RESPONDING TO TRAGEDY WITH FEELING

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Early in Plato's *Symposium*, the narrator Apollodorus says that the banquet was given "when Agathon won the prize with his first tragedy, the day after that on which he and his chorus offered the sacrifice of victory" (173a).1 In taking up the story of the evening, he tells how Socrates, having stood outside lost in thought, finally comes to Agathon’s table halfway through the meal. Agathon asks to share the wise thoughts that have detained him, and there is some banter between them as to who can claim to be wise. My wisdom, Socrates says, "is of a very mean and questionable sort, no better than a dream. But yours is bright and full of promise and was manifested in all the splendour of youth the other day in the presence of more than thirty thousand of your fellow Hellenes" (175c). Agathon acknowledges the mockery in good spirit, and while urging Socrates to continue his supper, refers the contest between them to the judgment of the god of tragedy and drinking parties: as to "who bears off the palm of wisdom—of this Dionysus shall be the judge" (175c).

Much later in the evening, the speeches in praise of love have gone the rounds to the point at which just two contestants remain, Agathon, and last of all, Socrates. Again there is banter between them before Agathon can make a start, for Socrates suggests that he feels "frightened out of his wits" in having to follow such a fine speaker (194a). As for Agathon’s rejoinder that he might be the one to feel disconcerted, Socrates reminds him of the recent scene at the theatre when the dramatist came on stage with the actors for the formal ceremony before the presentation of his plays and faced the vast audience altogether undismayed (194a-b). That is all very well, Agathon responds, but my head is not so full of the theatre as not to know that a few good judges are much more formidable than many fools. Of course, says Socrates; but there is no need for you to worry for we, after all, "were part of the foolish many in the theatre, hence cannot be regarded as the select wise" (194c). Phaedrus comes to Agathon’s rescue at this point, saving
him from a prolonged Socratic inquisition and opening the way for his speech in praise of love. A poet and dramatist, Agathon calls on poets and dramatists in his eulogy, Homer, Sophocles, and Euripides in particular. And when, in the course of noting love's virtues, he comes to speak of knowledge and wisdom, he speaks for poetry, saying that love is a poet in the first place and the inspired teacher of poetry and of all the arts, the creative source of living nature, and of what is best and brightest among gods and men (195c-197c).

Socrates, in complete command of the situation, once more pleads his nervousness in having to follow such a fine speech. Beautiful words and diction, splendid rhetoric, comparable with the great master of rhetoric, Gorgias—Agathon's speech has everything, Socrates says, except for one thing: regard for truth! This time Agathon cannot escape Socrates' sharp questions and he fights a losing battle until he moves to end the exchange by admitting defeat: "I cannot refute you, Socrates; you're quite unanswerable". "No", Socrates replies, "Socrates is easily refuted; what you cannot refute is the truth" (201c-d). The philosopher then leaves the poet to silence and goes on to tell his tale of love heard from Diotima of Mantinea. Agathon and all the others are left far behind by this speech, another case of the best wine being kept to the last. There can be no doubt as to who carried off the palm of wisdom. The victory of Socrates, to be understood as the victory of truth, is only confirmed more handsomely when Alcibiades arrives late in the night and the drinking begins in earnest.

The presentation from beginning to end is testimony to Plato's dramatic skill, not least his ability to depict a scene with economy and to sustain it across a series of speeches. The dialogue as a whole, it is clear, points to a contest between the philosopher and the tragic poet at a celebration in honour of the poet's moment of glory—though the young Agathon is never a match for the 'old master'. The Symposium in this sense is a dramatic presentation of the "ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry" (Republic 607b), but it all takes place in a spirit of friendly rivalry. Notoriously, this spirit was not sustained in Plato's discussion of poetry, especially tragedy, in a number of other major dialogues.

In alluding to an audience of more than thirty thousand Hellenes at the Dionysian festival (Symposium 175e), Plato was exaggerating, but not without point. This was the conventional number of Athenian citizens and the use of the figure, in Simon Goldhill's words, "indicates more about the prestige and glory of the Great Dionysia than the pos-
sible number of spectators”. Even so, the likely numbers at the festival, on well-attested estimates, would have been very large—an audience of perhaps fourteen thousand, easily the largest gathering in Athens, of a size to support the idea that ‘the whole city’ was present. What is to be recognised here is the extent to which the performance of Greek tragedy became, from an early stage, an important component of the Athenian democracy, bringing together religious, recreational, and political life in one great celebratory festival each year in early spring. In keeping with this, the state subsidised tickets for the less well off. The interest of the polis thus helped to swell the crowds, a testimony in itself to the importance of the event in the life of the city. On this basis, the Great Dionysia, with the formal involvement of the state, the funding of choruses by wealthy citizens, the many public events, choral processions, ritual sacrifices, the award of civic and military honours, the presence of distinguished foreigners, all surrounding the performance of the chosen tragedies, was the major expression of Athens as a ‘theatre-state’. As is well known, a large element of theatre was characteristic of the democracy as a whole, notably in the Assembly, in the people’s law courts, at religious festivals, and sporting events. This association of tragedy and democracy in Athens is almost certainly a critical factor in Plato’s sharp-edged quarrel with poetry.

In the Gorgias (501e-502d), Socrates argues that music and poetry, including “that stately and marvellous creature, tragic drama” are concerned only with the gratification of the audience, not its education or moral improvement. Poetry in its essentials, above all in the theatre, is portrayed as rhetoric in the form of flattery, addressed indiscriminately to a crowd of “men, women, children, freemen and slaves”. In this, the language of drama is equated with the flattery and demagoguery that fills the Athenian Assembly. The association is echoed later in the Laws in the idea that aristocratic rule is replaced by an evil sort of “theocracy”—rule, or misrule, by theatre—abetted by the democracy (701a). Tragedy, as Plato sees it, is the theatre that democracy was bound to have. In this vein, there is the contention in Book VI of the Republic that the power of the crowd, in whatever public forum, constitutes the greatest source of corruption in a society.

Are not the public... the greatest of all sophists? And do they not educate to perfection young and old, men and women alike, and fashion them after their own hearts? ... When they meet together, and the world sits down at an assembly, or in a court of law, or a theatre, or a camp, or in any other popular resort, and there is a great uproar, and
they praise some things which are being said or done, and blame other things, equally exaggerating both, shouting and clapping their hands, and the echo of the rocks and the place in which they are assembled redoubles the sound of the praise or blame—at such a time what courage will be left, as they say, in a young man's heart? Will any private training enable him to stand firm against the overwhelming flood of popular praise or blame? (492b)

In the assumed framework of exclusions, a democratic culture has no place for philosophical reflection. Mass gatherings drive out the good, in art and political life as in thought, and the best are likely to end up corrupted by popular values. This hyperbolical denunciation of tragedy as hand-in-glove with political misrule is given its strongest expression at the end of Book VIII of the Republic, where the tragedians, especially in the person of Euripides, are charged with encouraging, to their own profit, the downward step beyond democracy into the lawlessness of tyranny. What is portrayed is a symbiotic relationship between tragedy and the worst forms of government in which each feeds off the other:

The tragic poets being wise men will forgive us and any others who live after our manner if we do not receive them into our State, because they are the eulogists of tyranny. But they will continue to go to others cities and attract mobs and hire fine voices loud and persuasive, and draw the cities over to tyrannies and democracies. Moreover they are paid for this and receive honour—the greatest honour, as might be expected, from tyrants, and the next greatest from democracies (568c-d).

The dramatic power of Plato's writing in Book VIII is beyond question, but the argument, especially in relation to democracy and its aftermath, arguably runs off the rails in many ways. In writing of democracy, Plato appears to have the Athenian democracy in mind (as at 563b, 563d-e). In that case the portrayal of democracy as a permissive free-for-all, with little or no social unity or respect for law, seems particularly wild and hostile. In any case, no attempt is made to show how tragic drama and its associated religious and cultural traditions could flourish in a society of the kind he depicts. Again, the subsequent affiliation of tragedy with tyranny lacks the slightest historical or textual basis, though a few lines from Euripides are pressed into service. Allowing that Plato has genuine concerns about aspects of democracy and the effects of tragic theatre on political life in Athens, what he offers is hardly a reasoned criticism of either democracy or tragedy. Thus the account appears in many respects as a denunciatory exercise in which the emotions of fear, anxiety, and disdain figure prominently and cloud his judgment.

The even temper of Aristotle's approach to political and cultural
concerns by contrast is characteristically dispassionate. Clearly, he could not be described as an enthusiast for democracy. But when he settles on an account of citizenship in the *Politics*, he agrees that his definition is "best adapted to the citizen of a democracy" (1275b). More generally, he is amenable to what could be called a maxim of collective wisdom in espousing "the principle that the multitude ought to be supreme rather than the few best":

For the many, of whom each individual is but an ordinary person, when they meet together may very likely be better than the few good, if regarded not individually but collectively, just as a feast to which many contribute is better than a dinner provided out of a single purse. For each individual among the many has a share of virtue and good sense, and when they meet together, they become in a manner one individual with many feet, and hands, and senses—a figure of their character and thought (*Politics* 3.11: 1281bff).

He does not suppose that this happy outcome is universally true, for it is obviously not; but it is taken to be true enough to provide a justification for democratic forms of government and for taking account of popular choice in music and poetry. The whole political and cultural context for Aristotle’s consideration of tragedy is thus a world apart from Plato’s fevered concern, a generation earlier, over the Athenian constitution and the people’s theatre. Aristotle is aware, of course, of the political context of tragedy; but he is in a position where he is able to affirm its cultural setting as a whole and to consider it, in effect, in its own terms and to respond to it warmly with admiration.

The contrast between heightened emotion and calm appreciation in response to tragedy is subsequently apparent in the different ways in which the two philosophers depict the audience for tragedy, the huge crowd that continued to flock to the Great Dionysia throughout the fourth century. Aristotle’s scattered comments on the audience in the *Poetics*, and also in the *Politics*, could suggest some hesitation in regard to his “collective wisdom” principle. At one point, in defence of Euripides, he appeals to audience acclaim as confirming his account of the finest genre of tragedy (1453a23-30). But within a few lines he complains about the success of some tragedies which, he says, are more in the manner of comedies: they are “ranked first only through the weakness of the audiences; the poets merely follow their public, writing as its wishes dictate” (1453a33-35). There is no real inconsistency here, however, for, as Stephen Halliwell comments, audiences may want less than the best, and some poets will seek to play on this; but equally, the audience can be got to respond to the best kind of tragedy which
arouses the true tragic emotions. In this spirit, Aristotle ranks tragedy above epic as an art form, against the view of those who argue that it must be inferior since it appeals to a wider and hence less cultivated audience. (Interestingly, his argument bears comparison with the view that cinema is superior to painting.)

It is true of course that Aristotle's attitude to the audience for theatre, and the arts more generally, is not without an air of disdain, as in his distinction in the Politics between two kinds of spectators, "the one free and educated, and the other a vulgar crowd composed of mechanics, labourers and the like" (1342a 18-20). Moreover, his whole account of performance in the theatre lacks Plato's vivid appreciation of its power and significance. What his comments convey, nonetheless, is a sense of the Athenian audience for tragedy as generally well informed—better informed in some respects than the critics—and capable of appreciating good drama and benefiting from it. This stands in stark contrast with Plato's references to "the tempers and tastes of the motley multitude, whether in painting or music or politics" (Republic 493d), with the theatre crowd portrayed as seeking unrestrained pleasure and caught up in uncontrolled emotion. This contrast embraces, furthermore, entirely different estimates of what good dramatists achieve in their presentation of human action within the bounds of happiness and misery, of how tragic performance is related to a natural delight in works of imitation, and of what typically goes on in the minds and emotions and lives of an audience present, let us say, at a performance of the Oresteia, Antigone, Philoctetes, Trojan Women, or a play by Agathon, or one of the poets of the fourth century praised by Aristotle such as Astydamas or Theodectes. (There were regular revivals of Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides and others in the fourth century, constituting a 'classical' canon; and there is evidence that tragedy remained strong at least to the end of the century.)

The divide with which I am concerned is drawn most sharply around the respective attitudes of the two philosophers to tragedy and the emotions. In Plato's case, this question is linked importantly with a demarcation dispute concerning truth and wisdom; and disputes about territories and boundaries, as we know, are frequently charged with emotion. The fundamental objection in the Republic Book X to the tragic poets and other imitators is that their kind of art corrupts the minds of all who do not have the necessary antidote, the pharmakon, which consists in knowledge of their true nature. Such knowledge is the preserve of the philosopher. It follows that only the philosopher can safely attend
the theatre. The need for an antidote is stressed at the beginning of the discussion (595b). Later, the power of the mimetic poet "to corrupt, with rare exceptions, even the better sort" is remarked on (605c); and at the end, there is the proposal that the undoubted charm of poetry can be overcome only by a counter-charm which will work in the following way: whenever we find ourselves listening to poetry we should engage in a philosophical chant about its dangers (608a).

The corruptive force of poetry lies precisely its power to sway the emotions, especially pity, while impairing reason; specifically it draws us into feelings that men of good sense would reject:

When we listen to some hero in Homer or on the tragic stage moaning over his sorrows in a long tirade, or to a chorus beating their breasts as they chant in a lament, you know how the best of us enjoy giving ourselves up to follow the performance with eager sympathy. The more a poet can move our feelings in this way, the better we think him. And yet when the sorrow is our own, we pride ourselves on being able to bear it quietly like a man, condemning the behaviour we admired in the theatre as womanish. (605c-d)

There are several levels to this argument. In the first place there is the view that the appropriate emotional and moral response to great misfortune, the death of one's child for example, is to bear it with equanimity, not to indulge in a display of sorrow, above all not in the presence of others. Lament, as is said elsewhere in the Republic, "is for women, and not very good women at that, and inferior men" (388a). Secondly, there is the unsupported view that what tragedy effects in its audience, through the mechanism of imaginative sympathy, is precisely the experience of unrestrained emotion, in feelings of grief, pity and fear. The argument moves to a third level in the conviction that those who have been drawn into these emotions in the theatre will respond in the same way when things go wrong in real life; their reason will have become the slave of their passions:

Few are capable of reflecting that what we enjoy in others will inevitably react upon ourselves. For after feeling the emotion of pity there (at the theatre), it is not easy to restrain it in our own sufferings. (606b)

In spite of what is commonly said, the Republic Book X does not say that poets are to be banished tout court from the ideal city. Nor, in spite of the claim that the mimetic artist is "three removes from the king and truth" (597c), does Plato object to mimesis as such. Poetry and music, including mimetic art, will have a full place, but everything depends on their having the appropriate form and imitating the right sort of
behaviour: no flutes allowed, no modes of music other than the Dorian and the Phrygian, and no wringing of hands! The worry that a painting involves illusion—that children seeing a painted ship on a painted ocean might think that they are at the seaside—is readily set aside. Mimetic art is perfectly all right if, for example, it shows a brave man engaged unsuccessfully in warfare or meeting misfortune or death with equanimity (such as Socrates at his trial in the Apology or talking with companions on the day of his death in the Phaedo). The law of the ideal city sets a demanding test for life and for the art which is to imitate life:

The law... declares that it is best to keep quiet as far as possible in calamity and not to chafe and repine, because we cannot know what is really good and evil in such things and it is of no advantage to us to take them hard; and nothing in mortal life is worthy of great concern; and grief will get in the way of taking the necessary measures to cope with the situation. (606c)

It is important to remember that Plato’s argument about an ideal city-state is situated consciously in the historical and cultural context of Athens. From that standpoint, he makes clear that none of the great writers of Greece would escape banishment. Homer must go, and Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, and of course Aristophanes and the writers of comedy who, while being less serious, are no less blameworthy in indulging the different range of emotions associated with buffoonery and impudence (606c). One who goes to too many plays by Aristophanes will be consumed by the spirit of levity!

Plato is not wrong of course in supposing that there are situations in which the expression of emotions runs to excess in the theatre. Nor is he wrong in supposing that music and the other arts carry emotional force and influence behaviour. The difficulty is in understanding why he considers that the poetry and theatre of which he was critical had anything like the deleterious effects attributed to it, either in the immediate experience of the majority of Athenians or in their subsequent behaviour. His argument is presented in the name of reason and measured restraint. But it is driven by deep emotional judgment. Plato’s response to tragedy, as much drama as philosophy at critical points, thus exhibits the very fault with which poetry itself is charged. This response is generated in part, as suggested earlier, by Plato’s general disdain for the social and political order in which the art of tragedy came to be celebrated. Also at stake is a competition for the minds of the young, another domain in which emotions may run high.

That Greek tragedy was a deeply moving experience for actors
and audience is clear. But no less clearly it was essentially a drama of words and action and a theatre of ideas built around the power of stories typically concerned with critical points of conflict in individual, family, and social life (issues of particular relevance in the democracy). In commenting on the calling of the poet, Aristophanes said that “we must indeed say things that are good, because to the young it is the schoolteacher who speaks, but to those who are past puberty it is poets” (Frogs, 1053-55). From an early stage, Athenian dramatists were regularly acknowledged as ‘the teachers of the people’. Tragedy, as Simon Goldhill says, “rapidly entered the formal and informal teaching institutions: it was learnt for performance at symposia, read and studied, and from the fourth century on widely disseminated throughout the Greek world”.

Specifically, one of the significant themes of tragedy concerns the transition of the young male into adult society (as in Philoctetes, the second and third plays of the Oresteia, Oedipus (in a sense), Hippolytus and Bacchae). The focus of Philoctetes in particular is the education of Neoptolemus at the hands of the wily Odysseus. Ephebes, young men on the threshold of public life, were accorded a significant place in the Great Dionysia; and indeed one of the many theories about the origin of tragedy links it with rituals of adolescent initiation. One supposes that the young men at Plato’s Academy would have attended the performances, not least the regular revivals of the plays of Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides, and argued about the issues portrayed, even if they were not among “those who run about to all the Dionysiac festivals... whether in town or country” (475d). For Plato, the head of an institution concerned with preparing the young for public life in a democracy of which he is distrustful, the poet is thus a rival “legislator of the word” (Laws, 858c). A writer of dramatic power, Plato responds by drawing heavily on the emotions in a complex dialectic in which the emotions are portrayed as pitted against reason and truth.

Aristotle’s philosophical writing lacks the dramatic power and emotional force of his teacher. But his teaching in psychology and ethics puts stress on the emotions as an integral part of the psyche and human life along with reason: “the irrational passions are thought not less human than reason is, and therefore also the actions which proceed from anger or appetite are properly human actions” (Nicomachean Ethics, 1111b1-3). The emotions may of course be out of order, failing by defect in some cases or, more commonly, running to excess. Nonetheless the experience of emotion around the poles of pleasure and pain
is central to a worthwhile human life, for the morally mature person is identified as one who experiences pleasure and pain rightly. Specifically, the emotions are accorded a significant cognitive component as incorporating beliefs and judgments about the world around us; this is the basis for an account in which thought and emotion are interdependent and capable of integration, a consideration which is critical, in turn, to his treatment of the tragic emotions of pity and fear.

In the famous definition of tragedy in chapter 6 of the Poetics, pity and fear are cited as the affective response to tragedy, "...with incidents arousing pity and fear, wherewith to accomplish its catharsis of such emotions" (1449b27-9). The first thing of note in the discussion of pity and fear—to which Aristotle turns in chapter 9—is that it is part of a more general treatment of the elements and patterns of tragic plots and what is to be aimed at in the characters of tragedy. Tragedy is "a mimesis not only of a complete action, but also of fearful and pitiful events, which is effected most strongly when events occur unexpectedly but on account of one another" (1452a1-3). Regularly in this context, he speaks of "fearful and pitiful events" in the action of the play rather than of pity and fear as effects on the audience. The force of this, in Halliwell's words, "is to insinuate the close and necessary connection between the tragic emotions and the internal construction of the drama; the capacity to elicit pity and fear is an objective attribute of the poetic material as handled by the playwright". Aristotle points out that fear and pity may well be aroused by the spectacle—masks, costumes, gestures and (probably) the stage setting as a whole. But the emphasis falls on the poet's art. The conjuring up of the emotions depends, in the first place, on the skill of the poet in constructing a coherent plot around events and characters with appropriate language and form; but then it depends no less on the intelligence of the audience to follow what is going on and to respond accordingly.

In tragedy, the emotions are generated precisely in the experience of mimesis. The psychology of the emotions in this context is accompanied by the theses that poetry, and the arts generally, grow out of the human capacity for imitation along with harmony and rhythm; that imitation is natural to human beings from childhood; that to feel pleasure or pain in imitations is not far removed from the same feelings about realities (Politics 1340a23-5); and that delight in imitation is also natural, even when something painful is involved. For this latter consideration, Aristotle offers the explanation that, in the experience of mimesis, one is deriving satisfaction from learning about the world, gathering the meaning of
things (Poetics 1448b4ff). Even if this is not the whole story, Aristotle is on strong ground in holding that, in tragedy, the emotions of pity and fear are closely associated with a cognitive grasp of what is represented and with an enlargement of our understanding, especially in relation to human vulnerability.

The Aristotelian view is that fear and pity are the appropriate response to fearful and pitiful events, in life as well as in art. The arousal of emotion is a proper part of the poet's art. This stands in contrast with the stern law in the Republic that feelings of this kind are not justified, in either sphere, because we can never know whether perceived misfortunes are really misfortunes. So, in Plato's example, a parent should not feel grief at the death of a child because there is no knowing what is really good and bad in these matters. One could argue that this thesis is self-defeating as an attempt to escape the conditions for tragedy. For if it is correct, it is our misfortune not to be able to rely on our judgments about misfortune and to have to live with the uncertainty of never knowing what is really good and bad in the events that befall us.

The fundamental objection to the tragic emotions in the Republic rests on a strong thesis about the effects of art on life: feeling pleasure and abandoning ourselves in sympathetic response to the mimesis of grief in the theatre leads to similar loss of control in life. Aristotle's response to this alarmist picture of what happens in the theatre is indicated in part in what he says about the cognitive—and ethical—dimensions of emotion. His brief and enigmatic remark about the "catharsis of such emotions" in the definition of tragedy is also, almost certainly, relevant to this topic. What is meant by "catharsis" in this context has been notoriously subject to dispute. But there is good reason to suppose that Aristotle put it forward in opposition to the Platonist image of the tragic emotions running out of control. Where Plato speaks of "feeding fat the emotion of pity" at the tragic theatre, Aristotle talks of its catharsis of the emotions. What did he mean?

An adequate discussion of the topic would involve reference to a complex background in Greek medicine and religious ritual, Pythagorean ideas about the cathartic role of music, and specifically Aristotle's references to catharsis elsewhere, notably in the Politics Book VIII where he is dealing with the role of music in developing emotional sensibilities and contributing to the acquisition of virtue. That is a large task, not to be undertaken here. But in the context of Aristotle's general account of the emotions and of mimetic experience, in tragedy in particular, there is no basis for the view that catharsis means something like the clearing
out of overcharged feelings: the Platonist view that an excess of feeling is typical of the experience of tragedy is not conceded in the first place; in any case, that view cannot account for the inclusion of “catharsis” in the definition. The best clue, as Stephen Halliwell argues, is to associate dramatic catharsis in the Poetics with the process attributed to music in the Politics. This suggests that tragic katharsis in some sense conduces to the ethical alignment between the emotions and reason: because tragedy arouses pity and fear by appropriate means, it does not, as Plato alleged, “water” or feed the emotions, but tends to harmonise them with our perceptions and judgments of the world.\(^5\)

Tragedy arouses pity and fear, and in a way that enriches our understanding of their place in human life.

Plato consistently presents philosophy and tragedy as rivals in a competition in which there is room for only one point of view. In its most bizarre expression in the Laws, the rivalry is placed in the domain of politics as poetry, in which the envisaged state is a mimesis of the best and noblest life conceived as the very truth of tragedy: “You [the tragic poets] are poets, and we also are poets in the same style, rival artists and rival actors, and that in the finest of all dramas, one which indeed can be produced only by a code of true law” (817b). In this world of opposition the poets may be accorded a chorus only if they speak the language of philosophy and conform to the philosophers’ law.

Aristotle is at one with Plato in thinking of philosophy as the arbiter of knowledge and wisdom. But in place of an original opposition between philosophy and poetry he invokes the idea of a shared nature. For he holds that poetry, dealing with what might happen, with what is possible, with what is universal rather than particular in human experience, is itself broadly philosophical in character. Aristotle recognises and pays tribute to the specific skills of the poet’s art and he finds in tragedy a distinct source of knowledge and wisdom, in which the emotions are centrally involved. This was a judgment that Plato, in certain of his writings at least, rejected with an excess of emotion.

NOTES
1 References to Plato are taken from The Dialogues of Plato, translated by B. Jowett (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1931), cited in the body of the text in the form standardly used in editions of the dialogues.