection that the Japanese art of flower arranging called *ikebana* also is thought by some to have its origins in this kind of *yorishiro* expressing of the Divine in form. Any given location or “field” (*ba* in Japanese) is a location for the apparition of a soul. I would like to take the above ideas and extend them even further, and use for the discussion of *yorishiro* even the total landscape containing the garden. This will of course be for the purposes of illustrating more concretely just what is meant by a “monadological space.” It will be useful in this connection to listen to the French philosopher Alain, who writes as follows:

The gardener does not imitate Nature: he obeys it. Nature appears as an integral part of his work, its accomplice, its very source. Indeed, in that artificial garden, with its steps, its pathways and its profusion of greenery, it is indeed Nature which reveals itself, but we also see the man himself.<sup>111</sup>

This beautiful work that is a garden, this architectural painting (*cette peinture architecturale*)<sup>112</sup> must continually protect its style obtained through obedience (*le style par l'obéissance*)<sup>113</sup> to Nature. The artist we refer to as the gardener, must obey nature, the changing of the seasons, the varying amounts of water, air and light.<sup>114</sup> In other words, if he does not take into account *durées* different from his own, he will not be able to create his art. He must learn to respect the various *durées* that proceed each at their own pace. And in order to act on this respect and truly express it, he must develop techniques which integrate an appreciation not only for each of the individual *durées*, but also of the location that allows for the apparition of these various *durées* in space. This of course does not mean, however, that the individual *durées* lose their individuality to meld into this one space, and this is because the space itself, the garden itself, appears after all only on the basis of each individual element in it. A powerful philosophical description was given of this kind of mutual relationship between individual things and the space in which they appear, once again by Kitaro Nishida: his so-called "Logic of Basho". Let us consider the experience of someone walking through the garden. One by one, he encounters differing *durées* in the natural things he sees as he walks. Sometimes the *durées* must coordinate with each other; sometimes the difference between them becomes a source of artistic satisfaction. We should note here that these events arise as a direct result of the person's action of walking around the space in the garden as an embodied being. At any rate, these various events are each given form in their turn by the walker: this space which could be called monadological, arises anew every moment: it is perpetually in a process of becoming and changing. Together with this space, the monads in it as well appear and disappear, are born and die, moment to moment. This description differs from Leibniz's ideas in that the monads themselves can be born and then disappear. We might think of it as a developed explanation of what was called in the Christian church the theory of "continuous creation" (*creatio*

*continua*), although this paradigm does not postulate a God to create these monads. Buddhism speaks of the “momentaneity” (in Sanskrit, *ksanabhangasiddhi*) of things. The total field gives rise to the individual elements in it, and these elements in their turn give rise to the field: they are in a relationship of mutual dependence. This also bears some resemblance to the theory of “conditioned arising,” in Japanese *engi*. It is important to remember that the things which are in relationship to one another do not have any immutable substance of their own, and nor does the space which acts as their setting. This kind of space or field indicates the fundamental way of existing of the kind of space we have been searching for throughout this paper. It is a space of beauty, which allows both for a plurality of identities (being monadological), and also allowing these identities to each express themselves as they are (being polyphonic). This kind of generative space can itself be considered a work of art. Bringing the topic back to culture once again, we remember the vital function performed by the traveller in the discussion above of hospitality. This traveller can be compared to the walker through the garden, where different things are able to meet and discover each other.

Returning at last to our discussion of *renga*, we should note that, compared to a garden, *renga* is a much higher-level human production. However, the humans that produce it are seen in a different way that in the modern way of thinking characterized by individualism. It was for this very reason that when Japan entered the modern era with a vengeance, the *renga* poem suffered a temporary eclipse. The question was raised: How can we consider something to be Art if it has no fixed theme, nor any format or shape which accords with such a theme?<sup>115</sup> Writers who stressed the expression of emotion in literature, such as Shiki Masaoka, just gave their own part of the poem and considered it finished, thereby avoiding having to work together with another poet for a complete creation. In this way, they maintained, the poet could be free to give best expression to his individual feelings.<sup>116</sup> This “modern form of *renga*” is the haiku. These days, however, *renga* and *renku* have once again come back into fashion. It is fascinating to note that this interest once again flowered with the problems raised by modern thought. In other words, it seems that in these poetic forms were found a way out of the modern impasse, as well as new possibilities of aesthetic expression. I personally would like to term it an “Aesthetics of



Basho,” after Nishida’s “Logic of Basho”. The sequential addition of new stanzas, as the *renku* grows, allows for the birth of new meanings and interpretations, and out of the “slippage” of their successive interpretations, the work continues to grow in beauty.<sup>117</sup> If we then consider individuals and societies as not having fixed immutable substance, we can see them arising every moment anew on a background of true emptiness. They arise, meet, part, and then dissolve once again into the Emptiness whence they came. A true Aesthetics of Basho rejects solidifications into “substance”. Once solidification has occurred, the same themes are simply repeated ad infinitum, and the culture or individual is as good as dead. It may be important to note in this connection that just because an Aesthetics of Basho rejects the assumption of an underlying substance, it is not for this reason based on a nihilistic view of the universe, for reasons we will go into below. As it does not base itself atomistic assumptions either of indestructible substances or of immortal, indestructible souls, it aims to, and indeed can create works with a distinctive qualities of flexibility, pliability and lightness. Surely this is an important gift from the Orient for the present situation in Western thought and culture. It is a kind of artistic creation which is best represented in literature by the concrete form of the *renga*. By critically analysing whether it is necessary to consider the writer as a substantially-existing conveyor of information, we can get a closer view of the differences between the Western paradigm of creative activity which focuses on the individual artist, and an Oriental (or Japanese) way of seeing the creative process. It is fascinating to realize that in the *ba* or place of creation of the *renga* or *renku*, participants are not free to just do or say whatever they like, because the *ba* itself contains a certain kind of evaluative authority to judge the quality of their productions. We can see this way of thinking already being put into practice in the interest generated by the *renga* and *renshi* written by Octavio Paz<sup>118</sup>, the Nobel Prize winner for Literature, as well as in the attempts by the Japanese poet Makoto Ooka to travel around the many countries of Europe and engage local poets in the creation of *renshi*. It is also commonly known that Eisenstein was influenced by *renga* to develop an approach for his movies based on the presentation of a montage, in which certain scenes and shots are designed to impact upon each other. Furthermore, the Japanese scientist Torahiko Terada analyzed the

appearance of this kind of montage approach in ikebana, Japanese garden design, and the painting of hanging scrolls. It is deeply fascinating to compare his ideas in this respect with the ones mentioned above about the experience of a garden.<sup>119</sup> Once a setting or *ba* is established, a kind of resonance arises between the different thoughts which arise in this space,<sup>120</sup> giving rise to a coherence. We should not forget the existence of kind of coherence in relation to the self-organization of modern science. In witnessing all these recent developments in so many different fields, I was encouraged to bring all these threads together in a philosophical way. I wish to do my part as an Oriental myself to help extract the illusion of substantiality or essence from the Western philosophical approach as described in the quotation below, without at the same time falling into a nihilistic position. In this way, we can be aware of a particular kind of beauty that is possible to create, and can be motivated to study and analyze it in a systematic way.

Even without the existence of an “essence” or the way of seeing presupposed by assumptions of “essence”, the real world we live in still retains its reality. Events arise even without an underlying “essence”. Even when we completely eradicate the idea of essence from our minds, the empirical world we experience cannot be perceived in nihilistic terms, nor does it just disappear into a kind of dream or illusion. The recognition of reality sometimes takes on particular forms in the various schools of thought within the whole tradition of Eastern philosophy, and the importance of this kind of Oriental thought pattern can be clearly found in Mahayana Buddhism.<sup>121</sup>

At any rate, from whatever point of view we look at it, the small individual worlds into which we were locked open up, worlds meet worlds, and they overlap and become an immensely rich, open, qualitative space. Such a space is polyphonic, as so many voices are clearly heard each in their own way. This leaves individuals free to express their vision in this open space of creativity. Each one is a world in themselves, and the result is similar to what Leibniz had in mind with his monadology, with the obvious exception that where Leibniz postulated substantial entities, this approach does not. Once we rid ourselves of the obsession with substance, it may be that we will finally be able to hear the voice of the other. In the creation of *renga*, such enlightened participants listen to the multitude of voices as a true polyphony, even

as they are securely rooted in their own existence and create from their point of view. It is my belief, therefore, that such a polyphonic, monadological creative space can be the basis for the arising of a true transcultural aesthetics.

## NOTES

- 1 “Transculturality—the Puzzling Form of Cultures Today” (<http://www2.uni-jena.de/welsch/Papers/transcultSociety.html>).
- 2 Keizaburô Maruyama, *Saussure no Shiso*, 1981, Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1981, p. 93.
- 3 C. I. Gerhardt, *Philosophischen Schriften von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz*, Berlin 1875-1890, vii 285.
- 4 Alain, *Éléments de philosophie*, Gallimard, 1941, p. 118.
- 5 Alain, *Idées*, Paul Hartmann, Paris, 1939, pp. 134-135.
- 6 G. W. Leibniz, *Nouveaux Essais sur l’entendement humain*, 1765. vol. 4, ch. 7, §5.
- 7 Yûjiro Nakamura, *Katachi no Odyssey*, Iwanami Shoten, 1991, p. 214.
- 8 Hisayuki Omodaka, *Bergson no Kagakuron*, Chûo Kôronsha, Tokyo, 1979, p. 64.
- 9 H. Bergson, *Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience*, 144<sup>ème</sup> édition, 1970, p. 67.
- 10 *Ibid.*, pp. 73, 80.
- 11 cf. Omodaka, *op. cit.*, p. 48.
- 12 This is the name given to the totality by those who believe that all that really exists is atoms and a void.
- 13 Masaru Yoneyama, *L’espace monadologique* “Tribune d’histoire et d’actualité de l’architecture Cycle 2002 (23 appels à mesdames et messieurs les architectes)” à Paris [2002/5/23].
- 14 cf. Michel Serres, *Les cinq sens—Philosophie des corps mêlés-1*, Bernard Grasset, Paris, 1985, p. 283.
- 15 cf. M. Serres, *Hermès II L’interférence*, Les Éditions de Minuit, 1972, p. 73.
- 16 Michel Serres, *Les cinq sens*, p. 283.
- 17 G. W. Leibniz, *Monadologie*, §8.
- 18 Tādashi Inoue, *Tetsugaku no Genba*, Keisô Shobô, Tokyo, 1980, p. 271.
- 19 *Ibid.* pp. 212-3.
- 20 M. Serres, *Hermès II L’interférence*, p. 104.
- 21 “We called living organisms individuals, but actually this expression is not exactly correct. They are actually processes of individuation.” (Hisayuki Omodaka, *Bergson no Kagakuron*, p. 123.)
- 22 Alain, *Vingt leçons sur les beaux-arts* in *Les Arts et les Dieux*, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, Gallimard, 1958, p. 495.

- 23 Alain, *Esquisse de l'homme*, Gallimard, 1938, p. 33.
- 24 Edward W. Said, *Orientalism*, Vintage Books, N.Y., 1979, pp. 100-101.
- 25 "Commonly in our sorrows, we wish to stay at the critical moment, we deny the existence of time. What is much worse, we return to previous times, to happier times." / "Communément dans nos chagrins nous voulons rester au moment critique, nous nions le temps. Bien pis, nous retournons au temps passé, au temps heureux." (Alain, *Vingt leçons sur les beaux-arts* in *Les Arts et les Dieux*, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, Gallimard, 1958, p. 517.)
- 26 "The Forms or Ideas of a Plato or an Aristotle correspond to privileged or meaningful moments in the history of things." / "Les formes ou idées d'un Platon ou d'un Aristote correspondent à des moments privilégiés ou saillants de l'histoire des choses." (H. Bergson, *Évolution créatrice*, PUF, Paris, 142<sup>ème</sup> édition, 1969, p. 330.)
- 27 "The Ideas as defined by Plato are as if it were "snapshot pictures" taken during the development of things. We capture a privileged moment out of the durée "on film" as it were, and we reify it and absolutize it. Even though a so-called privileged moment may indeed be privileged, as it exists as a moment, it exists by definition in time, and is therefore temporal. A Platonic way of thinking would slice a section out of the living flow of experience, and enshrine it in an "eternity of death." (Mitsuo Nakata, *Bergson Tetsugaku*, University of Tokyo Press, 1977, p. 381.)
- 28 This also appears as an important theme in the political thought of modern-day Italy, and is connected with the topic of Massimo Cacciari's Arcipelago. "The problem I wish to present to my listeners is that we think of the various islands as existing in 'regions'. Can we be creative without looking back nostalgically to Siena or Florence, but rather strive to create new island groups within the regions which we inhabit? Can we imagine it, can we create within our regions island groups which are filled with meaning and which each have their own rich individualities and yet can connect with each other? This is the problem I wish to present." (*Toshi no Seiji Tetsugaku o Megutte*, in *Hihyo Kukan* III-4, 2002, p. 91.)
- 29 Alain, *Propos de littérature*, Paul Hartmann, Paris, 1934, p. 79.
- 30 In allen diesen Beziehungen ist und bleibt die Kunst nach der Seite ihrer höchsten Bestimmung für uns ein Vergangenes. Damit hat sie für uns auch die echte Wahrheit und Lebendigkeit verloren und ist mehr in unsere Vorstellung verlegt, als daß sie in der Wirklichkeit ihre frühere Notwendigkeit behauptete und ihren höheren Platz einnähme. Was durch Kunstwerke jetzt in uns erregt wird, ist außer dem unmittelbaren Genuß zugleich unser Urteil, indem wir den Inhalt, die Darstellungsmittel des Kunstwerks und die Angemessenheit und Unangemessenheit beider unserer denkenden Betrachtung unterwerfen. Die Wissenschaft der Kunst ist darum in unserer Zeit noch viel mehr Bedürfnis als zu den Zeiten, in welchen die Kunst für sich als Kunst schon volle Befriedigung gewährte. Die Kunst lädt uns zur denkenden Betrachtung ein, und zwar nicht zu

dem Zwecke, Kunst wieder hervorzurufen, sondern, was die Kunst sei, wissenschaftlich zu erkennen. (G.W. F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik I*, Werke 13 Suhrkamp, pp. 25-26.)

- 31 The following comment should prove instructive: “If we look at the thought in Germany after Hegel, we should notice that Adorno develops a Negative Dialectic in opposition to Hegel’s. In this dialectic, the parts which are left outside the structure retain a strength which renders them not easily assimilated into it. They retain an individual status that does not allow them to be reduced back into the uniform mass, and continue to exist as separate particles. This keeps them in a situation of continual tension of arising and changing with respect to the central structure. The Synthesis, which Hegel incorrectly adopted, that enormous, final ‘Ja’ just continues ever forward. By contrast, the accumulation of the activity of negativity is what is being described now.” (Akira Asada, *Kozo to Chikara*, Keisô Shobô, Tokyo, 1983, p. 120.)
- 32 Pierre Lévy, *L’Intelligence Collective—Pour une anthropologie du cyberspace*, La Découverte/Poche, 1997, p. 10 [cf. *Collective Intelligence—Mankind’s emerging world in cyberspace*, translated by Robert Bononno, Perseus Books, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1997].
- 33 *Ibid.*, pp. 12-13.
- 34 *Ibid.*, p. 14.
- 35 In short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient. (Edward W. Said, *op. cit.*, p. 3.)
- 36 *Ibid.*, p. 5.
- 37 *Ibid.*, p. 12.
- 38 Pierre Lévy, *op. cit.*, p. 15.
- 39 *Ibid.*, p. 29.
- 40 *Ibid.*
- 41 *Ibid.*, p. 16.
- 42 *Ibid.*, p. 26.
- 43 *Ibid.*, p. 28.
- 44 *Ibid.*, p. 29.
- 45 *Ibid.*, p. 31
- 46 *Ibid.*
- 47 *Ibid.*, p. 32.
- 48 *Ibid.*
- 49 *Ibid.*
- 50 *Ibid.*, p. 33.
- 51 *Ibid.*, p. 40.
- 52 *Ibid.* Also see Massimo Cacciari. *L’Arcipelago*, especially the relativity existing between hostis (guest) and hospes (the person who invites), which he describes at great length. cf. pp. 33 ff.
- 53 Pierre Lévy, *op. cit.*, p. 40.
- 54 Massimo Cacciari, *L’Arcipelago*, Adelfi, 1997, p. 151.
- 55 “Cacciari places the dialectic and negative thinking in opposition to each other. Dialectical thinking is historical and positive ... by denying the

- Dialectical Universal, we can centre ourselves on eccentric things, and on things that may be dangerous. This way of thinking is called 'negative'." (Patrizia Lombardo, *Architecture and Nihilism: On the Philosophy of Modern Architecture*, 1993, p. xxv.)
- 56 "If one insists on calling my way of thinking monadological, it is not in the superficial style of Leibniz, but rather generatively, creatively. It is a dialectical monadology." (*Nishida Kitaro Zenshū*, vol. 9, Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1949, p. 97.)
- 57 *Ibid.*, vol. 9, pp. 96-7.
- 58 *Ibid.*, vol. 10, 1950, p. 25.
- 59 *Ibid.*
- 60 *Ibid.*, vol. 6, 1948, p. 346.
- 61 *Ibid.*, vol. 7, 1949, p. 52. This is followed by the following words: "Hegel's Universal cannot actually subsume true individuals. It cannot be other than abstract. For this reason, the dialectic he proposed also cannot be the true dialectic."
- 62 *Ibid.*, vol. 10 p. 369.
- 63 *Ibid.*
- 64 *Ibid.*
- 65 For example, Wataru Hiromatsu, "*Koto teki Sekaikan e no Zensho. Busshōkaron no Ninshikironteki-Sonzaironteki Iso*" (Keisō Shobō, Tokyo, 1975), "*Sonzai to Imi: Koto teki Sekaikan no Teiso*" (Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1993). Please also see: Wataru Hiromatsu, Kotetsu Yoshida, "*Bukkyo to Koto teki Sekaikan*" (Asahi Shuppansha, Tokyo, 1979).
- 66 *Nishida Kitaro Zenshū*, vol. 11, 1949, p. 399.
- 67 *Ibid.* p. 73.
- 68 *Ibid.* p. 115.
- 69 *Ibid.*
- 70 *Ibid.*, vol. 8, 1948, p. 13. Please refer to the following note: "Whatever is independent and has the power to determine what it will be, and yet is what it is in relation and in opposition to the other, is therefore in contradiction with itself. And actually, the more contradiction is contained, the more the individual comes to be." (*Ibid.*, vol. 9, p. 72.)
- 71 For more on this topic, please see my book (in Japanese). *The Aesthetics of the Monadology*, The University of Nagoya Press, 1999, vol. 2, Chap. 4.
- 72 *Nishida Kitaro Zenshū*, vol. 8, p. 9.
- 73 *Ibid.*, vol. 11, pp. 115, 194.
- 74 *Ibid.*, vol. 10, p. 498.
- 75 *Ibid.*, vol. 10, p. 358.
- 76 *Ibid.*, vol. 10, p. 525.
- 77 *Ibid.*, vol. 12, 1950, p. 372.
- 78 *Ibid.*, vol. 11, p. 377.
- 79 Akira Ōmine, *Hiai to Ishiki*, in Shizuteru Ueda (ed.), *Nishida Tetsugaku e no Toi*, Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1990, pp. 117-8.
- 80 Kenjiō Okazaki, *Renaissance: Keiken no Jōken*, Chikuma Shobō, Tokyo, 2001, p. 133.

- 81 *Ibid.*
- 82 *Ibid.*
- 83 *Ibid.*, p. 147.
- 84 *Ibid.*
- 85 Tatsuo Minagawa, *Chusei-Renaissance no Ongaku*, Kôdansha, Tokyo, 1978, p. 144.
- 86 Kenjirô Okazaki, *op. cit.*, p. 148.
- 87 Tatsuo Minagawa, *op. cit.*, pp. 13-4.
- 88 Kenjirô Okazaki, *op. cit.*, p. 148.
- 89 Makoto Ôoka, *Europe de Renshi o Maku*, Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1987, pp. 212-213.
- 90 Yasuo Ishimitsu, *Noh: Koe no Polyphony*, in *Kokubungaku*, Gakutôsha, Tokyo, 1998, December issue, p. 68.
- 91 Alain, *Idées*, p. 211.
- 92 *Ibid.*
- 93 Junko Takahashi, *Renku no Tanoshimi*, Shinchôsha, Tokyo, 1997, pp. 17-8.
- 94 Hiroyuki Inui and Teizô Shiraishi, *Renku e no Shotai* (New Edition), Izumi Shoin, Osaka, 2001, p. 5.
- 95 Minoru Horikiri (ed.), *Matsuo Basho Shu 2*, Shogakkan, *Nihon Koten Bungaku Zenshu* (New Edition), vol. 71, Tokyo, 1997, p. 600.
- 96 *Ibid.*, p. 601.
- 97 *Ibid.*
- 98 *Ibid.*, p. 600.
- 99 *Ibid.*
- 100 *Nishida Kitaro Zenshû*, vol. 6, Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1948, p. 235.
- 101 H. Bergson, *Evolution créatrice*, p. 9; *La pensée et le mouvant*, PUF, Paris, 79<sup>ème</sup> édition, 1969, p. 12.
- 102 Gilles Deleuze, *Bergson no Tetsugaku* (*Le Bergsonisme*, Japanese translation), p. 25.
- 103 E. g., cf. Edmund Husserl, *Zur Phanomenologie der Intersubjektivität*, 3 Teil, S. 340:cf. “Robinet absorbed the problematic of monad temporality (*zeitlichkeit*) of Leibniz and Husserl, and gave it new prominence.” Renato Christin, *Phanomenologie und Monadologie*, *Studia Leibnitiana*, xxii/2, 1990, p. 163.
- 104 *Lettre à De Volder*, C. I. Gerhardt, *Philosophischen Schriften von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz*, ii, 253.
- 105 *Ibid.*
- 106 G.W. Leibniz, *Monadologie*, §66.
- 107 *Ibid.*, §67.
- 108 *Ibid.*
- 109 *Ibid.*, §68.
- 110 Midori Wakakuwa, *Bara no Iconology*, Seidosha, Tokyo, 1984, p. 346.
- 111 *Il (le jardinier) n’imite pas la nature, mais il obéit à la nature; il la montre jointe à son œuvre, complice de son œuvre, source même de son œuvre. Oui, dans ce jardin d’artifice, d’escaliers, de tournants, de massifs, c’est bien la nature qui se montre; mais l’homme aussi.* (Alain, *Vingt leçons sur les beaux-arts*, pp. 561-562.)

- 112 *Ibid.*, p. 559.
- 113 *Ibid.*
- 114 *Ibid.*
- 115 Minoru Horikiri (ed.), *Matsuo Basho Shu 2*, p. 601.
- 116 Hiroyuki Inui and Tsunesaburo Shiraishi, *op. cit.*, p. 8.
- 117 Minoru Horikiri, *Hyogen toshite no Haikai: Basho/Buson*. Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 2002, p. 9.
- 118 Jacques Roubaud, *Renga: poème par Octavio Paz (en collaboration avec O. Paz, C. Tomlinson, E. Sanguinetti)*, Gallimard, 1971.
- 119 *Eiga Geijutsu in Terada Torahiko Zenshû*, vol. 3, Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1950.
- 120 Junko Takahashi, *op. cit.*, p. 105.
- 121 Toshihiko Izutsu, *Ishiki to Honshitsu*, Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1983, p. 21.