SHARĪʿA, NĀḤ-YOGĪS AND INDIAN LITERARY TEXTS: SOME LINES OF CONGRUENCE

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Henry Corbin’s call for “un dialogue dans la métahistoire”¹ is the kind of seductive invitation for the construction of a philosophia perennis which, in the hands of the literary critic examining philosophical tracts, may lead to disastrous reductionism. Of course, I agree that comparative studies of any kind must seek to explore certain perennial suppositions, either in the belief-systems themselves or in the methodology applied to study them. Where I demur is when the claim is made that the correspondence between systems also explains, inevitably, praxis or application, in other words when it is stated that, say, because there is a Vedāntic monism, all other systems of “monism” (Neoplatonism, Ibn ‘Arabi’s pantheism, Chuang Tzu’s tso wang) have, in terms of cultural response, the same meaning. There is clearly a case to be made for a dialogue as Corbin suggests but the case must also be based on a cautious examination of the systems being compared. And “system”, like other related terms, is a dangerous word here for it hides the quite divergent sub-systems which may exist under the one presumably “systematic” umbrella. One of these metahistorical dialogues took place between Sufism and various Tāntric systems in Medieval India. Their symbiosis and expression in three Indian literary ‘texts’ written by people who may be loosely called ‘Indian Sūfis’ are the concerns of this paper. Before examining the literary texts themselves, a somewhat diachronic study of the interactions must be attempted.

From the point of view of “métahistoire” we can, of course, no longer subscribe to the kinds of readings given by J.N. Farquhar about the effects of Islām on Indian society.

The Muhammadan conquest of North India (1193–1203) was an immeasurable disaster to Hinduism as well as to the Hindu people, and it gave Buddhism its death-wound.²

While there is a lot of truth is this — Hindu India was never the same after Mahmūd of Ghaznī’s and, subsequently, Muhammad bin Sām’s raid on India at the turn of the second millennium A.D. — the antagonistic placing of these two great religious systems, implied in the Farquhar quotation, denies access to, or the possibility of, the more fruitful consequences of that initial confrontation. In cultural, and specifically literary, terms the more positive aspects of their interaction are to be found in Sūfism, the mystical dimension of Islam.³ This mystical movement found Indian soil congenial to the propagation and reinforcement of its ideals, a tendency which, characteristically, invited the wrath of the Ulama, the “custodians of the interpretation of the Shari‘a.”⁴
An interesting event in literary and religious history occurred when Sufism with its tradition of mystical exuberance (sukr), its complex of gurus (Pírs), ranging from the heretical martyr Hallaj (d. 922) to the serene and sober Imām Qushairi (d. 1074), met a truly "deviant" Hindu sect, the Nātha Yogīs and their sampradāya. Even before the full force of Islam began to be felt in India (during and after the successive Muslim rulers of India from the fourteenth century onwards), a close empathy, if not harmony, had grown between certain yogic aspects of Hinduism and their speculative counterparts, and the Sūfīs. Rizvi and Zaidi suggest that this happened before the thirteenth century. As these Yogīs were mainly the followers of Hatha-yoga, it is possible, and seductive, in retrospect, to see that Al Biruni's (973–1048) parallels between Sufism and Patañjali's Yoga may have been based on much deeper cultural affinities.

The encounter between the two did not lead to any major attempts at religious syncretism. On the whole ritual and religious practices were taken over or simply a certain degree of ghosti (discourse) led to the interchange of ideas. The winners in the game were finally people with a creative imagination. Once Rama and Rahim could be used in the same argument, fanā' and mokṣa, alāme be kaif and Śunya jagat, āvāze hamas and anāhada nāda, ışq and prema, tariqat and sādhanā, rūh and ātmā were equivalent philosophical substantives, the way was clear for poets who wrote in the vulgar tongue, Hindu, to draw upon the riches of both these traditions. Much has been made of the introspective nature of bhakti — that personal devotionalism was Hinduism's congenital reaction to an alien religiosity — but it seems that this is a result of a confusion between the development of "interiorization" by which the soul could "isolate itself" in the process of meditation and the sociological imperatives (the saint as outsider) surrounding that view.

Dr. Rizvi, in his short but valuable study of the subject, has thrown light on the real and "hagiographical" contacts between the Nātha Yogīs and the Sūfī saints. There were, in many cases, trials of strength and magic involved, since the Yogī was seen as a magian of old, one capable of extraordinary feats. It is possible that the tales of magic, mystery and imagination which made their way into Indian literature about this time (and employed by Mañjhan and Jāyasī later) reflect the popularisation of these stories.

The precise nature of Sūfī contribution to the bhakti ethos, and especially to the Nāth and Siddha systems has been the subject of some interesting studies. Within the limits of this paper, it is possible to offer three representative positions each of which subsumes, intrinsically I think, a particular bias:

1. Rizvi: "From the eleventh century onwards in India, the contacts and conflicts between sūfīs and yogīs became more frequent and meaningful."

2. Barthwal: "No doubt, the idea of the unity of God and man was foreign to Moslem notions of Divinity and was considered Kufra, entertaining which meant the forfeiture of one's life; still Sufism..."
which may be said to be a Vedântic commentary on the Qurân had made the Moslems used to it.”\textsuperscript{10}

And: “But the idea of God that the Nirguna School imparted is essentially different. That it is inconoclastic, does not warrant the assumption that it is similar to Mohammadan monotheism.”\textsuperscript{11}

(3) McLeod: “The Appearance [of the influence of Sûfism on Sikhism] is, however, misleading. Affinities certainly exist, but we cannot assume that they are necessarily the result of Sûfî influence. Other factors suggest that Sûfism was at most a marginal influence, encouraging certain developments but in no case providing the actual source of a significant element.”\textsuperscript{12}

With these “programmatic” positions in mind, I wish to turn now to an investigation of the crucial point at issue here—the spiritual links between Sûfism and Hindu religious movements. Perhaps one of the most interesting dialogues in this “métahistoire” has been suggested by Dr. Rizvi, and we shall use his position to explore the relationship further. In his brief but neglected article (I have yet to come across a reference to it in any of the major studies of Kâbîr for instance\textsuperscript{13}) on Sûfism and the Nâth Yogîs, Dr. Rizvi advanced an interesting hypothesis which may be quickly summarised here.\textsuperscript{14} Ibn ‘Arabi’s notion of \textit{Wahdat al-Wujûd} subsequently coalesced with the dominant stream of Sûfism and became identical with it. The compatibility of that dictum with Gorakhnâth’s doctrine of \textit{dvaitâdvaita-vilaksana-vâda}\textsuperscript{15} lends credence to the argument that the poets of the \textit{nirguna sampradâya} (Nâmdev, Kâbîr and Nânak among them) were not really talking about Vedânta (as Saîkara interprets the texts) but about much more “local” and “populist” renditions of the nature of the self and God whose significance in terms of some such confluence of the Sûfî \textit{Wahdat al-Wujûd} and Gorakhnâth’s doctrinal modification of \textit{advaita} has yet to be thoroughly investigated. Whilst not subscribing to the theory of “a massive impact of Sûfism on Hindu bhakti”, a proposition which Charlotte Vaudeville rightly maintains is “totally unwarranted,”\textsuperscript{16} it is nevertheless crucial for us to ask some important questions about the more limited areas of confluence suggested in the quotations cited above.

What is \textit{Wahdat al-Wujûd}? Toshihiko Izutsu defines it as the “oneness of existence,” and adds, as his interest is primarily in spiritual “dialogue,”

For expressing the same basic concept, Chuang-tzû uses the words like \textit{t’ien ni} “Heavenly Levelling” and \textit{t’ien chîn} “Heavenly Equalization.”\textsuperscript{17}

The philosophical world-view implied here is one of “Unity of Multiplicity,” not the “return of multiplicity into Oneness,” the classic Vedântic position. Izutsu has this in mind when he suggests that the two poles of \textit{Wahdat al-Wujûd} are characterized by an ontological tension between them. Unity (in Ibn ‘Arabi’s terminology \textit{haqq}, “truth”) is complemented by, as its polar opposite, multiplicity (\textit{mumkinât}, “possible beings”). Crucial to the set is the term \textit{tajallî} which designates
the "self-manifestation" of the One, by which it assumes "phenomenal forms." An earlier view of *Wujud* is found in Hallaj for whom, according to Louis Massignon, it signified "the qualification by God (kân) of all creation." Massignon goes on to contrast the "emanatiste" doctrine of Subhawardi (ishraq) with the "moniste" of Ibn 'Arabi (Wahdat al-Wujud) and about the latter remarks, (it) identified the virtuality (virtualité) of ideas with the existence of things (or vice versa).

It is this identification of a certain fixed quality (immanent in God) and designated in Massignon's word *virtualité*, with existence as such (not a fusion of one into another but their "inalienability") which has led many scholars to conclude that *Wahdat al-Wujud* marks a classic phase in Sûfism where an essentially pantheistic doctrine is advanced to counteract an inevitable mystical thrust towards monism. This intrinsic mystical inevitability, rather than historical exchange of ideas (such as Zaehner's well-known, and probably true, proposition that Bayazid's master was a man from Sind, Abû Ali) is what explains the apparent conflation of Sûfî doctrine with Vedânta.

A much more systematic examination of Ibn 'Arabî's *Wahdat al-Wujud* is given in A.E. Affifi's study of his mystical philosophy. Affifi identifies "Unity of Being" (possibly a better translation than Izutsu's "one-ness of existence") with Pantheism and immediately goes on to argue that *Wujud* carries two "fundamentally different senses": the idea of Being, and that which has being. Ibn 'Arabî, as Affifi proceeds to establish, bound as he was by diverse influences, not least of which was Neoplatonism, and a poetic imagination naturally at odds with logic or coherence, erred in his "mental" distinction between "Absolute existence" and "Absolute Existent, i.e. God." Affifi pursues the ramifications of this vehemently, and critically:

According to Ibnul 'Arabî there is only One Reality in existence. This Reality we view from two different angles, now calling it *Haqq* (the Real) when we regard it as the essence of all phenomena; and now *Khalq* when we regard it as the phenomena manifesting that Essence. *Haqq* and *Khalq*: Reality and Appearance; the One and the Many are only names for two subjective aspects of One Reality; it is a real unity but empirical diversity. This reality is God.

For Ibn 'Arabî, however, the diversity perceived by the senses can be transcended through mystic insight, which enables one to see behind seemingly contradictory phenomena a unified Reality: unity (jam') is behind the diversity (farq) that we apparently perceive. Clearly, much of this is anticipated in Hallaj and, incidentally, in Neoplatonism. But in one crucial respect, Ibn 'Arabî seems to have maintained his distinctiveness. In reformulating Hallaj he attested to the separability of the "I" from the "Real". In Affifi's words, "the two are always there, and there is no sense in saying that one becomes the other." A conception of Reality which denies a "process" or a "movement between" its two
basic components is largely pantheistic, something which Affifi claims is an “illegitimate movement” from the monotheism of Islam to the “philosophical doctrine of the unity of being (wahdat al-wujūd) or pantheism...”27 The antithetical positioning of this point of view (that “there is nothing in existence except God”) against the monotheistic “there exists but one God” is seen by Affifi as a reaction against the Śūfī fear of polytheism (shirk).28 If this is true, then Affifi’s distinction flounders on its own presuppositions. If pantheism is posited as a safety mechanism to prevent polytheistic spillage, then there is a sense in which monotheism and pantheism are “aspects” of the same doctrine, the latter in fact reinforcing a sense of “godly indwelling” already inherent in the former.

To return to our initial problem, the philosophical leap made by Rizvi in his search for correspondences between Śūfism and “Hindu mystic tradition”29 can now be re-examined. The most important correspondence which Rizvi discovers is between Wahdat al-Wujūd and Gorakhnāth’s dvaitādvaita-vilakṣaṇa-vāda. This leads him to equate not only Śūfism with “Nāthism” but, by extension, with Kabīr, Nānak and the poets of the entire Nirguna school.30 A systematic examination of the validity of this equation is outside the scope of this paper. All that we can fruitfully ask with reference to verse and the construction of a possible ‘syncretic’ system is the way in which such a conjunction manifests itself in literary texts. In Ibn ‘Arabi’s literary works, Affifi discovered a large number of “metaphors of the highest ambiguity”.31 From his list of five, let us select the metaphors of “Vessel” and “return.”32

The Rusđnāma

The first of our crucial literary texts here is the Rusđnāma of Shaikhh ‘Abdu’l-Quddus Gangohī (1456–1537).33 Whatever value we may wish to ascribe to its “syncretism”, it is demonstrably true that the Rusđnāma represents the classic instance of a specifically Śūfī attempt at embracing philosophical positions which were intrinsically Hindu. Of special interest to ‘Abdu’l-Quddus Gangohī were the Nāth systems associated with the name of Gorakhnāth and the Śiva and Śākta cults.

\[
\text{yaha mana sakatī yeha mana sīva} \\
\text{yaha mana tīna bhuvaṇa kā jīva} \\
\text{yaha mana lai jo unmani rahai} \\
\text{tīna bhuvaṇa kā bātaī kahai}\]

34

The mind is Śakti, the mind is Śiva, 
The mind is the jīva of the three worlds
He who takes this mind and “stills” it,
Speaks about the three worlds.

The passage recurs virtually verbatim in Gorakhbānī, with the only difference that here “three worlds” replaces “five elements” in the second line (second carāṇa to be exact).35 The implied reference to the
Gorakhnāth canon is, I think, consciously done and the Rusdānāmā is replete with references to Gorakhnāth. On the metaphorical level, and at any rate in the Hindi verses of the “Alakhbāni?”, the term which Gangohi often employs is saraba nirantara, technically “all is continuous, uninterrupted”. Hence,

\[ \text{jala thala 'mhela' saraba nirantara} \]
\[ \text{gorakhnātha akelā soī} \]

As water, earth and mountain are One
So is Gorakhnāth (in whom all multiplicity finally merges)\(^{36}\)

This image of the “unity of existence or being” recurs with remarkable consistency in the Rusdānāmā. The metaphor of “return” takes the dominant form of a drop of water mingling into the vast ocean, where, once again, the term saraba nirantara occurs:

\[ \text{jaise 'kumbha' 'ambha' māha theva} \]
\[ \text{taiso 'bunda' bādi 'narameva'} \]
\[ \text{bāhara bhītara 'kahā' na jāya} \]
\[ \text{'saraba nirantara' ekai 'kāya'.} \]

Just as the vessel floats on the water,
So the drop also stays in the Lord
There is no distinction [to be made] between outside and inside
In all pervades the one Being.\(^{37}\)

Elsewhere Shekh 'Abdu'l-Quddūs employs essentially Nāth Yogi terminology (he prefers “Alakh Niranjana” to other terms for the Supreme Creator) to speak of the Islamic khudā. I think that Dr. Rizvi is right in detecting the metaphysical theory of Wahdat al-Wujūd in ‘Abdu'l-Quddūs. I am not too certain if the author of the Rusdānāmā actually found the “teachings of the Nāths identical to the Wahdat al-Wujūd.”\(^{38}\) Whilst I can see that, and especially in the metaphysical values to be recovered from the verses quoted from the Rusdānāmā above, a certain “unity of Being” is present in ‘Abdu'l-Quddūs’ imagery, I do not detect either the sahaji or the śūnya state here. At the same time, could not the following sabada indicate the way in which the Vedāntic neti neti (“not thus, not thus”) combines with śūnya, the state of samadhi, leading ultimately to Brahman?

\[ \text{nahi kachu nahi kachu nahi kachu jāna} \]
\[ \text{'nahi kachu madhahi' na kachu pravāna} \]
\[ \text{nahi kachu dekha na jihābā bhāka} \]
\[ \text{jahā nahi kachu tahā rahayā lāga} \]

Nothing, but nothing, no knowledge either
No uncertainty, no finality.
Do not see anything, nor linger after its taste
Exist where indeed there’s nothing (ness).\(^{39}\)

Having raised this possibility of an actual Vedāntic reading, I demur once again and should like to tentatively offer another possibility. It seems to me that a certain mystical strain inheres in Quddus’ works
Religious Traditions

and that that mystical strain is perhaps best explained with reference to *Wahdat al-Wujūd*. Beyond that, at this stage at any rate, I should like to suggest that Quddus "borrowed" ideas from the "indigenous" mystical traditions (such as those of the Nāṭh Yogiś) because he saw possibilities of "transference", of the 'metahistorical' dialogue which mankind has always pursued whenever confronted with possible "affinities." Or perhaps, more explicitly in Dimock’s words,

There is an eternal borrowing and reborrowing of ideas and doctrines that goes on and has always gone on among religious sects in India, until the lines of derivation become very blurred indeed.\(^40\)

As Dimock so carefully demonstrates, in the Sahajiyā cult of Bangal and in the songs of the Bangali Bauls too one detects extraordinary degrees of syncretism which deny the demarcation of exact lines of influence. In these instances as well the interaction with Šūfīs was considerable.\(^41\)

**Sant Kabīr**

On another level, Shekh ‘Abdu’l-Quddus writes verses which elaborate the essential paradox of *Wahdat al-Wujūd*. Here the relevance of Kabīr (flourished 1st half of the Fifteenth Century) our second text/author, becomes important, nor for reasons of literary history (it is unlikely that Quddūs was familiar with Kabīr’s sayings\(^42\)) but because they seem to have employed very similar imagery to explore the paradox of the "unity of Being."

One of Quddūs’ *doharas* reads,

> herata herata he sakhi huā dhana gai ĥirāya
> parayā būnda samunda māha kaha kyaū ĥerījāya

You search, you search, O my friend,
I, the young wife, have disappeared;
The drop has merged into the Ocean,
pray tell how can it be found? \(^43\)

Two distichs from Kabīr’s sākhūs may be cited to show almost identical poetic content.

> herata herata he sakhi, rahā kabīra ēirai
> bunda samānī samunda mai, so kata ērī jāī
> herata herata he sakhi, rahā kabīra ēirai
> samunda samānī bunda mai, so kata ērī jāī.

You search, you search, O my friend,
but Kabīr has disappeared:
The drop has merged into the Ocean
how then could it be found?

You search, you search, O my friend,
but Kabīr has disappeared
The Ocean has disappeared into the drop,
how then could it be found? \(^44\)

At this point it is useful to recall Dr. Rizvi’s claim as he uses a similar verse from the *Adi Granth* to suggest deeper configurations. Rizvi writes,
Kabīr’s concept of Absolute Reality was founded on the dvaitādvaita-vilākṣana-vāda of the Nāths. Its compatibility with the Waḥdat al-Wujūd was responsible for Kabīr’s fame as a muwahhid.45 Rizvi quotes M.A. Macauliffe’s translation of the following pada from the Ādi Granth:

udaka samunda salala kī sakhiā nadī taranga sajāvahige
sunahī sūna milīā samadarasi pavana rūpa hoi jāvahige
bahuri hama kāhe āvahige
āvana jānā hakamu tīsai kā hukamai būjhi samavahige46
Like the water in the ocean, like bubbles in the river,
So I shall merge into (the One) becoming immaterial, merging śunya into śunya, like air, losing all identity.

Why should I be re-born? 47

Whilst Rizvi’s assertion that both Kabīr and Nānak were Muwāḥḥids and hence had access to Islamic practices and rituals (Nānak’s presumed visit to Kaaba is explained by Rizvi in this fashion 48) not available to the Hindus, the verses of Kabīr, especially those which use the bubble/ocean metaphor to suggest “Oneness of existence”, do not indicate the kinds of co-existence implied in the Waḥdat al-Wujūd. True, Dr. Rizvi works from an impressive array of primary texts but my necessarily partial and incomplete reading of Waḥdat al-Wujūd leads me to conclude that as a metaphysical concept it worked on the basis of spatial co-existence and not “movement” of one “being” to another, higher Being. In other words, Ibnul ‘Arabi’s metaphysics paved the way for a much more interesting encounter between Indian Śūfīs and Hindu mystics, but at the same time did not lead to a total identification of what remains, in spite of Gorakhnāth and the Siddhas, an essentially Vedāntic reading of the return of multiplicity into Oneness. In verse the exact nature of that interaction is still to be discovered and it may well be that in a given poem of Kabīr, especially those which are marked, linguistically, by heavy borrowings from Persian, a given philosophical view predominates. I think this could also lead to a re-examination of the somewhat simplistic claims of syncretism imputed to Kabīr. If two different kinds of readings co-exist in Kabīr’s sayings (the resolution implied in this instance is essentially a mystical one) then either he had different audiences in mind or he recognized that a given metaphysics was more appropriate for the poetic mode containing that metaphysics. One has only to place Kabīr against a more centrally Śūfī poet like Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī (1207–1273) to realise the diversity of Kabīr. It is for this reason, and possibly out of timidity, that I am more inclined to see the nature of Śūfī influence on Kabīr, mediated as it is, as Rizvi correctly suggests, by Gorakhnāth and the Nāth Yogīs, in terms of some such theory as the “admixture” theory of W.H. McLeod.49 At the same time I think that Professor McLeod’s “admixture” theory fails to examine the basis of the interaction and the degree to which the nirguṇa bhaktas consciously conflated Waḥdat al-Wujūd with śunya-vāda. As for Dr. Barthwal’s position, it remains with
the exception perhaps of Hazariprasad Dvivedi and R.K. Varma, the dominant Indian doxology on Kabir.\textsuperscript{50}

Without creating an annoying hiatus, I should like now to conclude this section with a further examination of the way in which the paradox of \textit{Wahadat al-Wujud} is negotiated in the verse of Kab\~{i}r. Affifi examines one of the crucial paradoxes in the following manner:

Now we are in a position to understand the apparent paradoxes in which Ibnul \textsuperscript{Arab\textsuperscript{i}} often revels – such as “the Creator is the created,” “I am He and He is I,” “Haqq is not Khalq and Khalq is not Haqq,” and so on and so on. Explained on his relative notion of the two aspects of Reality, these paradoxes are no paradoxes at all.

There is a complete reciprocity between the One and the Many as understood by Ibnul \textsuperscript{Arab\textsuperscript{i}} and a complete mutual dependence. Like two logical correlatives, neither has any meaning without the other. Allowing for some poetical element in his Philosophy, this reciprocity is as well expressed as it can by a mystic, in his extraordinary verses...\textsuperscript{51}

Affifi then translates a section of verse from Ibnul \textsuperscript{Arab\textsuperscript{i}}'s \textit{Fususu'l Hikam}. I should like to quote a \textit{pada} of Kab\~{i}r's to pursue the poetic use of the essential paradox of “Pantheism.”

\begin{quote}
lok\~{a} j\~{a}ni na bh\~{u}lahu bh\~{a}\footnote{\textit{loka jani na bhulahu bah\~{a}}}

kh\~{a}lika khalaka khalaka mah\~{i} kh\~{a}lika saba gha\textsuperscript{ti} rah\~{a} sam\~{a}i\footnote{\textit{khaliika khalaka khalaka mahi khaliika saba ghati rah samai}}

(\textit{teka})
avvali allaha n\~{u}ra up\~{a}ya kudarati ke sabha bande
eka n\~{u}ra tai saba jaga \textsuperscript{ki} kauna bhale kauna mande (1)
to all\~{a} k\textsuperscript{i} gati nahi j\~{a}ni gura gura din\~{h}a m\~{i}tha
kahai kab\~{i}ra mai p\~{u}ra p\~{a}ya saba gha\textsuperscript{ti} s\~{a}hiba d\textsuperscript{i}tha (2)\footnote{\textit{to allah ki gati nahi jani gura gura dinha mitha kahai kabir mai pura paya saba ghati sahiba dipta}}
\end{quote}

O you people, O brothers do not purposely forget

That the Creator is in the Created and present in all existence.

All\~{a}h first produced a light, and of that light (which infused the entire world of phenomena) are we slaves.

If He created the entire universe from that one light, then who is good and who bad? (1)

The “pulse” of that All\~{a}h no one has yet discovered (though) the (Sat) guru himself has given “sweet” teachings.

Kab\~{i}r says, I have found the Ultimate and have seen the One in all. (2)

Now all Indian exegetical material that I have been able to locate (S.S. Das, P.N. Tiwari, P.D. Barthwal, M.P. Gupta, S. Shukla, R. Chaturvedi, etc.\textsuperscript{53}) have interpreted the poem as Kab\~{i}r's search for Brahman and, by extension, of a kind of Ved\~{a}ntic unity. I think there is an extraordinary omission in the various exegeses here. First, the heavily Persianised and “Arabicised” diction is surely indicative of a stronger Muslim influence on the poem. Second, the wholesale transposition of \textit{khaliika (Khalq, ‘God’)} onto Brahman on the flimsy evocation of
the latter in the word *purā* ("Ultimate", of the Parabrahman) seems somewhat suspect. At the same time the poetic personality in the *bhānita* ("Kabir says") is not to be identified with *Haqq* and the implied equation of *khalq* and *Haqq* is by no means stated here. On the contrary when it comes to the poetic "I", the metaphor employed is not *rāhā kabīra hirāi* ("but Kabir has disappeared") of the earlier *sākhi* (*sakhi* 8.6) where indeed total immersion is inscribed in verse and presumably held by the poet, rather Kabir writes about *mai purā pāyā* ("I have found the Ultimate"), indicating not so much identification, but "discovery." If some such exegesis is accepted then the poem clearly maintains the mutual reciprocity of the One and the Many and at the same time isolates for the Self (who indeed sees the "One in all") a position which is, in religious terms, much more orthodox. I also believe that the verse is undeniably infused with the metaphysics of *Wahat al-Wujud*, but the appropriation does not, necessarily, become paradigmatic, simply a conception more amenable to the position finally taken by Kabir in the poem. Both in terms of metaphor and meaning, I think the sentiments of this poem are different from the *sākhīs* of Kabir already quoted. There, I think, the Oneness implied is a total "merging" of the self into Brahman. Tantric beliefs and the system of Gorakhnāth perhaps made the mediation possible and whilst the extremely rich, and midly provocative, implications of Dr. Rizvi's research cannot be fully developed here, this absence does not mean that the solutions have been found.

**Jāyasī's Padmāvat**

Another type of literary text which reflects this 'metahistoire' dialogue is a kind of allegorical love narrative called *matnavī* (*matnawī*). In a slightly different poetic genre (*gazal*) this kind of narrative had been anticipated in the verses of Amīr Khusrau Dihlawī (1253–1325) who wrote his verses in the idiom of the common people, in 'hindawi' (Hindū) and who, incidentally, began the great tradition of Urdu/Hindustani literature and music.54

Ever since the arrival of the "first great leaders of Šūfī orders, like Mu'īnuddīn Chisti and Bahā'uddīn Zakariyā", 55 the fusion of Islamic mysticism and Hindu *bhakti* manifested itself in the works of versifiers and saint-singers. The great contribution of Šūfism in this respect was a progressive refinement of the lover-beloved motif present in Indian devotionalism generally.56 The fusion of the two "traditions" — an earlier static poetic mode where symbols simply indicated the love of man and God and the later *mathnavīs* where principles of narrative structure gave greater coherence and momentum to the very same urges — led to extraordinarily vigorous experimentation and unusual artistic success.57 One of the great achievements of this style was the Šūfī poet Malik Muḥammad Jāyasī's *Padmāvat*, the third literary text I propose to use to examine the ramifications of this Šūfī-Hindu symbiosis.58
While Kabir had been dead for almost a century by then, the text expresses, at the level of a certain heightened literary consciousness those literary transmutations of which Kabir may well have been a part.

The theistic basis of Jayasi’s Padmavat is undeniably a Sufi vision of God and its literary enactment is based upon the Sufi principle of writing about “the love of a man for a woman...” insofar as it served as a model for the divine-human relationship.”^{59} Thus in chand (stanza) seven the notion that the Lord is one, invisible, formless and quality-less, omniscient, non-human (in origin), without parents or children, the First Principle behind creations is firmly established.

alakha arūpa abarana so karatā, vaha saba sō saba ohi sō baratā
pargata guputa so saraba biyāpi, dharmī cinha cinha nahi pāpi
nā ohi pīta na pīta na mātā, nā ohi kūṭumba na koi saga nātā^{60}

Elsewhere, Jayasi claims that God created the world for the love of Muḥammad, the Prophet, the “perfect man.” If this is true, then love has a special place in the world or, as S.M. Pandey says, “tab samsār mē prema kī sthitī to anivārya hī hai.”^{61} We find the whole argument best presented in a later work, Usmān’s Citrāvalī (1613):

ādi pema vidhi ne uparājā, pemahi lāji jagata saba rājā
āpana rūpa dekhi sukha pāvā, apane hiye pema upajāvā^{62}

From the earliest beginning the Creator made love
For love he adorned the world
He saw in this his own form
Pleased, He made it flourish.

A strong Christian mystical element may be detected here, but given the intellectual background of Sufism this is not surprising. Yet love acquires in Usmān’s formulation a certain dignity; more unusual because a basically antinomian sect presents (and acquires) an underlying ethical principle of organisation based on love. However else one would like to look at it, the mathnaviś demonstrate that for these writers “a beautiful woman can become the image which reveals the divine enchantress.”^{63}

This is how Hirāmani, the parrot, describes the beauty of Padumavati:

uata sūra jaśa dekhiā cānda chapai tehi dhūpa
aisai sabi jāhi chapi padumāvati ke rūpa

And when the sun forces the moon to disappear among clouds
So beautiful maidens hide upon seeing the splendour of Padumavati.

Ratnasen is totally infatuated by this description. He longs for union with Padumavati:
sahasahū karā rūpa mana bhūlā, jahā jahā diṣṭi kāvala janu phūlā.^{65}

A thousand rays diffused from her body (for so Ratnasen felt)
A thousand lotuses bloomed wherever he looked.

The relationship between love as union and viraha, separation, is one of the most important motifs in bhakti literature. The irony is that the alternation between the pain of separation and the ecstasy of union, viraha and prema, becomes a kind of psychological alternation in which
the essence of harmony lies not in the fulfilment of either (fulfilment or denial) but in the total “immersion” of the soul into the actual act of alternation. It is not an act of perpetual indecision or an existential condition in which one is always in media res; rather it is an expression of the absolute ground of existence, that precise mode in which the devotee’s (here the lover’s) sādhanā (means of devotion) operates. On the higher plane on which the symbolism works, the samādhi which arises is frequently the purer because of it. On the subject of prema and viraha, Pandey’s summary is worth noting:

There is an essential relationship between prema and viraha. The lover always wishes for union with his beloved. But the union is achieved only after the lover has burnt himself in the flames of separation. For a union with the Lord it is, similarly, essential that the devotee forsake all the pleasures of the world and concentrate on the vision of God alone. . . . For this reason in Sufi literature viraha is captured with such intensity. . . .

Jāyasī again writes about Ratnasen’s viraha as a fire which consumes the entire world and which penetrates all its parts: “sharper than the edge of the sword is the pain of separation”:

jehi so viraha tehī āgi na ḍīthi, saūha jarai jarai phira dei na pīhi
jaga mahā kāthina kharaga kai dhārā, tehī tē adhika biraha kai
jhārā.67

The total imagery against which these lines are developed is of epic dimension. The state of Ratnasen’s viraha occurs within the context of an almost primordial (cosmic?) image of a “burning sea” capable of consuming both the sea and the sky (dharātī saraga jarai tehī jhārā). Against this, viraha is presented as a state even more intense, even more over-powering and consequently “capable” of neutralising the ferocity of the sea which Ratnasen has to cross on his way to Śīṅghal, Padumāvati’s kingdom. The poem analogically develops the higher/lower, macrocosm/microcosm symbolism which is part of the mathnavī form. “From the religious point of view,” writes Charles White, “the experience of viraha corresponds to the disciplined purgation of the senses of the yogī or the follower of a religious ideal for whom the sensory world with all its temptations must be overcome before enlightenment can be achieved.”68 Jāyasī, of course, continues to develop the viraha theme with an almost single-minded intensity. In chand 254, we again encounter a reversion to Ratnasen’s earlier account of the pain of separation: the beginning of love has its corresponding pain which never lessens but grows progressively more vigorous and dynamic.69

The devotion of the lover pursued with such single-mindedness (ekanisthata) is like that of the Yogi. Indeed, in Padmāvat the figure of the Yogi is introduced as a conventional set-piece through the chief protagonist himself who dresses up as a Yogi. But this is simply to reinforce the two levels on which the work operates. Failure to realise this usually leads to a very narrow and literal reading of a stanza such
as *chand* 262 where Ratnasen employs florid language to suggest the intensity with which he loves Padumāvati. Obviously, this absolute love for another with its accompanying symbols of the eternal *dhvani* or "suggestiveness" and the everlasting presence of the beloved, transposes the surface meaning onto the higher plane of religious love.\(^70\) Another character, Mahādeva, tells Ratnasen, "You have cried a lot, no more please for without suffering pain first, you cannot attain your beloved. You are now pure, your body has been purified. Now you can go on the path of love."\(^71\) Padumāvati, likewise, would like to test her lover’s devotion first before giving herself up. Reflecting upon a note which Ratnasen has sent her, she wonders if Ratnasen’s love has in fact developed beyond simple desire, if in fact he has *rābi hoi caṛhā akāsā*, become the "sun" and climbed to the heavens.\(^72\)

Naturally, much of the imagery in *Padmāvat* belongs to the world of profane love. Yet, as Mircea Eliade has suggested in another context,\(^73\) the dual referents of the images constantly "sacralise" situations, discourse, so that one’s responses to the text, and the text itself, acquire "multivalent" values. For it is clear enough that the hero in the work considers his journey of love as an *adhyātmikayātra* – ultimately a religious quest in which the narrative is finally allegorical and the images, in spite of their metaphorical effulgence and descriptive resonance, *symbolic*.

In this religious quest, the *sādhaka* must first overcome many vicissitudes before he can reach Brahman and ultimate knowledge (*marifat*, in Ṣūfī terminology). In Usmān’s *Citrāvalī*, a "structural" symbolism is developed on the basis of the number *four*: four countries, with four cities, with four fortresses described as a series of concentric circles, with the four fortresses being part of the innermost circle. Going from the outer circle to the inner one, the devotee experiences the various "stages of mystical consciousness"; the cities, for instance, symbolise the stages of *nasūt*, *malakūt*, *zabarūt* and *lāhūt*.\(^74\) Ideally, of course, the *mathnavi*, the allegorical narratives, should show similar correspondences. The hero should move through these mystical stages until finally he reaches the state of absolute non-differentiation. In Ṣūfī literature, and in *bhakti* symbolism, this final state often takes the form of a *marriage*, real or imaginary. In the narrative proper, however, this structure (of the various stages) may be either crudely manifest (in which case the literary work itself is often minor) or it may be so transformed as the make it almost unrecognisable. This, of course, does not mean that any effort to isolate a deeper level of meaning would be futile; rather, the usefulness of the exercise lies in the awareness that very often the poet hides the underlying structure so as to avoid foregrounding practices which may be obviously yogic or Ṣūfī. In *Padmāvat*, again, there are significant cut-off points in the narrative indicating the various stages of awareness of the mystical life. But even Dr. S.M. Pandey, who suggests the parallel, quickly covers himself: "In spite of this (the foregoing analogy) the path of *lāhūt* or *haqīkat* seems
extraordinarily complex and somewhat uncertain."  

Again, the point is made that much more subtle transformations always occur in the literary work itself, in the artistic superstructure that is. Structure and conventions often become unrecognisable in the final work of art whose values transcend its constituent elements.

Despite the obvious connections between Śūfi narrative patterns and bhakti we have developed (the names of all the major characters are Hindu and the work, in G.A. Grierson's words, "is also remarkable for the vein of tolerance which runs through it, a tolerance in every way worthy of Kabīr or of Tul'ī Dās"), all that can be said with certainty about these narratives is that, since they were written in Hindi (in Avadhi in most of the cases), they must have been affected by other literary works such as those of Kabīr before it and, in turn, they must have influenced those which followed. But the main ground of these mathnavīs, the basis of their premadarśana, remained Arabic and Persian ideas and forms. They belong to the mainstream of those traditions though the influence of Hindu habits of expression must have given them some not incon siderable latitude.

Mataprasad Gupta in his introduction to the edition employed here writes about Jāyasi's theory of life. A study of this theory enables us to see how the complex factors informing the Indian religio-philosophical matrix during the first half of the second millennium surfaces in the texture of the poetic language. I wish to isolate a few examples to follow this line of argument through. In his description of the fort at Singhal, Jāyasi evokes very clearly the pattern of Kuṇḍalini Yoga popularised by the Nāth Yogis. The entire stanza combines a surface, phenomenal beauty with an inner symbolic logic which may be located through the application of the principles and properties of Hātha-yoga.

``garha para nīra khīra dui nadi, pāni bharahi jaisī durupadi  
auro kuṇḍa eka mōtti cūrū, pāni ambrita kīka kapūrū  
ohi ka pāni rājā pai piā, biridha eka techī jau lahi jia  
aṅcanabirikha eka tehi pāsā, usa kalapataru indra kabilāsā  
mūla patāra saraga ohi sākhā, amar beli ko pāva ko cākhā  
canda pāta au phūla tarāi, hoi ujiāra nagara jahā tāi vaha phara p  
vaha phara pāvai tapi kai koī, biridha khāi nava jobana hoī  
rājā bhae bhikhāri sunī vaha ambrita bhoga  
jei pāvā so amar bhā nā kichu byādhi na roga."

In that citadel were two rivers (nīra and khīra) from which women as beautiful as Draupadi (the wife of the Pandavas) fetched water. And in the citadel was a well made of diamonds whose water was as the rain eternal. The king who drank water from it never became impotent. Near the well was a kaṅcana tree like Indra's eternal tree in Śiva's kingdom [kalapataru = a mythological tree which grants all desires.] Its roots go down to the underworld, its branches to the heavens. It was the tree of life: who may find it? who may taste its fruit? Its leaves were like the moon, its flowers like the stars which
lit the entire city. Only through immense tapas (sacrifice, concentration) can one find its fruit. To find it, kings became beggars for those who do get it never become old nor fall ill.

Whether the fortress is also suggestive of the mystical stages towards union with Godhead is another question though the first word of this stanza, garha immediately invites interpretation in terms of the four-fold scheme of cities, fortresses, etc. we have outlined above. The garha (citadel, fortress) according to this system of symbology stands for the body, from which analogy the following parallelism emerges:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>garha</th>
<th>→</th>
<th>body</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>nira/khīra</td>
<td>→</td>
<td>the two main channels: Idā and Pingalā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kunda (well)</td>
<td>→</td>
<td>susūmnā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kancana (tree)</td>
<td>→</td>
<td>the tree of meditation – from the mulādhāra cakra to the sahasrāra cakra (from the base of the spine to the head)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The fruit is the ātmānubhava (experience of the self) which can be achieved only through tapas (intense meditation). This is the ultimate aim of all men. It is further developed in stanza 215 where the nau pāūrī (the ‘nine’ cakras or “doors” of the body), the dasava āvāra (the ultimate cakra, the bramarandhra) and the kunḍa all describe and allegorize yet another citadel.

The attainment of the highest state is further discussed with reference to the various marana-sādhanā (literally, means of death or “death exercises’’). We could interpret it as a “preparation for death” or even the “state of death”, but the idea becomes more meaningful if, once again, we do not see it as a life-death polarization but as a jivanamaraṇa contiguity: that, indeed, death-in-life is life-in-death. We have already found this captured in the word viraha, a state in which both the senses and the mind are devoid of consciousness (caitanya śunya). In Padmāvat we get our first glimpse of this state when Ratnasen hears from the parrot the alaukika (“other-worldly”) beauty of Padumāvati. On a purely realistic level, in this chand, the whole description seems excessively sentimental with all the emphasis falling on the wrong feelings. Yet images such as the flames of the sun (lahari sunija kai), the wound of love from which the king expires (muruchāī. . pema ghāva. . ), transposed onto the ecstasy of heavenly love, do not read so ingenuously. The images can, and do in this instance, acquire those very mystical elements which are essential for Indian devotional verse. In its patterned intensity – the triumphant heaping of image upon image, sensuousness compounded by lushness of phrase – the passage has the power to transcend what seems superficial and banal.

One could look at other features of the Šūfī mathnawī but it seems to me that the genre’s greatest contribution to bhakti poetics is its unusual combination of yoga-mārga and prema-mārga (the path of discipline and the path of love). Ideas which would not have otherwise reached people do filter through the medium of the literary artifact.
Concepts such as the divine nature of human love which were espoused by Sufi saints such as Ibnul ‘Arabi reached the other bhakti poets through their poetic manifestations. In Fususu’ul Hikam, for instance, Ibnul ‘Arabi had written:

Just as man was made in the image of God, likewise woman was made in the image of man. Hence man loves both God and woman. The relationship of man with woman is the same as that of nature with God. Therefore, in these terms, when one loves a woman, that love is divine.81

One recalls Nizami’s Khusro-Shirin and Laila-Majnun, Mullâ Daud’s Candâyan, in all of which the lover falls in love with a married woman, yet courts her with honour and without maithuna (“sexual union”) in mind. It is a kind of “perfect” desire which he never achieves. In all these instances the “hero” dies without ever possessing his beloved. The connection with marana (death) is clearly underlined here. Viraha is intense and the force of that intensity is maintained throughout these narratives. The best instance of this kind of pain of separation is found in Zami’s (d. 1492) Persian mathnavi, Yusuf-Zulekha in which Zulekha falls madly in love with Yusuf and sacrifices all her worldly possessions simply on hearing his name spoken aloud (symbolised by the way in which she parts with all her seventy diamonds) till finally she marries Yusuf. When this happens a “new” realisation dawns upon Zulekha who tells Yusuf, in Gupta’s paraphrase, “I loved you only so long as I did not know God. Now that my heart is full of heavenly love, there is room for no other (kind of love).”82 The inescapable suggestion made here is that marriage (fulfilment) lifts the laukika (worldly) love onto an extra-worldly (alaukika) level but in doing so denies the conditions which led up to that awareness. Quite possibly, this is one of the reasons why the mathnavi form often worked on themes of illicit love relationships. Before Sufism (and I am not too certain if one can be so categorical about this) the problem with the purely Hindu tradition of devotionalism we have outlined was its almost total inability to see any adhyatmika element in the love of man and woman.

Conclusion

The transmission of Sufi ideas through the ‘mediation’ of Nath Yogî thought (especially in the Gorakhpanthi doctrine of dvaitadvaîta-vilaksana-vâda) is thus of immeasurable consequence to medieval Indian literary texts. It is perhaps no coincidence that, initially, it is the poets of the santa sampradâya (the ‘saint tradition’) of North India, Kabîr among them, who can best accommodate Sufi symbology. There were social reasons for this. The non-dvîja caste nirguna bhaktas, as Hazariprased Dvivedi has shown, were themselves early converts to Islam, breaking away from the vaisya caste which was their lot.83 And as the Gorakhpanthis were also part of the lower castes, espousing a not altogether acceptable Tantrism, it is not surprising that the most fruitful literary ramifications
of the Śūfī-Hindu dialogue are to be found in their interaction with one another.

NOTES


3. The term ṣūfī was first applied to Muslim ascetics who dressed in coarse garments of wool (ṣūf). The term tasawwuf is derived from it. This term is used in this paper to explain those tendencies in Islam which accept the possibility of a direct communion between man and God. The Śūfīs claim a knowledge of the Real (al-haqq) which is inaccessible to orthodox Muslims. They believe that they must “travel a path” (salāk at-tariq) which would make this union with the Real possible. Against the systemic theology of Islam, we find here a stress on intuition, on the various processes (tariqā) by which spiritual freedom is attained. Nevertheless, Śūfism was a “natural development within Islam” and explicable in terms of certain tenets found in the Qurān itself. In the course of time it moved away from “teaching” to “feeling” and “experience”, and emphasised the reaching of gnosis (ma'rifā) through the experiencing of “ecstatic states”.

4. S.A.A. Rizvi, Muslim Revivalist Movements in Northern India in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (Agra: Agra University Press, 1965), p. 11. The attitude of the hieratic “castes” towards renouncers seems to be a sociological universal as is clear from the Brāhmanical attitudes to the concept of renunciation, nivṛtti.


8. Rizvi, “Śūfīs and Nath Yogis in Medieval India . . .”


11. Ibid., p. 20.


14. S.A.A. Rizvi, “Şūfis and Nath Yogis. . . .”


20. *Ibid.*, loc. cit:

  ... les écoles énanatiste (ishrāq de Suhrwardī d’Alep) et moniste (wahdat al-wujūd d’Ibn ‘Arabī), identifiant la virtualité des idées avec l’existence des choses (ou inversement.)


> Of all the masters of Şūfism it is Ibn ‘Arabī . . . who carried furthest the analysis of the phenomena of love; in so doing he employed a very personal dialectic, eminently suited to revealing the source of the total devotion professed by the *jedeli d’amore*.

The phenomena of love leads Ibn ‘Arabī to an examination of questions such as “how is it possible to love God?” One of the dominant leitmotives of mystical, including *bhakti*, verse is the relationship between the devotee and God within the structure of lover-beloved. Corbin formulates the position as follows (p. 147):

> And finally, who is the real Beloved, but also who in reality is the lover?


The introduction of Neo-Platonic ideas into Sufism from philosophy was, of course, made much of by Ibn al-‘Arabi who systematised them into something very like Śaṅkara’s version of Vedānta.

Against Zachner cf. Affifi, p. 59:
It is obvious that Ibnul ‘Arabi’s pantheistic doctrine is a natural outcome of typically Islamic thought with very little Hellenistic and particularly Neoplatonic element in it. It is an adaptation of the Ash’arites’ theory of an external world as being essentially one substance with an infinity of attributes of changeable states.

33. Rizvi and Zaidi, *op. cit*.
yahu mana sakati yahu mana śiva
yahu mana pāṃca tatta kā jīva
yahu mana le jai una mana rahai
tau tini loka ki bātā kahai
37. *Ibid.* Text, p. 13. Rizvi and Zaidi gloss,
‘theva’ = ... as the vessel does not ‘drown’ in water.
‘bunda’ = drop of water, the reality (‘existence’?) of the phenomenal world.
‘nārāmeva’ = the Lord or the prime being who is the Real.
‘kāhā’ = the thoughts of inner/outer is futile; both are indistinguishable forms of the one being.
‘saraṇa nirantara’ = existing in the entire world.
‘kāyā’ = body, Being.
39. *Rūshdnāmā*, Text, p. 35. I have consciously made my translation more idiomatic and, hopefully, more readable.
42. The *Rūshdnāmā* was probably compiled at the turn of the sixteenth century. Kabīr (fl. first half of the fifteenth century) had been dead for at least fifty years by then. On the other hand the absence of any exact reference to Kabīr in the text should not be taken as *absolute* proof of Quddūs’ ignorance of Kabīr’s sayings.
43. Rizvi and Zaidi, op. cit., Text, p. 34.
44. Parasnath Tiwari (ed) Kabir-Granthvali (Prayag: Hindī Pariśad, 1961), sākhi, 8. 6-7; Charlotte Vaudeville, Kabir I p. 196. I have used Vaudeville’s translation here.
45. Rizvi, A History of Sufism in India, I, p. 375.
47. My translation. Rizvi quotes Macauliffe’s somewhat more fluent translation (Macauliffe, op. cit., VI, p. 249).

As the bubbles of the river are accounted water and blend with the water of the ocean,

So the man who looketh on all with an equal eye, shall become pure and blend with the Infinite.

Why should I return to this world?


like bubbles in the river (I shall unite with Brahman) . . . sūnya (into Brahman) . . . sūnya (“state-less” ātmā)

Mataprasad Gupta, Kabir-Granthvali (Allahabad: Lokbhāratī Prakāśan, 1969), pada 51, p. 176 indicates that some manuscripts offer a somewhat expanded version of the poem. In the example he cites, the poem is almost twice as long. The concept of the Sikh hukam (“order”) occurs in a line of this presumed interpolation.
53. Parasnath Tiwari, Kabir-vānī-sudhā (Allahabad: Rākā Prakāśan, 1976) maintains a heavy Vedāntic (within Śāṅkara’s system) reading of Kabir throughout. This is followed by S. Shukla and R. Chaturvedi, Kabir Granthvali (Lucknow: Prakāśan Kendra, n.d.)
54. In the South, where Persian influence was not as strong, the creative language was called Dakhni, the ‘language of the South’. The influence of Gujarati and Telegu was much greater here.
56. In one of the most ambitious attempts at literary-philosophical conflation, the Gujarati poet Shāh ‘Ali Muhammad Jīw-Jān (d. 1515)
used “the motif of the estranged bride to symbolize the longing soul, and tried to explain the mysteries of wahdat al-wujūd, ‘Unity of Being’.” [Annemarie Schimmel, op. cit., p. 134].

57. There are very few studies in which the relationship between the Persian mathnāvi and the growth of the Indian narrative tradition are discussed. The tradition of narrative within Indian literature so far had taken three distinct generic forms: (1) the epic tradition where narrative developed within an established tradition of the Indo-European epic, a kind of progressive interaction between men and gods reflecting, at least in India, what Lukács called the values of “integrated civilizations” [The Theory of the Novel]; (2) the dramatic tradition which was courtly and aristocratic, generally highly conventionalised, pastoral, never tragic and (3) the Purānic tradition where narrative was pseudo-hagiographical, the somewhat unrealist recreation of avatārs of gods, interspersed with myth and folklore. The Persian mathnāvis brought to India by Islam and popularised by the Sūfis – works such as Nizāmī’s Khusro-Šīrin, Lailā-Majnūn, Zāmī’s (d. 1492) Yusuf-Zulekha – developed around an intense and passionate love relationship which normally ended with the death of the chief protagonists. Majnūn, the demented lover of Lailā, became symbolic of the mystic’s annihilation in God (fana). Apart from Padmāvat, the best known mathnāvis in Hindi are: Mulla Daud’s Candāyan (1380), Kutubān’s Mrgāvati (1504); Manjhan’s Madhumātī (1545), Usman’s Citrāvalī (1613) and Shekh Nabi’s Jīnanadīp (1619). Other important, though non-Hindi (or non-Hindui) mathnāvis are: Mulla Vajahī’s Kutub Mustāri (1610) and Sabaras (1636); Mukimi’s Candarbadan va mahiyār (1617). This was the great period of the mathnāvis though as a genre it continued to flourish right up to modern times. In 1917 the writer Nasir still called his work, Premakaham, a mathnāvi. The dominant narrative form has since become the novel and the short story. [This account of the history of Sūfī literature is based on S.M. Pandey, Madhyayug in premākhyaṇ (Allahabad: Mitra Prakashan, n.d.) and Annemarie Schimmel, op. cit.]. Perhaps the most important non-Sūfī love-narrative is the Rājasthānī Dholā mārī ra duhā which, whilst still being influenced by Sūfī thought and literature, is firmly grounded in a total Hindu tradition and world-view. In some recensions of Kabīr granthāvalī passages from this narrative are present. The opinion of most scholars (Pandey, p. 89 ff.) is that the Rājasthānī compilers of the text simply incorporated passages from their best known work, written definitely before the 14th century and probably accessible to Kabīr, into subsequent texts.

58. Padmāvat was written in 947 Hijrī (1540) in Avadhī, an Eastern dialectal variety of Khaṛī. Jāyasi employed the Persian Nasta’liq characters and “spelt each word rigorously as it was then pronounced.” See Lakshmi Dhar, Padumāvatī: A Linguistic Study of

Padmāvat may be divided into two parts. The first part begins with the birth of the heroine Padumāvati. She is the daughter of Gandharva, king of Siṅghal. On her twelfth birthday she is given a palace of "seven heights." There she begins to live with her companions and servants. Her closest friend is, however, a parrot who is extremely intelligent, well-read and crafty. Their friendship continues to grow and she gains her knowledge of all the important texts from this parrot. Unfortunately, the King becomes displeased by this and orders to have the parrot killed. It is hunted throughout the palace; Padumāvati tries to hide it but the task seems quite beyond her. The parrot finally offers to leave, leaving behind an agonising princes. The parrot escapes to another kingdom, where it is caught by a fowler who in turn sells it to a Brāhmaṇa sage. The parrot reaches the city of Caittauda where he is bought by its king, Ratnasen. The parrot narrates the beauty of Padumāvati to Ratnasen who falls in love with her. He then goes to the Kingdom of Siṅghal and marries the princes. The second part begins with the exile of a Paṇḍit from the city of Caittauda. This Paṇḍit goes to Delhi and tells its king, Allāuddīn Khijli, about the extraordinary beauty of Padumāvati. The king is infatuated and attacks Ratnasen's city. Ratnasen is captured. Padumāvati entreats other over-lords and kings to come to her husband's rescue and a whole series of battles and intrigues ensues. The end result of all this is the death of Ratnasen. Upon hearing this Padumāvati and Nāgmati, Ratnasen's first wife, destroy themselves. When Allāuddīn Khijli attempts another seige he finds the Queen dead and bemoans not only Padumāvati's death but also the death of honour in society.

59. Charles S.J. White, "Ṣūfism in Medieval Hindi Literature", History of Religions V (Summer, 1965), 118.

60. Malik Muḥammad Jāyasī, Padmāvat (ed) Mataprasad Gupta (Allahabad: Bhāratī Bhanḍār, 1973), chand 7. All references are made to this edition, and hereinafter cited as Padmāvat. See also The Padumawati of Malik Muḥammad Jaisī (ed. & trans.) G.A. Grierson and Mahāmahopādhyāya Sudhākara Dvivedi (Calcutta: The Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1896–1911) VI fasciculi. Edition to chand 286 only as publication suspended upon the death of Dvivedi. The entire poem has 653 stanzas in all. I have used this edition for purpose of cross-checking the text.

61. S.M. Pandey, op. cit., p. 112, Pandey adds, "In fact this world exists because of love."

62. Ibid., p. 123

of quite extra-ordinary emotional states (states which evidently parallel the state of divine infatuation) upon listening to the words of Madhumālī: “sunī kūvara arṇbrita rasa bāṭā/jāke sunata amara bhā gātā” and so on.

64. *Padmāvat, chand*, 95.

65. Ibid., chand, 96.


68. Charles S.J. White, *op. cit.*, p. 121.

69. *Padmāvat, chand* 254, p. 285: prīṭi beli aisai tanu dāṛhā/paluhata sukha bāṛhata dukha bāṛhā. . . (notice that the inescapability of the love-pain syndrome is heightened by the phonetic coupling of the ṛhā sound.)

70. Ibid., chand, 262.

hāṛha hāṛha mahā sabada so hoi
nasa nasa māha uṭhai dhuni soi
khāi biraha gā tākara gūda māsa kī khāni. . .

71. Ibid., chand, 214.

jo dukha sahai hoi sukha okā
dukha binu sukha na jāi sivalokā

72. Ibid., chand, 231.
kahesi suā moso sunu bāṭā
cahāu tāu āja milāu jasa rātā. . .


74. The essential correspondence between the cities and the states of mystical ascent that the hero undergoes in Citrāvalī may be presented as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bhognagar</td>
<td>nasūť, state of ignorance and worldly pleasures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gorakhpur</td>
<td>malakūt, heaven of the angels, “devaloka”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nehanagar</td>
<td>zabārūť, yogic discipline, abandonment of all impediments, total absorption in God</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rūpanagar</td>
<td>lāḥūt or ḫaqīkāt, the final stage, oneness in the Absolute. The result of bekhuḍī or ātmavismṛti in the sādhaka.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

75. Pandey, *op. cit.*, p. 137.


78. *Padmāvat, chand*, 43.

79. *Padmāvat, chand*, 119:
sunathai rājā gā muruchāi
jānahu lahari suruja kai ā
pema ghāva dukha jāna na koī
jehi lāge jānai pai soī...

80. Other points of interest are: the use of *advaita vedānta* by Jāyasi especially his preference for *tat tvam asi* over *aham brahman asmi* (see stanza 216); the relationship between the guru and his disciple and, possibly, a thorough knowledge of *Wahdat al-Wujūd.*

