MODERN GREEK STUDIES ASSOCIATION OF AUSTRALIA & NEW ZEALAND (MGSAANZ)

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It was intended that when Newspeak had been adopted once and for all and Oldspeak forgotten, a heretical thought … should be literally unthinkable.

George Orwell

Do you know Cassandra in Aeschylus and Homer? She is one of the world's great figures, and what the Greeks and Agamemnon did to her is symbolic of what mankind has done to her ever since – raped and despoiled and mocked her, to their own ruin. It is not your brain you must trust to, nor your will – but to that fundamental pathetic faculty for receiving the waves that come from the depths of life, and for transferring them to the unreceptive world. It is something which happens below the consciousness, and below the range of the will – it is something which is recognised and frustrated and destroyed.

D. H. Lawrence

Michel Foucault gave a series of lectures at the University of California, Berkeley, in 1983, on the ethical and political implications of parrhesia, or "free speech". Foucault began with a somewhat speculative analysis of the meaning of the word parrhesia, followed by an examination of that term in the plays of Euripides, including: Phoenecian Women, Hippolytus, Bacchae, Electra, Ion and Orestes. It was Foucault's opinion that Euripides problematised parrhesia, and that this problematisation, which I shall describe in more detail presently, made it possible for Western liberals in the late twentieth century to understand better both what he called "the crisis of democratic institutions" and "the care of the self." In this paper I follow Foucault's lead in showing how the problematisation of a communicative act in an Ancient Greek tragedy can illuminate our own current political and ethical circumstances, but instead of focussing on parrhesia, which is hardly even possible in the twenty-first century, I shall focus on the more contemporay problem of ekmarturia, "bearing witness", which is amply illustrated in the dialogue between Cassandra and the chorus in Aeschylus' Agamemnon. I will begin by giving a more detailed account of what Foucault says about parrhesia. Then I will outline the concept of ekmarturia, and finally I will examine the Cassandra scene in the Agamemnon in the light of parrhesia and ekmarturia.
FOUCAULT’S ACCOUNT OF PARRHESIA

a) the word parrhesia

Parrhesia, a compound term composed of the words pan and rhesis is, literally, speech about anything and everything. Because the content of parrhesiastic utterance is not in any way restricted, it is in that sense “free” speech. Foucault infers a slightly different sense from the etymology. For him, the parrhesiates “says everything on his mind”, i.e. he does not conceal anything. The term parrhesia can have a pejorative use. It sometimes refers to careless, reckless, or licentious speech. More commonly, however, the term has a positive connotation: Parrhesia was the civic virtue most widely boasted of by Periclean Athens.

b) ethical implications of the term

Taken in its positive connotation, the term parrhesia implies a set of ethical conditions, including: frankness, truth, danger, criticism and duty or conscience, and it is this set of ethical conditions that occupies much of Foucault’s discussion.

FRANKNESS

Foucault says that “[i]n parrhesia the speaker is supposed to give a complete and accurate account of what he has in mind so that the audience is able to comprehend exactly what the speaker thinks.” The condition of frankness requires disclosure, not just of one’s opinion, but one’s commitment to that opinion: “in parrhesia the speaker makes it manifestly clear and obvious that what he says is his own opinion.” Foucault thinks that this means that the speaker is “himself the subject of the opinion to which he refers”; but this is slightly misleading. The parrhesiates is both frank and earnest. The opinion need not be about him; he is only the subject of it in the sense that he has put his own character on the line. His frankness involves his character in his utterances. For example, when, in his famous “I have a Dream” speech, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. addressed the United States about the injustice of segregation, he spoke frankly and openly about the effect of ghettos on urban blacks, the effect of double standards in education, in employment opportunities, in federal and state services, in private business. He did not spare anything, and in that sense alone his speech was parrhesiastic. But he met the further condition of the parrhesiates, not because the things about which he spoke directly concerned him as an African American, but because he earnestly placed his own character before the public in his speech as indication or proof of his opinions. This aspect of parrhesia involves a connection to truth.
TRUTH

Parrhesia is thought to imply truth in connection with frankness. Foucault points out that *parrhesiazesthai* means “to tell the truth”11, but we would probably say this means “to speak sincerely, to say what one believes to be true”. Foucault thinks that the Greeks did not have a distinction between what the *parrhesiastes* thinks is true and what is true: “when someone has certain moral qualities [sc. the qualities of a *parrhesiastes*] then that is the proof that he has access to the truth and vice versa.”12 We can find support for this view in the attitude expressed towards the poets and sages (οἱ σοφοὶ), and perhaps even in the philosophers – Socrates in the *Apology* thinks that his own character provides evidence of the truth of his testimony, and Aristotle’s *phronimos* or *spoudaios* is the one who has correct judgements about ethical matters. But we don’t need to take this point as strongly as Foucault does and commit the Greeks to a subjective condition of truth. What is interesting here is just that *parrhesia* commits a speaker to being sure that he is right. There is more than just sincerity in this, there is epistemological commitment, but it is not clear whether there are any definite standards in *parrhesia* for this commitment.

DANGER AND CRITICISM

Parrhesia always involves an element of danger to the speaker. It is not simply a matter of speaking the truth, as well as one has been able to determine it, frankly and sincerely. I think I’m doing that right now, but my communication here is not *parrhesiastic*. It must be the case that the opinions expressed are in some way critical, perhaps even provocative or untoward. The danger in *parrhesia* stems from the critical stance one takes towards one’s interlocutor, and from the uncertain position of power one has with respect to one’s interlocutor.13 Foucault thinks that *parrhesia* requires an asymmetrical power relation, in which the *parrhesiastes* is in an inferior role, but I don’t think that this is necessary. When the power relation is uncertain, and speech might have influence in one direction or another, then even the speech of the *superior* can be *parrhesiastic*.14 But when the power relation is fixed and speech has no influence, then even the critical, open, candid speech of the inferior is not *parrhesiastic*. In the face of the contempt of a superior15 such speech is, I think, better described as a specific form of *ekmarturia*, viz. pro-test.

DUTY OR CONSCIENCE

The final condition of *parrhesia* is described by Foucault as duty, but I think it is more appropriate to describe it as conscience. Foucault points out that the *parrhesiastes* is free to
speak or not; he is compelled by neither court nor king, neither family nor friends. What compels him is a sense of duty. But philosophers since Kant have understood duty in a special way, as excluding the consequences of one's action from the realm of motivation. I don't think this is the case with the parrhesiastes. He does not use parrhesia simply because truth commands it, or because moral duty commands it, but especially because it is necessary to speak so if the goals to which he is committed are to be accomplished. In all the plays of Euripides that Foucault examines, the goal of the parrhesiastes is to influence an outcome through speech. What I want to maintain here is that the speaker's commitment to this outcome is conscientious, not that he speaks from a sense of duty. It is not in parrhesia but rather in ekmarturia that a sense of duty or some similarly irrational compulsion plays a role. For in ekmarturia the speaker has nothing to gain from her speech.

These conditions: frankness, truth, danger, criticism, and duty or conscience, all have analogues in ekmarturia, as we shall see.

c) political and moral conclusions

For Foucault the political dimension of parrhesia is found in the conditions of danger/criticism, and in the uncertain power relation between parrhesiastes and interlocutor. The value of parrhesia as a political virtue can be located in the civic accomplishments that result from it. The moral dimension of parrhesia is found in the conditions of frankness, truth, and duty/conscience. These conditions go to the character of the parrhesiastes, as well as their direct familial and social relationships.

I don't wish to recount here Foucault's examination of parrhesia in the works of Euripides – I have abstracted from what he says for the sake of this summary, and whether he got Euripides right isn't our concern – except for one thing. In the first lecture Foucault acknowledges that “the oppressed role of women in Greek Society generally deprived them of the use of parrhesia (along with aliens, slaves and children)”. Yet in the second lecture, when analysing the Electra, Foucault argues that “Electra – who is in the situation of a slave [sc. with respect to Clytemnestra], who plays the role of a slave in this scene, who can no longer live in her father's house under her father's protection, and who addresses her mother just as a servant would address the queen – Electra needs the right of parrhesia.” Thus, Electra demands parrhesia and is granted it by Clytemnestra.

Now this is interesting, because Cassandra will be in a similar situation with respect to Clytemnestra, but she will not claim the right, or beg for it. She knows it will do her no good. And that is important for me, because I don't just want to adopt a method that is analogous to Foucault's, substituting ekmarturia for parrhesia. Rather, I want to show...
that where parrhesia is absent or impossible, ekmarturia fills the available ethical space. But let us proceed by steps and examine the concept of ekmarturia more or less as we did for parrhesia.

EKMaRtURIA

a) the meaning of ekmarturia

At a pivotal moment in the Agamemnon, Cassandra calls out to the coryphaeus: “Bear witness, you, under oath / that the ancient sins of this house I know” (ἐκμαρτύρησον προμόσας τὸ μ εἰδέναι λόγα παλαίας τας γεννήματα δόμων, 1196–7). The concept of ekmarturia, I shall maintain, is fundamental to the understanding of the Cassandra scene, and indeed to the understanding of the Agamemnon. Like parrhesia, ekmarturia is a form of communication which has both political and moral implications. But unlike parrhesia, ekmarturia takes place in a context where influence is impossible.

I use the term ekmarturia as a shorthand way of describing the ethical significance of Cassandra’s communication in the Agamemnon, nevertheless we may find something interesting in an examination of the word. The abstract noun ekmarturia is an extremely rare word, and occurs only in the Attic orators, in connection with the legal practice of taking a deposition of a witness who is unable to appear in court. Cassandra does not use the noun, but an imperative form of the verb ekmartureo which LSJ defines as “to bear witness to a thing.” To judge from the dictionary, one would have to say that the prefix, ek-, is either insignificant, or it is taken as though it were merely a preposition of occasion, the English prepositional phrase “to a thing” pointing to the occasion of witnessing. That, at any rate, is the only difference in LSJ between martureo (to bear witness) and ek-martureo (to bear witness to).

I suspect there is more to be said about this. The verb martureo and its cognates are extremely common in Greek, but the verb ekmartureo is by comparison quite rare. It does not occur at all in Homer or the Homerica, it doesn’t occur in any of the tragedians other than Aeschylus, it doesn’t occur in Plato and it occurs only once in Aristotle, in the Constitution of Athens. It stands to reason, then, that when an author uses the term ekmartureo he is expecting the prefix to do some work.

Of course, the work it might be doing need not be semantic; it could be used for the sake of meter for example (though no edition that I’m aware of suggests this). It may do different work for different authors in different contexts (as I think it does for Aristotle and Aeschylus). But I think our hypothesis should be first to seek some work for it to do, and only if we fail at that to treat martureo and ekmartureo as equivalent.
In composite words, the prefix ek- generally has the meaning “out, away, off, also: utterly.” It is clear, for example, that in the technical legal term ek-marturia the prefix means “out” – an ekmarturia is a deposition taken out of court. But it is unlikely that Cassandra is appealing to this application of the term, and I follow Blass in the view that in the Agamemnon, the prefix in ekmartureo has a strengthening function, so that where martureo means “to bear witness”, ek-matureo means “utterly bear witness to” i.e. to witnessing wholeheartedly and with complete personal commitment. This strengthening function of the prefix is awkwardly expressed in English; it would normally be left untranslated.

Because the significance of the prefix is not clear, I won’t hang anything on it. I will still continue to use the term, however, to mark the special conditions of witnessing that the Cassandra scene involves. I would like to stress, furthermore, how important the basic idea of witnessing is to the Cassandra scene, since she uses the term martur on three other occasions:

1. 1095, marturioisi: here, referring to the ghosts of Thyestes’ children, she says: “by these witnesses I am convinced” (sc. of the crimes of Atreus, 1090)

2. 1184, martureitei: here, as she begins the plain-spoken portion of her prophecy, Cassandra urges the chorus: “Witness with me! Sniff out the track of evils begun so long ago.”

3. 1317, martureitei: here, in her last or next to last speech, Cassandra calls on the chorus: “but witness this when I’ve died – a woman shall die in answer to this woman’s death, and a man shall fall in answer to this man” (i.e. Agamemnon).

Let us say, then, that ekmarturia means “a bearing witness to”. Still, it is clear that in placing her demand on the chorus, Cassandra does more than just bear witness herself to past, present and future events. In ekmarturia, the person who bears witness calls on others to witness as well what she is saying. They cannot understand. They may not want to understand. But unlike parrhesia, the aim of ekmarturía is not that they should be enlightened, but merely that they should not be able to deny what they have seen.

b) ethical implicatons of ekmarturia

Ekmarturia implies a set of ethical conditions, including: candour, knowledge, suffering, and compulsion.
candour
Like the parrhesiastes the ekmartus does not conceal. But unlike the parrhesiastes she does
not put her character on the line as a proof of honesty – she is candid because she cannot
be otherwise. She herself is witness. Thus, for example, even the presence of the silent
Cassandra outside the house of Agamemnon is an ekmarturion. The difficulty of commu-
nication for the ekmartus does not even lie in any inherent obscurity of her expression.
The ekmartus bears witness to what Michael Ewans called “the hidden present,”50 that
which is obscure precisely because it is so immediate. In the Agamemnon, for example,
the chorus has little difficulty understanding Cassandra’s visions of the past, but they are
so blinded by the immediate present that they cannot even fit this understanding to the
context of concern. Thus, although the exact application of her words will not be able to
be understood, the ekmartus is completely candid: the phenomenon to be witnessed is fully
present in her, only its significance is absent.

knowledge
The ekmartus has knowledge through having seen (she is literally a wit-ness). But the
ekmartus is really indifferent to epistemological commitment. Perhaps she would like not
to tell the truth – but she cannot help it. Moreover, unlike parrhesia, there is no question
of, or need for the ekmartus to be certain of what she sees. Ekmarturia is not so much a
cognitive as an affective state. The knowledge of the ekmartus is genuine, but it is, as
Gilbert Murray so aptly described it, “that knowledge which is the crown of sorrow; the
knowledge that sees and warns and cannot help.”50 The knowledge of the ekmartus is thus
closely related to her suffering.

suffering
The ekmartus may not be able to communicate meaning to others, but she can
communicate feeling, which is the beginning of meaning. What she feels she can make
others feel; her suffering is thus a suffering unto truth.51 Because she suffers under the
truth, we may say that the ekmartus shows incredible strength of character (as Cassandra
does), and indeed her suffering is further augmented by the fact she lacks the power of
influence. In this way the set of power relations that involve the ekmartus is quite dif-
ferent from the parrhesiastes. Whereas the parrhesiastes is characteristically a free male
democratic citizen, the ekmartus is typically an alien, a refugee, a slave, or a woman. The
suffering of the ekmartus is analogous to the danger of the parrhesiastes, but whereas the
parrhesiastes is endangered by the effect of what he says on others, the ekmartus suffers just
because she is a witness. Even if her witnessing should endanger her further, the danger is
insignificant compared with the suffering she undergoes as witness.
compulsion and burden

The ekmartus doesn’t bear witness from a sense of duty, or even necessarily from conscience. If I may adapt the words of D. H. Lawrence, ekmarturia stems from a compulsion that lies “below the conscience”, it is unavoidable, inescapable, visceral; it cannot be silenced since, unlike speech, it is stained in the soul of the ekmartus. Even after Cassandra abandons Troy and Apollo, she cannot abandon the burden of her timeless memory. That is the “horrible pain of prophecy” (1215), the fire that consumes (1256).

Ultimately, the compulsion of the ekmartus is transferred, through her witnessing, to those who hear her speech, for whom it becomes a different kind of burden, viz. responsibility. The ekmartus is thus a medium for those who will someday, when perspective and power are finally attained, truly and articulately bear witness to what she has revealed. (Aeschylus’ play is a link in the long chain of responsibly witnessing tragedy. The end of the chain is still not in sight.)

**THE CASSANDRA DIALOGUE**

The Cassandra scene in Aeschylus’ Agamemnon dramatically reveals the condition of the ekmartus. It falls into three parts, beginning with her short, silent ‘dialogue’ with Clytemnestra and the Chorus (1035–1071), followed by the fractured, anxious Amoibaion (1072–1177), and culminating in Cassandra’s long, lucid disclosure of past, present and future moments of the House of Atreus (1178–1330). There is a very brief introduction to this scene at the end of Agamemnon’s speech (950–955), as well as an appendix, in Clytemnestra’s frenzied description of the murders (1440–1447).

Aeschylus’ Cassandra is indeed a highly distinctive character, created from more original stuff than history. Of the earlier myths about her Aeschylus alludes to little: she is the daughter of Priam; she was betrothed to Apollo and given the gift of prophecy; she betrayed him – we’re not told how; she was doomed not to be heeded when she foretold the destruction of Ilium; she was presented to Agamemnon by the Greek armies as his prize for conquering Troy. The rape of Cassandra by Ajax plays no role in the Agamemnon, though perhaps there is a suggestion of it when Cassandra cries: “Look! Apollo himself strips me…” (1269).32

But it is in her independence, her otherness, that we really see Cassandra. She appears, unnamed and silent in the sedan with Agamemnon upon his return and they are drawn together to the palace court. As Agamemnon departs to go inside he asks that “his guest” (ξένη, 950) too be escorted in, but Cassandra does not budge. Nor does she speak to Clytemnestra, or obey her commands. In this she shows more strength of will than Agamemnon, who fatally acquiesced to Clytemnestra, and went into the palace, to his
doom, treading the red carpet. When Cassandra does speak, she does not really address the chorus so much as Apollo, at whom she gradually becomes more and more enraged, until, finally, she violates him, crying:

Before my own death I'll corrupt you!
Be gone! With your own downfall I requite you, thus. 33
Enrich someone else with ruin, not me!” (1266–1268)

Cassandra, whose name means “downfall of men” is, in fact, a powerfully adverse element in the play, creating momentum in a direction opposite to that which hope desires. As many commentaries have pointed out, she is an alien, chthonic, feminine force, 34 aligned more with the Earth and with gods of dirge, destruction and revenge than with the Olympian gods. Thus her first words take the form of an ill-fitting (οὐ τοῦτο θρηνητοῦ, 1075), ill-omened (δυσφήμουσα, 1078), and utterly ironic wail: "όταντοι, πόποι, δας ἀπολλον, ἀπολλον" (1073–4). 36 She sees the ghosts of Thyestes' devoured children, entrails in their hands (1096–7, 1219–1222). She invokes Hades (1115, 1235), Faction (1117), Erynos (1190, cf. chorus, 1119), Ate (1192, 1283, cf. chorus, 1124), Amphibainia (1233), Scylla (1234), Ares (1235) and Murder (1309); and she depicts Cocytus (1160), Acheron (1160), the Fire (1256), the Gates of Hell (1291) and the Tomb (1311).

Because of her otherness, Cassandra is not accepted either by her enemies or her kin (1271–1274). She is described as an animal: a babbling swallow (1050–1051), an unruly horse (1066–1067), a dog (1093, cf. 1195), a nightingale (1143), a trapped beast (1048), a sacrificial animal (1298, cf. 1057), a fluttering bird (1316–1317). As a princess, the fairest daughter of King Priam, Cassandra should be able to claim parrhesia, at least as much parrhesia as Electra demanded from Clytemnestra, 37 but instead she must suffer the fate of a slave, an alien, a woman, an animal: she has no voice. The doom of Apollo, that Cassandra shall not be heeded, is superfluous. Cassandra cannot be heard as a human being; her prophesies have an inchoate, disturbing effect (1120–1124), they are “a-Loxias-tic”– their force is not adequately expressed by words.

Cassandra is a perfect candidate for ekmarturia. She witnessed the marriage of Paris and Helen by Scamander's banks (1156). She witnessed the subsequent slaughter in the fields about Troy (1169). She witnessed her great city despoiled by invaders (1167). Through Apollo she witnesses the horrible crime of Atreus, Thyestes' feasting upon his own murdered children (1090–1097, 1217–1222), Through Apollo she witnesses the murder of Agamemnon and her own pitiable fate (1100–1129, 1228–1264). And through some unexplained power of her own she witnesses the future – the final vengeance of
Orestes (1279–1284, 1318–1319). She knows all these things having already seen and felt them. Her pain punctuates her vision. And she knows that she is powerless to influence anyone with the truth (1212). The chorus are sympathetic to her pain, but they cannot, or refuse to, understand all she has witnessed. Nevertheless, Cassandra is completely candid with them. Like some shadowy devotee of Artemis she struggles to tear the horrible seed of Apollo from her own womb and hold it up to the light, fresh and bleeding:

…my oracle-gleam I’ll no longer hide, 1178
A-veiled, like the eye of a new-wed bride. 1179
But just as the winds blow bright at sunrise, 1180
A far greater woe surges, like a tide, 1181
Towards the light. 1182
I’ll no longer teach in riddles. 1183
Mark me! With me now! Sniff out the track of evil 1184
Laid down long ago! 1185

With effort, she succeeds. She tells the chorus, in the plainest words, “you shall see the death of Agamemnon” (1246), but they cannot bear such plainness – they ask her to euphemise (1247). Even though she “speaks perfect Greek” (1254), they find her hard to understand (δύσμακρον, 1255). The hardness (dus-), is not a cognitive but an affective difficulty: what Cassandra says is perfectly clear, but the pain of it, which the Chorus feel acutely, makes it impossible to understand. Nevertheless, Cassandra commits them to it. She demands that they bear witness, too, to the things she has seen. She calls demands that they witness the past (1196), present (1184) and future (1317), each of the three occasions when she uses the imperatives of martureo and ekmartureo accompanies a specific temporal part of her vision. Cassandra thus transfers the responsibility for her vision to the chorus, and, beyond them, to us. Her last words reach out:

Oh, the ways of men! Even the lucky ones 1327
Resemble but a shadow; but if they are unlucky, 1328
“The wet sponge wipes out the picture.” 1329
And these I pity even more. 1330

These words, too, are difficult to understand. But I think they mean something like this: life involves you in a kind of construction; you are the painter of what you are, what you have felt and seen, and the world around. Insofar as you bear witness in your life, you paint such a picture. The witnessing is at best a shadow of your life, an outline. But to
have borne witness is lucky, for the remainder of mankind, by refusing to acknowledge themselves, annihilate everything. And that is even more pitiful than the fate suffered by the ekmartus. Cassandra is ultimately a sign of hope to us. She “has a genius for conversions”, as Fagles says; she “converts destructive images into their opposites.”

Foucault’s useful study of parrhesia describes the responsibility of free speech in a democratic society. Parrhesia is idealism. Cassandra’s attempt to speak, to be heard, even when she is denied a voice, fights against the impossibility of being human in a purely political state. Ekmarturia is courage.

NOTES

3 These lectures were edited by Joseph Pearson and published under the title, Fearless Speech, Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2001.
4 Foucault singles out the Ion as a “parrhesiastic play”, i.e. as a text thoroughly and comprehensively concerned with parrhesia.
5 These were the subjects of his last two lectures.
7 See Pl. Gor. 461e.
8 Fearless Speech, p. 12.
9 ibid, p. 12.
10 ibid, p. 13.
11 ibid, p. 14.
12 ibid, p. 15.
13 ibid, pp. 17–18.
14 Abraham Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address for example. Foucault, in fact, explicitly recognises that parrhesia can be exercised by superiors in his discussion of Aristotle’s megalpsychos, p. 87.
15 Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer: “I’m not going to put off my agenda by some feral lefty student protesters” August 27, 2003, University of Adelaide.
16 (1) In the Phoenecian Women [386–394] Polyneices desires parrhesia in order not to “endure the idiocy of those who rule”; (2) In the Hippolytus [422–425] Phaedra desires her sons to live in Athens and have parrhesia for the sake of honour; (3) in the Bacchae [664–676] Pentheus wants the herdsmen to speak freely so that he might know what action is appropriate to take against the bacchants; (4) in the Electra [1058–1060] Electra wishes to be granted parrhesia as pro-
tection; (5) in the Ion [670–675] Ion seeks *parrhesia* as part of the complement of rights of a free
man; and finally (6) in the Orestes, *parrhesia* is used in the context of persuasion – where a
speaker hopes to gain from his *parrhesia* by persuading others that what he says is true.

17 See Feinberg, Rawls.
19 Ibid, p. 35.
20 Foucault says that for Clytemnestra the game of *parrhesia* is “just a subversive trap,” p. 36.
21 There are two problems in these lines that don’t concern us here: (1) the Venetian MS. has μη for μ and some editors follow this reading (Hermann, Kennedy, Paley, Fraenkel). If we follow
them, the sense is “Bear witness, under oath, that you do not know the ancient sins of this
house.” In other words, Cassandra is daring the coryphaeus to commit perjury. But pace
Fraenkel, Denniston and Sidgwick are convincing on the reading μ. This leaves the problem
(2) that λόγοι seems to undermine Cassandra’s proof of her vision, since in the old sins were
“notorious”, she may have gotten to know them by hearsay.

22 See Isaeus and Demosthenes.
23 Cf *martureo*, for which LSJ give, “to bear witness”, not “to bear witness to” (except “c. accus.
rei”).
24 See Aristotle, Constitution of Athens, –7.4, line 11. The remark made here is that Anthemion
set up a statue of his father, Diphilus, in honour of him becoming a Knight, “and a horse stands
beside him in testimony (*ekmarturon*) of the fact that the status of a Knight means this [i.e. the
ability to keep a horse]” (trans. Kurt von Fritz). Here I think the prefix ek- means something
like “out”; the statue of the horse is an out-ward sign to onlookers of Diphilus’ Knighthood.
25 LSJ v.s. “ek-”
26 But See Fraenkel, p. 550, who thinks the connection is suggested. The one point of attraction
in this view is that Cassandra would be implying that the Chorus should bear witness in court
for her since she won’t be available to speak herself. But (1) she knows already there will be no
trial (the justice for her murder depending on the revenge by Orestes, which she foresees), and
(2) the events she’s speaking about (Thyestes’ feast) aren’t even the subject of any possible
action.
27 Blass actually has a weaker view than mine, since he says that *ekmartureo* is “simply an
intensification of *martureo*” (Quoted in Fraenkel p. 550, my italics). My point is that the
intensification is important.
28 The speech from 1322-1330 is suspected by some of being a later insertion.
Herodotus (ix.16).
31 See Fagles, p. 33, “Under Apollo [Cassandra] is the Peitho that is Pathos” (i.e. the truth that is
suffering).
service is a rape.”
33 Here she throws down the wand and necklace of the priestess and treads on them. Fagles says
that Cassandra’s act may represent, “the shattering of the god [Apollo] himself, and his original
triumph over mother Earth” (p. 30); it is “the opposite” of Agamemnon’s treading of the carpet (p. 32).

34 As many commentaries have pointed out, Aeschylus takes the “nomen-omen” principle seriously. See especially Fagles, p. 326. For suggestions about the meaning of the name “Kassandra” (kata + andros) see Hjalmar Frisk, Griechisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch, Heidelberg; Carl Winter Universitätsverlag, 1959, vol. 2, p. 798.

35 See R. Vellacott, Aeschylus: The Oresteian Trilogy, New York: Penguin, 1956, p. 16. In fact, Cassandra is the only really feminine force in the play, since Clytemnestra is described from the beginning as having a man’s mind, “ἀνδρόβουλον” (11). For more on Cassandra as a Chthonic force see Sidgwick, Denniston.

36 The scholia suggest that δόξη = Doric ga’, gh’, “Earth”; but Fraenkel rejected this (p. 490) and Denniston says it is merely “an exclamation of horror” (p. 167). Nevertheless, such “half-barbaric cries”, which Fraenkel says belong to lamentation and mourning (p. 491), contrast strongly with the celebratory song characteristic of Apollo.

37 In Euripides, Electra (1058–60), see above.

38 From the epithet of Apollo, “Loxias”, from legein (to speak); see the Chorus at 1074.

39 The commentaries disagree about the meaning. Connington (in Denniston, p. 191) says that the sense is “adversity is next door to annihilation”, but I think the final message of Cassandra is not so pessimistic as that (see above).

40 Fagles, p. 33.