Constitutional Dignity post Farm Transparency

Abstract

In this article I consider the state of play for dignity in Australian constitutional law in the light of Clubb v Edwards; Preston v Avery (‘Clubb’) and Farm Transparency International Ltd v New South Wales (‘Farm Transparency’). In Part II, I explore the meaning of dignity in these decisions. I respond to the concern voiced following Clubb that dignity is an indeterminate, incoherent or empty concept. Together, the judgments in Clubb and Farm Transparency give dignity some content and meaning. Doctrinal analysis of these judgments reveals the emerging meaning of dignity in Australian constitutional law. This article offers this original doctrinal analysis, focusing on the new light that Farm Transparency can cast on the meaning of dignity. This doctrinal analysis suggests that dignity in Australian constitutional law is a multidimensional concept, including dignity as the intrinsic worth of natural persons, and dignity as a thick autonomy interest. In Part III, I address the second concern voiced following Clubb that the quirks of the Australian constitutional law system preclude recognition of the dignity of the speaker, and thus will cause dignity to be relevant only to the limitation of the implied freedom of political communication and not its protection. I address the complexities that apply in the Australian context and argue that none of these completely closes the door on dignity.