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INTRODUCTION

Academe has been occupied with Plato’s ontological theories during its historical advancement. Many academics from the very first, Xenokrates to the very last one, Damascius attempt to methodically interpret special points of the Platonic ontology by highlighting the theory concerning metaphysical Forms. As far as the Platonic tradition is concerned, the most systematic annotator of the Athenian philosopher is Proclus (412-485), who undertakes to explain further in most of his works the two ways of the presence of the Forms, the transcendent and the one immanent in the discernible/tangible beings. This investigation is certainly a part of the ulterior target that he, himself, has posed from the very beginning which is to analyze and even spotlight the way in which the metaphysical world produces the ‘physical’ one. He, therefore, indites principles that he implements with consistency so as to bring a theory forward on Forms that are strongly based on a great substructure and inner cohesion.

Proclus’ theory on the Platonic metaphysical «Forms» is strictly placed within the corpus of his principles on intermediates and their archetypical character. According to the Neoplatonic philosopher’s system, the intermediates are defined as being the ontological realities and divine powers that mediate the accomplishment of some functions and the declaration of specific procedures. They are impeded between the supreme ontological principle and cause, namely the ‘One’ (Εν) or the ‘Good’ (Αγαθόν), and the multitude of sensible beings and exactly due to their vast number and the specific mission they have undertaken, contribute to the strict organization and function of the metaphysical as well as the physical world. In other words, the intermediates are divine realities that express with their presence and functions the progressive exit of the One from itself and the gradual specialization
of its productive activity. This act is completed through specific theogonic-triadic procedures or through the procedures that are determined by the number of divine hypostases required for the connection of the metaphysical with the physical world. These procedures are in accordance with the legislative specifications of the triadic dialectic productive schema of ‘remaining’ (μονή) – ‘procession’ (πρόοδος) – ‘reversion’ (επιστροφή)1.

Proclus orders the intermediates according to the ontological and in order precedence of their substance which defines the range of their archetypical character. Thus, not only do they constitute the archetypes of the sensible being but also they operate in the same way in their inner relationship. The hierarchically superior beings are the archetypes of the hierarchically inferior ones. The Neoplatonic philosopher develops his theories on intermediates-archetypes mainly in his work On Plato’s Theology (Περί τῆς κατά Πλάτωνα Θεολογίας) and he relates them with the content of the ontological categories of the second hypothesis of the Platonic dialogue Parmenides (Παρμενίδης). Henads (ενάδες) possess the highest position on the grading scale of the intermediates.

We shall attempt to demonstrate how and for what reasons Proclus places Henads in a superior position from the Platonic Forms. What is really interesting is that he proceeds in this ontological differentiation by claiming that he remains consequently on Plato’s way of thinking.

I. THE PLATONIC SOURCES OF THE THEORY CONCERNING THE HENADS

The prominent theory of Proclus on Henads expresses the philosopher’s inferences that he drew after the systematic critical refutation of his predecessors Neoplatonists’ positions, except those of Syrianos. These positions refer to the ontological problem that arose from the philosophical-theological interpretation of the content and the interrelation of the first two hypotheses of the Platonic dialogue Parmenides. According to Proclus, this problem concerns the structure, content and function of a graded system of intermediary divine ontological classes as well as the type and limits of communication of this system with the superior One. In other words, the problem concerns the ontologically possible and logically acceptable correlations of the One with the produced divine beings. In regard to the theological interpretation of Proclus, the first hypothesis of Parmenides refers to the One while the second
hypothesis concerns the divine beings, which reflect the ontological categories of this hypothesis. The Neoplatonic philosopher based all the possible specifications of his system solutions of this problem on the principles of his theory on Henads. Henads are the productive powers of the One, its participated element for the production of the divine beings.

The philosophical term «Henad» originally appears in plural in the Platonic dialogue *Philebus* (Φίληβος), 15 a6. In this quote, Socrates uses the term ‘Henads’ instead of the term ‘Forms’ to qualify the ultimate and metaphysical genres of beings. It should also be noted that later in this text the term ‘Monads’ (μονάδες) is used in the same sense as Henads and therefore as forms too. In this regard, Plato through the use of these terms attributes a mathematical character to the structure and function of the Forms. The same mathematical pattern that is attributed to the Platonic theory of Forms is used in Proclus’ interpretation of the terms ‘Henad’ and ‘Monad’ in the dialogue Philebus. Proclus, referring more specifically to the aforementioned terms, moves on to the following differentiation between them:

"Ὅθεν καί ὁ ἐν τῷ Φιλήβῳ Σωκράτης ποτέ μέν πρός αὐτό τό ἐν μονάδες, διότι πλῆθος ἐστιν ἐκάστη καί ὄν τι οὖσα καί ζωή καί εἶδος νοερόν· ὡς δέ πρός τά ἀπ’ αὐτῶν παραγόμενα καί τάς σειράς ἅς ὑφεστᾶσιν ἑνάδες· πληθύνεται γάρ τά μετ’ αὐτάς γινόμενα ἀπό ἁμερίστων ἐκείνων."

This dual attribution is not, however, contradictory because as the Forms are called ‘Monads’ on the grounds of their relation to the One whilst the term ‘Henads’ is used when the Forms act as the cause for the production of a graded corpus of inferior to them beings.

According to the writer, it is considered that this construal is a skillful prefiguration of Proclus in order to introduce his readers to his theory on Henads in an indirect but concise manner and justify its necessity. The neoplatonic philosopher notices that, prima facie, this development may cause logical and ontological problems. In an initial approach of the issue, he emphasizes that Plato is the historical – philosophical origin of his theory. In our view, this is due to the fact that Proclus endeavors to demonstrate that the foundation of his theory he on Plato’s philosophical authorities, or, according to his usual method, that he rigidly develops his theory within the context of the platonic orthodoxy. Nevertheless, he presents henads to possess an ontological and qualitative precedence over Forms since he places the former to the hyper essential area while the latter to the essential area:

"Οὐκ άρα ἐπιταράττειν δεῖ τοῖς περὶ τῶν θεῶν λόγοις τούς περὶ τῶν εἰδῶν, οὐδὲ τῶν τῶν μερικῶν εἰδῶν διάκοσιμον εἰς ταύτον συγχεῖν πρός τάς θείας ἑνάδας, άλλα
According to Proclus, in the area of Henads everything is in a cohesive unity based on their organic interrelations, which are determined by their mutual coexistence, while in the area of Forms the specified distinctions have been fulfilled. More specifically, all Henads are immanent in each Henad. This occurs as a result of a particularly powerful unity that is attributed to their direct derivation from their common cause, the One. This immanence can be described in its original status as a cohesive unity and expresses the second One, which is the productive expression of the transcendent One. Further on, this immanence is preserved during the process of the generation of the divine beings gradually incorporating new ontological types according to the contemporary productive level and in line with the principle of ‘everything is immanent in everything maintaining however the unique way of existence’ (πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν οἰκείως δέ ἐν ἑκάστῳ). On the contrary, the element of coexistence is absent from the Forms and their communication is determined by its declining ontological undermining, which is expressed by participation «Πᾶσαι γάρ αἱ ἑνάδες ἐν ἀλλήλαις εἰσί καί ἥνωται πρός ἀλλήλας, καὶ πολλῷ μείζων ἡ ἔνωσις ἐκείνων τῆς ἐν τοῖς οὖσι κοινωνίας καί ταυτότητος... πᾶσαι γάρ εἰσίν ἐν πᾶσαις, ὅ μή ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς εἰςεσει... ταῦτα γάρ μετέχει μὲν ἀλλήλων, πάντα δέ ἐν πᾶσιν οὐκ ἔστιν».

II. THE LEVELS OF THE PRESENCE FORMS THEMSELVES

Proclus places the first appearance of Forms in the third triad of the Being, namely of the first term of his famous triad «Being – Life – Mind» (Ēίναι – Ζωή – Νους). The distinction-division of the Being which is actualized in the third triad results in the development of Forms. Each Form does not belong to the level of ‘the pure and prime Being’ (ἅπλῶς ἢ πρώτως ὄντος) but it is ‘some being’ (τί ὄν), in other words, it constitutes and expresses a part of the specified increased quantity of the prime Being. The Forms, by possessing the quality of increase, can neither be placed in the first triad of the Being – the place in which the unified prime Being is developed – nor in the second triad – where ‘power’ (δύναμις) operates as a distinctive factor, which develops the multitude without being a multitude itself. The Forms are therefore manifested in the field of the third triad, regarding the Being as an occurrence and consisting distinguished beings; with a specified archetypical application.
Proclus bases the ontological precedence of the prime Being over Forms on the principle that the productive cause is above the exemplary. The prime Being is simply and single dimensionally the transcendent cause in the sense that it produces all the following beings providing them exclusively with the quality of existence. Forms, however, are mainly exemplary causes – without insinuating that they are not productive since according to Proclus the attribute/property of production is transferred to all divine beings.17 This implies that the Forms provide their products with their qualities and inner analogies. In other words, Forms, define the specified content of the objects of their archetypical reference by the distinctive function. The provision with qualities and analogies, as transition from the state of simplicity to that of composite reality and from the unified corpus to the one of diversity is indicative of the transition from the non-defined being or ‘self-being’ (αὐτοόν) of the first triad of the Being to the clear definition of becoming (γίγνεσθαι) of the third triad, from substance to quality. This transition expresses also the potentially internal variety of the first Being, which is activated by the archetypical function of Forms: ‘The Forms are called examples of the beings, the Being is the cause of everything but not the example: this is because the examples are the causes for the divided and those whose characters of their essence are different’ (Τὰ μὲν εἴδη παραδείγματα καλεῖται τῶν ὄντων, τὸ δὲ ὁν ἀπὶ τῶν μετ’ αὐτῶν πάντων, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ παράδειγμα· τῶν γὰρ διῃρημένων κατά τὸ εἶναι καὶ διαφόρους τῆς οὐσίας ἐχόντων τοὺς χαρακτήρας αἴτια τά παραδείγματα)18.

The Neoplatonic philosopher states that there are four Forms in the third triad of the Being: those of the gods, the angels, the demons and the mortal animals. These Forms are included in the ‘Self-living’ (Αὐτοζῷον), namely in the term with which Proclus describes the third triad of the Being according to his interpretative principles in the Platonic dialogue Timeus (Τίμαιος)19. The Self-living is the intelligible archetype of the whole reality that is produced after it and up to the sensible beings. It has an ontological precedence over the Creator (Δημιουργός). The Self-living includes only the four general Forms of the worldly reality, whereas the Creator possesses the whole total of the individual Forms20. Thus the Self-living is different from the Creator not only due to its ontological precedence but also on the grounds that it includes only the Forms of the superior genres. On the other hand, the Creator, with his divisive procedures, includes not only the superior Forms but also the Forms of each genre with their specified reference of their archetypical function: «Ὡν γὰρ ἦν μονοειδῶς τὸ νοητὸν ζῶον, ποιητικὸν ἄμα καὶ γεννητικὸν, τούτων ὁ δημιουργός... δημηρημένως ἐκληρώσατο τὴν αἰτίαν»21.
The above issue gives Proclus the opportunity to examine an aspect of the more general ontological question as far as the transition from oneness to multitude is concerned. He notices then, that on the one hand the Forms exist as originally exemplary causes, albeit in an insohible unity in the space of their universal common sense, ie the Self-living, on the other hand, however, that the cause itself. Specialises its results in a following phase of its productive-archetypical quality. This specialisation manifests itself in the productive activity of the self-living, which produces the above mentioned four species of beings ie gods, angels, demons and mortal and, indeed, these conceived as dissimilar and endowed with differentiated ontological specifications.

III. RATIONAL AND ONTOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
THE THEORY ON THE FORMS

Proclus attempts to solve the problem as the basis of on reasonable arguments and on the real content of his theogonies. He stresses that according to his reasonable arguments which all are produced from a common cause do not necessarily have the same name since each one participates in its essence in a qualitative and quantitative manner. The type of participation defines the ontological and nominalistic distinction of each Form-Archetype. Their distinction is manifested as separate from their common cause and thus they obtain their specialized productive-archetypical property towards the order of the beings to whom they will be superior: «EMENTΟΝ ΓΆΡ ΕἸΔΟΣ ἩΓΕΙΤΟ ΣΕΙΡΆΣ ΤΙΝΟΣ ᾽ΔΝΩΘΕΝ ὌΡΧΟΜΕΝΟΝ ΚΑΙ ΜΈΧΡΙ ΤΈΝ ΕΣΧΆΤΩΝ ὍΡΙΣΆΝΟΝ»24. This specialization of Forms, which gradually renders their productive archetypical reference relevant, is progressively maintained through the whole scale of divine beings and thus the latter appear on each divine scale according to the special content of its nature, its functions and its correlations.

The actual answer to the question above is, according to Proclus, based on the theogonic divisive-multiplying procedures that, as it is stated by Proclus, are developed in the third triad of the Being, which corresponds to the multitude in the second hypothesis of Parmenides26: In this triad the «one-being» ( hayatını) produces through its henological level, namely of the one-being, the Form of gods and with its ontological level, namely of the 'being-one', the Form of angels. On the other hand, the 'being-one' (_death) produces with its henological level, namely the one-being, the Form of demons and with its ontological level, namely the Being-One, the
Form of mortals. This production displays a clearly graded metaphysical order, in which the principle of intermediate beings operates, since there is a development of intermediate orders of angels and demons between the marginal orders of gods and mortals. The successive transition from one order to another is consistent with the prime principle of the system of intermediates, which defines the metaphysical continuity of beings. According to the above principle, the principal element of each being is connected with the inferior element of its previous being. This connection is evident on the level of productive progression: «Αἱ τῶν δευτέρων ἑνώσεις οὐκ ἄδηλον ὃτι συνεγγίζουσι τῷ πλήθει καὶ τῇ προόδῳ τῶν ὑπερκειμένων». Thus a union and an exchange of qualities between the two terms is noticed, which is also confirmed by the quote: «ὅτι οὗ μέν τὸ ὄν ἕν τοῦ ὄντος ἐστί μέρος, οὗ δέ τὸ ἐν τῷ ὃντος ἕν, καὶ οὗ μέν ἐστιν ἕνωσις οὐσιώδης, οὗ δέ οὐσία ἕνωσιν οὐσιώδης». The statements above are valid as long as a complete distinction of the Being has been fulfilled and the one and the beings have developed into ‘unified multitude’ (ἑνιαῖον πλῆθος) and «multitude of beings» (πλῆθος ὄντων) multitude of beings respectively.

Our last point for education concerns the reason Proclus believes that the Self-living produces neither more nor less than four Forms. According to his view, the four Forms are consisted of a monad and a triad. This distinction is attributed to the fact that the Forms correspond, mutatis mutandis, to the four superior ontological principles the ‘One’, the ‘Limit’ (πέρας), the ‘Infinitude’ (ἄπειρον) and the ‘Mixture’ (μικτόν). The first Form corresponds to the One, while the following three correspond to the Limit, the Infinitude and the Mixture respectively. The Forms consist of a monad and a triad, because the One, as superior and transcendent principle, is not constructed to the same level as the other three. The hierarchical division that is actualized by the four principles is repeated by the Forms. At the same time, Forms extend to the last manifestations of sensible beings through their productive-archetypical function. Thus, the fourth form «τῇ τοῦ μικτοῦ φύσει προσήκουσαν καὶ θεοὺς ἀπογεννῶσαν τοῦς τὸ τέλος συνέχοντας τῶν ὅλων μονίμως καὶ κρατοῦντας τοῖς ἐσχάτοις καὶ διέσπεισε τὴν τῆς ὅλης ἁμορφίαν καὶ τὴν ἑστίαν τῶν ἐγκοσμίων εἰς ἐν τῷ τῶν αἵρεσις τῶν ἐπικρατεῖται καὶ τὴν τῆς πρωτότητας ἄνων ἑστίας τῶν ὅλων ὑποστάντας καὶ τὴν ἑστίαν τῶν ἑστιὰς αὐτοὶ μονίμως ἀφορίζουσιν». Therefore, it is evident that the third triad of the Being includes all the specifications of the production. It should be pointed out, however, that the production of
sensible beings is not directly accompliced by this triad, since everything within its area exists in a unity and it has not yet acquired its complete prescription. This prescription would be completed when the Forms pass through the remaining levels of the divine beings. At these levels, the Forms will obtain as many elements as they actually need as to create a world with perfect constitution. The details of this process will be thoroughly examined by Proclus in the following three books of this work About Plato’s Theology. «Εἰ γάρ αὐτῇ (sc. τῇ τρίτῃ τριάδι τοῦ Εἶναι) τά πρωτουργά παραδείγματα, δήλον ὡς ἀπ’ αὐτῆς ἡ τῶν δευτέρων ἄρχεται διακόσμησις· καὶ εἰ ζώον ἐστιν ἁπάντων ζῴων ὑποστατικόν, πᾶν μὲν τό ψυχικόν πλάτος, πᾶν δὲ τό σωματικόν ἐντεῦθεν ἔχει τήν πρόοδον, καί περιέχει τῶν τε ζωογονικῶν πάντων διακόσμων καί τῶν δημιουργικῶν τὰς νοητὰς αἰτίας»35.

EPILOGUE

In conclusion, the main thesis that is deduced is that Proclus places the Forms in an inferior level to that which they possess in Plato’s work. The Neoplatonic philosopher interjects the hen ads and the first two triads of the Being between the One-Good and the Platonic Forms. Therefore, it renders Platonic Ontology relevant. This can only be illustrated if it is examined in view of its theological orientations and thus, of the precedence of the One and the hen ads over the Being. More precisely, Proclus, as founder of an era during which Mysticism dominates and rituals are particularly prevalent36 gives a theological orientation to his work and he aims at including Classical Ontology in his Theological Enology so that every ontological grounding is absolutely impossible without its permanent reference to enological preconditions37. In this way, Proclus makes the Being dependent on the One and the hen ads. However, regardless the relegation of Forms, it is beyond doubt that Proclus gives an actual content to them and remains within the orbit of a consistent metaphysical realism. In his work, the Forms as specializations of the ‘Prime Being’ belong to the Metaphysical Ontology and constitute the foundation of Cosmology. By obtaining such features between Enology and the World of Experience these very Forms can of course be called the ‘intermediates’. In often words, the metaphysics of the immanence are at the same time guaranteed and fully secured.
ENDNOTES


2 See *About Plato’s Theology*, III, pp. 5.6-28.21.

3 See op. cit., III, pp. 14.4-9 and 83.20-92.28; *Commentary to Plato’s Parmenides* (Υπόμνημα εις τον Πλάτωνος Παρμενίδην), pp. 1045.6-9 and 1069.6-8; *Elements of Theology*, pr. 116, p. 102.13.


5 See *Philebus*, 15β1-2.

6 It is obvious that this character is embodied within the speculation of the articulated dialectic relation of ‘one’ (ενός) with ‘infinitude’ (άπειρον), which is the main topic of *Philebus*.

7 *Commentary to Plato’s Parmenides*, p. 880.30-38. E. R. Dodds intrigued by the Platonic text seeing it from a historical perspective observes the following: ‘Here ενάδες are simply units or ‘examples of ones’; they are called μονάδες just below. But Proclus (in Parm. 880.30) interprets the passage as referring to the Forms, which are called μονάδες as belonging to the world of Being, but ενάδες in respect of their transcendent unity. Now we learn from Plotinus (VI.vi 9 (II. 408.18) that the Neopythagorean called the Forms ενάδες; and a passage in Theon of Smyrna suggests that these ενάδες were sometimes thought of as co-ordinate with the One. If this is so, Syrianus’ doctrine will on this side be an example of that harking back to pre-Plotinian sources of which we have some evidence elsewhere in later Neoplatonism’ (p. 258). Proclus, *The Elements of Theology*. The same interpretation is repeated by Damascius in the work *Lectures on the Philebus* (Εις τον Πλάτωνος Φίληβον), p. 44.1-3.

8 *Commentary to Plato’s Parmenides*, p. 811.25-31. E. R. Dodds by advocating the principle of ‘immanence’ in combination with the three – aspects of the single reality ‘Being’, ‘Life’ and ‘Intelligence’ observes the following: ‘Are Being, Life and Intelligence to be regarded as three aspects of a single reality or as three successive stages in the unfolding of the cosmos from the One? Proclus characteristically answers that both views are true: they are aspects, for each of them implies the others as cause or as consequent; they are successive, not co-ordinate, for each is predominant (though not to the exclusion of the others) at a certain stage of the πρόοδος. This may be expressed by saying that the triad is mirrored within each of its terms, so that while e.g. the first term has Being as its predominant character, it is at the same time Life and Intelligence sub specie entitatis’ (p. 254). Proclus, *The Elements of Theology*.


11 *Commentary to Plato’s Parmenides*, p. 1048.11-21.

12 See *Elements of Theology*, pr. 101-103, pp. 90.17-92.19. Also W. Beierwaltes, *Proklos, Grundzüge…*, pp. 93-118, P. Hadot, *Porphyre…*, Vol. I, pp. 213-246 und 260-272. Also, according to Proclus, the Being corresponds to the ‘intelligible’ (νοητόν), the Life to the ‘intelligible-intellectual’ (νοητόν-νοερόν) and the Mind to the ‘intellectual’ (νοερόν). See *About Plato’s Theology*, IV, pp. 10.21-23.18. There is a hierarchical gradation among the three terms. The first one is Being, the middle one is
Life and the last one is Mind. This order is set according to their productive-archetypal range. See, *Elements of Theology*, pr. 101, p. 90.17-31.

13 See *About Plato's Theology*, III, p. 51.20-22.
15 See op. cit., III, 86.16-89.2.
16 See op. cit., III, 51.22-27.
17 See *The Elements of Theology*, pr. 25, p. 28.25-27: «Τά μετ’ ἐκείνην (sc. τήν μίαν τῶν ἀρχῶν ἢ τό ἕν) διά τήν τελειότητα τήν ἑαυτῶν ἀλλὰ γεννᾶν ἐπέλεγεν καταδεέστερα τῆς ἑαυτῶν οὐσίας».
18 In the same period (p. 30.9) the transferable quality of production is presented as a product of imitation, since every secondary cause produces One by imitating it.
19 About *Plato's Theology*, III, p. 52.3-5. The distinction between the prime Being and Forms repeats, mutatis mutandis, the distinction between One and Henads. See *Elements of Theology*, pr. 137, pp.120.31–122.6, where One is presented to provide to being the simple existence, while Henads, as its supersubstantial but productive powers, are presented to determine in its ontological bounds, its qualities and its functions. These productive relationships remind us of the Aristotelien distinction: 'first essence – second essence' (πρώτη ουσία – δευτέρα ουσία). See *Categoriae* (Κατηγορίαι), 5, 2a 11-16.
20 See *About Plato's Theology*, III, 52.13-54.20.
22 See op. cit., III, p. 53.18-21.
23 See op. cit., III, pp. 96.24-97.15
24 See op. cit., III, pp. 97.16-98.9.
26 See op. cit., III, p. 98.5-9.
27 According to Proclus, within the bounds of the third triad of Being, one and being are attached with each other with the meditative function of power (δυνάμεως) and as a result the one is given shape: one being (one being – being one) and the being: being-one (one being – being one). See *About Plato's Theology*, III, p. 89.11-18. We should consider that the term ‘one’ defines the henads, while ‘being’ (or the beings indeed) constitutes their productive result. According to Proclus the one and the being are mutually interlaced throughout the second hypothesis of Parmenides and articulate a hierarchically graded theogony. See op. cit., I, pp. 47.2-55.9.
28 H.D. Saffrey and L. G. Westerink (in Proclus... vol. III, p.148) they schematically present this kind of production as follows:

  accordingly to one being → gods
  one beingaccordingly to being one → angels

  accordingly to one being → demons
  being oneaccordingly to being one → mortals
With the term 'Henology' we refer to the theories of One and Henads (or to 'one'), while with the term 'Ontology' to anything that refers to the beings indeed (or to 'being'). About the term 'Henology', see, E. Gilson, L'être et l'essence, Paris 1948, p. 42-48; R. Schürmann, L'hénologie comme dépassement de la métaphysique, Les études philosophiques, 1982 (No 3), pp. 331-350. Both interpreters consider that the term 'Henology' was presented through (or derived from) Plotinus’ thought for the first time and it is being systematically analyzed by them with reference to this text. Their scepticism, briefly, is the following: If the metaphysics deals with the initial situation of beings and their foundations, then Henology, is superior to it provided that it deals with the One. For, One is not only the cause of beings but exceeds all to a great extent. The differentiation between Henology – Metaphysical Ontology is consequently commonplace for the Neo-Platonic Faculty and comes to its climax with Proclus and mainly with Damaskius.

29 About Plato’s Theology, III, p. 99.3-4.
31 See op. cit., III, p. 89.16-17.
32 See op. cit., III, pp. 65.14-66.27.
33 About the ontological principle ‘Limit-Infinitude-Mixture’, see Elements of Theology, pr. 89-96, pp. 82.1-86.7; About Plato’s Theology, III, pp. 30.15-40.8. Also, W. Beierwaltes, Proklos, Grundzüge..., pp. 50-60; J. Trouillard, L’Un et l’âme..., pp. 69-70.
34 About Plato’s Theology, III, o. 66.20-26.