'REVOLUTION'
AS AN HISTORIOGRAPHICAL CATEGORY FOR PRE-INDUSTRIAL EUROPE
(from antiquity to the sixteenth century)

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The term 'revolution' - like the term 'feudalism' - provides an opportunity for reflection on the construction of what may be seen as objective developments in history. It is also an invitation to ponder the mental processes and categories that determine and make possible such constructions. My purpose in this introductory paper, therefore, could well be seen as twofold:

1) theoretical: to comment on what any theory of revolutions does or should imply;

2) chronological: to highlight such developments as have been dubbed revolutions in the period from antiquity to the 16th century by modern scholars and to ask why they have been so dubbed.

I do not, however, propose to linger over the first purpose above except to observe that the term 'revolution' is primarily a way of alerting a reader to what one considers important about the past; that is, it underlines one's particular philosophy of history, pinpoints one's passions and preoccupations. For the rest, the reader must construct his/her own impressions from the available literature and from the other papers in this volume.

My second purpose I hope to execute somewhat polemically, and sketchily. I have only made a very preliminary survey of what has been termed 'revolutionary' - or of what has not been so termed - for the period, in question, and that largely from textbooks. It may be, however, that the latter indicate the crystallization of large scale historiographical viewpoints rather better than monographs devoted to the empirical investigation of particular projects or developments.

For the period under consideration in this paper, we do not have any clearly thought out theory of revolution, or any measure of agreement regarding the applicability of the term, nor of course do we have any "ages of revolution" such as the era between 1789 and 1848 according to E.J. Hobsbawm's book of a similar title. The absence of a 'theory of revolution' for the period reflects the extreme diversity of modern scholarship on the eras in question. United by no common perspective such as binds historians of the 'Annaliste' persuasion, historians of different backgrounds and ideological commitment - expressed or unexpressed - pursue an endless programme of empirical research that produces, to use Huizinga's metaphor, building stones which the ultimate arch-historian of human culture and its significance will in the end find unsuited to the task of constructing a universal history. Consequently, historians of the period from antiquity to the sixteenth century in Europe display a measure of ignorance, indifference and confusion in their handling of what is revolutionary about the past they are studying. This failure to agree on what is revolutionary produces parochial particularism, contradiction and an inability to properly seize upon the significance of certain historical events and developments singled out as 'important'. In the midst of this 'anarchy', the pseudo-historian will enter and erect a pseudo-theory, 'behind the backs', as it were, of the professional historian. I propose to illustrate in a sketchy fashion the indifference and confusion on the part of the professional historians of pre-industrial and near Eastern
history, in regard to what is "revolutionary" and then to look at the entry of the pseudo-historian and the pseudo-theory of revolutions, with reference to an important recent book that puts forward a crucial theory of 'revolution' for the medieval period.9

At one end of the historiographical spectrum lies the view of 'revolution' as a short term, localised, political or religious 'coup d'etat'. This notion is encouraged by one aspect of the etymology of the word revolution, from the Latin revolvere 'to come or go back, to revolve, to turn over, to return',10 rather than another which stresses the large-scale long term panorama. This latter aspect, perhaps to be translated 'unfold' 'retell', is that used by Livy, for example, in his Histories (Ab urbe condita) XXXIV.5.7: 'What novelty lies in this action of the matrons who have come forward into the public view on an issue very pertinent to their welfare? Have they never done so in the past?'. I will unravel against you your own (Book of) Antiquities (origines). See how often they have done so (in the past), and always for the public good . . . . The context, a speech by the plebeian tribune L. Valerius in favour of his own proposal to the people (rogatio) designed to repeal the lex Oppia (a sumptuary law against excesses in female dress), perhaps suggests the somewhat emotional overtones of this usage. The reference to 'unravelling' the Antiquities of M. Porcius Cato (an opposing speaker in the debate on the lex Oppia issue, 195/94 BC), has, of course, a literal reference (Roman books took the form of long rolls which had to be 'unrolled' page by page to be read), but perhaps suggests also the idea of an unfolding past, one in which events can be seen to progress according to a cyclic rhythm (appearance, development, maturity, decline, disappearance - cf. the use of revolvi in Livy 5.11.2).

The former sense - of short term 'tum-around' - governs the application of the term 'revolution' to the attack on the old priesthood of Amon, in favour of a monarchical monotheism, by the celebrated Egyptian pharaoh Amenhotep IV, or Ikhnaton. 'This remarkable revolution' as Breasted calls it, was followed by a 'counter-revolution' under the even more celebrated Tutankhamon (originally named Tutankhaton).11 It also governs the use of the word by English translators of the Greek historian Thucydides, whose account of the oligarchic revolution against the democrats at Corcyra in 427 BC has become a classic. In Thucydides' original, of course, the word used is not 'revolution' but ἔστασις 'a standing (from ἐστὶν 'to stand') position... state or condition... party, company (political) party ... faction ... sedition'.12 In the 427 BC context what is implied by the term is a 'sedition leading to constitutional or unconstitutional change'; so too is this meaning implicit in historiographical usage describing another celebrated Greek oligarchic revolution, that of the 400 in Athens in 411 AD.13 In a somewhat broader but nevertheless analogous sense the term is normally used also to describe the transformation of the Roman State and society via revolution, from Republic to Empire between the years 60 BC and 14 AD or 133 BC and 30 BC; in a reverse direction, Michael Winterbottom considers that Quintilian's call for a 'return to the past' in the oratorical practice of his day amounted to 'a revolution'.14

'Stasis' in fact, is the central word used in Aristotle's Politics V, which attempts to set up a theory of 'sedition' leading to constitutional/unconstitutional change. The Graeco-Roman notion of 'revolution' (stasis, μεταβολή 'change', πολιτείαν ἀνανανθήτω 'political coming around again/revolution', or commutatio as used by Polybius, Cicero and others) is thus essentially a political rather than a social one. As such it played the role of a sub-theme in the Middle Ages, by way of such topics as the lawfulness of resistance to a tyrant, emerging as the rivoluzioni of the autonomous city-states of the Renaissance, and enjoying a vigorous early modern career, as the Discorsi of Machiavelli and the Calvinist doctrine of resistance to an ungodly ruler testify.15
With the 'crisis' of the Roman Empire in the third century AD, the term revolution is employed by historians to underline a dramatic and total socio-political transformation. This "century of revolution" (c.180-284 AD) lead, it is alleged, 'from the enlightened reign of Marcus Aurelius to oriental despotism under Diocletian'. A totally different world emerged from this revolution: 'the state had been completely militarized and orientalized'. Similar perhaps are the implications of the Abbasid revolution in mid eighth century AD Islam: this 'was more than a mere change of dynasty. It was a revolution in the history of Islam, as important a turning point as the French and Russian revolutions in the history 'of the West'. It represented, in fact, a transformation in the nature of the Caliphate, in the direction of autocracy, divine right and military force, and on a different socio-religious base.

This fascination on the part of historians with dynastic (and associated) change is also evident in opinion about the advent of the Carolingians in seventh and eighth century AD France. Curiously, neither the so-called Carolingian Renaissance nor the 'coronation' of Charlemagne in the year 800 constituted 'revolutions', but the advent of the Carolingians did. The coronation was a 'turning point in history' but the 'papal separation from Byzantium and alliance with the Franks' in the eighth century (by which the Carolingians, technically, came to power) was 'more than a simple turning away from the East; it implied, as well, a turning toward the Christian West' which a recent investigator has dubbed 'the Roman revolution of the eighth century'. Alternative theories to explain the advent of the Carolingians are also dubbed 'revolutions'. Thus, for example, the advent of the stirrup, in one much criticized investigation, caused one 'revolution' in Europe by enabling the Carolingians to supersede the Merovingians, and another in England when the Normans succeeded the Anglo-Saxon monarchy. Further applications of the term 'Roman revolution' focus on minor short term, abortive politico-constitutional changes in the government of the city of Rome (for example in 1143 and 1347 AD), and the phrases 'significant revolution', 'constitutional revolution' are found in reference to attempts by cardinals or conciliarists to dismantle papal absolutism in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries; Jan Hus himself seems to have concluded that the Council of Constance itself was the truly guilty party deserving punishment as a revolutionary and a heretic and the consequence of his own execution was revolution. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the use of terms like 'revolution' or 'turning point' by modern historians is arbitrary and perhaps over-influenced by ancient notions of dynastic change and short term political coup.

When historians do move beyond these narrow confines they display a worrying vagueness. What, in fact, is meant by the "Feudal Revolution" that Georges Duby detects in documents of the second decade of the eleventh century, or the 'great revolution in the index of social values' that Marc Bloch detects in the 10th-12th century attitude towards serfdom? What is meant by 'the commercial revolution of the Middle Ages 950-1350 A.D.' which R.S. Lopez describes in a book of that title, a book probably unique in its lack of statement as to how and why the developments it describes should be called revolutionary? Lopez, in fact, under-rates agriculture, but that is no problem, since Lynn White, in his Medieval Technology and Social Change happily describes in ch. 2 the 'agricultural revolution of the early Middle Ages' which seems to have performed the same role in history as the 'commercial revolution' of R.S. Lopez. Messrs. Mollat and Wolff complicate all this by declining to take as their subject the 'urban or middle-class revolutions, and the communal, which took place between the eleventh and the thirteenth centuries', preferring instead to talk about the "popular revolutions" of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, which were, on the whole, abortive and without major impact on the socio-economic institutions of their day.
As characteristic of modern scholarship as the vagueness and narrow focus commented on immediately above, is a failure to seize upon key developments that, were revolutionary. 'Evolution', not 'revolution', for example, is the word chosen by Tarn to describe the pace of change in the Hellenistic centuries 323-30 B.C.27 Midst the vast and turbulent panorama of events in Europe between the age of Constantine and the Arab conquest of Spain in the eighth century, the reign of Constantine himself, although 'the sharpest break with the past in all Roman history'28, is not a revolution. The impact of Christianity upon the thought of the Graeco-Roman world is a revolution, as is the 'age of Theodosius' although it only consummates a 'renovation' 'originally undertaken by Constantine29. The transformation of the late Roman into the early medieval world is sometimes called a 'social revolution and beginning',30 but Henri Pirenne chooses not to label his decisive Islamic termination of the 'ancient world' a revolution, although in every sense, as he describes it, it must have been.31

Some historians work hard to obliterate the 'revolutionary' element in historical interpretation. Thus, for Witt 'there was little about the communes that was revolutionary in intent',32 and Charles Radding describes the 'great continuities' evident in two periods of Western history, 100 AD-1050 AD and 1050 AD-1700 AD, without describing the break between them as 'revolutionary', despite the fact that, for many, this break marks the passage from 'archaic' to 'modern' society and is thus the most decisive point in the evolution of western culture.33

Brian Tierney, too, as far as 'constitutional theory' is concerned, denies any sharp breaks between 1150 and 1650, and denies Christopher Hill's assertion that 'the seventeenth is the decisive century of English history, the epoch in which the Middle Ages ended'.34 All this despite the Reformation, the 'price' revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the 'scientific revolution' of the same period and the 'great technological "revolutions" between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries' (artillery, printing and ocean navigation) which historians of many persuasions are happy enough to describe as 'revolutions'.35

Midst this Babel of voices, is it any wonder that a non-specialist, a non-historian, should step in and announce the definitive 'revolution of revolutions' for the period prior to the 'German Reformation of 1517', the 'first of the great revolutions of Western history'? Developing earlier suggestions by professional historians36 Harold J. Berman, writing in a somewhat apocalyptic vein for "believers" rather than "skeptics", has homed in upon the 'great divide' indicated by others, such as Radding, discussed above, and erected there a theory of a 'papal revolution 1075-1122 AD', the first of 'six great revolutions' that have transformed the Western legal tradition, 'the first major turning point in European history'.37 Any notion we may have that Berman is referring only to a specialised aspect of the evolution of western society (legal ideas) is belied by a glance at his other great revolutions - the Russian (1917), American, French, English (1640-85), and Protestant (1517-1555)! Berman's discussion of these revolutions as "total" revolutions and his presentation of the morphology of 'total revolution'38 remove any residual doubts we may have that he is discussing only one aspect of the evolution of western society: for him, law and the legal tradition lie at the centre of historical development. With a sweep that reminds us of Hobsbawm (above n.4), Berman announces that 'one of the purposes of this study is to show that in the West, modern times - not only modern legal institutions and modern legal values but also the modern state, the modern church, modern philosophy, the modern university, modern literature, and much else that is modern - have their origin in the period 1050-1150 and not before.'39
What was the essence of this 'papal revolution' in Berman's eyes? In the first place, the concept of self-renewal, the regeneration of society: 'Without the belief that this world, these times, the secular institutions of human society, could be regenerated - and that such regeneration would lead to the fulfillment of man's ultimate destiny - the great revolutions of Western history could not have occurred.'

In the second, and perhaps for Berman, the more important, place, lies 'a revolutionary development of legal institutions':

In the late eleventh, the twelfth, and the early thirteenth centuries a fundamental change took place in western Europe in the very nature of law both as a political institution and as an intellectual concept. Law became disembedded. Politically, there emerged for the first time strong central authorities, both ecclesiastical and secular, whose control reached down, through delegated officials, from the centre to the localities. Partly in connection with that, there emerged a class of professional jurists, including professional judges and practicing lawyers. Intellectually, western Europe experienced at the same time the creation of its first law schools, the writing of its first legal treatises, the conscious ordering of the huge mass of inherited legal materials, and the development of the concept of law as an autonomous, integrated, developing body of legal principles and procedures...

The fact that the new system of canon law, created in the late eleventh and twelfth centuries, constituted the first modern Western legal system has been generally overlooked.

Underscoring these remarks is Berman's notion of the primacy in history of 'the western legal tradition'. This 'hidden agenda' should challenge all historians: Berman's concept of law, history and revolution aims to reify and objectify bourgeois-capitalist concepts of law and legal discourse above the social forces that create them. Western Legal Systems have hitherto, he says, survived and indeed been renewed by revolutions. To survive the latest challenges Berman calls for a rejection of traditional historiography - enshrined in such words as 'medieval'/feudal' - which obscures the focal importance of his 'papal revolution', and for 'the elaboration of a social theory of law' which will counter the Marxist notion that 'law is part of an "ideological superstructure" used by those who have economic power as a means of effectuating their policies':

The Western legal tradition cannot be understood simply as an instrument of domination, whether economic or political; it must be seen also as an important part of the basic structure of Western society. It is both a reflection and a determinant of economic and political development. Without constitutional law, corporation law, contract law, property law, and the other fields of law that developed in Western Europe from the twelfth to the fifteenth centuries, the economic and political changes of the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, which contemporary social theorists have identified with capitalism, could not have taken place........ in Western history law has been invoked periodically against the prevailing political and moral values of society - the very values which may be said to have
fathered it, and which it is supposed to share. Law is summoned to protect the dissident, the heretic, although the political authorities and public opinion itself condemn dissent or heresy. Law may protect the collective against a dominant individualism, or the individual against a dominant collectivism. This loyalty of the law to its own values is hard to explain in terms of an instrumental theory that views legal institutions as merely a tool of the dominant class or of the political elite. Law - in Western history, at least - cannot be wholly reduced either to the material conditions of the society that produces it or to the system of ideas and values; it must be seen also, that is, in part, as an independent factor, one of the causes, and not only one of the results, of social, economic, political, intellectual, moral, and religious developments....

Berman thus calls for an historiography that describes the emergence of legal systems functioning as he has just outlined, and for this theory, the eleventh century is fundamental:

Such a historiography would lead to a general social theory that sees Western history not primarily as a series of transitions from feudalism to capitalism to socialism but rather as a series of transitions from plural corporate groups within an overarching ecclesiastical unity to national states within an overarching but invisible religious and cultural unity, and then to national states without an overarching Western unity, seeking new forms of unity on a world scale.

Chapter Two of Berman's book elaborates his concept of an eleventh century papal revolution and what he presents is a competent and sufficiently scholarly digest of what professional historians have said in the past about the 'Investitures Contest' or the 'Investiture Controversy', coupled with one or two gentle sleights-of-hand. The first is a 'post hoc propter hoc' assumption that the investiture dispute, occurring at the same time as numerous larger changes in society, necessarily 'caused them', and the second is an over-valuation of the role of law and the papacy in socio-economic and institutional change, and in the investiture controversy itself; this role many would dispute.

It would take far more space than is available here to properly elaborate these criticisms. I would, however, invite the reader to consider carefully the document presented as Appendix II to my paper. The document concerns the election of the king of the Germanic lands in 1125 A.D. The German ruler was the leading secular potentate of the day and was normally promoted, by papal coronation, to the position of Universal Christian Emperor. This coronation was a central element in, and expression of contemporary papal sovereignty and dominion, and lay at the heart of the Investiture Controversy. From the document I hope the reader will deduce a number of important conclusions that should mitigate Berman's concept of a 'papal revolution':

1. in the election of the German ruler the pope played no role;

2. society is dominated by the ecclesiastical and secular potentes and this dominance is made possible by the engine of manorial/agrarian production and oppression recently highlighted by Georges Duby and Pierre Dockès;

3. 'social power' determines and results from the uneasy relationship between these potentes that prevails at any given moment;
4. ideas and institutions are resorts, sometimes forlorn, sometimes glittering and long-lived, which serve to bolster and buttress the position of newcomers (or, if not newcomers, elements whose command of brute force and charisma is deficient) in the struggle of the potentes;

5. the marvel of the whole period c.1000-1300 AD is the social, economic and political prominence finally achieved by the literati, those in command of the instruments and media of written (and to a lesser extent, formal, oral) discourse. Berman's 'papal revolution' is out-of-date in view of the recent ferment of interest in the "great revolution of literacy" that characterized the period c.1000-1300 AD.51

I end this paper - designed to provoke rather than to provide answers - with this challenge: if medievalists and historians of the period from antiquity to the sixteenth century, so abdicate their concern for the truly revolutionary, the globally, universally and fundamentally significant in history, non- or pseudo-historians such as Berman will move in, in an attempt to counter the genuinely revolutionary historical insights initiated during the nineteenth century by Karl Marx and his associates.52

1 See E. Leach, S.N. Mukherjee and J. Ward (eds) Feudalism: Comparative Studies (Sydney, 1985).
2 In the schedule of the original two-day seminar which produced the present volume of papers, my own contribution was meant as an introductory skirmish for the major, post-medieval, concentrations of the conference
3 John Urry Reference Groups and the Theory of Revolution (London, 1973); Lawrence Stone 'Theories of revolution' World Politics 18 (1966) 159-176; Bernard Yack The Longing for Total Revolution: philosophic sources of social discontent from Rousseau to Marx and Nietzsche (Princeton 1986); Isaac Kramnick Reflections on revolution: definition and explanation in recent scholarship, History and Theory 11 (1972) 26-63; J.C. Davies 'Toward a theory of revolution' American Sociological Review 27 (1962) 5-19. Louis Gottschalk 'Causes of Revolution' The American Journal of Sociology 50 (1944) 1-8; Ch. Wilson's review of Christopher Hill's The Century of Revolution in The Historical Journal 5(1962) 80-92. Current journalistic use of the term 'revolutionary' is indicated by the information from the Sydney Morning Herald 12/10/1987 that 'the party she (Mrs. Thatcher) leads has been transformed into a revolutionary force of the Right as passionate as the demoralised and directionless political left once was...' (!). Cf. also the use of the term 'revolution' in 'Tales of Thatcher', New Statesman/Society 28 April 1989 p.10, or 'a revolution of rising expectations' (with reference to the English miners' strike and to perestroika), NS/S 28 July 1989 p.17, and: 'This is a revolution; it could so easily have been a peaceful one, if only the old men of China's leadership had learnt from history', Sunday Telegraph 11/6/1989. I include as appendix I my review of a book by a distinguished contributor to the present workshop because it highlights the notion of the historian's tendency to construct such concepts as that of 'revolution', as elements in his/her appraisive field: by analogy, though Condren speaks of 'classic texts', his remarks apply equally to 'classic events' such as 'revolutions'. In fact, there seems general agreement that the age of Marsilius of Padua (the centre-piece, so to speak, of Condren's book) was 'revolutionary': the advent of Henry VII 'put the whole of Italy in a state of revolution' (G.Mollat The Popes at Avignon 1305-1378 trans. J.Love, N.Y. 1965 p.194); 'the freedom of utterance and the expression of modern ideas of these publicists mark the beginning of a revolution in the thought of Europe' (A.C.Flick The Decline of the Medieval Church I, London, 1930, p.31); according to A.Black Guilds and Civil Society in European political thought from the twelfth century to the present (Cornell U.P. 1984 p.91) Marsilius adds up to 'a revolution in scholastic political theory'; see also: 'The influence of Aristotle from the second half of the thirteenth century onwards wrought a transmutation in thought that amounts to a conceptual revolution' (W. Ullmann A History of Political Thought: the Middle Ages [Penguin, 1965] p.159); '...what made Marsilius revolutionary... (etc.)' (J.A.Watt, intr. to his trans. of John of Paris On Royal and Papal Power [Toronto, 1971] p.59); W.J.Courtenay (Schools and Scholars...
in Fourteenth Century England, Princeton, 1987 p.192) speaks of a 'revolution which occurred at Oxford in the 1320's and was exported to Paris in the early 1340's (as) probably the single most important dimension of fourteenth century thought, a revolution to which Ockham contributed, but did not create' (and cf. Courtenay p.206 'the revolutionary impact of Ockham's thought'); 'William of Ockham has the reputation of a revolutionary within the scholastic, spiritual and ecclesiopolitical traditions of the later Middle Ages...' (S.Ozment The Age of Reform 1250-1550, Yale U.P., 1980 p.55, and cf. pp.38-39,52,56 for reference to other aspects of Ockham's 'epistemological revolution', Ockham as a 'revolutionary thinker', as 'a conservative reformer, not a revolutionary' etc.; also M.Leff Medieval Thought (Penguin Books, 1958) p.284 'the effects of Ockham's theory of knowledge were revolutionary'); 'nothing could be more revolutionary than Meister Eckhart's 'rejection' of 'external cult', H.C.Lea A History of the Inquisition of the Middle Ages, II (London, 1888) p.359. It is generally concluded that John Wyclif, too, was a 'revolutionary' (M.Lambert Medieval Heresy [London, 1977] pp.232-33, M.Wilks in Studies in Church History 9 [1972] 118, 124, 127, G.Leff Heresy in the Later Middle Ages [Manchester, 1967] II pp.531, 538, 560, 579, 605, etc). See also the paper by Alastair MacLachlan, below.

4 E.J. Hobsbawm The Age of Revolution 1789-1848 (N.Y., 1962). Hobsbawm meant to imply that his period accounted for an unprecedented sharpening of the 'graph-curve' of progress towards the major lineaments of modern society


6 As Eco makes clear (A Theory of Semiotics, Indiana U.P., 1979 p. 29), the belief 'that one's own approach is not ideological because it succeeds in being "objective" and "neutral"' is fallacious - 'all enquiry is "motivated"'.

7 Johan Huizinga, Men and Ideas: History, the Middle Ages, the Renaissance. essays (N.Y. 1970), p.20.

8 Thus Marvin Harris, building upon an ill-founded historical edifice of Norman Cohn, produces an entirely fallacious explanation of socio-religious 'revolution' in later medieval Europe:- Cows, Pigs, Wars and Witches: the riddles of culture (London, 1975) 225-240. Berman (see below n.36) pp.26ff. comments on Cohn's messianic movements as revolutionary failures.

9 See n.36 below.


11 A.A. Trever History of Ancient Civilization I (N.Y., 1936) p.67 gives 1375 BC as the date of Ikhonaton's 'revolutions'. Cf. also J.H. Breasted Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt (N.Y., 1959) pp.319ff, esp. p.334; Donald B. Redford Akhenaton: the heretic king (Princeton, 1987) pp.158ff ('violent reaction' [to his time]; 'radical departure'); 165; 169; 175 ('drastic change'); 233; 234 ('revolution'). Despite his gloomy, pejorative account of Akhenaten, Redford is prepared to concede the king's 'innovations', his 'revolutionary ideas' (p.138).

12 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War III 82-83; Liddell and Scott, Greek English Lexikon, s.v. -  οτρευτις .


the original French word used was 'le demarrage'. Lopez, with the disposal the typescript of his undergraduate lectures on the 'concept of revolution from the Origins to Hegel'.


Sullivan ibid.

D.H. Miller in Mediaeval Studies, 36 (1974) 79ff. T. Hodgkin, Italy and her Invaders, VII p.129 also calls the events 751-54 AD 'the revolution towards which the whole course of Frankish history had been tending for more than a century'.


Cambridge, 1976. Lopez argues that in his period commerce played a crucial role in the economic 'take-off' of an underdeveloped medieval West. This is an idea also used in Georges Duby's The Early Growth of the European Economy: warriors and peasants from the seventh to the twelfth centuries, trans. H.B. Clarke (London, 1974) - the original French word used was 'le démarrage'. Lopez, with the later industrial revolution in mind, thinks of a 'take-off' from within, without external aid: 'it created the indispensable material and moral conditions for a thousand years of virtually uninterrupted growth' (p.vii). On the other hand, N.J.G. Pounds, An Economic History of Medieval Europe, (Longmans, 1974) ch. 9, pp.403ff, 542, cites Raymond de Roover's idea that a revolution in the methods of doing business occurred at the end of the thirteenth or early in the fourteenth centuries

The essence of Lynn White's ideas is expressed on p.78: on the northern European plains the heavy plough could be used, where summer rains permitted a large spring crop planting and where the summer oats would sustain horses, the use of which created an increased product yield for the peasant, compared
with the use of oxen. This resultant increase in produce from the soil raised the standard of living and created an ability to buy manufactured goods; it provided surplus food which permitted rapid urbanization from the tenth century onwards. The burghers in the new towns 'created a novel and characteristic way of life, democratic capitalism', and here 'germinated the dominant feature of the modern world: power technology'. Naturally, such ideas have been much criticised: cf. Sawyer and Hilton in *Past and Present*, 24 (1962), pp. 90-100.


29 C.N. Cochrane, *Christianity and Classical Culture*. (1940, Galaxy reprint, 1957), pp. v, 317, 318, 356-57. For the 'revolution that was Christianity' itself, see E. Pagels *Adam and Eve and the Serpent* (London, 1088) p.xviii ('accompanying Christianity......was a revolution in sexual attitudes and practices') and p.15 ('first century Christians saw themselves participating at the birth of a revolutionary movement that they expected would culminate in the total social transformation that Jesus promised in the "age to come"'). Cf. also Pagel's statement that, for Augustine, Adam and Eve provided 'not only the first government on earth, but also the first revolution' (Karen L. King (ed.) *Images of the Feminine in Gnosticism*, Philadelphia, 1988 p.418 - 'Adam and Eve and the serpent in *Genesis*'). Marina Warner, in the same vein (Alone of all her sex, the myth and the cult of the Virgin Mary, N.Y., 1983 p.72) asserts that Christianity 'offered women a revolution, as long as they subscribed to its precepts'.


31 *Mohammed and Charlemagne*. (Meridian, 1962), pt. II.


33 Charles Radding, *A World Made by Men: cognition and society 400-1200* (U. of NC Press, 1985), p.256. Other references will be found in my 'Rhetoric, truth, literacy and the Twelfth Century Renaissance', forthcoming in *Written Communication Annual* for 1988, ed. Richard Leo Enos. Note that M. Keen in his *The Pelican History of Medieval Europe* speaks of the 'twelfth century revolution in government' in favour of bureaucracy and literacy (ch. 8, pp.103ff). Tina Stiefel also uses the word 'revolutionary' in the twelfth century context. Cf. her *The Intellectual Revolution in Twelfth Century Europe* (London/Sydney, 1985). On p.50 she describes Petrus Alfonsus' substitution of medicine for the traditional study of grammar c.1110 AD as 'a suggestion of revolutionary boldness at a time when the liberal arts curriculum had been frozen by centuries of tradition'. F. Utley *The Crooked Rib* (N.Y., 1970 p.7) describes the twelfth century as 'a time when...the old axioms were restated in a revolutionary way' [with reference to misogynistic themes]. B. McGuire (Friendship and Community: the monastic experience 350-1250, Kalamazoo 1988, p.211) speaks of a 'veritable revolution in the expression of human sentiment associated with Anselm's writings on friendship' (*The Anselmian Revolutionoc* c.1070-1120', p.210). For Fuhrmann (*Germany in the High Middle Ages* c.1050-1200, trans. T. Reuter, Cambridge, 1986 [originally published in German in 1978]) p.128 a 12th century marriage alliance was 'a revolutionary act'. 'Clare' (writes Brenda Bolton *Mulieres Sanctae*, *Studies in Church History* 10(1973) p.89) 'represented a potential revolution within the church'. For David Knowles and his recent editors,
the arrival of Aristotle in the 13th schools of the medieval west was a ‘philosophical revolution’ (pp.xx, 320 and ch.18 of D.Knowles The Evolution of Medieval Thought, 2nd ed. by D.Luscombe and C.N.L.Brooke, London and N.Y., 1988), and the shift from rhetoric to logic as the pièce de résistance of the curriculum of the 11th century schools (ibid. p.69) is the index of a cultural revolution’. J.C.L.Sismondi in his History of the French (1823, 1826, translated as the History of the Crusades against the Albigenses in the 13th century, London, 1826 p.4 calls the Albigensian crusade a ‘horrible revolution’. These instances seem to cry out for some sort of coordination in terms of what was, or was not, revolutionary in the period.


37 Berman, pp.18-19, 87. As long ago as 1958 Norman Cantor described the eleventh century reform movement as one of the four great “world-revolutions” of Western history. See his Church, Kingship and Lay Investiture in England (Princeton, 1958) pp.6-9, and B. Tierney The Crisis of Church and State 1050-1300 (Prentice-Hall, 1964, p.47).

38 Ibid., pp.19-21, 99-100.

39 Ibid., p.4. Berman’s italics.


41 Berman, pp.86, 11-12. For another emphasis upon the ‘legal revolution of the 12th century’ see E.Peters Torture (Oxford, 1985) pp. 40 (‘a revolution in law and legal culture took place in the twelfth
century and shaped the criminal - and much other - jurisprudence in Europe until the end of the 18th
century') and 45 ('the legal revolution took more than a century to be accomplished...'). For another
critique of Berman see Ch.M.Radding The Origins of Medieval Jurisprudence, Pavia and Bologna 850-
42 Ibid., pp.10-12.
43 Ibid., p.10.
44 Detailed ibid., pp.33-41.
45 Ibid., pp.43-44.
46 Ibid., pp.44-45.
47 See above n.36, Schafer Williams for references, and more recently: I.S. Robinson, Authority and
Resistance in the Investiture Contest: the polemical literature of the late eleventh century (N.Y., 1978);
Uta Renate Blumenthal The Investiture Controversy: Church and Monarchy from the ninth to the twelfth
century (Philadelphia 1982).
48 Compare the emphasis Geoffrey Barraclough puts on the causative influence of the investiture
49 The papal role in the genesis of the first crusade (Berman p.104) is undergoing severe revision:
E.Breisach, Classical Rhetoric and Medieval Historiography, (Studies in Medieval Culture 19,
Kalamazoo, 1985), pp.121ff; E.O. Blake and Colin Morris 'A hermit goes to war: Peter and the origins
of the first crusade', Studies in Church History, 22 (1985) 79ff. Law was the resort of the papacy to
compensate for its lack of secular power, or its declared inability to build up such power, against those
who contested its legitimacy and its growing claims to dominion. Law followed socio-political
developments, changes in mentalité. Law sprang up in the space created by a balance of power between
secular and ecclesiastical structures. Law was less the midwife (Berman p.106) and more the field of
mushrooms that spring up after a shower of rain. Crucial here is the impact of spreading literacy and
'resary' educational training, evident across a far wider field than the legal.
50 The Three Orders, pp.154-166. See also: P. Anderson, 'Class Struggle in the Ancient World',
History Workshop (1983) 61, and Dockès (above n.23).
51 See B. Stock The Implications of Literacy: written language and models of interpretation in the
eleventh and twelfth centuries (Princeton, 1983).
52 See Edmund Wilson, To the Finland Station: a study in the writing and acting of history (Fontana,
1960).

'The abolition of the taille, therefore, was one phase of the great social revolution that was already well
under way in France by the opening of the thirteenth century. . . . . '

APPENDIX I

Review of


Conal Condren

(see n.3 to main text of paper, above)

[The following review was originally prepared for a reading group formed in 1987, at Sydney University to consider recent publications in Renaissance history. Selections only of the original review are reproduced here].

".........In some respects, the reader will find in this book an awkward oscillation between the truly general and the locally particular. At times one feels the work was written to inflate into a universal rule what Condren found to be particularly operative in his favourite text - Marsilius of Padua's Defensor Pacis. Certainly Marsilius comes in for more detailed discussion (e.g. pp. 189ff., 262ff.) than any other author, and the category of ambiguity, which Condren finds the chief feature of Marsilius' text, becomes the chief category informing the author's own view of what makes a classical text. Ambiguity has been driven out of subsequent appraisive fields for Marsilius because of the dominance of a host of other key-words and organizing concepts that Condren duly deconstructs. One is left, however, with a sense of unexplained shifting between authorial intention and appraisive field - which may explain in part Condren's return to the notion of authorial intention in his appendix: on the last page of his book he concludes that 'some idiom of intention cannot be avoided'. Yet there is something awkward here: hitherto in the book deconstruction has proceeded via the notions and concepts that mark appraisive fields, yet here, as a key feature of what Condren feels 'redefines the terms through which we must look for "correct" readings' (of classic texts - p.251), is advanced a characteristic which Marsilius himself is alleged to have built into his work, a characteristic, note, that has been by and large missed by all down to the time of Condren himself. The shift from ambiguity as an 'appraisive category' to ambiguity as a category of composition is to me an awkward one.

Early in the book we are told that Condren will concern himself with appraisive fields ('expectations and criteria of judgement the reader brings to bear upon a text' [p.3], when reading it within 'discursive unities' [Foucault's expression] 'which ... provide an abstract, yet effective means of imposing conceptual order upon the world, identifying its parts and discerning the connections between them as well as providing distinguishable but inseparable principles of connection and classification'[p.11]) and how they (the appraisive fields) establish some texts - the Bible, Machiavelli's Prince, Hobbes' Leviathan, Dante's De Monarchia for example - as classic texts, as great books, and not others, such as Pierre Dubois's De recuperatione Terrae Sancta (p.103).

Condren establishes two kinds of 'discursive unities', those such as 'myth', 'history', 'rhetoric', 'philosophy', 'poetry' etc. - as discussed by their major auctores - which are 'rid of the uncertainties and ramified untidiness of ... communal and temporal dimension', and, existent conventional matrices - 'any inherited semi-institutionalised
pattern of linguistic convention', such as the schools of the second sophistic, or the established university study of English literature or political theory. Within or above these discursive unities, hovers \textit{methodus}, methodology, 'the reduction of an activity to its guiding principles' (p.18), organised into a continuum, at one end 'assuming the goals of an activity', concentrating on 'the means of their achievement ... the process of legislating goals and of specifying the questions that the activity's practitioners may legitimately ask', and, at the other end, 'extrinsic and nonregulatory inquiry in (which) the characteristic conventions of discourse to which it appeals are not those of the scrutinized activity ... not to prescribe, but rather to render intelligible from beyond the confines of the activity ... ' (p.19). At the risk of misconstruing Condren's meaning here, we might propose at the first end of the continuum, the methodology that lead to the construction in Graeco-Roman times of the \textit{ars rhetorica}, and at the other end, the methods of the modern scholar of humanism, or of medieval and Renaissance culture, who seeks to render the \textit{fortleben} of this \textit{ars} intelligible 'from beyond the confines of the activity' (the \textit{ars rhetorica}). The latter activity is hindered by 'what Steiner has called the mandarin idiom ... in methodological discourse ... the tendency of writers 'to deal more with each other's papers and animadversions than with the intrinsic question' ...' (p.27). This failing, one might add, is more a failing of the Anglo-German philological project than it is of the Latin (or more specifically French) approach. One might also add at this stage, that the major failing of workers in appraisive fields is that identified by Skinner (p.10), the confusion of categories of the appraisers' own mental sets, with the priorities of past thinkers. It is this failing that has masked the ambiguity inherent in Marsilius of Padua's approach and it is thus that ambiguity must be the new corner stone of any attempt to set up an appraisive field. Yet, in a way, once we make the simple yet fundamental assertion that what we register in our appraisal is of interest to us, not necessarily an objective facet of what we are appraising, we are free to proceed in the way Condren is denouncing - except that here we run into the problem of authority and we cannot have it both ways. We cite a previous author, in a subjective way, to enlist his/her support for our case. If we confess that our citation is arbitrary and a reflection of our own priorities, rather than those of the author, we lose him/her as an authority. If we assert that our perceived priority is his/hers, we lose the essential insight that our priority can always only be that of an appraisive field, not that of the original author, and this renders us vulnerable to Condren's denunciations ... How can we be sure that the priorities we come up with as appraisers are those of the classic text? This is the problem. When we have succeeded in erecting a methodological critique that embraces authors \textit{and} appraisers in a level or mode of existence that frees us from Condren's denunciations and from the spectre of loss of our authority, we will have triumphed - at the risk, of course, of having established simply the very latest appraisive field ... It may well be that other approaches will lead to the promised land, but this may end up being an admission of the fact that the 'structural methodology' (p.19) of the very latest appraisive field is just subtler and more refined than that of past ones. This is a version of the 'historiographical paradox' to which Condren refers p.276 fn. 56.

Condren's local project is to disarm his opponents, past and present, in the academic camp of political theory. He does this by showing that their chief bullets are but wadding blanks: notions of 'tradition' (pp.63ff), 'terms like 'anticipation', 'insight' and 'perception' " (p.71), " clefs mots' such as 'piety, loyalty, justice, peace," (p.85) , even the words 'text' (p.84), 'originality' (ch. 4 and note pp. 100-01 - the deft dismissal of the 'Renaissance/medieval' debate and of Struver's \textit{Language of History}), 'contribution and influence' (ch. 5), 'relevance' (p.127) 'usage' (p.138), 'coherence' (ch. 6 and note the relevance of this discussion, esp. p. 152, to the 'hunt' for coherence in the 'quaestiones'-collections of the 12th century, inaugurated, quite misleadingly, by Jos de Ghellinck in his 'The Sentences of Anselm of Laon and their place in the
codification of theology during the twelfth century', *Irish Theological Quarterly* 6 (1911) 427-28 etc.) These terms can all be shown, in a mildly Foucauldian manner, to be characteristics of appraisive fields, not of the authors to whom they have been applied or in whom they are sought: 'they are deceptively unamenable to genuinely historical verification'. Embedded in this section of Condren's book - which, though of prime relevance to political theorists, is not without point for historians - is a neat deconstruction of Lovejoy's history of ideas construct (pp.104ff). The ideas Lovejoy felt were detectable across various appraisive fields, were not in fact, the same ideas: (p.113): 'ideas ... are both too fragile and too half-apparent to form a structure of continuity for historical writing, and so we cannot ever write a history of ideas' (p.109). Whether in the history of ideas or in cultural history generally ('and this helps distinguish my position from that of thinkers from Burckhardt to Foucault' [p.114]) 'the very notion of epistemic breaks punctuated by periods of unoriginal continuity is more a function of the historian's selective sense of suspended animation than a simple matter of objective fact' (p.114). [In parenthesis, I would dispute this: having traced the history of doctrinal ideas and terminology within the restricted field of the *ars rhetorica* across 1300 years, I find there are epistemic breaks, and long periods of continuity, though just how far these are products of the fitful survival of texts and how far of the actual fabric of teaching ideas and traditions, I cannot say.]

We have arrived at the midpoint of Condren's book (p.167) where he abandons the deconstructive mode, in which he excels, and adopts the constructive one in which one is always far more prone to pitfalls... Not content to leave things at the neat 'the status of a text is, in a sense, the sum of its different appraisals' (p.167), Condren presses on to his master 'clef-mot', ambiguity (ch.7), which is announced as possessing a 'tainted reputation' (p.174) 'in the appraisive field of political theory'. It is, thus, a good point to begin constructing an authoritative appraisive field. It is worth bearing in mind here that the ancient *ars rhetorica*, which took as its fundamental critical proposition the fact that appraisive fields were - within an inherited tradition of 'genre' or audience - moulded by authors via their effective use of persuasive language, assigned a functional role to ambiguity: we can persuade through *significatio* or 'emphasis' which is a way of setting up one's language so as to trap a reader/hearer into reading/hearing more than is actually said/written. Thus the writer/speaker associates the auditor/reader in an act of conspiring. One of the techniques for achieving this act is ambiguity (*Ad Herennium* 4.54.67). Thus, if we set the *ars rhetorica* at the basis of any appraisive field, we will have no trouble in following Condren's construction though he illustrates it in a misleading way, by showing us an author whose use of ambiguity in fact failed to create an appraisive field based on recognition of ambiguity - until Condren came along. In fact, Marsilius' failure, is the very condition of his 'success' (pp.189ff) with lesser figures than Condren. Now, in announcing the category of ambiguity, Condren marks its advent as a condition of the times: 'The point at which our historical language appears to throw ambiguities in [sic] an alien world may always be the point at which we should deconstruct our own vocabulary ... if it may be said that deconstruction is an essential means of maintaining historiographical momentum, ambiguity is a marker of its periodic necessity' (p.183). We are thus invited, as Bouwsma invites us in his 'The Renaissance and the drama of Western History' (*American Historical Review* 84 (1979) pp.1-15), as Stock invites us in his review of the new scholasticism inherent in western medieval studies ('History, Literature and Medieval Textuality', *Yale French Studies* 70 (1986) pp.7-17), to see the rhetorical, relativist insight, as a periodical, oscillatory swing of the pendulum of cultural history, evident during the so-called Italian Renaissance, and, as I have argued elsewhere, evident also during the twelfth century AD.
But Condren is more scholastically minded than this. In proposing, for example (p.196) that Marsilius' *legislator humanus* "should be seen" as an essentially ambiguous signifier, and not decoded - as modern academic commentators decode it - along the lines of a "single acceptable meaning", Conal is proposing to us an appraisive rule which not only was intended by the original author, but should (therefore) be the basis of our appraisal. Thus, we can have our cake and eat it too: we can retain Marsilius as an authority, but will make an appraisal of him that is both subjective in so far as it takes place some 750 years after his death, and objective in that it is agreed by good modern authority (i.e. Condren) to be verifiable. Ambiguity in the scrutinized text Condren calls autochthonous ambiguity; that recognized by an appraiser is synthetic ambiguity (p.210).

At the risk of over simplification, we may say that the category of the ambiguous is being presented to us as the latest and most successful of the registers within appraisive or discursive fields - as the last or latest in the line that Condren has denounced in the first half of his book. 'It is a notion of ambiguity which helps draw the line between (the idea that) great books are not written, they are read ... and the advocacy of a millenialist anarchy of interpretation' (pp.251-52). At this point in his book, Condren fairly admits that the correct course of action would be to re-write the history of all political theory in accordance with the new interpretative category of ambiguity (p.253). Doubtless because of a sneaking suspicion that he would - if he did so - thereby become the canon-fodder of his methodological successor, he does not do so. But to leave things there would be ambiguous, for if ambiguity be the chief feature of past works, how can they become unambiguous "authorities" for subsequent generations? This is the problem of Ch. 9. As this chapter unfolds, we find we must add the unambiguous categories of authority and emblem and exploitation to ambiguity to provide 'the means of organizing the single most significant thematic continuity in the historiography of political and social theory' (p.261). We are brought close, in fact, to a point familiar enough from literary criticism, that great (literary texts) have endurance because they so effectively explore the great ambiguous seams within human relationships - sex, marriage, inheritance, family versus feudal nexus, the line between step and non-step-children, and similar. It is the perenially ambiguous in human relations that summons forth literature that becomes "classic" .... However, lest we pursue this line too far, we must recall that seeming clarity and clean comprehensiveness aid a text in becoming classic, which presumably accounts for the success of Augustine (p.262) or of weighty writers within modern academic debates : texts, in other words, will become authorities, perhaps, merely because of the comprehensive and intelligent scope of their discussions. Presumably medieval commentators glossing Aristotle, or the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, or copying out patristic writings, just felt they couldn't say it as well themselves! It is quite another appraisive field that makes an enigmatic or problematical or exemplary text authoritative - such as the *Anticlaudianus* of Alan of Lille, or the *Bible*, or the *Iliad*, and yet another which endows a papal decretal with authority simply because of the structure of a validating institutional hierarchy within which the appraisive field operates.

Thus it is that Condren's conclusion (pp.284-85) marks the disappearance of his line of construction into the sand. The problems he deals with are basic, but his answers, baroque as they sometimes are, may not satisfy those who work outside the field of political theory or who are less concerned than Condren with the particular value of Marsilius of Padua as an exemplum. Readers outside Conal's own appraisive field will receive great tangential stimulus from this book, but may be pardoned for, in the end, having to write their own book on the subject......"
APPENDIX II

THE GERMAN ROYAL ELECTION OF 1125 A.D.

Translated by John O. Ward

The following document is an anonymous contemporary clerical account of the German royal election of 1125. It is printed in the Monumenla Germaniae Historica, Scriptores XII. 510ff. The account is preserved in a single 12th century manuscript and the author, who appears to have been present, may have been an Austrian cleric, an ardent champion of ecclesiastical liberties from the discipline of Conrad, bishop of Salzburg, who laboured to have Lothar elected. According to Wattenbach, the MGH editor, at this election the judgment of the bishops prevailed for the first time. The bishops hated hereditary succession to the throne because it struck them as a kind of simony. They wanted free elections in both kingdom and church. An important account of the election will also be found in Ordericus Vitalis, The Ecclesiastical History of England and Normandy, Bk. XII, ch. 43 ed. and trans. M. Chibnall (Oxford, 1978), VI pp. 361-66. Other accounts are referred to in note 9 below.

The document (not hitherto available in English translation) indicates the significance of 'feudal' 'followship' in the power struggles of medieval Europe: the mighty attend the election festival with their retainers, with whom they must remain in touch at all times; secondly, it shows, as in Flanders following the murder of Count Charles in 1127AD, the role of 'feudal elements' (oath and homage) in consolidating power once other factors have decided the issue (section 7 below and note that spiritual leaders are 'non-feudal' elements in the kingdom, in that they do not render homage); thirdly, it shows how power itself reflects an uneasy and entirely unsystematic amalgam of popular and religious factors on the one hand, and the strength of retinues on the other, with different shades of personal ambition thrown in. Finally it suggests (section 6) how 'unrevolutionary' the investiture struggle could be when seen from the ground. The document itself serves to express and to some extent to counter the anxiety of the clergy over the status of the church in the kingdom.

The Latin original and some expansions for the sake of good sense will be found within round brackets; comments/additions/explanations within square brackets.

ACCOUNT OF THE ELECTION OF LOTHAR, THE SAXON DUKE TO THE KINGSHP OF THE ROMANS.

1. We have entrusted briefly to writing what took place worthy of record in the assembly (curia) recently held at Mainz, namely, how the election of the King was conducted. There gathered at the assembly from all sides princes, legates of the Apostolic Lord (Pope), archbishops, abbots, provosts, clergy, monks, dukes, marquises, counts, and other nobles so many that no assembly in our time has ever seen more. The reason was that the common necessity of the most important business had summoned them, not, as previously, imperial power. On the first day, the Bishop-elect of Brixen, his election having been discussed and confirmed by all, was ordained solemnly into the episcopate by most of the bishops (ab episcopis quam pluribus). The princes of the Saxons, for their part, were honourably established in camps without number along the far bank of the Rhine, and beyond them, was Liutpold the Marquis, with the Bavarian duke¹ and a great company of soldiers. Duke Frederick² on the other hand, with the Bishop of Basel in his party, and other Swabian princes, had with certain nobles taken up quarters from a different direction elsewhere along the Rhine. A not inconsiderable body of princes were located separately with him. His designs upon the kingdom had already been formed, and as if anticipating a sure outcome of his bid and pretending fear of those from Mainz,
he put off joining the colloquy of princes. Prepared to be elected in the kingship, but not to elect another, he wished first to discover whose cause the common consent of all the princes was prepared to promote.

2. All the princes of the kingdom, therefore, except Frederick and his party, assembled and invoked the grace of the Holy Spirit at the encouragement of the Lord Cardinal, by singing the antiphon *Veni sancte spiritus*. First they put forward ten men of wiser counsel from each of the provinces of Bavaria, Swabia, Franconia and Saxony. All the rest promised to offer agreement to the election of these *quorum electioni ceteri omnes assensum prebere promiserunt* = to the candidate arranged by these*. These [ten] then, naming before the council (concio) three from among all, who were more impressive both from the point of view of wealth and that of virtue of soul, namely Duke Frederick, Marquis Liutpold and Duke Lothar, set about persuading one of the three - who might be acceptable to all - to be elected king [i.e. to accept the throne]. Duke Frederick, however, was not (as we have seen) present, and the remaining two humbly refused the title of royal empire (*nomen regii imperii*) when it was offered to them, on their knees, tears streaming down their faces. And so God now in our own day, conceded to his church this great and memorable example (*decus*), never before heard of, whereby the holiest humility of these two illiterate laymen, who specifically renounced their lofty secular ambitions (*in maioribus non ambiendis*), might show up how damaging pernicious ambition among the clerical and lettered elite, in lesser matters, though indeed spiritual, really was [the whole sentence is obscure].

3. Now Duke Frederick, blinded by ambition, hoping that what he saw humbly refused by the other two, was consequently reserved for him and would, as it were, be doubtless conferred (upon him), at once entered the city without retinue (*sine conductu*) which he had previously been afraid of entering with retinue, and, having joined the convention of princes, stood by in readiness to be chosen king. Then the Archbishop of Mainz arose and demanded by inquiry from the three aforesaid princes, whether each of the remaining two without contradiction or retraction or envy would be willing to obey the third if the latter was elected by the princes in common. To these words duke Lothar humbly requested - as he had done the day before - that he himself be in no way selected, and promised that he would obey whoever was to be chosen, as his Lord and Roman Emperor. Marquis Liutpold professed the same view publicly and desired to remove from himself on oath any ambitions regarding the kingdom and any rivalry with whoever the future king might be. Duke Frederick was then asked whether he himself, like the other two, wished to do the same as the others had done, to the honour of the whole church and kingdom, and the perpetual commendation of a free election; the duke claimed that he could not and would not reply without the counsel of his following whom he had left behind in their camps, and since he perceived that the mind of the princes were everywhere by no means unanimous on the question of raising him (to the throne), he withdrew forthwith his person and his counsel from the assembly (*curia*).

4. As a consequence, the princes saw the mighty ambition of the duke and the violent demand for power that he thought was, as it were, his due. Noting how public and effective his power was even before his elevation, they resolved unanimously to block any move to have him put in authority over them (*ne quando sibi preficeretur unanimiter refellebant*). On the day afterwards then, with the princes gathered together for the same purpose - though Duke Frederick, and the Duke of Bavaria were not in attendance - the archbishop of Mainz demanded whether each of those named in the election of the princes, who were (still) present, would set aside of their own will the designation of themselves already mentioned, and desire to offer consent benignly and harmoniously to the will of the princes in the election of any person. This met with their humble and devoted approval quite simultaneously, and, as if they were not to be further worried (about their own promotion) but were (instead) concerned about the selection of anyone at all (who might be suitable), at once they took a seat together. Accordingly, when those
who had received nomination had been (thus) set aside, and the princes were advised that by counsel communicated among themselves they should seek with careful reasoning a person who might be placed in authority over the kingdom according to God and the honour of the church, at once from the numerous laity (subito a laicis quam pluribus), the shout arose "Let Lothar be king". Lothar is seized, Lothar is raised on shoulders and exalted, splendid and resonant with royal acclamations.

5. The princes then, in a very large number (quam plurimi) and especially the bishops of the Bavarian province, shrinking in horror from so rash and ill-advised a completion of so important a matter, and complaining with due indignation, that they were disturbed about their position (sedibus), got ready in great annoyance to secede from the others and straight away from the assembly, leaving the business unfinished 5 The archbishop of Mainz then, with certain other princes of the hostile party (hostium) ordered a watch to be kept lest anyone enter or leave (the assembly). Some (istis) shut in their king by clamorously pressing around him from within, while others (illis) ran around outside in great uproar shouting praises for a king of whose identity they were as yet unaware (ad laudem regis quem ignorabant). At length, when the dissension among the princes had kept up to the point that Lothar too, in great rage, demanded revenge for his apprehension, and the bishops, grieving at their own discomfort (disturbatione) were seeking ways of breaking out, the Lord cardinal and the other princes of saner counsel, scarcely managing to quieten the tumult with voice and gesture, eventually brought all to return to their own positions (sedes) to take counsel6. Here the Lord Cardinal, forearmed by the grace of God, took the bishops aside and gravely charged them with blame for their secession (discessionis culpam). He ascribed to them all the carnage and arson and all other evils that were about to result from their secession unless they themselves returned to peace and concord, and took back with them others who were less learned than they and followed their example (sua informatione reducerent). The archbishops of Salzburg and Regensburg finally, having obtained an opportunity to speak, argued in a most upright manner on their own behalf and on behalf of the honour of the kingdom, worked to bring the parties to concord, and declared that they would spell nothing out regarding the kingship (de rege...diffinire) without the duke of Bavaria who was absent. Besides, concerning the ill-judged vehemence of those who arranged the apprehension (de inconsulta raptorum vehementia), they demanded deserved justice from the primates, as much for themselves as for the one apprehended [=Lothar], on account of the not undeservedly most serious honour of majesty [i.e. the crown]. Whereupon, it was brought about that having offered due satisfaction of humility towards the others, along the lines suggested above,(? factum est ut praemissa debitaes satisfactionis humiliate), those who had aroused discord through the fault of their own inconsiderate haste were returned to favour.

6. The duke of Bavaria was summoned and the grace of the Holy Spirit set about unifying the minds of all in the direction of one and the same enthusiasm. By unanimous consent and petition of the princes, now ahead of all others (iam primum) Lothar, a king pleasing to God, is raised to the kingdom. And so, with all the princes of the kingdom in agreement over the election of the king, what rights (quid iuris) the empire (imperium) of royal dignity, and what liberties (quid libertatis) the priesthood (sacerdotium) of queenly deity, that is, the church, should have, are set publicly with steadfast reason (stabili ratione prescribitur), and, the honourable mode for each having been adopted, are fixed before all (prefigitur) at the dictation of the Holy Spirit. Let the church have the liberty which it has always desired; let the kingdom have the just power (potentia) in all things, the kingdom which should have as its own, without slaughter and through charity, whatever belongs to Caesar. The church should have free election in spiritual affairs, not under constraint through fear of the crown, nor restricted by the presence of the prince, as previously, nor confined by any (royal) request (petition [i.e., in regard to
any candidate the crown might favour]). Let the imperial dignity have (the right) to solemnly invest the person freely elected and canonically consecrated, with the royal (appurtenances [= 'temporalities']) by means of the sceptre, without accepting payment, and also to stably bind the person so elected with oaths into allegiance to royal trust and just favour, saving anything that might compromise his (vows and the requirements of his religious) order.

7. Finally, King Lothar, elected by all, sought out by all, sat down on the following day in an assembly (contio) of the princes and first accepted the fidelity that was due according to custom from all the bishops, that is, the 24 who were there, and the abbots, virtually all of them (quam plurimis), for the sake of reverence due towards the empire and for the sake of confirming the unanimous concord and perpetual peace of the kingdom and priesthood (regnum et sacerdotium). From no one of the spiritual (leaders), however, as was customary (ut moris erat [= as used to be customary?!]), did he receive or compel homage (hominium 7). Then there flowed in from all sides the princes of the kingdom; they confirmed their fidelity to the lord king as much in the form of homage (tam in hominio) as by oath, and, granting the king the accustomed honour, accepted from him the things which were of the kingdom 8. And so duke Frederick, seeing that the counsel or power of men could not stand against God who had collected into one the minds of so many great princes, against the expectations of all, finally, on the third day, corrected by the advice and prayers of the bishop of Regensburg and the other princes, returned to the court of the king (curiam), and, honestly enough refusing the 200 marks with which the king had previously promised to enfeoff (inbeneficiare) him, displayed customary reverence (referentiam) to the king who was now his lord and returned into favour and friendship with him, the more stable as it was the more freely undertaken (tanto stabilius quanto liberius). At length, with everything composed, the aforesaid king publicly declared under the veil of royal majesty, a firm peace in all the Teutonic kingdom, right up to Xmas and from there for a year, in every quarter. If anyone, it was announced, infringed the peace, he would be required to pay the severest penalty according to the law and justice of each province.9

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1 Henry the Black, father of Henry the Proud, grandfather of Henry the Lion (Duke of Saxony and Bavaria). As Henry the Proud was already affianced to Lothar's only child, his daughter Gertrude, the duke of Bavaria must be classed as a supporter of Lothar, though he was not present for the early negotiations at Mainz.

2 Frederick of Swabia was named heir by the previous Emperor, Henry V. He was 35 years of age in 1125 and, as head of the Hohenstaufen dynasty, the obvious candidate under any 'hereditary' system. His son was the famous Frederick Barbarossa. It was at this present election that Charles, Count of Flanders, was offered the imperial crown - by ecclesiastical elements.

3 Leopold III of Austria, father of Otto of Freising and two other step-brothers of Frederick and Conrad (later III). Leopold was the second husband of Agnes, daughter of Henry IV, sister of Henry V. Her first husband was Frederick of Hohenstaufen (d.1105), father of the Frederick of n.2 above.

4 Stalling, to have Frederick's claims blocked and to allow the victory of Lothar who represented the 'electoral' as distinct from the 'hereditary' principle of imperial election. Lothar was duke of Saxony and, according to A.L. Poole, in the Cambridge Medieval History, it was a mob of Saxons who raised him up in sect. 4 below, although Mainz was in Franconia, controlled by the Hohenstaufen, in particular, by Conrad, Frederick's brother.

5 The word 'sedes' could refer to 'sees' or even 'quarters', but in the present context probably refers to the benches or raised platforms allocated within the cathedral at Mainz to the delegation of the bishops from Bavaria, on the analogy of the "sedes [lit. "seats"] on which the players [in any contemporary liturgical play] 'stood' [or sat] and which, as far as the contemporary staging of religious dramas is concerned, are still a matter of some dispute - pp.52ff of J.Wright The Play of Antichrist, Toronto, 1967. It is probable that the affairs described in the present narrative took place inside some large hall, for example the cathedral nave, rather than in the open air.
6 Are the bishops here maintaining that the popular acclamation of Lothar had robbed them of their proper electoral role, hence their concern, expressed a little earlier for their sedes, the benches/platforms set aside for their electoral delegation??


8 = 'tiefs de dignité. Ganshof p.113.

9 For further details see Fuhrmann (above text n.33) pp.117-118; The Cambridge Medieval History, V, 165-6, 334ff; G. Barraclough, The Origins of Modern Germany, (Oxford, 1947) p.156; K. Hampe, Germany under the Salian and Hohenstaufen Emperors, trans. R. Bennett (Oxford, 1973) p.123. Ordericus’ account of the election is a characteristic clerical attempt to impose a pattern of harmony on the unruly facts: Adalbert, the archbishop of Mainz, brings the chief insignia of the Empire to the assembly (he seems to have got them from the late Emperor’s wife), and delivers a harangue (cf. the ‘harangue of Urban II at Clermont, 1095 A.D.) in which he advises that the 60,000 knights present should choose forty from their number, who will then select an emperor. These 40 select Frederick of Swabia, Henry duke of Lorraine and Lothar, duke of the Saxons (compare section 2 above). Three these then assemble and are addressed by Henry, who nominates Lothar and the other two agree, in fear of the archbishop’s assertion that whoever of the three disagreed with the decision of the other two, should be beheaded! Lothar is duly elected and supported by all, but after the assembly has broken up, Frederick’s army attacks Lothar and puts him and his supporters to flight. Ordericus admits that Frederick had come to the assembly with 30,000 armed men to force his own election, but was outwitted by the archbishop of Mainz. It is thus curious that the anonymous narratio covers up dissension at the end of the election, whereas Ordericus veils the truth at the beginning. Duke Frederick’s real conduct and machinations appear only from a combination of the two accounts. From Galbert of Bruges’ account of the election we learn that the archbishop of Cologne and Godfrey, Count Palatine of the Rhine (an ally, perhaps, of Frederick and Conrad ( Otto of Freising, Gesta Frederici I.121) actually made an attempt to secure the candidacy of Count Charles the Good of Flanders! (Galbert of Bruges, The Murder of Charles the Good, Count of Flanders, trans. J.B. Ross [N.Y. 1960] pp.90-91). The eminent chronicler Otto of Freising, son of Margrave Leopold III of Austria (n.3 above), maternal uncle of Frederick Barbarossa, and (maternal) step-brother of Frederick of Swabia (n.2 above) and Conrad (III), has two accounts of the election. In the Chronica, (ed. A. Hofmeister, Hannover, 1912 pp.333-34 - bk VII sect. 17, trans. C.C. Mierow as The Two Cities, N.Y. 1928 pp.423-24) he tells us that ‘in the one thousand one hundred and twenty-fifth year from the incarnation of the Lord, since Henry had died without an heir, the nobles assembled at Mainz and there deliberated with regard to his successor. Four princes of the realm - Lothar the duke of Saxony, Frederick duke of Swabia, Leopold margrave of Austria and Charles the count of Flanders were considered for the throne. Finally Lothar, a Saxon by birth, the son of Gebhard, although he objected and protested vigorously was compelled by the prayers of all, in the presence of the legate of the apostolic see, to become king and he reigned as the ninety-second in line from Augustus.’ So Mierow, whose annotation is at fault ( contra p. 424, n.84, Galbert mentions the nomination of the Count of Flanders) and whose translation of ‘ad regnum designantur’ is dubious. In his second account (Gesta Frederici I Imperatoris ed. G. Waitz, Hannover 1912 I xv-xvii, trans. C.C. Mierow as The Deeds of Frederick Barbarossa N.Y. 1953, 1966 pp.47-48) Otto provides vital clues. Empress Matilda (of England) had the royal insignia, but Albert, Archbishop of Mainz, tricked her into handing them over ‘falsis promissionibus’ and he, exercising an ancient right, summoned the princes of the realm to Mainz and though Frederick was demanded by many as ruler, persuaded all to choose Lothar of Saxony, an adverse decision, it turned out, since it proved to be ‘gravissimae scissurae seminarii’. It is only Otto’s second account that tells us how fundamental a partisan of Lothar and an enemy of the Hohenstaufen Albert had long been, thus supplying the keystone for any reconstruction of the events of 1125. The role of Adalbert (Albert) of Mainz is properly stressed by Fuhrmann (p.117). I owe thanks to the members of the Sydney University History Department Medieval Latin Reading Group (L.S.Davidson, J.Scott, D.Stone) for assistance with some difficult passages in the above translation.