Archbishop Gough and the Sydney Philosophers: Religion, Religious Studies, and the University

D. W. Dockrill

On Wednesday, 5 July, 1961, the Twelfth Biannual Convention of the Law Councils of Australia, meeting in Sydney, was opened by the Lord Chief Justice of England, Lord Porter. He was one of a number of distinguished international jurists, including the Chief Justice Earl Warren of the United States Supreme Court, who had come to join the Australian judiciary and other members of the legal fraternity at the seven hundred strong Convention. Early next morning there was an official service at St Andrew’s Cathedral at which the preacher was the Anglican Archbishop of Sydney, Dr H. R. Gough who had been installed two years earlier as the seventh holder of the See. The topic of the sermon was the legal enforcement of morals and its importance for national life at a time of continuing Cold War crisis.

In the circumstances, most of those attending the service presumably expected the Archbishop to preach a well prepared but not particularly controversial sermon on religion, morality and the law. Newspaper reporters in the congregation, however, were not quite so sure. ‘Journalists had been tipped off to expect something unusual’, according to Peter Coleman who was present at the occasion for the Bulletin, ‘but few’, he writes, ‘foresaw the furore that followed the sermon’.1 The ‘something unusual’ turned out to be an attack on certain unnamed university teachers in Sydney. In the course of his sermon the Archbishop claimed that there were academics in Australian universities, particularly in Sydney, who were aiding the Communist cause by teaching godless and sexually immoral soul-destroying philosophies. The unnamed teachers Dr Gough had in mind were soon revealed to be three prominent academics at the University of Sydney, Emeritus Professor John Anderson and Professors A. K. Stout and W. M. O’Neil.

The controversy which followed the Archbishop’s remarks completely overshadowed newspaper reports of the remaining days of the Law Convention and largely ignored his Cold War concerns. At first it centred on whether the identified academics and others had taught such doctrines but it soon came to embrace or touch

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upon a number of other issues: academic freedom, the secular character and independence of Australian universities, the teaching of philosophy, and, at its widest remove, attitudes towards Thomism by Catholic philosophers, and questions about the conditions which should govern the study of religion in secular universities. The most vigorous newspaper\(^1\) phase of the controversy was in the first couple of weeks after the sermon but its echoes and ramifications reached well into 1962. Its end, in terms of Archbishop Gough’s specific charges, might be said to be marked by the Report of the New South Wales Youth Policy Advisory Committee which was ordered to be printed by Parliament on 30 October, 1962. In its abstracted form, the controversy came to rest with Professor J. L. Mackie’s article, ‘Religion and the University’ in Vestes, September, 1962.\(^2\)

I

There can be little doubt that the invitation to preach the Convention sermon provided the Archbishop with a difficult challenge. He had to speak briefly but usefully to a distinguished audience on some topic in the area of law, morality, and religion. This would not be an easy task for a bishop with a strong background in the more philosophical theological disciplines, but it would be even more testing for someone, such as Gough, whose

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1 Unless otherwise indicated, the year dates are 1961. Abbreviations of newspapers and journals: ACR (The Australian Church Record); Ad (The Advocate, Melbourne); CW (The Catholic Weekly, Sydney); DT (The Daily Telegraph, Sydney); HS (Honi Soit, student newspaper, University of Sydney); SC (Southern Cross, Sydney Diocesan Magazine); TA (The Anglican); TM (The Mirror, Sydney); TS (The Sun, Sydney); SMH (The Sydney Morning Herald).

intellectual strengths were not of this kind. In the circumstances it appears that the Archbishop was prepared to take counsel on what he might consider in preparing for the occasion. His sermon certainly reflects the influence of two recent writings: one, a locally produced pamphlet, *Empiricism and Freedom* (1959) by Dr V. K. Kinsella, a Sydney surgeon; the other, Sir Patrick Devlin’s ‘The Enforcement of Morals’, the 1959 Maccabean Lecture on Jurisprudence at the British Academy, a much discussed paper amongst legal philosophers during the next decade. The Archbishop’s source for the Kinsella paper was Judge Adrian Curlewis, who probably drew his attention to Devlin’s lecture as well.¹

Curlewis, a judge in the District Court of N.S.W. and a leading figure in the Australian Surf Life Saving Association had been made chairman, in November 1960, of The New South Wales Youth Policy Advisory Committee, appointed by the Minister of Education. It had come into being because of growing public concern by the churches and others about changing youth mores and questions about whether a new and morally disturbing youth culture was emerging, as some, such as Archbishop Gough, believed. The Committee’s task was in general ‘to inquire into and study the needs of Youth and then to advise the Government of New South Wales on an appropriate Youth Policy’. In his approach to the task of his Committee, Curlewis found Devlin’s lecture to be of great value: an extract was listed in the Committee’s Report as one of a number of statements which provided guiding principles used by it in reaching its recommendations.² Devlin’s concerns, however,

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² In his presidential address to the 1960 synod Gough said that he had come to the conclusion that ‘a considerable proportion of our young people are amoral.’ (*Year Book of the Diocese of Sydney...1961*, Sydney, 1961, p. 222.) The leading editorial in *SMH* (19/10/60) attacked what it called The Primate’s Cures for our Moral Ills; see also the editorial in *The Sun Herald* (23/10/60), and the remarks of the Minister for Education (E. Wetherall) in *SMH* (29/10/60). The aims of the Curlewis Committee: *Report of the New South Wales Youth Policy Advisory Committee*, Sydney, 1963 (as separately printed), p. 7; references to Devlin, pp. 49, 156. In the A. K. Stout papers in the Archives of the University of Sydney there is a copy of a letter from Judge
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were primarily jurisprudential, not moral or policy related, though
his position on the enforcement of morals and the role of religion
in sustaining morality obviously had general policy implications.¹

His lecture is in large part an attack on a principle used in the
English Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offences and
Prostitution (1957), the Wolfenden Report, in recommending that
homosexual acts between consenting adults be no longer treated as
offences under the criminal law. The principle to which Devlin took
objection is that the law should be concerned with matters of public,
not private morality. Homosexual relations in private between
consenting adults, the Committee had argued, are not public matters
and ought not to be subject to the criminal law. Devlin was not
directly concerned with whether or not homosexual practices were a
threat to social life or the public welfare - he was prepared to leave
to that question to experienced judges and others - but with whether
the distinction between public and private morality was acceptable
or useful for jurisprudential purposes. In his view it was not. Any
immoral act, he claimed, could be of social significance, but there
are various classes of immoral acts and not all of them are or should
be of concern to the law. Some because no law against them could
be effectively enforced; others because their immorality is uncertain
or contested; and others again because the law of a free people must
allow as much tolerance of a citizen's behaviour as is compatible
with the essential welfare or integrity of society. The tolerance of a
society in relation to particular immoral acts is apt to change over
time with the result that some forms of immorality previously
tolerated or ignored by the law become matters of legal concern,
e.g., incest, whereas others cease to be offences against the criminal
code. The social framework within which this occurs, Devlin argued,
is a widely and deeply shared set of moral principles within the
society which indicate what is and what is not decent human
conduct. It is, he claimed, a morality understood by most people,
the morality accepted by 'the man on the Clapham omnibus'. This

¹ See, e.g., Proceedings of the British Academy 1959, p. 132 for Devlin's
statement of his interest in the issue as a judge. Also note his claims: 'an
established morality is as necessary as good government to the welfare of
society. Societies disintegrate from within more frequently than they are
broken up by external pressures.' (p. 140); 'No society has yet solved
the problem of how to teach morality without religion. ... without the help of
Christian teaching the law will fail.' (p. 151).
common understanding of moral matters in British society is rooted in the Christian past of the country and remains so despite the fact that religious belief or disbelief is now no longer seen as having direct bearing on the welfare of the nation. The same situation generally prevails in Western countries:

Morals and religion are inextricably joined - the moral standards generally accepted in Western civilization countries being those belonging to Christianity. ¹

In terms of this approach, according to Devlin, immoral acts such as adultery and fornication are not matters for the criminal code whereas bigamy is.

In England we believe in the Christian idea of marriage and therefore adopt monogamy as a moral principle. Consequently the Christian institution of marriage has become the basis of family life and so part of the structure of our society. It is there not because it is Christian. It has got there because it is Christian, but it remains there because it is built into the house in which we live and could not be removed without bringing it down.²

Whether or not homosexual behaviour should be subject to the criminal law does not depend upon whether it is performed in private or public but whether the act is such as is likely to have serious consequences for the moral welfare essential to the integrity of the society. The measure of that welfare in England is, as a matter of fact, the historic and still accepted Christian principles which have shaped the common moral understanding and expectations of the people.

For anyone of a conservative moral and social persuasion, Devlin's argument provided welcome support against tampering too readily with those features of the criminal law in the West which enforced traditional Christian moral prohibitions. It is hardly surprising that the Archbishop found it a useful source for the first part of his sermon where he sets out a framework for answering the question 'How far, if at all, should the Criminal Law of a country

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² Ibid., p. 137.
concern itself with the enforcement of morals'. (ACR, 20/7, p.3)¹

Gough pointed out that not all forms of immorality or sins are crimes: some are, such as bigamy and homosexual acts; others are not, for example, fornication, adultery. What is the basis of the distinction? The answer, Gough claimed, depends upon understanding the purpose and the historical shaping of the law. The legal system is concerned with protecting the liberty of the individual and the welfare of the nation. But the liberty of the individual is not absolute: it has to be exercised with respect to the liberty of others and the welfare of the society. But how is the welfare of society to be determined? The answer is to be found in the historic moral traditions which structure the life of the society, 'the basic accepted standards which lie at the heart of national well being' (p.3). These are the principles whose presence is expressed in the 'repugnance felt by the conscience of society' (p.3) when they are flaunted. In the British nation these 'basic accepted standards' have been determined by the Christian religion, but their living authority does not depend upon a belief in the religion which has shaped them but in their acceptance and their place in the continuing practice of the people. The law against bigamy, for example, applies to Christian believer and unbeliever 'not because it is Christian but because it has been adopted through long history by the society in which they live. It is so much part of the house in which we live that we could not remove it without bringing down the whole building' (p.5). And this, the Archbishop claimed, applies generally to the basic moral standards of Britain and the West: 'The moral standards of Western Culture so much arise out of the Christian religion that Christianity cannot be abandoned without destroying the nations of the West' (p.5).

The unacknowledged influence and borrowings from Devlin's lecture would have been noted by some of the congregation, as the Archbishop might well have expected, but few, other than those who had followed his public statements since arriving in Australia, would have expected that the sermon would then quickly turn to Cold War issues.

He introduced this theme by referring to the trial of the war criminal, Adolph Eichmann, in Israel. Nazi Germany, Gough claimed, was the product of a long series of attempts by secular philosophers and modernising theologians to separate the German

¹ The sermon was printed in two forms: publicly in ACR (20/7), pp. 3, 5 and separately as a four page pamphlet for private distribution. A copy of the latter is in the A. K. Stout papers (item 871) accompanied by a With Compliments note from the Archbishop.
people from their traditional Christian roots. The end result, he asserted, had been Eichmann and his like. Communism, however, posed an even greater threat than Nazism. And the present danger was that Communism might win by default because there are those who seek to separate the Western democracies from their historic Christian morality, thereby giving easy entry to Communist ideas about liberty, the importance of the individual, the place of religion and the authority of the state. The often unwitting leaders of this internal threat were the intellectuals who attack the religious view of man and traditional moral standards. The end result, he claimed, was moral impotence and despair in which resolute opposition to Communism is replaced with a policy of ‘Better to be Red than Dead’, ‘now being widely advocated in the Western World’ (p.5).

In developing this case Gough went far beyond the material he found in Devlin’s lecture. His opposition to changing mores and legal reform of the kind shown by the Wolfenden Report as well as his conservative political convictions about dissent of the type associated with the campaigns for nuclear disarmament are more likely to have drawn support from the second work which he consulted in preparing his sermon, Kinsella’s Empiricism and Freedom. The influence of this pamphlet upon his sermon appeared when Gough gave local relevance to his claim about the internal intellectual threat to the Western democracies by saying that there was evidence before the N.S.W. Youth Policy Committee to show that the same danger was to be found in Australia and particularly in Sydney. The evidence, whose source and nature he did not specify, was Kinsella’s pamphlet, as Judge Curlewis informed journalists soon after the sermon.

Yet, here in the Western World, in Great Britain, in America and in Australia, yes even here in Sydney, we have those who are shamelessly teaching in our universities these same soul destroying philosophies. I am not saying that such lecturers are Communists but they are teaching ideas which are breaking down the restraints of conscience, decrying the institution of marriage, urging our students to premarital sexual experience, advocating free love and the right of self expression. Evidence of this kind is even now before the New South Wales Advisory Youth Policy Committee, recently appointed by the State Government. I hope that in due course such publicity will be given to this that the national conscience will be aroused. To teach that there is no God and no Divine Law; to encourage self
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expression and free love; these throw the door wide open to Communism. (p.5)

In Gough’s hands, Devlin’s general argument in support of the enforcement of morals had become united with an anti-Communist call for action to be taken to ensure that certain religious beliefs and moral standards be maintained by academics, particularly in Sydney.

The Archbishop’s sermon did not end at this point. ‘I may seem to have wandered from the real subject of this address’, he told the congregation. The final section of the sermon consists in a return to material about the relation ‘between the Divine Law and Criminal Law’ in which he encouraged his legal hearers to ‘Uphold the law and do not give way to the popular clamour to relax its severity’ (p.5), presumably a protest against the movement for law reform in England during the 1950s such as the Wolfenden Report. The Archbishop also attempted to loosely relate the content of the sermon to his text, Galatians 3:24: ‘The Law was our schoolmaster to bring us to Christ’. The fate of his sermon and his reputation did not depend, however, upon the material he drew from Devlin or his Cold War fears or his view of Christ’s saving work, but his use and endorsement of Dr Kinsella’s pamphlet.

II

In time, both Gough and Curlewis were to discover that Kinsella was not the most reliable guide to affairs at the University in 1959, when his pamphlet first appeared, or in 1961, when the Archbishop and the Judge managed to give the author and his work a publicity they could not otherwise have obtained. Judge Curlewis and his Committee, however, had the opportunity of many months of reflection and advice before having to determine the precise value of Kinsella’s submissions for their task. When the Committee reported to the Minister in July, 1962, it said with respect to Kinsella’s Empiricism and Freedom and its claims about immoral teaching:

After a very full consideration, the Committee came to the conclusion that there was insufficient evidence that immoral teaching had occurred. The Committee also considered that, because of the wide publicity given to the allegations, the Senate
of the University was in the most favourable position to make such inquiries as it thought fit.¹

The Archbishop unlike the Committee, did not have much public scope for reconsidering the pamphlet and its worth. That freedom had all been but lost once he had preached his sermon. By drawing upon the pamphlet and describing it as evidence, he had become committed to its untested claims and identified as an establishment figure encouraging a public request for authoritative action against the atheistic and antinomian philosophers at Sydney University. It was not long, however, before Gough came to realise, or, perhaps, was forced to realise that he was in an untenable public position.² In a printed version of the sermon, published fourteen days after the event in *The Australian Church Record* and separately printed in pamphlet form for private circulation, the Archbishop conceded something to his critics in a note printed at the bottom of the sermon:

N.B. The evidence referred to on the previous page was partly a pamphlet by Dr Kinsella which had been sent to His Honour Judge Curlewis of the N.S.W. Youth Policy Advisory Committee. I now understand that the accuracy of some of its allegations has been denied. H. S. [Hugh Sydney] (*ACR*, 20/8, p.5).

As a concession to those whose reputations had been smeared by the allegations referred to, this was not a generous admission, and the mention of other evidence suggested that there was independent material to support the Archbishop's claims.

What was this other evidence? The answer to this question was provided by Gough's spokesman the day after the Convention

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¹ Report of the New South Wales Youth Policy Advisory Committee, p. 32.
² In a letter, dated 21/7/61, from Dr Eric Dowling, then a lecturer in Philosophy at the University of NSW to his former student, A. W. Sparkes, then studying in London, Dowling writes: 'a youngster ... a member of the Sydney Philosophy staff and an active communicant with the Church of England solicited and obtained an hour's interview with His Grace in which HG said that (a) he unconditionally withdrew *everything* based on the Kinsella pamphlet and (b) that he'd like to make a public apology to Sydney University but that (c) he could not because it would have to be so qualified, due to certain reservations by which he still stood, that it would be incomprehensible and misleading to the average member of the faithful.' I am indebted to Dr Dowling for letting me quote from this letter and to my colleague, Dr Sparkes for drawing it to my attention.
sermon. It was material presented to the Archbishop’s Moral Welfare Committee appointed by him after his first diocesan synod in 1959. At that synod concern had been expressed by one of the assistant bishops, Bishop R. C. Kerle, about ‘a growing “sex hysteria” in Australia [which] was leading slowly to the degeneration of the moral tone of the community’. The synod resolved that the matter be investigated by a committee of the Archbishop’s choosing, a motion which Gough welcomed as an opportunity to do ‘something to prevent these kinds of things happening’ (SMH, 25/9/59). In his presidential address to the 1960 synod, Gough reported that his Committee had found that ‘sexual impurity amongst married and unmarried young people and children is a cancer which is eating at the very heart of this great nation’.1 The Archbishop’s spokesman explained the relevance of this Committee to the attack in the Convention sermon:

Men of experience and standing in the community have given other information on this matter to the Archbishop’s Moral Welfare Committee. Naturally the Archbishop cannot reveal these sources. But the information was sufficient to convince the Committee that the situation is serious. (DT, 8/7)

The Archbishop’s Committee did not continue much beyond the October, 1960 synod. With the appointment of the Curlewis Committee in November of that year, it ‘had been in abeyance’ (S, 7/7), indicating that it was thought that its concerns would be better served by the Government inquiry. The connection between the work of the two committees, in the Archbishop’s view, was further confirmed by a report that

leading Anglicans who are in close touch with Dr Gough ... believed that his attack [in his sermon] was designed to: Ensure close study of the university question by Judge Curlewis’s committee. Urge his own informants to submit evidence to this committee’. (DT, 8/7)

As the controversy over the Archbishop’s attack developed, it became clear, however, that neither he nor his informants were well

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1 ‘Presidential Address’, 17/10/60, Year Book of the Diocese of Sydney ... 1961, Sydney, 1961, p. 222. The membership of the Committee included ‘a Judge of the Supreme Court, a Children’s Court Magistrate, a Psychologist, a Psychiatrist, a leading Educationist and Social Workers, both clerical and lay.’ (ibid.)
placed to understand the complexities of the 'university question' or the reliability of Dr Kinsella's account of affairs at the University.¹

III

Dr Kinsella, a Sydney medical graduate (1923, MD, 1947) was an established surgeon, an honorary at St Vincent's, one of the teaching hospitals for the University. He had a strong but narrowly based interest in the social significance of philosophy which had been furthered by association with the Aquinas Academy. The Academy had been established in 1945 by the Catholic Archbishop of Sydney, Dr Norman Gilroy, under the Regency of Dr Austin Woodbury, a priest in the Marist order. Woodbury, a very well qualified Thomistic philosopher and forceful teacher, exercised considerable influence on several generations of Catholics who wished for a philosophical education in accord with Church teaching and independent of the tradition of philosophical naturalism which had dominated University philosophy since the arrival of John Anderson as Challis Professor of Philosophy in 1927.²

Anderson's empiricism was the main target of Kinsella's attack in Empiricism and Freedom. Anderson is, he wrote, 'its chief teacher' 'at our university' but Kinsella also aimed at the other members of staff, those 'official teachers of our university' who taught the same doctrines. In practical terms that ought not to have been a difficult task, for during most of Anderson's tenure of the

¹ Why were Gough and Curlewis so concerned about the 'university question'? The Archbishop had a particular concern about the changing mores of young people from wealthy backgrounds (SMH, 24/10/60); the Curlewis Committee regarded the universities as providing a leadership class (Report, p. 33).

² On the founding of the Aquinas Academy, see CW, 25/1/45. The editor wrote: 'It might be encouraged, for example, that an arrangement might be reached with the local university authorities whereby Catholic students for the Arts Degree might complete their courses in philosophy in the Academy and receive appropriate credit from the University. This would offset the unsatisfactory philosophy taught by the clique that has gained control of philosophy at Sydney University.' In 1961 the Academy had 600 students, (CW, 16/3). On Dr Woodbury, see CW, 15/2/45, 1/3/45, and T. L. Suttor, 'Austin Mary Woodbury', The Australasian Catholic Record, 55, 1978, pp. 142-50. See also 'Who Put the Arsenic in the Chocolate?', in The Bulletin, 19/8/61; Patrick O'Farrell, The Catholic Church and Community, rev. ed., Sydney, 1985, p. 409.
Chair his department was staffed by his own former students and the department became host to a philosophic school whose research program was ideally to consist in developing a systematic and comprehensive naturalistic metaphysic along the general lines set out by Anderson in his early papers. This systematic philosophy was known as empiricism or realism and sometimes as Andersonian because of its distinctive doctrines. The appointment in 1939 of A. K. Stout from Edinburgh to the new Chair and department of Moral and Political philosophy widened the opportunities for those students who in their second and later years wished to specialise in moral and political philosophy or who simply wished to escape Anderson's department, now called the department of Logic and Metaphysics. Stout, however, was a very different sort of philosopher from Anderson in style, interests, and doctrine. He was not driven by the wide ranging metaphysical ambitions that motivated Anderson (or his own father, G. F. Stout, who accompanied him to Australia) and his social and political concerns, which involved him in many extra-university activities, tended to be more constructively and less confrontationally expressed than Anderson's. Philosophically, he was conscious of the influence of his father's teaching upon his thought, a philosophy opposed to the sort of naturalist metaphysic advocated by Anderson. Stout's appointment, however, did little to change Anderson's actual and perceived central place in philosophy at the University.

1 Concerning Anderson's life and times, see D. Horne, 'John Anderson', DT, 14/9/46; P. H. Partridge, 'Anderson as an Educator', The Australian Highway, September 1958; A. J. Baker, op. cit.; Brian Kennedy, op. cit., and the E. Kamenka (1986) and W. M. O'Neil (1979) items in his bibliography. Kinsella's pamphlet: V. J. Kinsella, Empiricism and Freedom, Sydney, [1959], pp. 12, privately printed and distributed. (Item 901 in Stout papers). In some copies there is a hand written addition on p. 1 indicating that he believed that, what at Sydney is called empiricism, 'In other universities, the same is taught under the name "logical positivism".' Anderson's school: J. A. Passmore writes that 'He [Anderson] thought of the department as being rather like a German Institute, in which we should all work out ideas that, as he granted, he had only sketched.' (Memoirs of a Semi-detached Australian, Melbourne, 1977, p. 139.)

Amongst churchmen and social and political conservatives, the interest Anderson generated amongst undergraduates and others together with his forthright statements concerning various matters caused much chagrin and, from time to time, vigorous public protests. In such circles Stout’s appointment was sometimes seen as a disappointment. ‘I have been told’, the Bishop of Newcastle wrote in 1943 to the Warden of St Paul’s College, ‘that the new Professor’s influence is negligible as against Professor Anderson’. The coalition of Anderson’s extra-university critics resented his atheism, his criticism of religion and clerical claims to moral expertise, his rejection of conventional moral and political beliefs, and, in the first decade of his tenure, his Communism, and later his continuing admiration of aspects of Marx’s thought.

Kinsella’s *Empiricism and Freedom* is the last expression of this tradition of public opposition to Anderson and his influence, for by the time the pamphlet was published its chief target had retired at the end of 1958 as emeritus professor, and the two philosophy departments which had existed from Stout’s appointment were reunited with two professors, Stout and J. L. Mackie, one of Anderson’s former students, who replaced him in the Challis Chair. The significance of these and other changes, however, were lost on Kinsella, in part because he thought Anderson’s empiricist philosophy still lingered on in the work of Stout and W. M. O’Neil, Challis Professor of Psychology. They were, he believed, Andersonians.

To be an Andersonian or Sydney University empiricist was for Kinsella to be a member of a school which he describes as ‘an unwitting fifth column’, ‘hidden persuaders in such key posts at a time so dangerous in our country and civilization’ (p.9). The Andersonian philosophy is ‘as subtle as it is evil’ (p.4), ‘rubbish’, ‘devoid of strength and manliness, but contains the seeds of moral corruption and political subversion’ (p.12). Anderson’s department was ‘a Department for the De-education or Psycho-seduction of children’ (p.8).

The nature of the language, quite unlike that of Anderson’s critics in the pages of the *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* or the language of forceful criticism in scholarly journals, should, perhaps, have alerted educated readers, even those who shared in one way or another Kinsella’s concerns, to the possibility that *Empiricism and Freedom* was a knockabout piece of criticism whose claims needed

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1 Bishop F. de Witt Batty to Canon A. H. Garnsey in David Garnsey, *Arthur Garnsey*, Neutral Bay, NSW, 1985, p. 106. Batty goes on to write: ‘I have also been told that Anderson’s own influence is well merited.’
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close checking. From Kinsella's point of view, however, the language of abuse was justified because of the danger that a false philosophy posed to social well being. 'Ideas', he wrote, 'are the mighty viewless winds which account for the movement of history' (p.1). And, like Gough two years later, he illustrated this view with reference to claims about the role of nineteenth century German thought - Hegel, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche - in the decline of Germany into Nazism. It is also likely that his unguarded language was in part politically oriented as he hoped that his pamphlet would directly or indirectly force the University Senate to do something about the Andersonians and their influence.

It [the Senate] should explain why empiricism is the chosen teaching of our university and why monopoly rights have been afforded to it, and why the more noble disciplines of philosophy have been excluded. (p.12)

To achieve the ends of warning his readers and encouraging the Senate to act, it was necessary, however, to justify his claims by critically outlining Anderson's position and showing how Stout and O'Neil applied such views.

Anderson's empiricist philosophy, Kinsella claimed is 'a form of sensism and of materialism'; 'He admits only the material things which occur in space and time, and which impress his sense organs and can be weighed or measured by some experimental means' (p.2). The consequence of this position is that Anderson rejects the (Aristotelian-Thomistic) doctrine of natures with disastrous results for moral and legal theory and natural theology. The doctrine of natures is that substances are made what they are by a formal principle, the essence, which determines in each individual substance its type or kind and thereby provides its identity and determines the field of its range of operations and changes. Anderson has to reject this metaphysical doctrine, according to Kinsella, because the only source of knowledge he allows is what the sense organs provide and the senses cannot reveal to us the structural principles upon which the world we experience through them is based. The distinction between man and brute in Anderson's philosophy is said to be effectively denied because human knowledge is restricted to what a brute, lacking intellect, can discover. 'It has been rightly said of empiricism', Kinsella claimed, 'that it is the philosophy of the gutter, for it admits only sense-knowing -peering, sniffing, nosing, cocking the ears, etc' (p.5). A correct philosophy, a common-sense philosophy, he asserted, knows that human beings have 'different
knowing powers, viz., senses and intellect' and can know more than sense reveals.

The possession of the intellectual or immaterial manner of knowing distinguishes man from the brute. As consequences, man enjoys speech, progress, arts, sciences, law, religion, literature, virtues and vices, laughter and tears. The explanation of these higher things is beyond empiricism. (p.4)

Kinsella then proceeds to show in a little more detail the disastrous consequences that follow from the Andersonian rejection of a doctrine of natures.

In moral theory, 'the empiricist must reject the natural moral law' (p.3) which is a general expression of the conduct that is morally appropriate for a being possessed of a human nature endowed with reason and free will. The only moral theory open to the empiricist is moral subjectivism: 'For them, there remains only subjectivism in morals. The act is good provided that you feel like it' (p.6). The effect of this theory upon the source of law, Kinsella claimed, is to remove its rational moral foundation. Law can then only be based upon will, upon what is pursued rather than what is rightly to be pursued, thereby leaving society legally vulnerable to the rule of the strongest. 'Empiricism thus throws the doors wide open to totalitarianism and tyranny' (p.9). Theologically, empiricism destroys natural theology and thereby removes the basis which enables divine revelation to be recognised as such. The reason is that sense experience provides no evidence of the distinctive causal bond which links an effect to its cause, with the result that 'We cannot conclude from the cosmos to the Creator' (p.9). The empiricist, (unlike the Aristotelian and common sense) is reduced to treating causation as mere regular succession.1

The role of Stout and O'Neil and other 'university empiricists' in Kinsella's account is largely to illustrate the way in which Anderson's doctrines are applied. Stout is accused of advocating trial marriages in a 1958 television program, 'Any Questions?', which Kinsella regarded as a consistent but shameful application of the empiricist position in morals. A letter written to The Sydney Morning Herald (22/4/55) concerning the Obscene Publications Act in which 'university empiricists' asserted that 'moral values cannot

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1 'For him [Anderson] there is no difference between caused-succession, e.g., lightning and thunder, and uncaused-succession, e.g., my breakfast egg and the subsequent delivery of the morning mail by the postman. Empiricists are not as other men.' (p. 5).
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be assessed objectively’ (p.6) shows the same moral subjectivism in action. Stout’s claim, in another letter to The Sydney Morning Herald (1/7/58) that the moral philosopher’s task qua moral philosopher is to analyse moral concepts and claims but not to advocate particular moral positions or courses of action is held to be inconsistent with his behaviour on television and, more importantly, it is taken to show how empiricists seek to avoid responsibility for settling the matters they claim to investigate: ‘they resort to the mean and pusillanimous device of sophisticating the truth (implying that “critical study” and “advocate” are mutually exclusive), then shrinking from judgment and refusing to advocate’ (p.8). Anderson’s view, expressed in relation to the issues raised in the Orr case at the University of Tasmania, that a university lecturer’s sexual relationship with one of his students is not necessarily a ground for dismissal since the teaching and examining relationship might well be unaffected, is taken to show an indifference to the teacher’s moral responsibility for his students. O’Neil, long suspect as an Andersonian in certain Catholic circles, is said to have ‘showed one of their favourite instruments of deception, the suppressing of the true and suggesting of the false’ (p.11), because he had linked Anderson’s name with Socrates in the report (SMH, 31/12/58) of a retirement farewell at the University in 1958. Nothing, Kinsella claimed, could be further from the truth: ‘Socrates, unlike Anderson, had maintained ideals and ultimates and objective morality, and by teaching and example had advocated and urged youth to the practice of virtue, as Xenophon and Plato relate’ (p.11).1

To philosophically untrained readers, hostile about what they knew or feared about Anderson and his influence, Kinsella’s angry paper might well have seemed authoritative if somewhat obscure. Criticus, a columnist in The Catholic Weekly (30/4/59) welcomed its appearance: ‘it hits hard’, he reported, but ‘is timely and provocative. It is to be hoped it brings results and a change for the better’. The problem with this view, however, is that Kinsella was wrong in a number of significant details.

1 J. Anderson, ‘The Orr Case and Academic Freedom’, in The Observer, 28/6/58. Anderson would have had in mind his affair with his student and colleague, Ruth Walker. See Brian Kennedy, op. cit. In her retirement Ruth Walker made a generous donation to the University of Newcastle Philosophy Club for the publication of Andersoniana in its magazine, Dialectic. Concerning O’Neil: see CW, 26/7/45 where he, the recently appointed Professor of Psychology, is criticised for his allegedly ‘prompt readiness to fall into line with Professor Anderson and advocate similar causes.’
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Anderson's distinctive empiricist philosophy is not a version of sensism, i.e., sensationalism, a view which he specifically rejected; his materialism amounts to the claim that mind and all that is, is spatio-temporal and governed by the general categories of existence, especially causation, not that mind is to be reduced to matter; his ethical and aesthetic views were objectivist, not subjectivist: goodness is a natural quality found in certain states of mind and social movements just as beauty, another natural quality, is found in certain works of art and aspects of nature; causality is not to be reduced to mere succession or certain regular forms of succession, as Hume had done, nor is it to be explained in terms of essences or natures, but rather it is a distinctive category or pervasive feature of all things or situations as both causing and being caused and which, in principle, can be observed in particular situations.¹

Kinsella's study of Anderson's writings was very restricted and not well informed. To his own and his readers' disadvantage he overlooked the writings of prominent members of Anderson's school such as J. A. Passmore's Ralph Cudworth (1951) and Hume's Intentions (1952) which helped to explain and to bring out the distinctiveness of Anderson's philosophy in comparison with other positions. Where he was right, however, was in seeing that Anderson was opposed to any ethics of a deontological kind thereby dismissing the distinctive ethical authority of traditional moral prohibitions. This did not mean that such traditional prohibitions are to be disregarded though it did mean that there are no moral reasons why they should be observed. In time, after the controversy following Gough's sermon, Kinsella came to see this: Anderson's philosophy was then seen as covertly recommending immoral practices, a view which in relation to sexual behaviour fitted a not uncommon perception.²

¹ The fullest exposition of Anderson's philosophy is provided in A. J. Baker's Anderson's Social Philosophy, Sydney, 1979, and Australian Realism: The Systematic Philosophy of John Anderson, Cambridge, 1986. The bibliography in Brian Kennedy, op. cit. should be consulted.

² See, e.g., the review of Owen Kelly's novel, There is No Refuge, Nation, 29/7/61; D. Wetherell and C. Carr-Greg, Camilla: C. W. Wedgwood 1901-1955, Sydney, 1990, pp. 131-2. Covert teaching: Onlooker, a columnist in The Sun Herald (23/7) writes that Dr Kinsella 'asks me to say that he has "certain proof" that free love is still being advocated "covertly and implicitly." As he puts it, "the arsenic is administered, not neat but concealed in chocolates."' See also TS, 12/7.
Kinsella was also mistaken about persons. Stout was no Andersonian, as he explained in a letter\(^1\) to Curlewis’s Committee in 1961: ‘my main philosophical views were already formed [on taking the Sydney chair], largely under the influence of my father, the late Professor G. F. Stout’ (HS, 14/7). The claim that he had advocated trial marriages was based on a mistaken newspaper report in The Daily Telegraph (8/8/58) of an Any Questions program on television in which he had played ‘devil’s advocate’ when no other member of the panel felt able to put up a case. O’Neil, a very philosophically minded psychologist, was also wrongly identified by Kinsella as one of Anderson’s disciples, particularly as understood by Kinsella, but he acknowledged the influence of Anderson on his thought: ‘I do, of course, owe a great intellectual debt to him, just as I do to other men in philosophy, psychology and physiology’ (HS, 27/3/63). Perhaps the most revealing error was the claim that the 1955 letter to the Sydney Morning Herald protesting the Obscene Publications Act was the work of ‘university empiricists’. Anderson, Stout and O’Neil had signed the letter along with twenty eight other professors and forty nine senior lecturers from across the University, though as it happened Anderson signed the letter to help the protest against the Act despite his objectivist dislike ‘of the view that moral values cannot be assessed objectively’. On Kinsella’s reading of the situation there must have been many unaware Andersonians in the senior ranks of the University, but as Anderson pointed out, most of the signatories ‘must have known little or nothing about empiricism’ (HS, 27/7). Kinsella’s method of understanding Anderson and his influence was to take anything which he regarded as Andersonian and to make Andersonians of those Sydney academics who maintained such things. Even so he missed the one target, the Libertarian Society, which would have provided him with useful but limited material for his cause. This voluntary society of students and staff, founded after the break-up of Anderson’s Freethought Society in 1951, was both influenced and rejected by Anderson.

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\(^1\) Stout’s six and a half page letter, date 10/7, to the Curlewis Committee was cyclostyled and distributed in the University and later printed in Honi Soit, 14/7. The letter is item 872 (2) in the Stout Papers; 872 (1) is Curlewis’s invitation (date 7/7) to Stout to appear before or write to the Committee, with an assurance that the Committee had as yet no position on the Kinsella pamphlet. Stout was unimpressed by this claim, as he indicated in a note on the invitation, since he held that Curlewis had passed the document onto Gough as something he might use in his sermon. See also A. K. Stout, ‘The Archbishop and the Philosophers’, in Vestes, 4 (3), Sept., 1961, p. 35, fn.
University Libertarians opposed the authority of the state and the churches and other bodies which they took to be authoritarian and encouraged, as their student secretary, George Molnar, wrote, a life free of conformity to the ‘illusions of virginity, chastity, the sanctity of marriage and of the family’ (HS, 4/3/57).¹

When Empiricism and Freedom first appeared in 1959, Stout, of those named in it, was particularly upset by the attack. He and Anderson, however, decided to do nothing about it because the advice they received was that ‘no responsible person would pay any serious attention to the pamphlet or be influenced by it’ (HS, 13/7). Stout was particularly buoyed up by a letter at the time from Dr John Burnheim, Rector of St John’s, the Catholic College at the University, commiserating with him about the pamphlet and advising that he thought it ‘garbled and intemperate’ and would ‘soon be consigned to oblivion’ (HS, 13/7). Shortly after Burnheim’s letter, the Catholic Chaplain to the Newman Society, Roger Pryke, wrote to The Catholic Weekly (7/5/59).² In his letter dissenting from Criticus’s earlier welcome of the pamphlet, he expressed his regret that the pamphlet had been published, defended Stout’s reputation over the trial marriage issue, protested at Kinsella’s ‘emotive language’, and warned of the dangers involved in asking the Senate ‘to legislate, more or less, what philosophical positions should be taught’.

Amongst close observers of University philosophy in 1959, Kinsella was seen as an aggressive and uninformed dabbler. He had learnt the rudiments of one philosophical system but was unsuspecting of its difficulties and insensitive to the details and strengths of its rivals. His philosophical scholarship was weak, his approach to philosophy, ideological and political. None of this, however, was known to Archbishop Gough, nor it seems to those upon whom he relied for advice. They all were, as the Vice-


² Burnheim’s letter is in the Stout Papers attached to item 872 (2); a copy of Pryke’s letter, items 902, 903.
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Chancellor of the University of Melbourne was later to say of Gough, ‘completely out of touch’ (*SMH*, 7/7).

IV

One week after the Archbishop’s sermon, *The Anglican* (14/7), whose managing director was Francis James, carried the headlines: ‘Archbishop Attacks University - Nation Wide Reaction by Clergy and Academics’. Remarkably for a national church newspaper, *The Anglican* set out to publicise the Primate’s troubles in painful detail, and published an editorial to match. A day by day diary of the course of the controversy up to the time of printing was provided on the front and the back pages of the paper. On the front page, James reported that

His Grace’s words have touched off a nation-wide controversy, in which university teachers and administrators and the clergy of several denominations are now taking part. All the university men and all the clergy, save one, have differed from the Archbishop.

There were three types of prompt critical reaction to Gough’s claims about the Sydney and other philosophers. One came from Vice-Chancellors anxious to protect the reputations of their staffs and the independence of their universities, as far as politically possible, from outside interference. Sydney’s Sir Stephen Roberts said that ‘while reluctant to contradict’ the Archbishop, ‘I must do so in this case. I doubt if the archbishop can produce the facts to substantiate his outrageous charges’ (*SMH*, 7/7). Later he was to lose whatever reluctance he felt about contradicting Gough. He is reported to have sent a message to him ‘somewhat as follows: “Let the Archbishop continue with his accusations and face the law of libel.”’

Other early critics included those who had a knowledge of the University scene and supported the liberal ideals of the secular university tradition. Amongst these was a group of academics at the University of Melbourne organised by D. M. Armstrong who spoke out forcefully in defence of the personal characters of Anderson,

1 D. R. V. Wood, *Stephen Henry Roberts*, Sydney, 1986, p. 87; see p. 92, n. 26. In his letter to the Curlewis Committee Stout said that on the first appearance of the Kinsella document he had received legal advice that he had grounds for an action of defamation against Kinsella. (*HS*, 13/7).
Stout and O’Neil, and the success of Anderson’s opposition to Communist ideas at the University of Sydney. They were also strong in defence of academic freedom against Gough’s attempt to enforce certain beliefs upon the university community:

It is our conviction that a university lecturer has the right to hold and say that there is or that there is no divine law and that he is entitled to adopt a critical attitude to prevailing sexual mores as well as to defend them. (SMH, 10/7)

The most striking defender of the liberal character of the secular university was, however, Stuart Barton Babbage, Dean of St Paul’s Cathedral, Melbourne, and recently Dean of St. Andrew’s, Sydney. Babbage was strongly opposed to any attempt to restrain freedom of expression within universities. It would be, he said, ‘an alarming state of affairs if, in a university, a man was forbidden to speak the truth as he saw it. If freedom of speech is forbidden, the next step is the rubber truncheon and the concentration camp. I cannot fairly claim the right to freedom of speech for myself without at the same time conceding the same to others’ (TA, 14/7). Babbage also suggested that the Archbishop had confused the Libertarian Society with the work of the Department of Philosophy.1

Whether or not this was true, other well placed commentators also made the point that the Archbishop was mistaken in his claims. Felix Arnott, Warden of St Paul’s, the Anglican College within the University, gave support to the philosophers which Stout, in particular, appreciated. In two separate responses Arnott, the most senior Sydney Anglican to take part in the controversy, said:

I think it is an excellent department. The Archbishop’s statement was based on claims made two years ago, and even so I think it was grossly uninformed (SMH, 8/7). I know of no case of students being encouraged in any way by university staff to commit immoral acts or indulge in an immoral way of life. (DT, 8/7)

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The heads of Women's College (Miss D. Langley) and St Andrew's (the Rev. A. Dougan), the Presbyterian College, also gave their support to the philosophers, in the same newspaper reports.\(^1\)

The third type of response to the sermon was that of those named in Kinsella's pamphlet. There were two common elements in their individual rejoinders. First, each claimed that he had never taught students to engage in free love and so on. 'In my 32 years at Sydney University', Anderson said, 'I never heard a philosophy teacher advocate free love or pre-marital experience in the lecture-room. What he expresses in private is his own business, and not the Archbishop's or Dr Kinsella's' (S, 7/7). Stout and O'Neil made similar claims (SMH, 8/7). Secondly, each man expressed amazement that Gough had been prepared to give public credence to Kinsella's pamphlet. 'A man with the training in the Humanities that one ordinarily expects in senior Anglican churchmen', O'Neil told The Anglican (14/7), 'should readily have seen that Dr Kinsella has the strangest view of what philosophy is and what University teachers should do'. Stout told the Curlewis Committee: 'I am still to understand how the Primate of Australia or any other person of intelligence could regard this pamphlet as serious argument, or how indeed his Grace could dignify it with the title of evidence at all' (HS, 13/7). Anderson was even more contemptuous; 'It is a disgrace that a person like Dr Gough couldn't see straight away that Dr Kinsella's pamphlet is illiterate stuff' (DT, 8/7). They expressed, from an aggrieved position, a puzzlement which others sympathetic to the Archbishop's aims resolved in his favour.\(^2\)

Beyond these points of similarity, the three academics followed different agendas in their response to Gough. O'Neil pointed out that he was targeted out of a combination of ignorance and prejudice (TA, 14/7). Anderson and Stout, differed, in accord to some extent with their situations and views. Anderson, who had become a legend in his lifetime, was now a professor emeritus with a long history of confrontation with powerful critics outside the University. Stout, no less determined, was the professorial head of the University's Department of Philosophy, and a respected intellectual contributor to many causes outside the University.

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\(^1\) As the Anglican academic, R. G. Tanner wrote: 'He [the Archbishop] has chosen not to seek the advice of such people [Anglican and other Christian academics] and must not be disappointed if they repudiate his policy.' (TA, 21/7).

\(^2\) The Catholic apologist, Dr Rumble MSC handles the matter sympathetically, CW, 17/8; Francis James (?), unsympathetically in an editorial, TA, 14/7.

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For Anderson, the controversy provided a further and welcome opportunity to battle once again on behalf of the autonomous secular university against interference in its life and work from religious and other non-academic interests. 'This thing boils up every now and then. I am glad it has again because it gives us an opportunity to say things that must be said' (SMH, 11/7). In lectures at three university centres Anderson argued that the secular character of universities faced a positive threat from religious interests. Religion, church doctrine and practice, had no proper place in the life of the university community:

The immediate occasion of the present controversy should remind us of the constant endeavour of the clerical forces to encroach on work which is essentially secular and which, more particularly, is marked by a rigour which clerics cannot approach. (HS, 27/7)

The secular university, a university free of church control and sectarian intervention, is on this view a secularist university, a university which is to operate in accord with a secularist philosophy. 'In any university', Anderson said, 'the fight between secularism and religion is intense' (SMH, 21/7).

But why should the secular university be secularist? In an earlier 1943 controversy about religion in school education, Anderson's answer had been that education requires that the matters to be taught and learnt are such as are open to question and able to be investigated by 'observation and experiment - these are the universal educational methods'. Religious or sacred objects are typically thought to be beyond question and are not open to observation. The result is that 'religion and education are opposed'; 'education is necessarily secular'.¹ In his 1961 public lectures

¹ 'Religion and Education', in J. Anderson, Education and Inquiry, ed. D. Z. Phillips Oxford, 1980, p. 203. This paper was Anderson's contribution to Religion in Education, New Education Fellowship, July 1943; a record of the controversy surrounding Anderson's remarks is printed in an Appendix. See A. J. Baker, Anderson's Social Philosophy, pp. 118-22. Why did Anderson not take the same line in 1961? The answer might relate in part to Gilbert Ryle's criticism that Anderson mistakenly treats philosophy as if it were not different from the sciences: 'Not one of his articles contains, so far as I can see, the reports of any experiments...' ('Logic and Professor Anderson', in Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 28, 1950, p. 153.) Also, though this is unlikely, his awareness that his doctrine of Space and Time was 'unspeakable' in terms of other requirements of his system, as happens with Plato's Form of the Good, Plotinus's One and Aquinas's God, might have played a part.
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Anderson does not take this line on religion in the university. Rather the case for a secularist view of the university is based on the opposition between philosophy and religion understood as theology. 'If you are going to get anywhere', he told a Newcastle audience, 'you must get rid of one or the other' (TA, 11/8). The 'whole trend of modern philosophy', Anderson claimed to Sydney students, 'has been anti-religious (or, more specifically anti-Christian), and the same can be said of the philosophy of to-day' (HS, 27/7). This conflict is said to turn on whether a theory of reality is to be constructed in personal terms in which a deity is regarded as central to the nature of reality or an impersonal view as in philosophy where the aim is 'to discover the forms of connections between things, e.g., how they are caused or brought about' (HS, 27/7), which is, in Anderson's view, a theory of the categorial or pervasive features which mark all spatio-temporal occurrences. The importance of the choice between the two approaches for the university is that 'In a university every subject coalesces with philosophy or is related to it in some way' (TA, 11/8). But Anderson argued the choice between a theological or anti-theological approach to philosophy is fairly straightforward since the religious position is confused and groundless: 'It is all empty phrases, does not add to knowledge, and has no evidence to show a connection between the ultimate Being and dependent reality' (Newcastle Morning Herald, 5/8).

The case for a secularist understanding of the university is also supported by way in which religious believers present fairy tales as if they are true, which goes to show how far the religiously minded 'are from reality' (HS, 27/7). The proper approach to religion in a university is to disregard the fairy tales and the confused philosophy of theology and to reveal the secular, non-divine, human problems which are expressed in a hidden and mixed way in religious stories and doctrines. 'Historically', Anderson claimed, 'it was from human and social relations that religious issues arose; or as Feuerbach put it, the real content of "the divine" is the human' (HS, 27/7).

In developing his views about the secularist character of the secular university, Anderson also had to defend his school-approach to the work of philosophers in the university. This had been a point of criticism in Kinsella's appeal to the University Senate, and it had

long been a matter of concern to theologically minded observers, particularly those who had experience of other philosophy departments. It was also a matter of concern to some of those who had defended the Sydney philosophers against Gough's attack and yet were convinced that Anderson's approach to education in a thoroughly speculative subject restricted students' educational opportunities far too much in favour of his own philosophy. 'The purpose of teaching philosophy', one well placed clerical critic wrote, 'is surely not to inculcate particular views, but to train students to think for themselves about philosophical issues'. The present post-Anderson department with its 'reasonable variety of viewpoints', was, he believed, well situated for this purpose. For Anderson, this sort of criticism was pedagogically uninformed: 'A strong central position is necessary from which to work - otherwise he [the student] only adds his scraps of knowledge to the bundle of scraps offered to him, and such a collection of odds and ends is not a body of learning'.

Many of those who teach speculative subjects such as philosophy and theology would agree that a clear method must be followed in organising, expounding, and criticising the material in lectures. Does it, however, have to be a method deeply embedded in a systematic viewpoint and common to all members of a department? This was one of the points on which Stout and Anderson disagreed. Stout's small Department of Moral and Political Philosophy had never been host to a single school of philosophic thought. The union of the two Departments upon Anderson's retirement meant that the Department of which Stout was the professorial head was not only more diverse as a result of administrative union but became even more so with new appointments from a variety of backgrounds. 'The department contained persons of various religious and philosophical views', he told the N.S.W. Humanist Society, 'and there was frequent disagreement between them'. It was a point Stout emphasised in his letter to the Curlewis Committee and in the letter column of The Sydney Morning Herald. The philosophers, however, were generally opposed to the view that securing a balance of viewpoints should be a mandatory policy for departments, as recommended by an editorial in The Sydney Morning Herald, confident that a

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1 The Rev. Dr J. Haultain Brown of St Andrew's College at the University, secretary of the Presbyterian Church's Faculty of Theology.
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policy of appointing the best academically qualified candidates for positions would produce philosophic diversity within departments.¹

Another area of disagreement between Anderson and Stout was on the question whether to respond to the Curlewis Committee which was going to consider the Kinsella pamphlet which had been tendered as evidence for its consideration on youth welfare. Should the University or its members seek to defend themselves before such a Committee? Anderson’s answer was no. His view was that the University through its established academic procedures is its own arbiter of academic matters, not outside non-academic bodies. ‘It is the University itself’, he argued, ‘which maintains academic independence and makes decisions on academic grounds, not for example, on utilitarian or on ecclesiastical grounds. It is a mistake, then, for members of the University to offer evidence to the Curlewis Committee’ (HS, 27/7). By the time Anderson had expressed this view to a packed meeting at the University, Stout had written a detailed submission to the Curlewis Committee. In it he attacked Kinsella’s pamphlet with ‘its defamatory statements about Professor Anderson, Professor O’Neil, and myself’, expressed his concern that the Archbishop should endorse such a document, explained his own position on various matters including the television program on trial-marriages, and the fact that he was not an Andersonian. He also stated his admiration for Anderson as a philosopher and a teacher of high ideals, and outlined Kinsella’s errors about Anderson’s philosophy and its influence. ‘The Committee can hardly expect me and will not want me’, he wrote, ‘to try to re-state in a few words Anderson’s philosophy so as to rescue it from the farrago of nonsense that Dr Kinsella makes of it. And’, he wryly added, ‘Professor Anderson would not thank me for trying to do so’ (HS, 13/7).

¹ See A. K. Stout, SMH, 14/7 where he pointed out that the courses and the textbooks at the University were common to Australian and British universities; J. B. Thornton, Professor of Philosophy at the University of NSW, SMH, 18/7, more Andersonian in approach - ‘philosophy does not any more than chemistry consist of viewpoints’ - insisting that academic criteria should be the only measure for appointments. Len Goddard, Professor of Philosophy at the University of New England, unpublished paper, ‘The Philosopher and Society’ (Stout Papers 897 (2)), departments should encourage a variety of views amongst staff; J. L. Mackie, ‘Philosophy - Its Place in the Universities’, in Vestes, 14, (3), Sept., 1961, p. 43, ‘the market place of appointments on academic criteria will ensure diversity’. Only Goddard discussed the problem of human frailty in such matters. Cf. J. M. Fahey SJ ‘Academic Freedom’, in Twentieth Century, Spring 1961, pp. 28-31.
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Later Stout was to express misgivings about having written, perhaps because of Anderson’s views about the autonomy of the secular university. But whatever the strength of university claims to autonomy because of its role as the general provider of the higher professional skills and the disinterested conserver and source of advanced knowledge, it is a state recognised and funded self-regulating institution and not a complete law unto itself. In the Gough controversy or controversies the dependence of the university on the community was a point made by a number of churchmen, friend and foe. It was most forcefully argued by J. M. Fahey SJ, a theologian attached to the Jesuit Institute for Social Order in Melbourne. Australian universities, he argued, ‘are semi-autonomous governmental bodies, supported by the State, that is, by the tax-payer, and having a privileged position in law because they have a community function to perform’. Academic freedom, he maintained, is essential for the university if it is to fulfil its community function, but the university is not the only arbiter of its adequacy in this regard. The claim to academic freedom by staff ‘who think of themselves as modern Socrates on superannuation’ and others is not absolute but conditional, though properly honoured within the community and rarely challenged. Philosophy, however, provides the central and most difficult problem. There is no easy solution to the tensions it creates: ‘It is probably true that there can be no way of teaching philosophy which will satisfy the teachers and the community’. The best compromise, Fahey argued, is to appoint staff not because of their views but because of their competence in ‘a common technique of philosophizing’ as, he says, is now done in Melbourne and Sydney. ‘It is because of the number of instructors and the variety of opinion that the community can be satisfied with this compromise’.

What of the other side, those who were for Dr Gough? While the Sydney philosophers found allies in a number of quarters, the Archbishop was not so fortunate. At the beginning of the controversy he received unquestioning support from The Sun, an evening paper, and later critical but encouraging support from The Sydney Morning Herald, both Fairfax papers, whose proprietor, Sir Warwick Fairfax, had a long standing interest in philosophy and religion and a critical attitude towards Anderson’s dominance of

University philosophy.¹ Gough’s main clerical supporter was the
Rev. Gordon Powell, minister of St Stephen’s Presbyterian Church
in the city. Powell was not concerned with drawing distinctions
between the influence of the Philosophy Department and the
activities of staff in voluntary groups such as the Libertarian and
earlier Freethought societies. His criticism was based on first hand
and anecdotal evidence that some, perhaps many of those who had
come into contact with Anderson’s philosophy, had come to reject
both Christian faith and accepted moral practice. Staff who brought
about such results in their students whether inside or outside the
lecture room were not in his view fit to hold their positions²:

I don’t think it matters whether professors express their thoughts
on marriage and sex in the lecture room, on television, or in
private. If they have these beliefs that can only corrupt morals
they should not be holding positions in which they can
influence young people. Sydney today is littered with

¹ Sir Warwick Fairfax listed philosophy amongst his recreations in his entry in
Who’s Who in Australia. See, particularly his column ‘Casual Converse,’
See Peter Coleman, op. cit., pp. 159 ff. Editorials in SMH were critical of the
Gough synods of 1959 (26/9/59) and 1960 (19/10/60). In the editorial
Archbishop Gough and the Philosophers (15/7), Gough was criticised for his
‘more excessive criticisms’, his ‘exaggerations’, his ‘calling for Government
action’ but commended for being one of a ‘courageous kind.’ The philosophers
were criticised for a readiness to assail him simply for speaking out and
because they had not maintained a balance of teaching at the University by
providing for ‘the rightful place of non-empirical philosophy’, a balance
which should be ensured by ‘university administrators’.

² There is an account of Gordon Powell’s Sydney ministry in G. W. Hardy,
Living Stones, Homebush West, NSW, 1985, ch.8. Powell wrote to Stout
(Stout Papers, 891 (1)) including the full statement he made in support of
Gough on 9/7, which was printed in The NSW Presbyterian, 11/8. Powell’s
ignoring of the distinction between what was publicly taught or held in class
and what was not, had a curious parallel in the views of some of the
philosophers about the controversy. In Dr Eric Dowling’s letter to A. W.
Sparkes - see n.11 - Dowling writes: ‘The cream of it is that David Stove
(Sydney) and I are supporting Gough and charging Stout with dishonesty
(which makes Stout very angry) - our line being that what Gough & company
mean by “immorality” is just fornication & adultery and that it is true that
“empiricism” does in fact “encourage” these activities & in historical fact has
done so in Sydney University, but that this is defensible and that if you’re not
going to admit the deed but deny the guilt then you ought to say nothing at all
(which would probably be best in view of the average I.Q.).’

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intlectuals without any faith because of the techniques of one professor and his followers. (S, 10/7)

The N.S.W. Council of Churches, of which the Archbishop was the honorary chairman, came out in a swingeing attack on the academics who had criticised Gough, the abuse of academic freedom, the failure of the Government to appoint church representatives to the Curlewis Committee, and the secularism of the University in failing to provide a Faculty of Divinity to counter anti-Christian teaching (SMH, 19/7). This and Powell’s attacks provided weak support for the Archbishop because they were soon called into question by their natural allies. The Presbyterian Church, which had a strong reputation for a scholarly ministry, had no desire to be associated with Powell’s attack. Furthermore the Presbyterians and some of the other churches in the N.S.W. Council resented the failure of the Council President and Secretary to consult with the constituent member churches before publishing their criticism, and there were threats of withdrawal (SMH, 21/7). The reputation of the Council was also not helped by Sir Stephen Roberts’ description of the Council statement as ‘a tarradiddle of verbose frustration’, pointing out that the University already had a Board of Studies in Divinity which was poorly patronised by students, all of whom had their fees refunded by the University in an effort to encourage use of the facility (SMH, 9/7). The Government, which, like the University, was said to be secularist in spirit, responded that it was up to the Curlewis Committee, if it wished, to recommend a church representative for appointment.

Significantly, The Catholic Weekly did not come out directly in support of Gough’s charges. The editorial in the 27 July issue, however, attacked soul-less, godless, immoral philosophies without mentioning names. Morality, the editor argued, can exist only if human beings possess rational, immortal souls created by God. Denial of God’s existence by ‘some person or some group’ does not change the nature and basis of the moral domain or its central place in the life of a Christian country such as Australia.

In this sense it is good to remind ourselves that whilst ever we claim the name of being a Christian country every freedom has its restrictions - that it is limited to liberty of expression that will not undermine Christian tenets and the morality they imply. Christianity has not only the duty to expect that its teachings will be defended: it has the right to insist that they are.
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It appears that the criticisms of Burnheim and Pryke protected *The Catholic Weekly* from linking its sympathy with the general thrust of the Archbishop's criticism to any suggestion of support for Kinsella's document. This caution, however, was not due to any lack of sympathy for Kinsella's aim in attacking Anderson and his influence. Once the chance came to fire upon Anderson on seemingly uncontestable grounds, Catholic authority spoke forth. Anderson's university addresses provided the opportunity. Bishop Muldoon then launched an attack on his 'pernicious and soul-destroying ideas', 'principles calculated of their very nature to destroy the basis of all morality' (*CW*, 3/8).

Archbishop Gough, however, was not without specific support in the pages of *The Catholic Weekly*. In the 'Question Box' of the paper, the well known Catholic apologist, Dr Leslie Rumble, MSC,1 answered queries from readers about the Archbishop's charges and the contributions to the controversy by the Andersons, father and son, A. J. Anderson. Rumble was aware that Gough's charges had been incautiously stated, but he distinguished between the letter and the spirit of what had been claimed and used the occasion of the controversy to attack an old foe and his philosophy from an informed Catholic viewpoint. Rumble had not read Kinsella's pamphlet (*CW*, 19/10) and would not enter into debate on whether Gough had good grounds for his attack: the presumption had to be, he claimed, that a man in the Archbishop's position would not speak as he did without such grounds (*CW*, 17/8). And he would not support Gough's claim of a direct link between 'a philosophy of free love and sexual promiscuity' and Communism. But he took the view that the spirit of Gough's attack served a useful public end.

Archbishop Gough's remarks in any case will have done nothing but good if they served only to awaken everybody's attention to the fact that moral standards must be maintained, and that it is a matter for the national conscience to see that they are maintained. (*CW*, 17/8)

Gough was not to be deserted. But John Anderson or Anderson senior, as Rumble sometimes called him in order to distinguish him from Anderson junior, his philosopher son at Newcastle, was to be attacked in his own right or in his son's words, not Gough's or Kinsella's, for what the Andersons said during the controversy. It

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was a procedure which Rumble followed in answer to questions for most of the latter half of 1961.1

Before, however, Rumble had finished his treatment of the Andersons, the Gough's conflict with the Sydney philosophers helped contribute to a very different sort of controversy within the circle of Catholic philosophers and academics. On 12 October, Dr P. M. Farrell OP from the Dominican House of Studies in Melbourne, published an article in both The Catholic Weekly and The Advocate (Melbourne) entitled, in the Weekly, as 'Philosophy and Christianity in Australian Universities'. The article was prompted, Farrell said, by the way in which the Sydney philosophers had reacted to the criticisms by Gough and the NSW Council of Churches.

In their responses, Farrell claimed, 'the slogan "academic standards" was largely writ'. His criticism was that academic standards were not being observed by certain philosophers when it came to the discussion of important matters of religious faith, a point which he sought to illustrate with references to recent discussions by J. L. Mackie and H. J. McCloskey on the problem of evil, and Kurt Baier's inaugural lecture at the Canberra University College on the meaning of life as well as certain public discussions at Melbourne and Monash universities. It was in the best interests of universities, he argued, that proper standards be observed, particularly when claims are made which are 'offensive to the beliefs and moral sentiments of a majority (at least statistically overwhelming) of the Australian community'.

Farrell's comments soon elicited reactions from Catholic philosophers and intellectuals. University based Catholic philosophers, especially the six in the eighteen strong Melbourne department, did not take kindly to Farrell's view that Mackie and McCloskey had not observed proper standards in their discussions nor did they think that Baier was fully deserving of Farrell's strictures. As the controversy continued in the letter columns of The Catholic Weekly and, more fully in The Advocate the issue turned from whether secular philosophers observed proper standards to the different issue as to whether the Catholic defenders of the academic integrity of these critics of the Faith were properly formed Catholic philosophers, that is Thomistic philosophers:

1 Sandy Anderson wrote a letter during the controversy, SMH, 22/7, attacking aspects of the editorial Archbishop Gough and the Philosophers, SMH, 14/7 from an Andersonian viewpoint. See his 'Following John Anderson', in Andersonian Papers, Leila Cummings, ed. Dialectic, [Newcastle University Philosophy Club], 30, 1987, augmented edition, 1993.
those who have not been formed in the authentic philosophy of
the Church are not qualified in the high questions it engages -
those who have been formed wholly or principally at a secular
university are therefore rather disqualified. (Ad 26/10)

This was not the first expression of this tension in Catholic circles.
Earlier in 1961, a Catholic university student at Sydney, John Small,
managed to precipitate a troublesome and long running controversy
in the pages of the Catholic Weekly about whether a Catholic
philosopher had to be a Thomist. The controversy had its origin in
response to a somewhat triumphalist essay on St Thomas to mark
the opening of the academic year at the Aquinas Academy (CW,
16/2 & 9/3). In the later controversy, Farrell was not without support
in either Sydney or Melbourne - where the Melbourne philosopher
Max Charlesworth became the chief target of contradiction - for
claims concerning the philosophic trustworthiness in religious
matters of departments in secular universities, even when, as in
Melbourne, a significant number of staff were Christians. The
development of the Farrell controversy, as of the earlier Sydney
based conflict, was the reflection of anxiety about the future of
Catholic philosophy in conservative circles as more Catholics
became members of university departments or studied in them
without the benefit of a training in an institution which accepted
that, to use Farrell's words in another context, 'to depart from him
[Aquinas] is to invite serious danger' (Ad. 21/12).

Long before the Farrell dispute and even before Bishop
Muldoon and Dr Rumble had involved themselves in the
Archbishop's troubles, he had withdrawn from the field of battle. At
first he had been confident of the action he had taken though he
soon became aware that aspects of his claims needed to be more
carefully stated. The course of events after his sermon seem to have
affected Gough in two ways. At first he was confident of the action
he had taken though aware that aspects of what he had claimed
needed to be more precisely stated. In The Archbishop's Letter for
the August issue of Southern Cross, written on 10 July, he explained
his role in the controversy and included in the issue the relevant
sections of his sermon. He justified his role in terms of the
undertaking given, when consecrated a bishop, to oppose and to
drive away false doctrines. He acknowledged that Dr Kinsella's
evidence had been contested and that his accusation naturally 'has
aroused resentment in University circles' (SC, p.1). But questions
about 'Whether the details of Dr Kinsella's evidence are correct in
every instance or not' did not lead him to retreat from the general
force of Kinsella's claims or his own: 'I can only say', he wrote, 'that I hear from time to time of many individual facts which seem to corroborate the [Kinsella] evidence. I am not suggesting that these philosophers are wilfully urging students to commit immorality, but their teaching does result in this kind of conduct'. And he repeated in a stronger form his claim that the national welfare required something to be done about this teaching 'in our universities which cuts right at the heart of Christian doctrine': 'the problem is not one for the Church only but also for the State' (SC, p.2).

Before this letter was published, however, the Archbishop seems to have undergone a change of heart. On 15 July, The Daily Telegraph reported that the Sydney University Staff Association had been unable to arrange a mutually suitable time for the Archbishop to discuss the issues. The same report also included an item which suggested that the Archbishop probably did not think that such a meeting was at all necessary. His spokesman was quoted as saying that 'Dr Gough's sermon was not meant to be an attack on Sydney University or any other University'. Presumably his sermon was no longer to be interpreted with reference to Empiricism and Freedom or the information given to the Archbishop's Moral Welfare Committee. Within the next few weeks, if not earlier, the Archbishop's sermon was printed for limited distribution with the partial qualifying note at the bottom of the last page. And the full text of the sermon together with the qualifying note appeared in the 20 July issue of The Australian Church Record, the fortnightly evangelical Anglican paper published in Sydney, where it was accompanied by a general expression of support, but no editorial. Why the change? The answer, according to D. R. V. Wood, the Sydney Vice-chancellor's biographer, is to be found in Sir Stephen Robert's legal threat against Gough. 'The Archbishop', Wood writes, 'was soon in touch with him and withdrew the attack. No further mention of the matter [concerning the University academics] appeared in the daily press'.

Stout, a member of the University Senate at this time, who had received a printed copy of Gough's sermon, with compliments, was not prepared to let the Archbishop escape so easily. What was this other evidence which the Archbishop possessed, as implied by his qualifying note in the privately distributed copy of the sermon? In an address to the N.S.W. Humanist Society, he attacked Gough's integrity. Was it Christian to make public claims based on evidence

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1 D. R. V. Wood, op. cit., p. 87.
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which allegedly could not be revealed or publicly tested? Was not the claim of private evidence a mere subterfuge? And he questioned Gough’s courage as a public figure in privately circulating his qualified withdrawal: ‘If the Archbishop meant to make even a partial withdrawal, why, has he not the courage to do so publicly?’ (SMH, 19/8). Unknown to Stout, Gough had done so a month earlier in The Australian Church Record. It was probably the only point, and that mostly unnoticed, where Gough was not victim to his critics. A sermon which was meant as one churchman’s contribution to ‘a courageous lead to the Western World’ at a time of Cold War crisis had achieved only confusion, embarrassment, and the disdain of many among the clerisy. ‘Dr Gough’s remarks’, The Free Spirit observed, ‘... will confirm a view already far more widespread than the Archbishop realizes among sensitive and well educated Australians, that the Australian clergy are worthy do-gooders but intellectual lightweights, and, at their occasional worst, anti-intellectual headline-hunters of a peculiarly reprehensible kind’.¹

The other figures associated with Gough’s attack were taken up with Sydney philosophers and moral issues for a longer period. Kinsella brought his claims up to date and widened the target. He had to acknowledge that those he had named did not teach their students to engage in immoral conduct but rather had taught doctrines which made what he took to be moral or immoral behaviour a matter of individual preference. He also discovered a new cause of philosophic disorder which enabled him to condemn not only the post-Anderson university department at Sydney but also the philosophers at the University of N.S.W. The unifying principle was John Hosper’s An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis (1959), a text used in first year courses at both places. Kinsella described Hosper’s book as ‘unspeakably evil’ (DT, 10/8). Its chief failing in his eyes was (the mistaken claim) that it

¹ The Free Spirit, Bulletin of the Australian Association for Cultural Freedom, 7, (3/4), May/August, 1961, p. 1. See also Observer in The Bulletin, 15 July, 1961. In the first issue of Southern Cross, June 1961, the Archbishop in his 5 May letter wrote of Christianity and Cold War problems in ways which anticipate his sermon, and indicated what he believed would be the benefits ‘if the Christian Church will only give a courageous lead to the Western World at the present time’. (p. 7). Chief Justice Earl Warren, who arrived too late for the Convention Service, provided a different analysis of the Cold War problems for the Western Democracies though with no reference to the controversy absorbing Sydney at the time: ‘One of the great problems of the free world is to preserve all these human rights ... We must not find ourselves in the position where, because we fear totalitarianism we abandon these fundamental rights in order to protect ourselves.’ (DT, 13/7).
encouraged ethical subjectivism.\textsuperscript{1} He recommended that both departments be re-staffed with philosophers free of such views.

This was all part of a further submission to the Curlewis Committee which, like the claims in \textit{Empiricism and Freedom}, did not finally receive the Committee's endorsement. One matter, however, in which Kinsella was involved to some degree did become part of a continuing concern for the Committee, and for a while for the universities. During the 1962 orientation week activities at Sydney and N.S.W., one speaker, Dr Peter Kenny took part in symposia at the two universities. In typical 'terrae filius' style, Kenny assailed common sexual prohibitions and taboos. Kinsella, a fellow symposiast at N.S.W., protested to the Committee about Kenny's performances and linked his claims to what was and had been taught in the universities. The Committee referred Kinsella's letter to the Attorney-General and asked the Vice-Chancellors for information. As Kenny was a PhD in psychology from Sydney, his remarks were taken by Kinsella to show how Psychology there had been corrupted by the philosophers, so he recommended that the Philosophy and Psychology departments at Sydney and Philosophy and Sociology at N.S.W. be closed. These philosophic matters finally did not concern the Curlewis Committee but it thought that the claims about the orientation week functions touched on problems of substance. It reported that while the issues raised (by Kenny) were fit matters for discussion by young people, 'the particular way in which they were raised and the views advocated were highly undesirable for the particular audience'. It accepted that it was a matter for control by the authorities at the Universities: 'steps had been taken at both Universities to ensure that similar happenings will not occur again'.\textsuperscript{2} The Curlewis Committee's central recommendation that the Government should establish a residential Leadership Training College for the training of youth workers was not accepted by the Labor Government on grounds of

\textsuperscript{1} Hosper's own preference in his survey of moral theories seems to be for G. E. Moore's objectivist doctrine of goodness as a non-natural quality. See \textit{An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis}, London, 1956, p. 494. Kinsella developed his views at length in the popular pictorial magazine, \textit{Pix}, 16 September, 1961.

\textsuperscript{2} \textit{Report}, p. 33. See HS, 5/6/62: 'The Chancellor [Sir Charles Bickerton Blackburn] has told the S.R.C. that there are to be no more symposia on the subject of sex in Orientation Week. The S.R.C. decided on May 14 to reject this ultimatum.' Sir Stephen Roberts said 'the action had to be taken because of adverse publicity arising from the Kinsella-Kenny clash at a symposium at the University of New South Wales.'

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When James McAuley was offered *Empiricism and Freedom* for publication in *Quadrant* he advised Kinsella 'that he did not know what was taught in the Philosophy Department and did not appreciate the nature of a modern university and that he would do harm if he published his text'.¹ For the most part McAuley was right. Yet despite the confusion, distraction, and offence which the pamphlet helped bring about, the result of the Kinsella-Gough offensive was not entirely negative. That this was so owed much to E. L. Wheelwright, a lecturer in Economics at Sydney University and A. K. Stout.

In 1961 Wheelwright was editor of *Vestes*, the Journal of the Federal Council of University Staff Associations of Australia. *Vestes*, which first appeared in 1958, sought to inform Staff Association members in the Australian universities on a wide variety of university affairs ranging from recent appointments and resignations in universities and salary matters to policy issues and problems concerning the post-Murray report on the growth of the university system, academic disciplines and studies in the universities, and controversies such as the Orr Case in Tasmania. Archbishop Gough's widely reported attack was a matter of natural interest to the *Vestes* readership. Wheelwright asked Stout, as he reported, 'to tell the whole story as I saw it'.² Stout's 'The Archbishop and the Philosophers' appeared in *Vestes*, 4, September, 1961.

The story, as Stout saw it, could hardly be dignified as the history of a controversy since 'no evidence has been offered, no specific charges made which it was possible to controvert' (p.37). But Stout was determined not to let the story rest at that point. It had to yield a moral or a number of morals from which those seriously concerned with the welfare of universities could learn. Stout effectively put himself into the Archbishop's shoes and provided a

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series of issues, 'the real issues', which the Archbishop should have asked.

The pity of it is that there are a number of important issues well worth discussing which could have been raised by the Archbishop. They include the place of religion in a university, the nature of philosophy and of philosophical teaching in universities, and in Sydney University in particular, the relation of religion to morality and of recent developments in moral philosophy to religious belief (I hold the view that these leave a clearly defined place for religious faith which was not there before, and I point this out to my students), the nature of university teaching in general (authoritarian or not?), the meaning and scope of 'academic freedom', the difference between discussion of a principle and 'advocacy' of a practice, the question whether students are to be treated as children or as adults, the question whether in a university truth is or not to come first. (p.37)

The issues were not, of course, new to the senior figures involved in the Gough controversy and its ramifications. Concern about the orientation of philosophy in Anderson's department had led to Stout's appointment in 1939. And Anderson had been the centre of a large scale controversy concerning religion and education in 1943. The issue of the study of religion as distinct from historical and philosophical theology in the BD course at Sydney, introduced in 1937, had long been a concern of the University professors on the Board of Studies in Divinity. They sought a widening and 'strengthening of the BD course on the side of general theory', but the divines on the Board from the theological colleges who did most of the teaching, were not prepared to allow this development at the cost of historical and philosophical theology.1 Most of the issues to which Stout drew attention were standing issues for critically minded academics but they had been given a public relevance by the circumstances of the Archbishop's attack, the running conflicts surrounding the Orr case, in which Stout and Anderson were deeply involved, and developing plans to expand the university system. The post-war revival of interest in religious matters amongst students and some of the younger academics appointed from this generation gave a further degree of relevance to the place of religion in the university.

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1 See Minutes of the Board of Studies in Divinity, 21 June, 1947.
In Stout’s Papers in the University Archives and elsewhere there are to be found his contributions to some of these issues. For the discussion in Vestes, the place of philosophy in the university was given to Stout’s professorial colleague, J. L. Mackie, and the place of religion in the university to two other Sydney University identities, Felix Arnott, and, in the first instance, John Anderson.

Mackie’s article, ‘Philosophy - Its Place in the Universities’ appeared with Stout’s paper in the same September, 1961 issue of Vestes. In the course of six pages he succinctly presents his views about the nature and development of philosophy as a subject, its importance for the university community, the way it is to be taught and how departments are to be staffed.

Philosophy, he points out, is a controversial subject which often deals with matters which are apt to arouse strong feelings. Its primary subject matter are the issues ‘that are fundamental for a view of the world and man’s place in it’ (p.39). Discussions of these issues, however, have given rise to matters of secondary interest, from a lay point of view, such as questions about method of argument, the sources of knowledge, and more recently the nature of linguistic meaning. This secondary subject matter raises many new philosophical issues, but the primary issues remain a central philosophic concern: ‘the big fundamental questions are still there, and part of the purpose of philosophising is still to argue them’ (p.40).

The place of philosophy in higher education is based on the importance of this primary subject matter. Yet it is a field of inquiry surrounded with controversy:

There are as yet no agreed and authoritative answers, but progress has been made, many confusions have been conclusively exposed, many incoherent systems of thought can be eliminated and the possible coherent systems thus limited in number. (p.40)

Because the proposed answers to these primary problems are contested amongst philosophers, a lecturer, Mackie claimed, should take care to carefully state the opposed positions, carefully explaining the reasons why they are maintained ‘as well as the grounds on which he adopts those that he holds himself’ (p.45). In his teaching, the lecturer will not play the role of an advocate, that is, one who seeks to persuade his students to accept his position or to reject others. Yet in his presentation of positions, his own and others, the lecturer must take care to bring out the systematic character of
the body of philosophical doctrine in question, the way 'in which views on logic, ethics, epistemology and metaphysics support and illustrate one another' (p.42). This approach, Mackie claimed, 'is a valuable corrective to the piecemeal treatment of philosophy as an assortment of puzzles, and it may be a stimulating challenge to thought, whether in the end one accepts the system presented or not' (p.42).

Some of what Mackie has to say would have been contested by certain philosophers at the time, as might be expected. Much of it, however, accords with the views and practices he would have encountered as an undergraduate in Anderson’s department.1 But on one important matter he suggests a sharp point of difference with the way in which Anderson held that philosophy should be taught and researched within a philosophy department. The systematic character of philosophy teaching within a department should not, if circumstances allow, be a systematic teaching from the viewpoint of one philosophic system: 'a philosophy department is more likely to be vigorous if there is controversy within it, and if there is sufficient diversity of views to promote controversy' (p.43). There is no need, Mackie claimed, to plan or to impose such diversity, particularly to meet demands from outside the university: the ordinary procedure of appointing the best candidates to positions as vacancies occur is sufficient.

The Department of Philosophy of which Stout and Mackie were professors contained a marked diversity of philosophic viewpoints, as Stout had been keen to stress. This welcoming of diversity within the Department was one of the points which Anderson took up in his solicited paper, 'Religion and the University'. 'This', he argued, 'is the doctrine of philosophy as “arena”, not as subject, and it is anything but conducive to the students' educational progress'.2 The academic readers of Vestes, however, were not to see Anderson’s paper. The editor had refused to accept the paper without substantial revisions because he thought it too closely related to the particular details of the Gough controversy and 'it did not give enough consideration to the practice of Universities, on both counts not being sufficiently general for an adequate treatment

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of the subject'. 1 Anderson refused to revise the paper and published it in *The Australian Highway*, November, 1961, the journal of the Worker's Educational Association of NSW. The article is in large part a critical response from his own distinctive position to statements made or appearing late in the Gough controversy. He particularly stresses that theological ethics is weak on content and confused and he contrasts it with his own theory of ethics as concerned with goodness, a natural quality, free of what he takes to be the confused notions of moral imperatives and obligations. But, he claimed, despite the difference between his ethics and other moral theories, he claimed that both were seeking to deal with the same moral phenomena. 'I take the positive subject which even the loose theories of morals are struggling with to be that of culture, of departments of social life in which disinterested activities such as art and inquiry are sustained through institutions and traditions'. 2

The result of Anderson's refusal to revise his paper meant that the next item to appear as originally intended was F. R. Arnott's 'Religion and the University', *Vestes* 5, (1), March, 1962. Arnott, later to be Anglican Archbishop of Brisbane and a member of the Royal Commission on Human Relationships, had become Warden of St Paul's College at the University in 1946 and was a long serving member of the University's Board of Studies in Divinity. Not surprisingly, he took the issue of the place of religion in the university to be the place of the Christian religion.

Arnott's discussion consists in the building up of a cumulative case for the university study of the Christian religion, attacking the reasons which have been advanced against it and putting forward reasons which support it. The secular character of Australian, he argued, should not be taken as an endorsement of a secularist university as is indicated, for example, by the Preamble of the University of Sydney Act of Incorporation with its reference to 'the better advancement of religion and morality and the promotion of useful knowledge' and support for the foundation of denominational colleges in the foundation of the University (p.38). 'The secular nature of the Australian universities', he wrote, 'must not be assumed too readily. They [the university founders] rightly in a modern democracy sought no religious tests, but they were not

2 *Ibid.*, p. 53. Mackie had suggested in 'A Refutation of Morals', in *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 24, 1946, p. 90 that Anderson's theory of goodness 'has very few of the relations and other features that we have been in the habit of associating with goodness.'
hostile to religion itself' (p.39). Yet, if now weakening sectarian rivalries had previously kept the study of the Christian faith from having a place in the earlier lives of the developing universities, it ought not to be assumed that the study of religious issues should continue to be excluded from the academic work of the universities:

The university often professes its neutrality on ultimate questions, whether political or religious, but this does not mean that they should be ignored, and our thinking conditioned to believe they do not matter'. (p.36)

But what religion or religions should be studied and how? Arnott's answer to the first question was that all religions could be properly studied in the secular university and many in fact were: 'courses in Islamic and Semitic studies, primitive religions in its anthropology schools, Indian and Chinese religion in its schools of Oriental Studies' (p.36). The major exception was the Christian religion: 'Bible or Theology' often seemed to be excluded though the situation had changed to some extent in the last twenty five years with developments such as the post-graduate BD program at Sydney. Such opportunities, he argued, ought to be widened and a first degree in Theology introduced into Australian universities.

The basic principle upon Arnott relied in making this claim is that 'The University is a microcosm of our civilization as a whole' (p.36). And, following T. S. Eliot, he claimed that civilization or culture was still Christian, even though Christianity was no longer the dominant set of ideas in the culture, for no alternate set of ideas had so far succeeded it. Christianity, understood in this way, retains a special right to be studied in the university under the usual conditions of academic life as do the 'other principles of modern thought' (pp.37-8). And those training for the Christian ministry have as much right to a university education as do those entering the traditional professions and others 'in applied pursuits like journalism, pharmacy, physical education and social work'. 'Christianity', Arnott claimed, 'is not yet a minority group in our 'neutral' culture, and may therefore demand the privilege of its adherents enjoying the freedom for instruction in its tenets and the encouragement of its virtues, a state beneficial for Church and Commonwealth alike' (p.36).

But can the Christian religion be studied in the open and critical fashion of the university? Arnott had no doubt that it could. The root of this problem, he maintained, is to be found in the nineteenth century conflict 'between Biblical Fundamentalism and modern
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Biology', but this he believed was a passing phase in the history of the Christian religion and science based on a biblical literalism 'that had developed in the late eighteenth century' and which had now been rectified by 'a vast change in Biblical Scholarship' (p.38) and revised Church attitudes towards science since Darwin's time.

The way is now open, Arnott claimed, for Australian universities to follow the recent British example and establish theological faculties or departments. Such departments would have to be entirely free of any concerns about heresy and orthodoxy and be non-denominational in teaching. Their staffs would have to be appointed in accord with the same standards that apply elsewhere in the university and they would have to teach and research in the same critical spirit. Would the staff to be appointed have to be Christian? Arnott did not answer this question, but in view of some of the gains that he thought would follow the establishment of departments of theology, such as pastoral benefits, the answer would seem to be yes, which would seem to be at odds with other aspects of his paper. His general position, however, is summed up in the claim 'It would seem mere prejudice to maintain that religion has no title to a place in an academic world' (p.41).

With Anderson's unwillingness to revise his paper, the task of providing a secularist viewpoint to balance Arnott's article with one of the same name fell to J. L. Mackie. He was a natural choice. A sometime member of Anderson's school, he held to the view that no religious metaphysic or theological system provides the truth about man's place in nature. He was also hostile to calls such as Arnott's for the university to provide a home for a department or faculty given to the promotion of a particular religious position. He saw such calls as belonging to the same category as the recent attacks by Gough and Kinsella on the Sydney philosophers and the pressure by the Catholic church for its own university. 'It is important to see', he wrote in Vestes, 5, (3), September 1962, 'that these diverse demands express different attitudes of a common attitude to the universities; the present universities, it is felt, are godless, either positively, or at least negatively, by hostility to or neglect of religion, and we should either make the existing universities more religious or provide others that are based explicitly on religion' (p.6).

Mackie's hostility to such claims was not driven so much by his convictions about the falsity of Christianity and other theistic faiths,

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but by his belief that a religious presence could not easily be separated from attitudes and policies which were inimical to the spirit of criticism within the university. Religion, whether as a practice or as study, was apt to bring with it the censorship of opinions, outside demands for orthodoxy in belief, methods of enquiry which were insufficiently critical or dependent upon a 'supernatural, supra-rational act of faith' (p.9), unquestioning assumptions about the intellectual plausibility of theistic faith, and shallow views, such as Arnott's, who is never mentioned by name, about the challenge posed by science to religious views. Accordingly Mackie's discussion of the place of religion in university life is in large part a strongly directed warning against the dangers of accepting the sort of recommendations made by Arnott and others like him.

Yet Mackie was well aware that the topic of religion in the university could not be put to one side simply because of these concerns. He also knew that various churchmen had spoken out in defence of the university and the philosophers in the recent Kinsella-Gough controversies against religiously motivated 'blatantly anti-academic' demands: 'it is only fair to record that other adherents of religion have publicly supported academic principles against these demands' (p.12). Furthermore, he knew that the question of the academic study of religion in the university could not wait upon agreed rational answers to 'the substantive questions' of 'the nature and the truth of the relevant religious doctrines' (p.6) And in Sydney, at least, it had to be acknowledged that the advancement of religion and morality was part of the charter of the University, as Arnott and other churchmen pointed out: it 'made certain concessions to the religious view' (p.9).

How then is the academic study of religion, particularly the Christian religion, to be approached? The answer, according to Mackie, has to be in terms of the principles 'that govern the relationship between the university and religion' (p.6). But what are these? At the outset Mackie tacitly sets aside the governing principle of Arnott's approach. Arnott's view was that the university is a creation of society and cannot hold itself altogether separate from the needs and interests of the society which sustains it. And Arnott's case, as far as Sydney was concerned, was strengthened by the fact that the exclusion of the teaching of theology and divinity from the

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1 Anderson's view was that 'what the Act gave was not a prescription but a prediction, viz., that religion and morality would be advanced and useful knowledge promoted if the University were set up as part of a system of liberal education'. *loc. cit.*, p. 51.
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curriculum in the Act establishing the University had been repealed in 1936. Mackie, however, would not follow this line of argument, at least as stated by Arnott. His general response to Arnott’s point can, however, be easily inferred. The sort of interests and procedures to be accepted within any institution set up by the state depend upon the sort of institution it is designed to be. In the case of the university, Mackie claimed, its purpose is critical enquiry: ‘A university as such has the task and the right of enquiring honestly into all fields of knowledge’ (p.6). Religious claims to a higher or sacrosanct knowledge or to a special sensitivity or respect for teaching about religious matters are not to be tolerated in the university any more than similar claims about the moral tendencies which might flow from certain teachings within the university.

It is not, of course, the business of such departments to recommend any morality, conventional or unconventional; but if their teaching has an indirect effect on conduct this can only be because it enquires into relevant facts and into the status of ethical concepts. A university department has every right to carry on such enquiries, and if its conclusions are damaging to some established beliefs, this may show that those beliefs are in need of revision, not that its enquiries should be suppressed; we need not respect the claim of outside institutions to know what is right or wrong in advance of any rational enquiry. (p.7)

How then is the study of religion or religions to fit into the academic structures and curriculum of such an institution? In the absence of agreed answers concerning ‘the substantial questions’, its place has to be determined by the availability of the material to be investigated, its integrity either as a field to be investigated by a single discipline or its unity as an area which can be investigated by a variety of disciplines. Such an approach rules out any subject which rests its claims on a special way of knowing - ‘there are no facts to which in principle there can only be one way of access’¹ (p.10) - or one in which the matter to be investigated is so heterogeneous that its unity simply reflects the imposition of an arbitrary interest on the material.

Mackie divides the fields of acceptable religious study into three groups. First, there are subjects such as ‘biblical studies’, which had recently been introduced as a course in Arts at Sydney under E. C. B. MacLaurin. ‘The geographical, linguistic, social, historical and

¹ The basis of this claim is not provided.
archaeological background of the biblical writings constitutes a subject, or related group of subjects, which can be appropriately studied in an academic spirit and at the university level” (p.7). As an ‘area study’ involving a number of disciplines, this and other inter-disciplinary studies are apt to be theoretically weaker than the single discipline based subjects, but, Mackie argued, this is less of a problem when the traditional subjects are strongly represented in the university. Secondly, there are questions that arise in natural theology, issues ‘about the existence and nature of God and related matters’. This is an area of philosophical study, worthy of a place in universities either in departments of philosophy or in some special department set aside for such issues. Whatever the organisational arrangements for the study of these matters, ‘it is clear’, Mackie claimed, ‘that it must be taught in a philosophically competent way, by university teachers with an adequate knowledge of general philosophy’ (p.8). They must be able to develop their own views about natural theology free of any requirement to defend or to oppose orthodox religious views on such issues. Natural theology thus understood could also embrace issues about allegedly ‘revealed knowledge’ or what is called ‘theology in the strict sense’ if the basis of such a study - the possibility of revealed knowledge and the criteria for accepting any knowledge claim as revealed - is a principal consideration. Theology understood in this way would seem to be a largely philosophical study of religious and theological claims:

Theology, then, has a place in university courses only in so far as it is a rational and philosophical study, but it is then one subject, not a cluster of alternative opinions or doctrines, and for all that we can settle in advance an atheist might make the best professor of theology. (p.9)

Thirdly, Mackie allowed that the history of doctrines had a legitimate place in university studies. How doctrines developed, the problems they encountered, why they were rejected or fell into disuse, their influence upon the life of their times and later, and so on, is an established field of academic study. ‘This is a branch of the history of ideas. It is an entirely reputable academic subject, though it may appeal only to a limited audience’ (p.9). But what particular tradition of historical theology should be studied? The answer depends, Mackie claimed, on which particular religion is thought to be the true religion. If the Christian religion is not true or not regarded as true, then the history of doctrines in another
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religion might well be regarded as more deserving of a place in the university curriculum than doctrines in the Christian tradition. But the problem, he pointed out, relates not only to Christianity but to its rivals. If the truth or falsity of a religion is to be the guide as to whether or not its history is of importance for university study then it is possible that no one religion has priority over any other. In that case, he argued, 'comparative religion or comparative theology' might be the most important area for the study of the history of religious ideas and their development.¹

But if it turned out that all religions were in their main doctrines, false, or alternatively that what was true was some element common to many or all of them, then comparative religion or comparative theology would be likely to be far more illuminating than the separate study of the systems of thought evolved by the adherents of one religion alone. (p.9)

VI

In 1972, ten years after the Vestes articles, the executive of the Australian and New Zealand Society for Theological Studies, in which Jim Tulip was a leading figure, put out a collection of documents and articles which they hoped would serve as 'a useful tool' for those 'who see the possibility of introducing or extending the study of religion and/or theology in the universities of our two countries'.² Neither Arnott's nor Mackie's articles were included, but they were probably not known to the compilers. Traces of one article and perhaps both are probably be found in one of the documents contained in the collection, The Martin Committee Report of 1964 Chap. 15: Theological Training in Australia. It would be surprising if there were not as they are amongst the few academic articles canvassing such matters at this time.

¹ Mackie's article is in most respects an application of the principles found in Anderson's 1943 paper, 'Religion and Education', op. cit. to the university situation whereas Anderson was concerned with schools.
The Martin Committee or The Committee on the Future of Tertiary Education in Australia under the chairmanship of Sir Lesley Martin was appointed in August, 1961 by the Prime Minister, Sir Robert Menzies, to consider 'the pattern of tertiary education in relation to the needs and resources of Australia' for the purpose of making recommendations 'to the Australian Universities Commission on the future development of tertiary education'. For the Martin Committee, theological colleges and theological training came within reach of its activities because it took its brief to include consideration of all education following a full secondary school training. To help it in this particular task, the Committee appointed a group of churchmen 'to investigate, on its behalf, the present position with regard to theological training' (ch.15.10). Felix Arnott was the Anglican representative.

The spirit and argument of Arnott's Vestes article is certainly present in the group's cautious attempt to sound out the Committee's attitude towards the provision of publicly funded theological studies in universities.

In its report to the Committee the group has referred to the possibility that theological studies will be provided in universities, mentioning the possibility mainly 'to indicate that the climate is now favourable for theological studies at the universities and that the cordial co-operation of all denominations has removed an obstacle that hitherto has caused hesitation on the part of university governing bodies'. (15.50)

The Martin Committee, however, would not recommend any direct Federal funding for theological training which 'deals with the furtherance of religious beliefs' (15.51); 'it would not be appropriate for Commonwealth and state funds to be made available for training in the views and beliefs of any particular religious group' (15.52). Responsibility for such training, it held, belongs to the denominational theological colleges. The Committee, however, was prepared to meet group's tentative recommendation half-way. In accord with its views of enhancing the benefits of 'both general education and specialized education at all levels' (1.26), it suggested that the special needs of ministerial training could be met, in part, if secular tertiary institutions were to provide courses in areas particularly appropriate for those who intended to undertake theological training.

It is suggested, therefore, that Australian universities and the proposed Institutes of Colleges and Boards of Teacher Education might consider the advisability of offering a wider range of courses in subject which would be appropriate for theological training. The Committee does not contemplate the possibility that institutions would offer training in beliefs, although courses might doubtless be available in comparative religion, theological (including biblical) history, early specialist languages for the understanding of manuscript material and original texts, classical languages and literature, ancient history and archaeology. (15.43).

The policy was more in line with Mackie's approach than Arnott’s, but more for constitutional reasons than philosophical.

Fourteen years after the Martin Report, the Department of Religious Studies at the University of Sydney offered its first courses, taught by Professor Eric Sharpe and Dr Garry Trompf. Its aim was more or less in accord with the sort of academic policy recommended by the Report, but reflecting the changes which had occurred in the study of religion in the recent past. It treated the consideration of religion in its diversity as a worthwhile 'non-confessional' area study in its own right, open to staff and students who 'may be of any faith or none', and it made use of the phenomenological method as one of its means in understanding religion. According to the Arts Handbook 1978,

Its overall aim is to provide an understanding of the phenomena of religion within the total context of Primal, Eastern and Western Cultures. Its methods are those of history, sociology, psychology and phenomenology applied to specific areas of human experience.

The new department would work closely with the Board of Studies in Divinity though 'it does not aim at providing ministerial training for the ministry or the priesthood'.
