Nietzsche on Music: Perspectives from The Birth of Tragedy

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Since the first appearance of The Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music, Nietzsche has arguably proved to be amongst the most influential intellectuals upon European artistic practice. Indeed, four musicians with strong Nietzschean traces who immediately come to mind are Richard Strauss (Also Sprach Zarathustra, 1895) and Gustav Mahler (Symphony No. 3 in D Minor, 1895/1896), Frederick Delius (A Mass of Life, 1904/1905) and Arnold Schoenberg (Der Wanderer in Eight Songs, Opus 6, 1903/1905). Yet this paper is not concerned with the vicissitudes of Nietzsche’s influence upon musicians over the last four or five generations, let alone with the influence of a Richard Wagner or a Georges Bizet upon him, nor, for that matter, with his own attempts at composition.

The Birth of Tragedy, in common with Nietzsche’s other publications, verges upon the potentially intimidating. Even on a cursory reading, it presents its readers with significant problems of how they are to orient themselves. Not only do we confront his visionary, and at times abstruse, concerns with ancient Hellenic and contemporary European culture, but we also need to adjust again and again to his rhetorical, and at times self-conscious, strategies. As Nietzsche himself was to acknowledge in his 1886 “Attempt at a Self-Criticism”, his text is one “without the will to logical cleanliness, very convinced and therefore disdainful of proof, mistrustful even of the propriety of proof”. Indeed, commentators of more analytical persuasion have long warned us of Nietzsche’s propensity for playing the most basic of notions through a conceptual concertina, compressing and billowing the meanings of terms “in part to crack the habitual grip on thought in which language holds us”.

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Furthermore, for readers either familiar with or fresh to Nietzsche, there is the difficulty of deciding whether he should be principally read in light of the intellectual idiom and aesthetic debates of his forebears—Kant and Schiller, Hegel and Schopenhauer to name but the most obvious—or whether he should mainly be read in light of his published works from *The Birth to Ecce Homo*. In either case, that decision seems to rest in the final analysis upon whether we regard Nietzsche’s writings as possessing an underlying, possibly evolving system of thought or not. Yet for all that, this paper is not concerned with an attempt to read Nietzsche historically, nor to trace his intellectual development through published and unpublished writings.

Instead, we shall adopt the more modest aim of critically exploring Nietzsche’s conception of music as specifically revealed by *The Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music*. Because it is a work conflating aesthetic, metaphysical, and psychological issues from its very opening paragraph, we shall also need to confront certain complications peculiar to the transcendental approach to the arts. These same complications, in turn, appear to compel a marked tension in Nietzsche between (“Apollonian”) appeals to representation and (“Dionysian”) appeals to transformation as a means of grappling with the metaphysical purposes of the arts. However, even within this limited compass, it should be stated that we shall not be assessing the extent of, say, Schopenhauer’s idealist influence nor providing a corrective to Nietzsche’s classical scholarship nor adjudicating amongst the successive interpretations of Nietzsche by recent theories, ranging from the ethnographical and the existential to the psychoanalytic and the deconstructionist. Rather, we shall pay particular attention to the way in which music and other artforms that Nietzsche categorises as tragic are grounded by the way in which he develops the Apollonian-Dionysian distinction. Although adopting a different tack from those listed above, we, too, shall be driven to ask whether his conception, as evocative and influential as it has proved to be, is not riddled with “ambiguity” and “confusion.” This question will initially be tackled from two points of view. Firstly, does the Apollonian-Dionysian distinction slide between different kinds of analogies? Secondly, does it similarly shift between unrelated types of tendencies? Next, when tracing how Nietzsche applies the Apollonian-Dionysian distinction to music, we shall find him turning from any construal of it as a representation of experience to a transformation of experience that includes the
transcendent. Finally, how the sheer metaphysical weight Nietzsche sought to impose upon music and the tragic arts can be justifiably supported, will form the concluding theme of this paper.

Section One of *The Birth of Tragedy* immediately introduces Nietzsche's widely disseminated Apollonian-Dionysian distinction, the first of several, seemingly polarised terms, including "appearance" and "reality", "individuation" and "oneness", "the imageless" and "the symbolic" amongst others. The variable relationship between states of affairs signified by both terms of the distinction is used to account for Hellenic and European artistic development in general whereas a momentary balance between the two is used to account for the artistic pinnacle assigned to Aeschylus' and Sophocles' tragic dramas in particular. More germane to our concerns is Nietzsche's opinion that the distinction is to be perceived "not merely by logical inference", "not, to be sure, in concepts", but is nonetheless to be revealed by "the intensely clear figures of their gods ... the two art deities"—Apollo and Dionysius. In the closing Section of the work, this appeal to a non-inferential mode of reckoning is made more explicit when Nietzsche rhapsodises over the "power of transfiguration" wrought by both the Apollonian and the Dionysian "art drives" whose effects we "should be able to feel most assuredly by means of intuition". The Apollonian-Dionysian distinction, whilst construed as two antithetical or opposing "tendencies", is then explicated analogously as "the separate art worlds of dreams and intoxication" respectively. Dreams, supposedly functioning as the prerequisite of the plastic arts, notably sculpture, architecture, and painting, are characterised by "the immediate understanding" of their forms and images which afford the "aesthetically sensitive" individual "an interpretation of life" by virtue of his or her being "a close and willing observer". By contrast, in intoxication or rapture (*Rausch*), "everything subjective vanishes into complete self-forgetfulness", into an ecstasy or paroxysm associated with music and dance, where one "is no longer an artist" as dreamers can be, but where, in effect, one "has become a work of art". These opposing tendencies are re-construed by Nietzsche in Section Two:
as artistic energies which burst forth from nature herself, without the mediation of the human artist—energies in which nature's art impulses are satisfied in the most immediate and direct way—first in the image world of dreams, whose completeness is not dependent upon the intellectual attitude or the artistic culture of any single being; and then as intoxicated reality, which likewise does not heed the single unit, but even seeks to destroy the individual and redeem him by a mystic feeling of oneness.11

Pausing at this initial stage of Nietzsche's polemic, we may detect a number of manoeuvres which more or less rapidly reveal themselves to be characteristic of the text as a whole. However, two in particular—the appeal to analogies and the appeal to tendencies—will form the centre of our attention here given their impact upon the means of understanding the Apollonian-Dionysian distinction within which music is rooted.

First of all, Nietzsche overtly develops his view of the distinction by means of analogy. But what kind of analogy or analogies does he employ, especially in the case where the Dionysian is predicated of "the primordial unity" said to exist "beneath" the "mere appearance" of "our being"?12 It would seem that two analogies in particular—the "projective" and the "existential" to borrow Dorothy Emmet's terms13—are ambiguously exploited by Nietzsche. In the first case, Dionysian experiences (of the kind associated with the initiates of the Eleusinian Mysteries or the medieval dancers of St John and St Vitus) enable Nietzsche to postulate the nature of the transcendent state of reality which supposedly cannot be known from Apollonian experiences alone. But since the Dionysian, by definition, is tantamount to a holistic identification with the transcendent without the intervention of individualising concepts, then knowledge of its nature is only obtained by assuming that Dionysian experiences have a representational character which can form the content of an "Apollonian dream-inspiration".14 However, to compare a phenomenon—a Dionysian experience—with something which is not regarded as a phenomenon—the transcendent state of reality—leaves us with an appeal to the imagination, to a projection from the experiential (or phenomenal) to the transcendent (or noumenal) which, in strict terms, cannot be known.
Given the apparent epistemic impasse of projective analogies, perhaps we could more generously reinterpret Nietzsche's approach in terms of an existential analogy. Here, the analogy might be depicted as the expression of a relationship to something which is in part experienced and in part not experienced. In other words, the transcendent state of reality—whether called "the inmost ground of the world" or "the primal unity", "a hidden substratum of suffering and of knowledge, revealed...by the Dionysian" or quite simply "truth"—should not be taken to mean something beyond or above, as it were, the range of our experience, whether Dionysian or Apollonian. Rather, the transcendent is something other than ourselves or our minds to which, during Dionysian experiences, we can be said to be related. In effect, Dionysian experiences provide an indirect testimony by which Nietzsche believes the character of the transcendent can be evoked. Yet, undermining Nietzsche's reliance upon the existential analogy is that, on the one hand, the testimony of such experiences is one that he often asks us to "picture" or "imagine", and, on the other hand, his belief in the "cosmic symbolism" of music is one which symbolises "a sphere which is beyond and prior to all phenomena".

Could there be another form of metaphysical analogy which best describes Nietzsche's practice? At first glance, it might seem tempting to suggest that hypothetical analogies, no matter how provisional, suit his purposes, except that they normally appear to be coupled with demands for verification. More specifically, such analogies presuppose that the nature of the world as a whole can be drawn by means of selected phenomena within it, including music, yet the world as a whole, not being an object of experience, makes the hypothesis unverifiable. Nor, as Hans Vaihinger has long since noted, are hypothetical analogies totally akin to fictional constructs which posit a possibility for the purposes of argument without implying that such a possibility need exist. Again, nothing in Nietzsche indicates that he merely entertains the Apollonian-Dionysian distinction and the place of music within it as an expedient construct, let alone a probable one. Last but not least, the possibility remains that Nietzsche uses analogies non-argumentatively. In an effort to make the ineffable more familiar, if not more vivid, Nietzsche often resorts to such anecdotes as the pronouncement of Silenus (firstly conveyed in Section Three of *The Birth of Tragedy*). In other words, it is not always easy to determine when Nietzsche slides from argumentative to non-argumentative uses of analogy. Nor is it
immediately obvious what we are to understand by 'experience', which, for Nietzsche here, includes experience of that which seemingly transcends experience.

Compounding the elusiveness of Nietzsche's use of metaphysical analogy as interpreted above is his accompanying description of the Apollonian-Dionysian distinction in terms of opposed tendencies. For Nietzsche to classify the so-called artistic energies of nature as antithetical tendencies as such disguises two logically unconnected cases: the directional tendency towards or from something and the tendency to do or to be something. When accounting for the manner in which the "immediate art-states" or "art impulses" of nature developed amongst the ancient Greeks and, more particularly, underscored "that relation of the Greek artist to his archetypes", Nietzsche appears to vacillate between both kinds of tendencies. On the one hand, by attributing one set of characteristics to the Apollonian impulse or force and another opposing set to the Dionysian, Nietzsche appears to be highlighting the different directional tendencies of the Apollonian and the Dionysian. On the other hand, he also seems to be saying something about what Dionysian behaviour from Babylonian times onwards tends to do without exception, namely, to unleash "the most savage natural instincts". However, exceptionless tendencies which qualify the extent rather than the frequency of those tendencies do not make sense, since the latter, not the former, admits of degrees, and Nietzsche, moreover, appears to be focused upon the issue of extent given his concern with "the deepest roots of the Hellenic nature". Admittedly, ambiguity arises when the extent and the frequency of a tendency are conflated, as in cases where it might be said Dionysians invariably tend to unleash their frenzy on all occasions. However, if Dionysians always unleash their frenzy on all occasions, it seems odd to assert that the explanation lies in the Dionysians having a tendency to do so. The objection here is that exceptionless tendencies to do something can become all too easily converted into rather mysterious causal explanations of the powers of nature.

A further difficulty arising from Nietzsche's view of the Apollonian-Dionysian distinction in terms of opposite tendencies lies in his propensity to characterise such directional tendencies as 'impulses' or 'forces'. Such is the case when, according to Nietzsche, both forces were "reconciled", thereby enabling the resultant "transfiguration" to become "an artistic phenomenon". Although Athenian tragedy may be subject to two equal and opposed forces or impulses at play during
various artistic epochs, it does not inevitably have two tendencies. It does not have a tendency to shift towards the Apollonian and a tendency to shift towards the Dionysian which happen to cancel each other or which happen to combine and thereby produce a third tendency. In the face of two equal and opposing forces, there is no tendency to shift one way or the other because, unlike physical forces continuing to act upon a material object, the two tendencies have disappeared, a point basically ignored by *The Birth of Tragedy*. Tendencies do not function in the same way as forces or impulses do although we often describe the effects of impulses or forces as tendencies.

II

So far, we have concentrated our attention upon the kind of ambiguities in his appeals to analogies and tendencies which can make a reading of Nietzsche so difficult. At the same time, we have attempted to open his highly influential Apollonian-Dionysian distinction to critical inspection, as a prelude to disclosing something of his conception of music. The latter properly emerges when the Apollonian-Dionysian distinction is no longer exclusively applied to nature. So, let us now highlight four major perspectives connected with music taken by Nietzsche in *The Birth of Tragedy*.

First of all, with the introduction of the Dionysian strain in Hellenic culture, the “essence of nature”, claims Nietzsche, could be “expressed symbolically”. This, in turn, supposedly requires “a new world of symbols”, namely, “the entire symbolism of the body ... not the mere symbolism of the lips, face, and speech but the whole pantomime of dancing” whereupon “the other symbolic powers suddenly press forward, particularly those of music, in rhythmics, dynamics, and harmony”. At this early stage, it might be said, Nietzsche signals a relatively uncontroversial realisation that not only can there be shifts in what is symbolised, but also in how it may be symbolised. And this, in turn, allows him implicitly to contrast his stance to that of Aristotle, not so much in denying artistic processes as an “imitation of nature”, as in denying Aristotle’s naturalistic conception of nature. More controversially, however, if Dionysian music is being assigned symbolic powers, then included amongst those powers is its capacity to engender other forms of producing symbols (subsequently asserted to be lyric poetry, then tragic myth and drama). Yet how can music, a “cosmic symbolism”, simultaneously “give birth to ... tragic myth ... which expresses
Dionysian knowledge in symbols”?27 Is “birth” here little more than a metaphor for music as an artistic or an experiential yet non-reciprocal inspiration for the non-musical?

A second perspective emerges when the appeal to the symbolism of music and dance is eventually contrasted with the representational capacities, so to speak, of lyric poetry and the poet. Here, poetic processes provide a partial intimation of the Dionysian insofar as, “before the act of creation”, Schiller, for instance, found himself encountering not a “series of images in a causal arrangement, but rather a musical mood”.28 Nietzsche finds this psychological state of the lyric poet explicable since, “as a Dionysian artist he has identified himself with the primal unity, its pain and contradiction” and, presuming that “music has been correctly termed a repetition and a recast of the world, we may say that he produces the copy of this primal unity as music” (although “this music reveals itself to him again as a symbolic dream image”, as “a second mirroring”29). Though removed from transcendent reality, the lyric poet is nonetheless closer to the Dionysian than any other artist, in that his “images ... are nothing but his very self”.30 To that extent, the poet’s psycho-poetic images are in effect various projections of himself. This “self” of the lyric poet, Nietzsche asserts, “is not the same as that of the waking, empirically real man” nor as that of the egocentric “subjectively willing and desiring man”.31 The reason given is that such an artist, even if he has used himself as the ostensible subject of his work, “has already been released from his individual will, and has become, as it were, the medium” for “the one truly existent subject”—that “eternal self resting at the basis of things”.32 Only in this heightened state of approaching that of the creator of the world can Nietzsche’s hypothetical lyric genius in his act of creation be said to “know anything of the eternal essence of art”, and only in this state is he transformed: “at once subject and object, at once poet, actor, and spectator”.33 Artistic representation or symbolism, from this second perspective, has now been extended from the artist and artefact to a transcendent reality as if the psychological and the metaphysical domains were analogously and unarguably connected.

At the same time, artist and (as conceded in Section Six of The Birth) artefact alike undergo significant modification in the attempt to realise the transcendent. The modification would not only involve the perceivable properties of the work, but the intentions of the poet also. In addition, although more by implication, there is the recognition of
the same by appropriately attuned performers and spectators. In other words, Nietzsche does not confine artistic representation or symbolism to an individual's apprehension; rather, it belongs to a communal context.

Section Six of *The Birth of Tragedy* contains a third major reference to music where its interaction with poetry becomes a focus of attention. Nietzsche has specifically in mind how the language of song may be extended to the point of imitating music. Indeed, he claims to have depicted "the only possible relation between poetry and music" as one where "the word, the image, the concept here seeks an expression analogous to music". However, this relationship is an asymmetrical one:

> music itself ... does not need the image and the concept, but merely endures them as accompaniments. The poems of the lyricist can express nothing that did not already lie hidden ... in the music that compelled him to figurative speech. Language can never adequately render the cosmic symbolism of music, because music stands in symbolic relation to ... primal unity, and therefore symbolizes a sphere which is beyond and prior to all phenomena. Rather, all phenomena, compared with it, are merely symbols: hence language, as the organ and symbol of phenomena, can never by any means disclose the innermost heart of music ...."  

Without detouring into his unpublished writings about the presuppositional relationship between music and language, it might be maintained here that Nietzsche gives voice to the broadly contemporaneous theme—common to a Hanslick and a Gurney—that music, unlike poetry, cannot be translated into another representational medium since its (metaphysical) content can only be articulated by music itself. Perhaps this sheer untranslatability of music allows Nietzsche to scorn those whose merely contemplative or passive response might view music as typical of the elusiveness, indeterminancy, or obscurity of the arts resistant to description. Yet even if it were true that dithyrambic music, shorn completely of images and concepts and erasing any sense of self, symbolises a transcendental sphere, it does not follow that so experiencing it precludes a more or less apt, a more or less figurative description of the experience of that music as Nietzsche himself demonstrates throughout *The Birth of Tragedy*. 
In the context of the physical disposition of ancient Greek theatre, a fourth set of assertions about music returns us to the matter of the representational connection borne by the chorus in terms both of its spectators and of how it "generates" the Dionysian vision, "speaking of it with the entire symbolism of dance, tone, and words".39 Nietzsche particularly emphasises the distinctiveness of the dithyrambic chorus as "a community of unconscious actors who consider themselves and one another transformed", a transformation which is "the presupposition of all dramatic art".40 Both the dithyrambic composer and the choral member have transfiguration in common: the composer being one who "feel[s] the urge to transform himself and to speak out of other bodies and souls" and the Dionysian choral actor being one who "sees himself as a satyr, *and as a satyr, in turn, he sees the god*, which means that in his metamorphosis he beholds another vision outside himself".41 As befits the earlier articulation of the Apollonian-Dionysian distinction, both composer and choral actor are contrasted with the rhapsodist and the painter neither of whom becomes "fused with his images," but, rather, "sees them outside himself as objects of contemplation".42

Clearly, by now, we can detect a marked shift in Nietzsche's conception of art and representation derived from his prior construal of music. Taken from the point of view of its creation and enactment, an increasing emphasis falls, in the words of Richard Schacht, upon "the *transfiguring* character of art."43 As a result, the transcendent force or impulse "which calls art into being, as the complement as consummation of existence" is paradoxically seen by Nietzsche as "the cause of the Olympian world" which the Greeks then "made use of as a transfiguring mirror".44 Similarly, towards the end of his tract when focusing upon the nature of tragic myth and its dissonances, he observes that it "participates fully in this metaphysical intention of art to transfigure", immediately after reminding his readers that "art is not merely imitation of the reality of nature but rather a metaphysical supplement of the reality of nature, placed beside it for its overcoming".45 Precisely in what way art can be both a product of the "artistic energies which burst forth from nature herself" that sees it embodying the same Apollonian-Dionysian "art-impulses of nature" as well as a distinctive, separate "metaphysical supplement of the reality of nature" by which we can supposedly overcome nature's revelation of "the horror or absurdity of existence" remains challenging to say the least.46
During the foregoing section, we have briefly detailed the way in which Nietzsche has gradually turned from dealing with latent and actual artforms as representations pure and simple under the heading of such related concepts as copy and image, imitation and mirroring, representation and symbol. In its place, or, more precisely, alongside this conceptual cluster, has emerged another set pertaining to the notion of transformation or transfiguration. Now even if we were to contend that it is altogether far more justifiable to see Nietzsche as ultimately extolling transformation as the means of characterising the metaphysical dimension of music and cognate tragic arts, would such a thesis prove cogent? In large part, the answer has to contend with the difficulties confronting Nietzsche's belief that art of a particular kind actually discloses the transcendent. It is with this issue that we shall bring this paper to a close.

How can the transformations wrought by art, especially music and tragic drama, reveal the transcendent state of reality, when the transcendent, on Nietzsche's account, is "beyond" or "beneath" possible experience (and not, in the Kantian manner, those *a priori* conditions by which experience is made possible)? If, by definition, the transcendent cannot be experienced, momentarily or otherwise, is Nietzsche committed to the view that we only seem to experience the transcendent, or, alternatively, that it only seems that the transcendent is revealed, or, less directly, intimated in some manner? To all intents and purposes, Nietzsche opposes the notion of seeming experience, if for no other reason than the appeals to his own, actual experience. But for him to claim, in effect, that he has experienced something of the transcendent when experiencing particular works of art—notably, the third act of Richard Wagner's *Tristan und Isolde* (1859) as Section 21 of *The Birth of Tragedy* reveals—leads to outright falsehood, since, if the transcendent is outside experience, whatever he purportedly experienced could not have been an experience of the transcendent.

What of the other two notions: that of music as a seeming revelation of the transcendent or as a seeming intimation of the transcendent? Here, to understand what music "seems", it appears we need an explanation of what it is that it seems. To adapt an example from Nietzsche himself, if Aristophanes seems "a dissolute, mendacious Alcibiades of poetry", then what Aristophanes seems is largely premised upon understanding what is meant by "a dissolute, mendacious
Alcibiades of poetry”. Without understanding what this expression signifies outside its occurrence in the above example, the explanation of what Aristophanes ‘seems’ appears to be radically incomplete. However, an objection along these lines may not bring the issue at hand any closer to resolution, because a definition of transcendence is being sought well before an insight into whether or how music can be a seeming revelation or intimation of it.

Perhaps another approach to analysing what it is for music to intimate or reveal the transcendent is to return to the general case of what it is for the arts to represent anything. Here, of course, we face Plato’s question in The Republic of whether or not, in experiencing an artwork, we experience what the work represents. To hear a call of a bird is to experience something in the way that to hallucinate it is not actually to hear and thereby experience it. Hence we may ask, in cases where the object and the medium of representation are closely aligned, how far do hearing and hallucinating indicate what it is to hear a call of a bird, represented in, say, the first movement of Symphony No. 1 in D Major (1888/1889) by Gustav Mahler? Or, less controversially, to see a woman at a window is to experience something in a way that to dream it, for example, is not to see and thereby experience it. And the question again, therefore, is how far do seeing and dreaming illuminate what it is to see a woman at a window, represented in, say, the painting of the same name by Edgar Degas (1871/1872) housed at the Courtauld Institute? To say that both representational cases involve the imagination simply recasts the issue as one of asking whether imagining is more similar to hearing or to hallucinating or more similar to seeing or to dreaming respectively. The point here is that we could just as easily have substituted the transcendent for a call of a bird or a woman at a window since experiencing something in music is not, as argued above, solely a matter of what experiencing that something must be in extra-artistic contexts. The Degas, for instance, shows us what a woman at a window is like—indeed, what it would be like for us to see a woman at a window—without necessarily having to be the case that we are in fact having an experience of seeing a woman at a window.

But a difference still remains: we are not restricted to the Courtauld Institute Galleries in order to see or experience a woman at a window whereas, as Nietzsche seems to be saying, we have no choice but the arts (or their “spiritualised” equivalent) as our venue for the metaphysical. In other words, perhaps Nietzsche intuitively
shied away from construing music or the so-called tragic arts in representational terms towards construing them in transfigurational terms, because their task was not somehow to symbolise or reproduce, mirror or imitate, illustrate or copy the metaphysical, but to constitute it. If that is the case, then for Nietzsche these tragic art forms embody or express a transcendent experience, but they do not represent it in a way that may be had from some independent source. In this constitutive sense, music or the tragic for Nietzsche is paradoxically both the cause and the object of a transcendent experience otherwise normally denied to our human, all too human experience.

Notes
1 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy and The Case against Wagner (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), Section 3, p. 19. All references to this work in the text are to this edition, containing Walter Kaufmann’s translation of the revised 1874 version of The Birth of Tragedy. Also questioning the value of logic is Alan Watt, “Nietzsche’s Productive Logic”, in The Fate of the New Nietzsche, Keith Ansell-Pearson and Howard Caygill, eds (Aldershot: Avebury, 1993), esp. pp. 128-30. Watt postulates that Nietzsche’s logic is best characterised as “productive”, as distinct from deductive or inductive, in so far as it promotes the inconclusive, the undecided, and the exploratory. However, Watt not only draws his examples from originally unpublished notes, but also appears to be willing to conflate logic and rhetoric.
5 A conclusion also reached, e.g., by Peter Heckman, “The Role of Music in Nietzsche’s Birth of Tragedy”, in The British Journal of Aesthetics, 30.4 (October 1990), pp. 351-60.
6 Section 1, p. 33.
7 Section 25, pp. 143 and 144.
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8 Section 1, p. 33.
9 Section 1, p. 34.
10 Section 1, pp. 36 and 37.
11 Section 2, p. 38.
12 Section 1, pp. 37 and 34.
14 Section 2, p. 38.
15 Section 2, p. 38, Section 4, pp. 45 & 46.
16 Section 2, p. 38, Section 4, p. 46 & Section 6, p. 55.
18 See T.S. Champlin, “Tendencies”, in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, n.s., 91, paper 7 (28 January 1991), pp. 119-33, to whom this and the following paragraph are indebted.
19 Section 2, p. 38.
20 Section 2, p. 39.
21 Section 2, p. 39.
22 Section 2, pp. 39-40.
23 Section 2, p. 40.
24 Section 2, p. 40.
25 Following Heckman, “Role of Music”, pp. 156-7, but without reference to Nietzsche’s alleged adherence to Schopenhauer at this juncture.
26 Section 4, p. 46.
27 Section 16, p. 103.
28 Section 5, p. 49.
29 Section 5, p. 49.
30 Section 5, p. 50.
31 Section 5, p. 50.
32 Section 5, pp. 52 & 50.
33 Section 5, p. 52.
34 Section 6, p. 54.
35 Section 6, p. 54.
47.4 (October/December 1986), pp. 663-72.


39 Section 8, p. 65.

40 Section 8, p. 64.

41 Section 8, p. 64.

42 Section 8, p. 64.


44 Section 8, p. 64.

45 Section 24, p. 140.

46 Section 2, p. 38 & Section 7, p. 60.


48 See T. J. Diffey, “Art and the Transcendent”, in *The British Journal of Aesthetics*, 34.4 (October 1994), pp. 326-36, to whom this and the following paragraphs are indebted. Whether Nietzsche’s claims about the transcendent might be translatable in terms of knowledge by acquaintance would take us beyond the space allocated for this paper since it would force us to question which of several attempts to elucidate it by the early Russell could apply, let alone apply successfully: see, e.g., B.A.W. Russell, “Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description”, in *Mysticism and Logic and other essays* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1953), pp. 197-218 and “Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description”, in *The Problems of Philosophy* (London: Williams & Norgate, 1912), pp. 72-92.

49 Section 13, p. 87.

50 Book X, 593b-602b.