Globalisation, the Convergence of Religions and the Perennial Philosophy

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It is a commonplace that we are living in an unprecedented situation in which the different religious traditions are everywhere impinging on each other. There has, of course, always been some intercourse in ideas and influences between religions. Nevertheless, each civilisation formerly exhibited a spiritual homogeneity untroubled, for the most part, by the problem of religious pluralism. For the vast majority of believers in a traditional civilisation the question of the inter-relationship of the religions was one which was either of peripheral concern or one of which they remained unaware. The homogeneity of Christian civilisation has long since been ruptured. In the last few centuries European civilisation has itself been the agent for the disruption and extirpation of traditional cultures the world over. Since then all manner of changes have made for a 'smaller' world, for 'the global village'. Despite the fact that the title of my paper carries the word 'globalisation', I must confess I have only the haziest notion of what this might mean beyond the obvious point that more often than not what it seems actually to mean is Americanisation: McDonalds in Mongolia, so to speak. However, it is clear that the question of the relationship of the to another and the imperatives understanding take on a new urgency both for comparative religionist and theologian and, indeed, for all those concerned with fostering a harmonious world community. In an age of rampant secularism and scepticism the need for some kind of inter-religious solidarity makes itself ever more acutely felt. At least three other alternatives arise out of 'globalisation', each disastrous for humankind's spiritual welfare: intensifying internecine theological and/or political warfare; the disappearance of the religions under the onslaughts of modernity; the dilution of the religions into some sentimental, 'universal' pseudo-religion.

The philosophical question of the inter-relationship of the religions and the moral concern for greater mutual understanding are, in fact, all of a piece. We can distinguish but not separate questions about *unity* and *harmony*; too often both comparative religionists and those engaged in 'dialogue' have failed to see that the achievement of the latter depends on a metaphysical resolution of the former question. Here I wish briefly to consider the

implications of the convergence of religions from the traditionalist perspective exemplified in the works René Guénon, Ananda Coomaraswamy and, particularly, Frithjof Schuon.

The traditionalists are committed to the explication of the philosophia perennis which lies at the heart of the diverse religions and behind their manifold forms. However, unlike some of those who sought to popularise the notion of the perennial philosophy – most notably perhaps, Aldous Huxley, various neo-Hindus and some 'Aquarian' New Agers – the traditionalists are also dedicated to the preservation and illumination of the traditional forms which give each religious heritage its raison d'etre and which guarantee its formal integrity and, by the same token, ensure its spiritual efficacy. I shall have time to do no more than drastically adumbrate some of the central themes of the traditionalists as they impinge on the questions with which we are presently concerned.

Religions and Revelations

The traditionalist understanding of the nature of religion, and thus of the inter-relationships of the religious traditions, depends on four key ideas or principles. These are: the necessary diversity of multiple Revelations and thus of the religious forms which derive from those Divine dispensations; the principle of orthodoxy which ensures that each integral religious tradition furnishes its adherents with an adequate metaphysical doctrine and an effective spiritual method; the distinction between the outer, exoteric and the inner, esoteric domains of religion; and, fourthly, the transcendent or metaphysical unity of religions which surpasses but in no way invalidates their formal diversity. Given the limited compass of this paper, I can only here address the last two of these governing ideas, and even then only in severely abbreviated fashion.

There is a good deal of talk these days about the traditional religions being 'played out', 'inadequate to the problems of the age', 'irrelevant to contemporary concerns' and so on. 'New solutions' are needed, 'appropriate to the times'. From the traditionalist viewpoint, and I quote from Schuon:

Nothing is more misleading than to pretend, as is so glibly done in our day, that the religions have compromised themselves hopelessly in the course of the centuries or that they are now played out. If one knows what a religion really consists of, one also knows that the religions cannot compromise themselves and they are independent of human doings... The fact that a man

may exploit a religion in order to bolster up national or private interests in no wise affects religion as such... as for an exhausting of the religions, one might speak of this if all men had by now become saints or Buddhas. In that case only could it be admitted that the religions were exhausted, at least as regards their forms.¹

Schuon's view of religion turns on the axiomatic notion of multiple and diverse Revelations; the principle is a kind of linch-pin in his work. Schuon perceives humankind neither as a monolithic psychic entity nor as an amorphous agglomerate but as being divided into several distinct branches, each with its own peculiar traits, psychological and otherwise, which determine its receptivities to truth and shape its apprehensions of reality. Needless to say there is no question here of any kind of racialism or ethnocentricism which attributes a superiority or inferiority to this or that ethnic collectivity. Nor, however, is there any sentimental prejudice in favour of the idea that the world's peoples are only 'superficially' and 'accidentally' different: 'We observe the existence, on earth, of diverse races, whose differences are 'valid' since there are no 'false' as opposed to 'true' races.' Each branch of humanity exhibits a psychic and spiritual homogeneity which may transcend barriers of geography and biology. An example: that shamanism should extend through parts of Northern Europe, Siberia, Mongolia, Tibet and the Red Indian areas betokens, in Schuon's view, a certain spiritual temperament shared by the peoples in question, one quite independent of physical similarities and leaving aside the question of 'borrowings' and 'influences'.3

To the diverse human collectivities are addressed Revelations which are determined in their formal aspects by the needs and receptivities at hand. This is a crucial point. Thus,

...what determines the differences among forms of Truth is the difference among human receptacles. For thousands of years already humanity has been divided into several fundamentally different branches, which constitute so many complete humanities, more or less closed in on themselves; the existence

F. Schuon, 'No Activity Without Truth', in J. Needleman (ed.), *The Sword of Gnosis*, Baltimore, 1974, p. 29. See also F. Schuon, *Stations of Wisdom*, London, 1961, p. 11.

F. Schuon Gnosis: Divine Wisdom, London, 1959, p. 32.

See F. Schuon, Light on the Ancient Worlds, London, 1966, p. 72.

of spiritual receptacles so different and so original demands differentiated refractions of the one Truth.

In a sense the Revelations are communicated in different divine languages. Just as we should baulk at the idea of 'true' and 'false' languages, so we need to see the necessity and the validity of multiple Revelations.² (This is not to suggest that all 'religions' which claim to derive from a 'Revelation' do so in fact, nor that there is no such thing as a pseudo-religion.) The principle of multiple Revelations is not accessible to all mentalities and its implications must remain anathema to the majority of believers. This is in the nature of things. However, as each religion proceeds from a Revelation, it is, in Seyyed Hossein Nasr's words, both

...the religion and a religion, the religion inasmuch as it contains within itself the Truth and the means of attaining the Truth, a religion since it emphasises a particular aspect of Truth in conformity with the spiritual and psychological needs of the humanity for whom it is destined.³

Further potential ambiguities are dispelled by the principle of orthodoxy. Schuon articulates the principle thus:

In order to be orthodox a religion must possess a mythological or doctrinal symbolism establishing the essential distinction between the Real and the illusory, or the Absolute and the relative... and must offer a way that serves both the perfection of concentration on the Real and also its continuity. In other words a religion is orthodox on condition that it offers a sufficient, if

See F. Schuon, Gnosis: Divine Wisdom, London, 1959, p. 29. For some mapping of these branches and some account of their differences see Schuon's essay 'The Meaning of Race' in F. Schuon, Language of the Self, Madras, 1959, pp. 173-200. This essay should be read in conjunction with 'Principle of Distinction in the Social Order' in the same volume. These essays can also be found in F. Schuon, Castes and Races, London, 1982, the latter essay appearing under the title 'The Meaning of Caste'.

The comparison of religions and languages is a common one. For some examples see M. Müller, 'Chips from a German Workshop', in J. Waardenburg (ed.), Classical Approaches to the Study of Religion, The Hague, 1973, pp. 88-89; and R. Z. Werblowsky, 'Universal Religion and Universalist Religion', International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1971, pp. 10-11.

See S. H. Nasr, *Ideals and Realities of Islam*, London, 1966, p. 15.

not always exhaustive, idea of the absolute and the relative, and therewith an idea of their reciprocal relationships...¹

This is re-stated and expanded in another passage:

For a religion to be considered intrinsically orthodox - an extrinsic orthodoxy hangs upon formal elements which cannot apply literally outside their own perspective - it must rest upon a fully adequate doctrine... then it must extol and actualise a spirituality that is equal to this doctrine and thereby include sanctity within its ambit both as concept and reality; this means it must be of Divine and not philosophical origin and thus be charged with a sacramental or theurgic presence...²

In other words, each religion is sufficient unto itself and contains all that is necessary for man's sanctification and salvation. Nevertheless, it remains limited by definition. The recognition and reconciliation of these two apparently antagonistic principles is crucial to the traditionalist perspective. Schuon states the matter this way:

A religion is a form, and so also a limit, which 'contains' the Limitless, to speak in paradox; every form is fragmentary because of its necessary exclusion of other formal possibilities; the fact that these forms – when they are complete, that is to say when they are perfectly 'themselves' – each in their own way represent totality does not prevent them from being fragmentary in respect of their particularisation and their reciprocal exclusion.³

The key to the inter-relationships of the religious traditions is to be found in the relationship of the exoteric and esoteric aspects of religion.

F. Schuon, Light on the Ancient Worlds, London, 1966, p. 138.

F. Schuon, Islam and the Perennial Philosophy, London, 1976, p. 14. See also commentary by L. Schaya in Y. Ibish and P.L. Wilson (eds), Traditional Modes of Contemplation and Action, Tehran, 1977, pp. 462ff.

See F. Schuon, *Understanding Islam*, London, 1966, p. 144. See also F. Schuon, *Dimensions of Islam*, London, 1969, p. 136.

The Exoteric and Esoteric Domains

We are accustomed to drawing sharp dividing lines between the religious traditions. The differences here are, of course, palpably real and Schuon has no wish to blur the distinctions. We shall not find in the work of the traditionalists any Procrustean attempt to find a unity on a plane where it does not exist nor an insipid universalism which posits a unity of no matter what elements as long as they lay some claim to being 'religious' or 'spiritual'. However, this notwithstanding, Schuon draws another kind of dividing line which in some senses is much more fundamental: that between the exoteric and esoteric.

In discriminating between the exoteric and the esoteric we are, in a sense, speaking of 'form' and 'spirit'. Exotericism rests on a necessary formalism:

Exotericism never goes beyond the 'letter'. It puts its accent on the Law, not on any realisation, and so puts it on action and merit. It is essentially a 'belief' in a 'letter', or a dogma envisaged in its formal exclusiveness, and an obedience to a ritual and moral Law. And, further, exotericism never goes beyond the individual; it is centred on heaven rather than on God, and this amounts to saying that this difference has for it no meaning.¹

It follows that exotericism must thereby embody certain inevitable and in a sense therapeutic limits or 'errors' which from a fuller perspective can be seen in both their positive and negative aspects. Religion, in its formal aspect, is made up of what the Buddhists call *upaya*, 'skilful means' which answer the necessities of the case, what Schuon calls 'saving mirages' and 'celestial stratagems'. The limiting definitions of exoteric formalism are 'comparable to descriptions of an object of which only the form and not the colours can be seen'. Partial truths which might be inadequate in a sapiential perspective may be altogether proper on the formal exoteric plane:

F. Schuon, Light on the Ancient Worlds, London, 1966, p. 76.

F. Schuon, Survey of Metaphysics and Esoterism, Bloomington, 1986, p. 185, fn 2. See also F. Schuon, The Transfiguration of Man, Bloomington, 1995, p. 8: 'In religious exoterisms, efficacy at times takes the place of truth, and rightly so, given the nature of the men to whom they are addressed.'

F. Schuon, Understanding Islam, p. 80.

The formal homogeneity of a religion requires not only truth but also errors – though these are only in form – just as the world requires evil and as Diversity implies the mystery of creation by virtue of its infinity.... The religions are 'mythologies' which, as such, are founded on real aspects of the Divine and on sacred facts, and thus on realities but only on aspects. Now this limitation is at the same time inevitable and fully efficacious.¹

A specific example of an exoteric dogma might help to reinforce some of the points under discussion. In discussing the Christian dogmas about heaven and hell, Schuon has this to say:

We are made for the Absolute, which embraces all things and from which none can escape; this truth is marvellously well presented in the monotheistic religions in the alternative between the two 'eternities' beyond the grave... the alternative may be insufficient from the point of view of total Truth, but it is psychologically realistic and mystically efficacious; many lives have been squandered away and lost for the single reason that a belief in hell and in paradise is missing.²

The statements of a formal exotericism can thus be seen as intimations of Truth, as metaphors and symbols, as bridges to the formless Reality.³ In other words, the forms of exotericism represent certain accommodations which are necessary to bring various truths within the purview of the average mentality. As such they are adequate to the collective needs in question. For the normal believer the exoteric domain is the only domain.

However, if 'exotericism consists in identifying transcendent realities with dogmatic forms' then esotericism is concerned 'in a more or less direct manner with these same realities'. Esotericism is concerned with the apprehension of Reality as such, not Reality as understood in such and such a perspective and 'under the veil of different religious formulations'. While exotericism sees 'essence' or 'universal truth' as a function of particular forms, esotericism sees the forms as a function of 'essence'. To put it another way,

F. Schuon, Spiritual Perspectives and Human Facts, London, 1969, p. 70.

F. Schuon, Light on the Ancient Worlds, London, 1966, p. 22.

F. Schuon, Understanding Islam, p. 110.

⁴ F. Schuon, Logic and Transcendence, New York, 1975, p. 144. See also F. Schuon, Esoterism as Principle and as Way, London, 1980, p. 37.

F. Schuon, Esoterism as Principle and as Way, p. 19.

exotericism particularises the universal, esotericism universalises the particular:

What characterises esoterism to the very extent that it is absolute, is that on contact with a dogmatic system, it universalises the symbol or religious concept on the one hand, and interiorizes it on the other; the particular or the limited is recognised as the manifestation of the principial and the transcendent, and this in its turn reveals itself as immanent.¹

Esotericism is 'situated' on the plane of mystical experience, of intellection and realisation, of gnosis, a plane on which the question of orthodoxy cannot arise, operative as it is only on the formal plane:

If the purest esotericism includes the whole truth – and that is the very reason for its existence – the question of 'orthodoxy' in the religious sense clearly cannot arise: direct knowledge of the mysteries could not be 'Moslem' or 'Christian' just as the sight of a mountain is the sight of a mountain and not something else.²

Nevertheless, the two realms, exoteric and esoteric, are continually meeting and interpenetrating, not only because there is such a thing as a 'relative esotericism' but because 'the underlying truth is one, and also because man is one'.³ Furthermore, even if esotericism transcends forms, it has need of doctrinal, ritual, moral and aesthetic supports on the path to realisation.⁴ Herein lies the point of Schuon's repeated affirmations of orthodoxy, such as this: 'Orthodoxy includes and guarantees incalculable values which man could not possibly draw out of himself.'⁵

It is not surprising that the exoteric elements in a religious tradition should be preserved and protected by custodians whose attitude to esotericism will be, at best, somewhat ambivalent, at worst openly hostile. In addressing itself to the defence of the *credo* and of the forms which appear as guarantors of truth the exoteric

Ibid., p. 19.

² F. Schuon, Understanding Islam, p. 139. See also F. Schuon, Sufism, Veil and Quintessence, Bloomington, 1981, p. 112.

F. Schuon, Esoterism as Principle and as Way, p. 16.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

F. Schuon, Spiritual Perspectives and Human Facts, p. 113. See also F. Schuon, Islam and the Perennial Philosophy, p. 5.

'resistance' to esotericism is entirely positive. But sometimes the exoteric defenders of orthodoxy overstep themselves and in so doing beget results that are both destructive and counter-productive, especially when a religious tradition is endangered by a preponderantly exoteric outlook:

The exoteric viewpoint is, in fact, doomed to end by negating itself once it is no longer vivified by the presence within it of the esoterism of which it is both the outward radiation and the veil. So it is that religion, according to the measure in which it denies metaphysical and initiatory realities and becomes crystallized in literalistic dogmatism, inevitably engenders unbelief; the atrophy that overtakes dogmas when they are deprived of their internal dimension recoils upon them from outside, in the form of heretical and atheistic negations.¹

How much of post-medieval Christian history bears witness to this truth! Recall the theological and ecclesiastical ostracisms that have befallen some of the mystics and metaphysicians seeking to preserve the esoteric dimension within Christianity.

The supra-human origin of a religious tradition in a Revelation, an adequate doctrine concerning the Absolute and the relative, the saving power of the spiritual method, the esoteric convergence on the Unitive Truth: all these point to the inner unity of all integral traditions which are, in a sense, variations on one theme. However, there remain certain puzzling questions which might stand in the way of an understanding of the principial unity which the religio perennis discloses.

The Limits of Religious Exclusivism

One frequently comes across formulations such as the following:

It is sometimes asserted that all religions are equally true. But this would seem to be simply sloppy thinking, since the various religions hold views of reality which are sharply different if not contradictory.²

F. Schuon, The Transcendent Unity of Religions, New York, 1975, p. 9.

O. Thomas, 'Introduction' to Attitudes to Other Religions, London, 1969, quoted by H. Smith, 'Introduction to the Revised Edition' in F. Schuon, The Transcendent Unity of Religions, p. xiii fn.

This kind of either/or thinking, characteristic of much that nowadays passes for philosophy, is in the same vein as a dogmatism which

reveals itself not only by its inability to conceive the inward or implicit illimitability of a symbol, but also by its inability to recognise, when faced with two apparently contradictory truths, the inward connection that they apparently affirm, a connection that makes of them complementary aspects of one and the same truth.¹

It is precisely this kind of incapacity which must be overcome if the transcendent unity of the religions is to be understood. As Schuon remarks,

A religion is not limited by what it includes but by what it excludes; this exclusion cannot impair the religion's deepest contents – every religion is intrinsically a totality – but it takes its revenge all the more surely on the intermediary plane... the arena of theological speculations and fervours... extrinsic contradictions can hide an intrinsic compatibility or identity, which amounts to saying that each of the contradictory theses contains a truth and thereby an aspect of the whole truth and a way of access to this totality.²

Examples of 'contradictory' truths which effectively express complementary aspects of a single reality can be found not only across the traditions but within them. One might instance, by way of illustration, the Biblical or Koranic affirmations regarding predestination and free will.³

From an esoteric viewpoint the exclusivist claims of one or another religion have no absolute validity. It is true that 'the arguments of every intrinsically orthodox religion are absolutely convincing if one puts oneself in the intended setting'. It is also true that orthodox theological dogmatisms are entitled to a kind of 'defensive reflex' which makes for claims to exclusivism. However, and this is crucial,

F. Schuon, The Transcendent Unity of Religions, p. 3. See also S. H. Nasr, Knowledge and the Sacred, New York, 1981, p. 281.

F. Schuon, Islam and the Perennial Philosophy, p. 46.

F. Schuon, The Transcendent Unity of Religions, p. 4.

F. Schuon, Spiritual Perspectives and Human Facts, p. 14.

The exoteric claim to the exclusive possession of a unique truth, or of Truth without epithet, is... an error purely and simply; in reality, every expressed truth necessarily assumes a form, that of its expression, and it is metaphysically impossible that any form should possess a unique value to the exclusion of other forms; for a form, by definition, cannot be unique and exclusive, that is to say it cannot be the only possible expression of what it expresses.¹

The argument that the different religions cannot all be repositories of the truth because of their formal differences and antagonisms rests on a failure to understand this principle. The lesson to be drawn from the multiplicity of religious forms is quite different:

The diversity of religions, far from proving the falseness of all the doctrines concerning the supernatural, shows on the contrary the supra-formal character of revelation and the formal character of ordinary human understanding: the essence of revelation — or enlightenment — is one, but human nature requires diversity.²

Schuon has deployed several images to clarify the relationship of the religions to each other. He likens them to geometric forms. Just as it would be absurd to imagine that spatial extensions and relationships could only be expressed by one form so it is absurd to assert that there could be only one doctrine giving an account of the Absolute. However, just as each geometric form has some necessary and sufficient reason for its existence, so too with the religions. To affirm that the Truth informing all religious traditions is one and that they essentially all vehicle the same message in different forms is not to preclude qualitative discriminations concerning particular aspects of this and that tradition. Schuon extends the geometric analogy:

The differentiated forms are irreplaceable, otherwise they would not exist, and they are in no sense various kinds of imperfect circles; the cross is infinitely nearer the perfection of the point... than are the oval or the trapezoid, for example. Analogous considerations apply to traditional doctrines, as concerns their

F. Schuon, 'No Activity Without Truth', p. 4. See also M. Pallis, A Buddhist Spectrum, London, 1980, p. 157.

F. Schuon, The Transcendent Unity of Religions, p. 17.

differences of form and their efficacy in equating the contingent to the Absolute.¹

Ecumenism and Dialogue

From a traditionalist viewpoint, the vexed issues of ecumenism. dialogue and the inter-relationship of the religions are all strands in the same web. It should be noted, firstly, that the recognition of the proper status of traditions other than one's own depends on various contingent circumstances and does not in itself constitute a spiritual necessity. In some respects a religious intolerance is preferable to the kind of tolerance which holds fast to nothing: '...the Christian saint who fights the Moslems is closer to Islamic sanctity than the philosopher who accepts everything and practices nothing.'2 Secondly, traditional orthodoxy is the prerequisite of any creative intercourse between the traditions themselves. To imagine that dialogue can usefully proceed without firm formal commitments is to throw the arena open to any and every kind of opinion and to let a kind of anarchy which can only exacerbate the problem. Thirdly, and crucially, the question of the relationship of the religions to each other can only decisively be resolved by resort to traditional esotericisms and by the application of trans-religious metaphysical principles. The 'problem' of religious pluralism can only be resolved through a penetration of the exoteric barriers which each tradition has erected. As Seyyed Hossein Nasr has pointed out, 'Ecumenism if correctly understood must be an esoteric activity if it is to avoid becoming the instrument for simple relativisation and further secularisation.'

A proper understanding of the exoteric-esoteric relationship would put an end to all the artificial and quite implausible means by which attempts have been made to reconcile formal divergences. As Marco Pallis, starting from a Buddhist perspective, has suggested,

Dharma and the dharmas, unitive suchness and the suchness of diversified existence: here is to be found the basis of an interreligious exegesis which does not seek a remedy for historical conflicts by explaining away formal or doctrinal factors such as in reality translate differences of spiritual genius. Far from

F. Schuon, Light on the Ancient Worlds, p. 139.

F. Schuon, Logic and Transcendence, p. 182. See also S. H. Nasr, Knowledge and the Sacred, New York, 1981, p. 291 and p. 307, fn 28.

S. H. Nasr, op. cit., p. 282.

minimising the importance of these differences in the name of a facile and eventually spurious ecumenical friendliness, they will be cherished for the positive message they severally carry and as necessities that have arisen out of the differentiation of mankind itself.¹

There have been several attempts to reconcile these formal antagonisms under an array of different philosophical and theological canopies - theosophy, 'anonymous Christianity', 'natural religion', 'universal religion', the perennial philosophy as espoused by the likes of Aldous Huxley and the redoubtable Swami Vivekananda. As Ananda Coomaraswamy has remarked, these various attempts at a universal religion amount to a kind of religious Esperanto – with about as much chance of success!

The outlook implied in the passage from Pallis depends on a recognition of the exoteric-esoteric relationship and a subordination (not an annihilation) of exoteric dogmatism to the metaphysical principles preserved by traditional esotericisms. The main obstacle on this path is the tenacity with which many representatives of an exoteric viewpoint cling to a belief in the exclusive claims of their own tradition and to other 'pious extravagances'. Schuon goes to the heart of the matter:

...if exoterism, the religion of literalism and exclusive dogmatism, has difficulty in admitting the existence and legitimacy of the esoteric dimension... this is understandable on various grounds. However, in the cyclic period in which we live, the situation of the world is such that exclusive dogmatism... is hard put to hold its own, and whether it likes it or not, has need of certain esoteric elements... Unhappily the wrong choice is made; the way out of certain deadlocks is sought, not with the help of esoterism, but by resorting to the falsest and most pernicious of philosophical and scientific ideologies, and for the universality of the spirit, the reality of which is confusedly noted, there is substituted a so-called 'ecumenism' which consists of

The phrase is from Schuon's essay 'Deficiencies in the World of Faith', Survey of Metaphysics and Esoterism, p. 125.

M. Pallis, A Buddhist Spectrum, pp. 109-110. The essay from which this excerpt is taken can also be found in R. Fernando (ed.), The Unanimous Tradition, Colombo, 1991. See also V. Danner, 'The Inner and Outer Man', in Traditional Modes of Contemplation and Action, pp. 407ff.

nothing but platitudes and sentimentality and accepts everything without discrimination.¹

Religious Studies and the Traditionalist Perspective

For many scholars concerned with the inter-relationship of the religions the central dilemma has been this: any 'theoretical' solution to the problem of conflicting truth claims demands a conceptual platform which both encompasses and transcends any specific theological position; it must go beyond the premises of any particular theological outlook but at the same time not compromise the theological position to which one might adhere. Traditionalism shows the way out of this impasse. It neither insists on nor precludes any particular religious commitment. Once the necessity of orthodoxy is accepted, and the principles which govern the relationship of the exoteric and the esoteric are understood, then one can remain fully committed to a particular tradition while recognising the limits of the outlook in question. Traditionalism requires neither a betraval of one's own tradition nor a wishy-washy hospitality to anything and everything. The observation made by an early reviewer of Schuon's The Transcendent Unity of Religions might be applied to traditionalism as a whole. It presents 'a very concrete and specific philosophy of religion for an ecumenical age... It opens... [the] way for discovering a basis for coexistence for the different creeds.'2

Traditionalism addresses itself to the inner meaning of religion through an elucidation of immutable metaphysical cosmological principles and through a penetration of the forms preserved in each religious tradition. The sources traditionalist vision are Revelation, tradition. intellection. realisation. It is neither a vestigial pseudo-scientific methodology nor a subjectively-determined 'hermeneutic' but a theoria which bridges the phenomena and the noumena of religion; it takes us 'from the forms to the essences wherein resides the truth of all religions and where alone a religion can be really understood...'.3 It provides an all-embracing context for the study of religion and the means whereby not only empirical but philosophical

F. Schuon, Logic and Transcendence, p. 4.

F. H. Heinemann in The Journal of Theological Studies, Vol. 6, 1955, p. 340.

S. H. Nasr, Sufi Essays, London, 1972, p. 38.

metaphysical questions can be both properly formulated and decisively answered.

In an essay entitled 'On the Pertinence of Philosophy', Ananda Coomaraswamy suggested that

...if we are to consider what may be the most urgent *practical* task to be resolved by the philosopher, we can only answer that this is... a control and revision of the principles of comparative religion, the true end of which science... should be to demonstrate the common metaphysical basis of all religions...¹

It would be sanguine in the extreme to imagine that comparative religion as a discipline will harness itself to such an enterprise. Nor, by the same token, can traditionalism itself ever be primarily an academic discipline. Nevertheless, there remain considerable possibilities for the discipline of religious studies to assimilate at least something of the traditionalist outlook or to accept it as one of the perspectives from which religion can be studied. Clearly there are many spiky questions which attend any attempt to reconcile a traditionalist vision with the demands of an impartial academic scholarship - questions which cannot be canvassed here.

The argument that traditionalism is too normative to be allowed to shape academic studies is no argument at all. As currently practised by many of its exponents, comparative religion is quite clearly normative anyway. As soon as we are prepared, for instance, to talk of 'sympathy', of 'mutual understanding', of 'world community', and so on, we have entered a normative realm. It is time scholars ceased to be embarrassed by this fact and stopped sheltering behind the tattered banner of a pseudo-scientific methodology which forbids any engagement with the most interesting, the most profound and the most urgent questions which naturally stem from any serious study of religion. The question is not whether the study of religion will be influenced by certain norms - it will be so influenced whether we admit it or not - but to what kind of norms we are prepared to give our allegiances. The time has come to nail our colours to the mast in arguing for approaches to religion which do justice to the traditional principle of adequation, and which will help rescue the discipline from the ignominious plight of being nothing more than

A. K. Coomaraswamy, What is Civilisation? and Other Essays, Ipswich, 1989, p. 18.

undistinguished member of a disreputable family of pseudosciences.

The discipline of religious studies will never have any integrity so long as it is pursued as a self-sufficient, self-validating end in itself. As Klaus Klostermaier has so acutely observed,

The study of religions can no longer afford the luxury of creating pseudo-problems of its own, of indulging in academic hobbies, or of acting as if religion or the study of it were ends in themselves. The one thing that might be worse than the confusion and uncertainty in the area of religious studies would be the development of a methodology of religious studies, by scholars of religious studies, for the sake of religious studies: playing a game by rules invented by the players for the sake of the game alone.¹

If this is not to be the fate of the discipline then, at the very least, there must be a much more radical debate about philosophical, theological and metaphysical questions generated within the discipline. E. O. James many years ago observed that 'The study of religion... demands both a historical and a scientific approach and a theological and philosophical evaluation if... its foundations are to be well and truly laid.' A serious consideration of the works of the traditionalists and of the whole traditionalist perspective would, at least, open the way for a fruitful reconvergence of philosophy, theology, comparative religion and metaphysics.

Those who accept the traditionalist position can reap a richer harvest. The explication of the sophia perennis and its application to contingent phenomena shows the way to an outlook invulnerable to the whim and fancy of ever-changing intellectual fashions and armours one against the debilitating effects of scientism and its sinister cargo of reductionisms. It annihilates that 'neutrality' which is indifferent to the claims of religion itself and removes those 'optical illusions' to which the modern world is victim. For those who see religions as something infinitely more than mere 'cultural phenomena', who believe them to be the vehicles of the most profound and precious truths to which we cannot and must not immunise ourselves, who wish to do justice to both the external forms and the inner meanings of religion, who cleave to their own

K. Klostermaier, 'From phenomenology to meta-science: reflections on the study of religion', Studies in Religion, Vol. 6, No. 4, 1976-77, p. 563.

E. O. James, quoted in E. J. Sharpe, 'Some Problems of Method in the Study of Religion', *Religion*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1971, p. 12.

tradition but who wish to recognise all integral religions as pathways to God, whose pursuit of religious studies is governed by something far more deep-seated than mental curiosity - for such people traditionalism can open up whole new vistas understanding. Ultimately, for those prepared to pay the proper price, it can lead to that 'light that is neither of the East nor the West'. A rediscovery of the immutable nature of man and a renewed understanding of the sophia perennis must be the governing purpose of the most serious comparative study of religion. It is, in Seyyed Hossein Nasr's words, a 'noble end... whose achievement the truly contemplative and intellectual elite are urgently summoned to by the very situation of man in the contemporary world'.2

From the Koran, quoted by S. H. Nasr, 'Conditions for a meaningful comparative philosophy', Philosophy East and West, Vol. 22, No. 1, 1972; p. 61.

S. H. Nasr, ibid.