John Cage Defended against his Appropriators

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for Jacques

A musician dipping into the escalating literature on post-modern arts theory is likely to be both depressed and relieved by the virtual absence of reference to contemporary music, especially as an art form. Depressed, because musicians seem to have been marginalised from the whole aesthetic (or anti-aesthetic) debate. But also relieved, perhaps, when one contemplates the rather glib bandying of O.K. names that often takes the place of informed discourse on music, assuming the subject is broached at all.

Perhaps inevitably, the most-bandied name is that of the late John Cage. This is unlikely to have bothered Cage himself, who spent a lifetime patiently enduring one sort of misrepresentation or another—at least the latest variant generally has had the virtue of seeking to praise him rather than bury him. But abuse is still abuse, and just as Adorno once found it necessary to write an article defending Bach against his devotees,¹ so I shall venture, at a much more modest level, to defend the most significant four-letter-word composer of our own day against those who have been inclined to appropriate him for purposes which sometimes, perhaps, are not much less millenarian than that of the post-war Bach fanatics.

I shall not deal here with Cage's reputation among composers; nearly all composers are, at some stage in their career, appropriators, and if they misunderstand or misrepresent what they have appropriated, then usually so much the better: that's how it becomes their own. Nor shall I be particularly concerned with music historians and musicologists, many of whom have done a perfectly adequate job in terms of their own demarcated territory. Rather, I shall be concentrating on the contributions of philosophers, aestheticians and cultural commentators.

As regards the latter, one might wonder whether Cage is not fated—at least temporarily—to be the ultimate one-liner, the single index entry, the obligatory passing reference in, say, The Shock of the New or Anti-Oedipus, or else a statutory component in a list where it's assumed that everyone knows who Cage is, and where the company
may range from 'the antics of Warhol and Rauschenberg', as in Hilton Kramer's collection *The Revenge of the Philistines*, via Lyotard's list of 'minimalism, arte povera, happening and performance' (which he admittedly describes as 'useless'), and Kristeva's 'La Monte Young, Kagel and Stockhausen', to the frankly ignominious company of the Bee Gees in Umberto Eco's *Report from the Global Village*.

It also seems that Cage's music, and to some degree his thought, has been wilfully fixed in a time-warp—eternally frozen at the moment of the first Happening at Black Mountain College in 1952, or at the premiere of the notorious 'silent' piece 4'33". That piece was inspired in part by Rauschenberg's blank canvasses of a couple of years earlier, and indeed, the very notion of 'John Cage' has become a blank canvas on which a whole series of interest groups have inscribed their own agendas. So in what follows, I shall plead for a more differentiated view, in relation both to Cage's music and to his extensive writings.

To start with the music, if one looks at Cage's works over the 40 years since the first pieces involving chance procedures, it is clear that their outward format has often changed. Cage's work does not consist of one piece, silent or otherwise—it's an enormous output ranging over nearly six decades, and yet not too much expert knowledge is required to date most works within about five years, just on the look of the notation. Going further back, to the 'thirties, one can trace a line from the very earliest pieces, with their rather strange version of Schoenberg's 12-note technique, via the percussion pieces and prepared piano pieces to a series of works in the 'forties using just a very small number of notes—precursors, however inadvertently, of minimalism. Then came the first chance pieces, whose notation becomes more and more unorthodox during the 'fifties and early 'sixties, a brief period with electronics, then a return (in part) to relatively exact notation (in the instrumental pieces), alongside increasing interest in sound poetry, based as often as not on texts by Joyce or Thoreau. In the 'eighties come all kinds of theatrical extravaganzas, notably the Europeras, and increasing incursions into the visual arts.

Even that thumbnail sketch should suffice to show that there have been many John Cages, and that whenever a commentator refers to John Cage, we may be well within our rights to ask, 'which John Cage?', or 'John Cage when?' Comparably, the guiding sensibility, the 'Cage aesthetic', seems to have gone through various cycles, or pendulum motions. Listening to Cage's answers to questions at the end of the 1988–89 Harvard lectures, one can often believe that in principle at least, most of them would have been answered the same.
way back in 1958 in Darmstadt; but not on the West Coast in the late 'thirties, nor in New York in the late 'sixties.

One could characterise Cage’s thinking as beginning with brash, youthful optimism: ‘revolutionary’ without having any particular political orientation. Then, the shock of Hiroshima and the holocaust leads to a flight from Western thinking, first into the spirituality of Indian thought, and thence to the impassivity of Zen—this is what gives rise to the first chance pieces. This ‘Zen’ period lasts about fifteen years. Then, in the late 'sixties, there is a ‘swerve’. Some years earlier, in the wake of the first performances of the Concert for Piano and Orchestra, Cage had said of his performers, ‘I must find a way for them to become free without their becoming foolish ... My problems have become social rather than musical’. At this stage, though, ‘social’ did not necessarily mean political; for Cage, the purpose of non-purposive music was primarily ethical.

However, in the late 'sixties and early 'seventies, political references become more explicit. In conversation with Daniel Charles, Cage describes the difference between his books Silence and A Year from Monday as one of moving ‘from a consideration of individual experience to a consideration of social experience’. This difference is neatly illustrated in two of Cage’s notorious ‘stories’. The first, from Silence, is typical of the fifties outlook: ‘I went to a concert upstairs in Town Hall. The composer whose works were being performed had provided program notes. One of these was to the effect that there was too much pain in the world. After the concert ... I said ‘Well, I enjoyed the music, but I didn’t agree with that bit about there being too much pain in the world. He said, ‘What! You don’t think there’s enough?’ I said, ‘I think there’s just the right amount’. Compare that with the following one from a decade later: ‘Just before Christmas I visited my mother who lives in a nursing home ... I told her I’d written three texts on world improvement. She said “John! How dare you? You should be ashamed!” I asked her, in view of world conditions, whether she didn’t think there was room for improvement. She said, “There certainly is. It makes good sense”.’

In conversation with the German sound-poet hans g helms in 1972, Cage focuses on Maoist China, though he partly distances himself from political commitment by saying ‘Mao’s solutions appear to many people to be political, but I like to think of them as being utilitarian’. And yet, a few minutes later, he comments: ‘Not only I, but now many more people say that our proper business is revolution ... [though] I am too old to do much of any good’—‘good’, in this
context, being equated with direct action, rather than writing and speaking. It is around this time that Cage becomes particularly preoccupied with Thoreau (in the *Songbooks*, for instance): in particular, he likes to quote the line ‘The best form of government is no form of government’. The *Songbooks*, for him, are a conscious subversion of artistic categories; as he puts it, ‘But at the present time to consider the *Songbooks* as a work of art is nearly impossible. Who would dare? It resembles a brothel, doesn’t it?’ Still, one can argue as to whether it constitutes as explicit an invitation to overthrow the regimes of the day as that of the Parisian Situationist students in 1968.

Cage’s overt political engagement appears to have collapsed around the late ’seventies, as the less benign aspects of Mao’s Cultural Revolution became all too apparent; in conversation with Geoffrey Barnard, Cage says: ‘I think that current events in the years since then [i.e. the mid-'sixties] have been what you might call dumbfounding, so that optimism which was implicit in my remark—that is to say, the optimism that there was the possibility of changing society—has become less ... and taking its place has been a kind of silence’. And of the politically heavily engaged music of his former pupil Christian Wolff, he says: ‘I admire his recent music too but not its concern with power, with political subject matter’.

Having sketched the phases of Cage’s work and outlook, I should like to chronicle some of the appropriations that have overtaken Cage’s work from the ’fifties onwards, with varying degrees of concern for their congruence with Cage’s own outlook. I’ll highlight three particular areas: leftist appropriators from Adorno onwards, French phenomenologists, and post-modern theorists.

What unites the early appropriators is that they don’t rest on the authority of Cage per se—they have no use for gurus; in any case, it is doubtful whether Cage would have been regarded as such in Europe, at least in the late ’fifties and early ’sixties. Rather, they draw perspectives from the works themselves: perspectives which are not, on the whole, Cage’s own, but equally, are not usually directly ascribed to him.

If I begin with Adorno, that’s already a slight chronological falsification, because his pupil Heinz-Klaus Metzger had already seized on Cage for a more radical purpose than Adorno would have countenanced, and it may well have been Metzger who drew the older philosopher’s attention to Cage. Still, Adorno’s views represent an older generation of thinking.

Adorno’s initial response to Cage around 1962 is cautious, not to
say suspicious: in *Vers une musique informelle*, he writes ‘Cage, perhaps in connection with Zen Buddhism, seems to ascribe metaphysical powers to the sound freed from all intentional superstructure’ and goes on to equate this with ‘Steiner-séances’.10 But later, in the *Aesthetic Theory*, during a passage referring to ‘authentic art’ as one ‘which engages the crisis of meaning’, Adorno writes: ‘Highly revealing in this context are phenomena such as John Cage’s *[Concert for Piano]*, which imposes the strictest contingency on itself, and gains a kind of meaning in the process, meaning in the form of an expression of terror’11. Significantly, the reference to Cage comes in the context of a discussion of Beckett, whose work Adorno sees as ‘terminating in a catastrophe which consists in the fact that no catastrophe occurs’.12

Similar to this, perhaps, is Susan Sontag’s treatment of Cage—as writer/philosopher rather than musician/composer—in ‘Thinking Against Oneself—Reflections on Cioran’, where she takes Cage’s thinking as a radical counterpart to that of Cioran. Following a line not unlike Adorno’s, she immediately locates Cage as ‘a thinker in the post- and anti-philosophical tradition of broken discourse ... [with] a commitment to a radical transvaluation of values’.13

Here, it seems to me, Sontag is almost as anxious as Adorno to inscribe Cage within Western angst, as an exponent of the tragic fragment, and once again Beckett is not far away. This may seem curious, coming from an author who only three years earlier had ended her essay *Against Interpretation* with the words ‘In place of a hermeneutics, we need an erotics of art’.14 At the same time, though oddly without reference to the heavy Zen undercurrent that pervades *Silence* (from which all her quotations are taken), Sontag senses that another, alien factor is involved, as if Cage were offering a relatively benign version of the radical external influences, non-psychological in character, which Artaud advocates in *The Theatre and Its Double* (which Cage had read in the late ‘forties, probably on the instigation of Pierre Boulez): ‘something else—that will seem strangely unfeeling and intellectually simplistic—must be allowed in’.15 And a little later she writes: ‘Perhaps, for a unified transvaluation, one must look to those thinkers like Cage who—whether from spiritual strength or spiritual insensitivity—are able to jettison far more of the inherited anguish and complexity of this civilisation’.16

This may fairly describe Cage’s Zen-based impassivity of the fifties. But by the time Sontag makes her comments, in 1967, Cage’s own outlook has changed considerably; in many respects it is much
closer to that of Sontag herself, as portrayed in essays such as What’s Happening in America and Trip to Hanoi.

The Cage/Beckett equation is a curiously pervasive one, resting on the determination to endow Cage’s ‘silence’ with metaphysical properties which are quite alien to it. We find it again, much more recently, in Frederic Jameson’s Post-Modernism, when he writes ‘think, for example, of the experience of John Cage’s music, in which a cluster of material sounds (on the prepared piano, for example) is followed by a silence so intolerable that you cannot imagine another sonorous chord coming into existence and cannot imagine remembering the previous one well enough to make any connection with it if it does’, and then proceeds to equate this loosely with Beckett’s writing: ‘most notably Watt, where a primacy of the present sentence in time ruthlessly disintegrates the narrative fabric that attempts to reform around it’.17 and then proceeds to equate this loosely with Beckett’s writing: ‘most notably Watt, where a primacy of the present sentence in time ruthlessly disintegrates the narrative fabric that attempts to reform around it’.18

A post-Adorno interpretation of Cage, in which art is seen as having strong implications for revolutionary praxis, comes as early as 1958, in the immediate wake of the Cologne performances of the Concert for Piano and Orchestra. Heinz-Klaus Metzger, in an article entitled John Cage or the Liberation of Music (John Cage oder die freigelassene Musik) writes: ‘Cage’s refusal of organisation is no capitulation of compositional reason, no abdication of the composing subject; au contraire, the latter is evident everywhere in a manner that actually gives new impetus to the forgotten category of originality ... Palpably—almost too palpably—Cage’s latest works are social blueprints ... The idea of freedom is played out as a theatre piece [in later versions, ‘as a concert’]. Meanwhile, outside, the main thing is to do away with the conductors and tear up the scores from which the world perform’.19 This, it seems to me, exudes the Spirit of ’68, however prematurely, and it’s a version of Cage that Metzger clung onto long after the ’sixties.

In general, Cage declined to refute other views of his work, even when they were critical: ‘I never answered those criticisms. It didn’t seem to me to be necessary’.20 But there have been exceptions, the most notable of which concerns the French philosopher and musician Daniel Charles, a Parisian phenomenologist with considerable influence from Adorno. From the late ’sixties onwards, Charles wrote a number of essays on Cage, admirable in themselves, but very clearly exploring his own philosophical interests, as titles such as The Aesthetic of ‘non finito’ or The Experience of Non-Volition make clear. For Charles, Cageian silence not only assumes aspects of Mallarmé’s ‘vertigo of
the blank page', but also unleashes a whole host of ontological
speculations, none of which necessarily match Cage's concerns: they
are, to cite the title Charles gives to a published collection of his
essays, *Glosses on John Cage*. In the late 'sixties Charles conducted a
series of interviews with Cage which eventually appeared in an English
version as *For The Birds*. Inevitably, the notions of Being and
Nothingness soon started to crop up, and in the Afterword to *For the
Birds*, Cage clearly records his discomfiture when confronted with
attempts to interpret his work in a particular way: 'On the third or
fourth day of our interviews ... I admitted my discomfort: I explained
to Daniel Charles my uneasiness when confronted with any attempt to
construct a discourse which started from certain premises in order to
draw conclusions from them'.21 I'll return to a specific instance
below, in the context of post-modern views of Cage.

The basics for regarding Cage as a post-modernist rather than a
modernist are problematic, though not untenable. I would suggest,
though, that those versions of post-modernism which insist on post-
avant-gardism will have trouble in assimilating the Cage who, as late
as 1982, wrote: 'My belief [is] that there will always be one, because
without the avant-garde, which I think is flexibility of the mind and
freedom from institutions, theories and laws, you won't have invention
and obviously, from a practical point of view, the society needs
invention. Whether they accept the fact or not, they need it'.22

Among the standard writers on post-modernism, leaving aside
those concerned with popular culture, music, as I suggested earlier,
does not merit much attention. All Frederic Jameson can find to say of
the post-modern repertoire, in his recent book, is: 'The music is not
bad to listen to'.23 A dismal prospect! One imagines a sullenly tolerant
tribe of post-modern listeners, compelled—rather like the audiences
for Mao's Peking operas—to endure the 'ideologically sound': a far
cry from Baudrillard's 'ecstasy of communication'.

Perhaps it is this indifference to the acoustic outcome that engenders
a parallel indifference to factual accuracy among post-modern writers
on Cage. Here we may recall Jameson's own comment, cited above in
relation to Beckett. The situation Jameson describes is not impossible
within Cage's work, but it is extremely uncharacteristic. The works
involving very long silences are mainly clustered in the fifties; Cage
doesn't use the prepared piano after 1952. In fact, within Cage’s huge
output there are probably only two works—the *Concerto for Prepared
Piano* and the *Two Pastorales*, both from 1951—to which Jameson's
comment could accurately refer. Clearly, it is not impossible that it is
precisely one or both of these works that he had in mind. But it seems a good deal more likely that two Cage buzzwords—‘silence’ and ‘prepared piano’—have been somewhat arbitrarily conjoined. In fact, what Jameson describes is more characteristic of Christian Wolff's work in the 'fifties than that of Cage.

Not every post-modern commentator has shown a cavalier attitude to Cageian fact. Marjorie Perloff, who has written frequently on Cage's text pieces, tends to be meticulously accurate, and in her essay on Cage's *Rearrangement* 24 she takes the critic Jill Johnston to task in a way that would have many applications elsewhere. She writes: ‘Johnston (and this is typical of commentary on Cage's work) makes a series of misleading, if not simply incorrect statements’, 25 and she goes on to cite chapter and verse. Yet this laudable insistence on accuracy is not necessarily extended to her academic colleagues. Towards the end of the same essay, Perloff discusses the relationship between Cage's work and Derrida's theories, and in a footnote she expresses her debt to Gregory Ulmer's *The Object of Post-Criticism*, included in Hal Foster's compilation *The Anti-Aesthetic*. 26 This, as it happens, is one of the more bizarre examples of the 'who cares about facts?' species of Cage-appropriation, and I shall refer to it here, not so much in order to dispute the author's findings, questionable as these may be, but as a widely circulated document which shows just how much one can get wrong in a short space of time. I should point out that Perloff does not repeat any of Ulmer's errors; but nor does she choose to unveil them.

The essay's main issue is identified as 'representation—specifically, the representation of the object of study in a critical text'. 27 The first section is on 'Collage/Montage', and refers to various arts and artists (though not to music, and not to Cage). The next is headed 'Grammatology', and is therefore, naturally, mainly about Derrida. The third section is entitled 'Allegory', and here, after a couple of pages, John Cage is introduced as 'the great montage-ist of electronic music'. 28 If this description does not cause you to raise your eyebrows, maybe it should. Leaving aside the appropriateness of the adjective 'great' within post-modernist discourse on art, it may be pointed out:

a) that Cage was never much associated with electronic music, except in terms of 'live electronic music', which offers little scope for montage;

b) that it was musique concrete, rather than electronic music, that went in for montage, and that's what Cage (occasionally) practised;
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c) that montage, as defined by Ulmer, presupposes an intent-ionality which is exactly what Cage had rejected ever since the early 1950s; indeed, I doubt whether the word is used by Cage at all.

Cage resurfaces a few pages later, in the ‘Parasite/Saprophyte’ section, where it is suggested that part of the value of his later texts as post-literature lies in the fact that ‘Cage is famous as a post-modern musician’. (Again, the fascination with fame, with status as something which immediately grants authority, seems rather at odds with the decentralising aims of post-modernism.) Various of Cage’s innovations, Ulmer rightly suggests, revolutionised music. But Ulmer’s exact phrase is ‘revolutionised—“post-modernised”—music’. This may come as a surprise to those many writers who regard ‘revolution’ as a modernist characteristic!

Next, we are told: ‘It is worth noting that Cage, like Adorno, studied music theory with Schoenberg. Cage adopted a view, similar to Adorno’s strategy of the “concrete particular”, that music should be a kind of research, an exploration of the logic of materials’.31

Here, three comments suggest themselves:

1) that Adorno didn’t study with Schoenberg, but with Alban Berg;
2) that, anyway, ‘music theory’ as taught by Schoenberg was simply an intensive course in traditional harmony and counterpoint;
3) that the phrases ‘kind of research’ and ‘logic of materials’ (not supported by citations) are not, as far as I can tell, part of Cage’s vocabulary, at least from 1950 onwards.

Let’s examine the last point a little farther. In the conversations with Daniel Charles alluded to earlier, the word logic does indeed occur several times, but how? ‘In indeterminate music, such as I conceive it, there is a priori no such logic ... You are free to infuse it with all the logic you care to, [but] I’m not the one who put the logic in the score.’ And later, ‘Unfortunately for logic, everything we understand under that rubric ‘logic’ represents such a simplification with regard to the event and what really happens, that we must learn to keep away from it. The function of art at the present time is to preserve us from all the logical minimisations that we are in each instant tempted to apply to the flux of events’.

Returning to Ulmer: inevitably, before too long, Cage’s reputation as a leading amateur mycologist is evoked, and not least the fact that he has written a distinctly unorthodox Mushroom Book in collaboration with Lois Long. For Ulmer this acquires all kinds of allegorical
symbolism. Yet of the book, Cage says simply, ‘I had for years wanted to write a mushroom book, and I found that when I concentrated on mushrooms it was not interesting’.\textsuperscript{34} So what started the interest in mushrooms?: initially, simple hunger, followed later by gourmet refinements. Cage says: ‘During the depression, in California ... I had no money. I was living in Carmel and around my shack grew mushrooms. I decided they were edible and lived on them. After a week of this, I was invited for lunch by friends who had a house about a mile away. I found I no longer had the energy to get there. Mushrooms are so arranged chemically that we are incapable of absorbing their proteins. We can only use the minerals, the vitamins, and the water, which is not sufficient. But they taste so good they increase our ability to digest other things; our stomachs are so happy’.\textsuperscript{35}

I think anyone tempted to ascribe too ornate or apocalyptic a significance to Cage’s interest in mushrooms would do well to ponder the last of the 90 stories that make up Cage’s lecture \textit{Indeterminacy}, from the late ’fifties: ‘Dorothy Newman invited me to dinner in New York. There was a lady there from Philadelphia who was an authority on Buddhist art. When she found out I was interested in mushrooms, she said, “Have you an explanation of the symbolism involved in the death of the Buddha by eating a mushroom?” I explained that I had never been interested in symbolism, that I preferred taking things just as themselves, not as standing for other things. But then a few days later while rambling in the woods I got to thinking. I recalled the Indian concept of the relation of life and the seasons. Spring is Creation, Summer is Preservation, Fall is Destruction, Winter is Quiescence. Mushrooms grow most vigorously in the Fall, the period of destruction, and the function of many of them is to bring about the final decay of rotting material. In fact, as I read somewhere, the world would be an impassable heap of old rubbish were it not for mushrooms and their capacity to get rid of it. So I wrote to the lady in Philadelphia. I said, “The function of mushrooms is to rid the world of old rubbish. The Buddha died a natural death”.\textsuperscript{36}

The ultimate cautionary tale, though, is probably that of the unfortunate young German musicologist who, in the mid-seventies, wrote her doctoral thesis on Cage’s music, and included scores such as \textit{Fontana Mix} and \textit{Cartridge Music}, which consists in part of lines and points on superimposed plastic transparencies. Alas, some cynical colleagues inserted additional transparencies into her copy of \textit{Fontana Mix}, including a drawing of a mushroom and—Germany being the land of all the \textit{wurst} jokes—a sausage. The unfortunate scholar took
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all these scurrilous additions at face value, eulogised their mystical and sensual characteristics as part of the Cage ethos and, I blush to confess, was provisionally awarded her doctorate. However, when the deception was discovered, she promptly lost it again, in a blaze of very unkind publicity, most notably in the rampantly philistine Spiegel magazine. Where Cage is concerned, caveat emptor, but caveat scriptor too.

Notes

7 Charles, p.59.
9 Charles, p.199, fn.
12 Adorno, p.221.
15 Sontag, Styles of Radical Will, p.95.
16 Sontag, Styles of Radical Will, p.94.
18 Jameson, p.28.
20 Barnard, p.10.
21 Charles, p.239.
23 Jameson, p.298.
27 Ulmer, p.83.
28 Ulmer, p.96.
32 Charles, p.79.
33 Charles, p.80–81.
36 Cage, Silence, p.85.