AESTHETIC PERCEPTION OF NATURE OR, ON THE INTRIGUING ASPECTS OF NATURAL BEAUTY

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I. THE VANISHING OF NATURAL BEAUTY

It is interesting how few contemporary texts on aesthetics concern themselves with questions related to natural objects, with 'nature'. Natural beauty has somehow vanished from aesthetics, although for Kant it was the main subject of inquiry. Pure aesthetic judgement is in fact possible only about objects of nature, *pulchritudo vaga*, free beauty, almost exclusively includes examples of natural objects. Kant expressly puts natural beauty above artistic beauty, and only in the case of natural beauty can we talk about an aesthetic object in material form: "A natural beauty is a beautiful thing; artistic beauty is a beautiful presentation of a thing". Feelings of sublime magnificence arising through reflection on one's ideas comes about almost exclusively through the perception of natural phenomena (the roar of the ocean, storms etc.).

How is it that aesthetic theory has with time (almost) lost its interest in the question of natural beauty? The explanation is complex and rather problematic, and I am aware that for the sake of greater contrast I am allowing for some simplifications. As Adorno aptly remarks:

Natural beauty, which was still the occasion of the most penetrating insights in the *Critique of Judgement*, is now scarcely even a topic of theory. The reason for this is not that natural beauty was dialectically transcended, both negated and maintained on a higher plane, as Hegel’s theory had propounded, but, rather, that it was repressed.

This suppression, this vanishing, to which I shall return later, is even more interesting thanks to the fact that in modernity, artistic beauty, the main focus of aesthetics, was in to a great degree shaped by natural beauty. Experience with natural beauty in modernity is vital for the understanding of art and is in fact the ultimate foundation of one’s aesthetic views. In fact, both sides—nature and art—refer to each other. As Adorno puts it in his own words,
As pure antitheses, however, each refers to the other: nature to the experience of a mediated and objectified world, the artwork to nature as the mediated plenipotentiary of immediacy. Therefore reflection on natural beauty is irrevocably requisite to the theory of art.\(^6\)

Kant deals with the relationship between works of art and nature on several occasions:

In "dealing with" a product of fine art we must become conscious that it is art rather than nature, and yet the purposiveness in its form must seem as free from all constraint of chosen rules as if it were a product of mere nature.\(^7\)

At the same time, admiration is aroused by nature, "which in its beautiful products displays itself as art".\(^8\) Similarly, Schiller says: "Nature's work is beautiful when it appears free in its artistic character".\(^9\) Even Hegel derives art from its historical development, "from the inadequacy of nature"; for him artistic beauty is in the negation of the natural,\(^10\) that is to say, "natural beauty gains legitimacy only by its decline, in such a way that its deficiency becomes the raison d'ètre of art beauty".\(^12\)

There is yet another angle from which there is something paradoxical in the approach towards natural beauty. When a person today seeks what could be referred to as the 'beautiful' or 'beauty', they are more likely to head for nature (or what can be considered as such in our civilised landscape), or maybe to a gallery with old art, but seldom to a modern art gallery.

Unlike art of previous eras, 20th-century art does not strive for the creation of a 'beautiful' work. Artists have avoided this term since at least Picasso's Avignon 'desmoiselles': they are disgusted not only by theoretical reflection on art per se but also by the internal development of art itself. The point is no longer to depict something beautiful or 'beauty' as such. It is no coincidence that aesthetics tends to talk about 'art' and about aesthetic function and value rather than beauty (and if it does, then only within a historical context). Nevertheless, is it not a pity for aesthetics that by focusing on art it loses its original focus (i.e. 'beauty' and nature) from its scope?

II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE CHANGING PERCEPTION OF THE AESTHETIC ASPECTS OF NATURE, OR THE AESTHETISATION OF NATURE

The search for beauty in nature is not only typical in contemporary people; it is specific to people of the modern age (and several other civilisations). Let us look briefly at the historical development of aesthetic interest in nature, or even better, in landscape.
Antiquity had no such notion—especially the Greeks, who only liked a few particular natural objects (horses and birds, for example), but definitely were not attracted by landscape (not even flowers enjoyed much attention). More interest can be found in the Hellenic age, when the development of large urban centres brought with it interest in the aesthetic aspects of nature. The Romans, probably due to the value placed on agriculture, had a special fondness for the cultural landscape, if only in a very limited scope and mainly among poets (we also find then the first attempts at landscape painting). Only traces of theoretical reflection can be found—among the Stoics for example we find several attempts at an almost-biological reasoning for natural beauty.

In the Middle Ages we find a few scholars who are enthusiastic about natural objects such as flowers or birds or places (a valley, for example, or a traditional classical topos of a beautiful location—locus amoenus), but never complete landscape complexes.

The sense for natural beauty begins its gradual development during the Renaissance (which can be seen in the emergence of more natural backgrounds in paintings), along with the development of interest in the theoretical study of nature. Columbus’s diaries, although in principle ‘medieval’, include interesting descriptions of nature. These are completely modern descriptions of nature’s beauty, in which the pleasure is autonomous, unrelated to personal benefit or the goodness or God.

The first ascents of mountains for sheer pleasure, something absolutely unheard of in Antiquity or the Middle Ages, also date to the Renaissance (for example, Konrad Gessner in the mid-sixteenth century). Petrarca’s memorable and absolutely unique ascent of Mont Ventosus in 1337 is accompanied by theological-philosophical reflections and is not a record of aesthetic pleasure.

In the seventeenth century, great interest in nature is found among the English (Shaftesbury and his followers have the lion’s share of the discovery of wilderness towards the end of the century) and the Dutch (landscape painting). The question is, what was the impetus for this aesthetic interest in nature? In these cases, the new interest in natural phenomena directed by science almost certainly blends with Protestant sensibilities. Isn’t nature here a mere substitute for the saints to whom God used to ‘delegate’ his power and who are now replaced by the landscape and by a ‘nature’ upon which beauty is projected as an attribute of God? This combination of the aesthetisation of nature with religion, which replaces the invisible, abstract God of the Prot-
estants with visible trees and grass is evident both in Shaftesbury and, later, Rousseau. For Rousseau, awareness of the beauty of nature is a substitute for prayer15 (and God is more likely to be found in wilderness than in a geometric, man-made park). As for the Dutch painters, the end of possibilities for painting saints or women’s nudes or semi-nudes led to the search for new themes and the development of sensitivity for countryside in landscape or seascape paintings or for the fine sensual pleasures of still-lifes. Another impulse for interest in nature was certainly the development of urban centres (as during the Hellenic age) and therefore a need to balance the urban lifestyle, as with Rousseau.

There gradually evolved a sense for hitherto rejected scenes such as mountains and forests, which until then had been considered hideous and incomparable to plains. We find the first admirers of mountains: although Shaftesbury travelled to the Alps as early as the late seventeenth century, the first to travel into the ‘heart’ of the mountains are Windham and Pococke, while seeking picturesque and “scary beauty” in Chamonix in 1741. Scientists especially lead the aesthetisation of mountains such as the Alps. In fact, Kant relies on passages by the geologist de Saussure for his descriptions of mountains and glaciers in his Critique of Judgement (which is of course influenced by Rousseau’s admiration of wilderness).

How then did natural beauty come to be ‘excluded’ from theory? Adorno offers a very reasonable explanation that has its roots outside aesthetics itself:

Natural beauty vanished from aesthetics as a result of the burgeoning domination of the concept of freedom and human dignity, which was inaugurated by Kant and then rigorously transplanted into aesthetics by Schiller and Hegel; in accord with this concept nothing in the world is worthy of attention except that for which the autonomous subject has itself to thank.16

In his opinion, the caesura is Schiller’s Treatise on Grace and Dignity. I believe, however, that Schiller already deals with the question of freedom and a new definition of ‘beauty’ in his Papers on Beauty (both works 1793)—"a natural thing is beautiful where it appears free". Unlike the Papers on Beauty, the Treatise on Grace and Dignity is rather an expansion on the theme and applies mainly to man and nature. In fact, nature—because of its pre-determined state—here often serves as an antithesis to art.

According to Adorno, the changes caused by ‘idealism’ had the strongest negative impact on aesthetics, and art in general. He is not afraid to
use rough language: "Perhaps nowhere else is the desiccation of everything not totally ruled by the subject more apparent, nowhere else is the dark shadow of 'idealism' more obvious, than in aesthetics", and he even talks about the terror of 'idealism'. In Adorno's opinion, the last blow to natural beauty was inflicted by Hegel, who felt that only artistic beauty fitted the idea of 'beauty itself' and who placed artistic beauty above natural beauty since art is beauty born from spirit. Aesthetics, according to Hegel, were therefore the study of beauty only in art.

According to Adorno, Hegel's philosophy of beauty is flawed, because the thing Hegel considers a weakness of natural beauty—the fact that it eludes solid definition—is the very substance of beauty. Put another way, Hegel takes what Kant considered a virtue and knocks it down. As a result, Adorno says, natural beauty begins to wane along with the collapse of the philosophy of nature—Naturphilosophie.

Adorno's account applies to theoretical philosophy-aesthetics, but can we extend it to other theoretical reflections on nature or the perception of aesthetic objects by people in the nineteenth century? Apparently not, as that century's hackneyed expression "nature cult" attests. Not only did aesthetic perception of nature and 'natural beauty' not disappear, but it actually continued to grow, undergoing massive development, refinement and cultivation (this does not apply so much to the 20th century).

This time, however, philosophy was not the driving force, as it had been for Rousseau's and Kant's followers. The main inspiration for the aesthetisation of nature now becomes the natural sciences. These blended with art, or were inspirations for each other—first literature, then (landscape) painting. Landscape painting was closely connected with art criticism, which strongly reflected issues of the aesthetic perception of nature and thus tried to define what the philosophical aesthetics missed.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century we see an evident connection between the perception of the aesthetic dimension of nature and the philosophy of nature, an aesthetising Romantic science. (Adorno only states further that "...under the pressure of developments in painting the definition of natural beauty has been transformed".)

This Romantic era (and the first truly large-scale outings into nature to enjoy its beauty) was followed by various tendencies representing an astonishing blend of scientific and artistic approaches to nature. Along with the coming of positivist science we find the arrival of artistic realism, which found particular resonance in science and talked only of
facts, the detailed study and analysis of natural phenomena. The word 'imagination', so typical for the Romantics, became redundant—or more precisely, its meaning changed completely. For Courbet, it either signifies the "ability to find the most complete expression for an existing thing" or else he rejects the notion altogether. He also refuses to romanticise reality and insists on painting only what he sees. Scientific perception, becomes a model, or at least an important support, for the aesthetic perception of nature.

This trend brought a great sense for detail into the aesthetic perception of nature, plus a sense for simple natural phenomena and scenes, and brought down to earth the exalted Romantic visions. The focus shifts towards nature and landscape itself rather than the human psyche.

On the path towards Impressionism, the efforts to define 'fact' and 'reality' by means of painting brought about the self-destruction of the hitherto positivist perception of 'reality'. The attempt to capture 'fact' necessarily led to redefining fact as 'perception' and to attempts at capturing its ephemeral quality and fleetingness. This development represents a giant leap in the changing perception of nature. Suddenly the fleetingness of natural phenomena, their changeability, and the importance of light began to be perceived. As Proust puts it, the perception of nature changed with Renoir.

We can find similar parallels in science: firstly, in the questioning of the positivist approach, and secondly in physics as it shifted from concepts of matter to those of energy. At the same time, Europeans began to discover Far Eastern ways of thought.

In Central Europe, where the influence of impressionism was not as strong, the concept of a neo-Romantic landscape of 'atmosphere' came into existence. In his conclusive paper of 1893, art critic Alois Riegl calls the idea of atmosphere the central aspect of modern art. Significantly, he begins his text with a description of the enchanted stillness and feelings of essential harmony that overwhelmed him while looking down from an alpine peak.

Art critique now begins, sometimes using concepts borrowed from the natural sciences, to actually redefine and expand on the aesthetic attitude towards natural objects. In Riegl's opinion the basic elements of 'atmosphere'—peacefulness and a wide view—lie in contrast to concepts of the struggle for survival and a close-up view.

It is interesting that 'philosophical' aesthetics remained separate, or
nourished theoretical reflection and especially its aesthetic perception of nature from completely deformed, unexpected or absurd sources. There is for example Modersohn's description of the Worpswede landscape as a Kantian thing in and of itself.

It is significant that when aesthetics found inspiration in nature, it is so absorbed in its admiration of the methods and theories of natural science that it neglects the actual questions of aesthetics—not only in the case of 'experimental' aesthetics trying to copy the exactness of the natural sciences.

At the end of the century, new developments in art and science lead once again to a different view of nature. Now the focus is on biology—the influence of Darwinian theory decreases and we see increased interest in various forms of vitalism (Driesch), which coincides with the beginnings of Art Nouveau. This approach was often espoused by university graduates of biology who were disgusted by Darwinism and preferred botany, the field most opposed to Darwinism. Both science and art were seeking the life energy, the 'élan vital'—the elemental force or cosmic principle (van de Velde—the so-called "Belgian line"—is a record of this force).

III. OTHER QUESTIONS REGARDING THE AESTHETISATION OF NATURE

Aesthetic questions regarding natural beauty are not only interesting from a historical perspective; they present numerous other questions related to both the fundamental terms of aesthetics and the basic understanding of art and culture.

Merely defining natural beauty requires us to place nature and civilisation (or more precisely, natural beauty and technology) in opposition to each other. Historically speaking, admiration of (and aesthetic interest in) nature first developed in towns (as early as the Hellenic age). In villages we will don't see anything similar until much later. Even today, there are cases of indigenous peoples who, when they want to make their surroundings look 'special', they decorate the forest (which they find aesthetically unappealing) with cans or bags of soup they have received from travellers. Deep into the nineteenth century, European villagers considered forests and mountains 'ugly' and in fact were not aware of the concept of 'landscape'.

Adorno rightfully points out that the crude antithesis of technique and nature does not hold up. After all, what Europeans consider to be aesthetic landscapes are actually ancient cultural landscapes. A genuinely original forest is something totally different from our forests,
which more resemble rubber plantations, which is basically what they are—plantations. In fact, writes Adorno, it is precisely nature unmediated by human activity and untouched by human hands, such as the Alps' moraines and rockpiles (which often remind people of industrial heaps), that does not fit socially-accepted definitions of aesthetic beauty.\(^{27}\)

Another example from my own experience in a tropical (Malaysia) forest: A European on his first visit to a rainforest (the ultimate 'wilderness') may actually doubt the aesthetic value of the experience. From the outside, nothing looks less interesting, as countless travellers will agree. And inside? Total chaos; a dark tangle of branches, leaves, vines etc. Most consternating of all is the sound. There is no birdsong of a European quality; instead the sounds remind our traveller of industrial noises—he 'hears' a sawmill, a dentist's drill, a mobile phone, a motorway, an ambulance siren...

His experience is related to a very interesting phenomenon—the complexity of an aesthetic object becomes evident during the perception of nature. Only the inexperienced eye sees a tropical forest or moraine as 'landfill-like'. More careful observation allows individual objects and patterns to show—both in a rainforest and a moraine. Walk through a rainforest for a week or more, and your perception will be very different. You perceive its aesthetic qualities much more strongly. You have learned to see the differences in an undifferentiated background. (Science deepens this differentiation, which is why Darwin recommended studying botany in order to enhance one's aesthetic pleasure of nature.\(^{28}\)) A more significant distinction exists in the perception of natural beauty. When an individual object (flower, bird, rainbow) and an entire landscape are perceived as aesthetic subjects, there is a moment when the background becomes an independent aesthetic subject in and of itself. Civilisation makes this step very late and very slowly, just as with the concept of 'nature' itself. Indigenous people in rainforests have no concept of 'Nature'; they do not even have an expression for it, although people at lower cultural levels do have preferences for particular flowers or animals. Even members of our own culture living outside urban centres made this step very late—some Bohemian villagers did not 'perceive' the landscape until deep into the 20th century.

Another theme emerges in connection with the relationship of nature to civilisation. There is no doubt that the issue of natural beauty is today closely related to environmentalism. Countless arguments for preserving this or that species or ecosystem are not based on practical or ethical reasons, but on aesthetic preferences. For example, preserving
a certain capricorn beetle in a forest is actually quite irrelevant from the perspective of the forest's ecosystem—we often find a single species on one single tree. Arguments for protecting nature based on possible future discoveries for medicine are not too strong, either—much more important is research into already-known species. Even theories about the balance of nature or harmony of natural communities are really just fictions of religious or aesthetic perceptions of nature. 'Nature' thus more resembles a sequence of ongoing catastrophes followed by temporary periods of relative peace. From an aesthetic point of view, it is therefore probably a pity to cause the extinction of something as pretty as a capricorn beetle or to chop down a lovely spinney. (There are, of course, non-aesthetic arguments for environmental protection—the destructive impact of humankind is so large that the world is heading towards environmental disaster.) It is no coincidence that today we speak of 'environmental aesthetics', which is also one of the most significant contemporary academic trends.29

Also interesting is the difference between the perception of natural and artistic beauty. For Kant, pure aesthetic judgement can be made only about natural phenomena. Moreover, unlike judgements of artistic beauty, judgements of natural beauty are have an inherent ethical aspect. In Kant's account, judgements of the beauty of nature also prove certain ethical qualities:

An interest in the beautiful in art... provides no proof whatever that someone's way of thinking is attached to the morally good... On the other hand... a direct interest in the beauty of nature... is always a mark of a good soul.30

Nowadays it is hard to agree with any propositions regarding the purity of aesthetic judgement—we are too aware of the history of the appreciation of nature's aesthetic qualities and of the images and ideas involved. Also, as this paper might imply, the appreciation of the beauty of landscapes requires more cultural experience than the appreciation of art.

Still—culture and ideas serve rather as references towards certain objects in nature (flowers, types of landscape) which catch our attention. When perceiving the natural environment, terms such as perfection, purposefulness or the issue of meaning do not come into play, as they do with the perception of art. To take Kant's example—hardly anyone apart from the botanist knows which organ of a plant serves what purpose, but he pays no attention to this natural purpose when he judges the flower by his taste.31
Different methods must also be used when judging categories of perception in nature and art. For example, although the notions of regularity or symmetry have meaning in judging art, they do not apply to nature (although symmetry does very often occur in nature). According to Kant, precisely such regularity is not liked in nature.\(^3^2\) (Cailllois puts it similarly: true natural beauty is not found in symmetrical roses etc., but in the free patterns of butterfly wings.\(^3^3\)) It is as if perception of natural beauty resists being connected to ideas and commentary (it is for this is reason that art theory is so interesting). Adorno is very sceptical of those who talk about natural beauty: "The 'Oh how beautiful'... disturbs the 'celebration of nature', it is appropriate to the tense concentration vis-a-vis art works, not nature. Its beauty is better known through unconscious apperception".\(^3^4\) Planned visits to popular vantage points are futile: "Nature's eloquence is damaged by the objectivation that is the result of studied observation".\(^3^5\) Natural beauty can best be perceived in solitude—an old idea of Rousseau's.

As Adorno puts it, in nature (unlike in art), we cannot differentiate between beauty and ugliness—"but without such distinction, the concept of natural beauty would be empty".\(^3^6\) With this, Adorno returns to questioning the whole concept of natural beauty. I do not see why this has to be so: we do not necessarily need a pair of terms such as 'beautiful/ugly'; we can use 'beautiful/indifferent'. For that matter, this is also a historical judgement. The Romantics knew and practised a kind of 'landscape critique', as both Alexander von Humboldt and Goethe did—'Let's add a tree here, take one out there.' Or: Milesovka (the Czech mountain) offers the third most beautiful view in the world (Humboldt). Still, one has to admit that people today resist calling natural scenery 'ugly'—it is rather towns and industry that are considered ugly. Cailllois thus reserves the term 'ugly' only for something artificially created (does this mean that the bowerbird's elaborate structure is ugly?).\(^3^7\) Our reluctance to apply negative judgements to natural objects may indicate an insufficient awareness of natural sceneries and a lack of the experience that the Romantics apparently had.

Another question raised by the perception of the aesthetics of nature is the use of terms other than beauty. Here I mean first of all the notion of magnificence. Many experiences from the perception of landscapes (mountains, glaciers, lakes) resist the use of the term 'beautiful'. The concept of sublimity, emphasised in post-modernism, may be more applicable than 'beauty' when analysing natural aesthetics. Plenty of 'classical' authors have analysed feelings of sublimity arising during
the perception of nature, although each in his own way. These include Edmund Burke, but also Kant (although a thing in nature cannot be sublime, the thoughts it evokes in a person may be). Kant in particular points out that an analysis of sublimity is much more complicated than one of beauty. The concept of sublimity is also more closely related to higher ideas spreading into the realm of religiosity.

Some aesthetic terms are used exclusively for landscapes—for example, 'picturesque', which was derived from the Dutch 'Schilderachtig' in the seventeenth century. This concept brings up numerous thoughts related to the influence of art on our aesthetic preferences in perceiving nature.

Another interesting theme related to nature aesthetics is the presence of taste, or more precisely aesthetic judgement, in animals. This theme, suggested by Darwin, was too hastily swept aside, for it offers some very interesting recent findings. The aestheticians' objection that birdsong is something based on instinct and therefore excluded from aesthetic judgement (because all birds in a species have the same song) has turned out to be mistaken. Most birds learn their songs and there are not only among species, but also among regions and individuals. Aestheticians' objections that an animal has no Self and therefore cannot show pleasure also appear to be unjustified. In particular, experiments with sign language have revealed unexpected mental activity. A gorilla, for instance, is able to wonder what will come after death (quiet, peace, darkness).

In one case, during research with a female chimpanzee, Washoe and her group showed that non-humans can make use of symbols. For that matter, chimpanzees also use primitive symbols in their 'wild' state. Gestures expressing 'stop!' or signals for private mating differ from group to group. Anthropologists even talk about different cultures based on different technologies for shaping simple tools. The definition of man as the only animal using symbols no longer applies. Chimpanzees not only use symbols, but also create them and use them for intra-species communication, for constructing simple sentences and even to lie.

The use of symbols is closely related to the possibility, as Darwin thought, of the beginnings of 'art' among animals. Not only do chimpanzees enjoy creating without reward, for the sheer pleasure of it, but they can also tell when a 'picture' is finished, give it a title, and even imitate specific objects, however hard they may be for us identify. But this is a more loosely related issue.
CONCLUSION

I have attempted to summarise some of the more interesting points suggested by issues of natural beauty. In the history of this topic, there is a somewhat hard-to-understand loss of interest in this field of aesthetic inquiry, which had been quite important for many ‘classical’ authors. But this topic is hardly antiquated: natural beauty, unlike most contemporary art, is something that even people today are able to perceive as belonging to the domain of ‘beauty’. There is also an evident need for mutual references between art and nature and between artistic and natural beauty. These are, in fact, two inseparable parts instead of different fields.

Any inquiry into the history of this topic will find plenty of material. Related topics of interest are the (justified?) question of whether the concept of natural beauty is a characteristic of modernity; changing aesthetic preferences (such as changing styles, changing preferences for various types of landscape); and parallels between perception in natural science and aesthetics and their mutual influence.

Also of interest for further research are definitions of various categories and concepts (beauty, sublimity, art, symmetry, aesthetic subject, picturesqueness).

Last but not least there is the question of the relationship of aesthetics and nature, which suggests the possibilities for aesthetic perception in animals, or the beginnings of art and the biological basics for human aesthetic perception. Finally, we as people enjoy wilderness as much as galleries, so why should we not be interested in other aspects of aesthetic theory?

NOTES


3 Kant, Critique of Judgement, p. 166.

4 Kant, Critique of Judgement, p. 312.


6 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p. 62.

7 Kant, Critique of Judgement, p. 173.

8 Kant, Critique of Judgement, p. 168.
9 Friedrich Schiller, Kollas oder über die Schönheit (Stuttgart: Reklam 1999).
11 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p. 76.
16 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p. 62.
17 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p. 62.
18 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p. 62.
19 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p. 76.
20 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p. 72.
21 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p. 72.
23 Wittlich, Umení a zivot, p. 33.
25 Typical Czech examples would be Otakar Hostinský’s attempt, in his paper "Darwin and Drama" (Studie a kritky (Prague: Československý spisovatel, 1974), to apply Darwin’s ‘struggle for survival’ to theatre theory, or some of Josef Durdič’s (1857–1909) writings: Darwin y Kant (Prague: J. Papírek, 1906). Durdíč was the only Czech to meet Darwin in person. Unlike Darwin, these two authors do not cover the question of aesthetic phenomena in nature, but choose instead a simplified theory about the survival of the fittest. (Czech aestheticians’ interest in the problems of the natural sciences is quite intriguing, though. For example, František Matouš Klácel (1808–1889)—Mendel’s colleague at the Brno monastery—performed similar experiments with genetic transmission in the monastery garden, although he did not draw similar conclusions.) This claim may be too strong, since some of Hostinský’s papers on the aesthetic aspects of nature are not at all inspired by science. Nevertheless, the fact remains that any list of Czech Darwinists will include the Czech aestheticians.
26 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p. 68.
27 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p. 68.
30 Kant, Critique of Judgement, p. 165.
31 Kant, Critique of Judgement, p. 76.
32 Kant, Critique of Judgement, p. 93.
34 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p. 69.
35 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p. 69.
36 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p. 70.

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